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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
This study deals with financial collateral arrangements. Such arrange-
ments relate to cash and securities and are typically entered into by banks 
and other major players on the financial markets. Their importance 
becomes clear when considering some of the main examples of financial 
collateral arrangements: repurchase ('repo') and securities lending agree-
ments, which are instruments for parties to provide each other with cash 
and/or securities. These financial products are of key importance for the 
liquidity of the cash and securities markets in the European Union. Cen-
tral banks use them as their main tool to conduct their monetary policy, 
and they are also applied on a large scale by participants in commercial 
markets. The size of the commercial repo and securities lending markets 
in Europe is measured every half year in the European Repo Market 
Survey, which shows how significant these markets are. According to the 
Survey conducted on 7 December 2005, there was a total amount of 5883 
billion euro of outstanding repo and securities lending transactions in the 
commercial markets at that moment.1 Another major market that features 
transactions in which financial collateral is often provided is the deriva-
tives market. The repurchase and securities lending markets, in particular, 
and to a somewhat lesser extent, the derivatives market will be used 
throughout this book as illustrations of what financial collateral arrange-
ments are about. 
This study will focus on a number of important legal issues in relation to 
financial collateral arrangements. In the European Union, the so-called 
Collateral Directive2 sets out a legal framework for repurchase, securities 
lending and other collateralised arrangements. This directive requires 
Member States to harmonise a number of issues of property and insol-
vency law. This book analyzes the most important of these issues from the 
perspective of Dutch law. For historical reasons, some attention will also 
1 See www.icma-group.org. 
2 Directive 2002/47/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 June 2002 
on financial collateral arrangements. Official Journal L 168, 27 June 2002, pp. 43-50. 
See also the list of legislation at the end of this book. 
1 
Chapter I 
be paid to American and English law. Moreover, comparisons will be 
made between Dutch and German law on account of their similarity. The 
rest of this introduction will give further insight into the issues examined 
in this book. 
2. THE EUROPEAN COLLATERAL DIRECTIVE 
In October 1998, the European Commission issued a Communication 
titled 'Financial Services: Building a Framework for Action'.3 In this Com-
munication, the Commission pointed out several areas in which action 
was required to establish an integrated European market for financial 
services upon the introduction of the single currency, the euro. The 
markets for collateralised transactions were mentioned as an important 
point of attention: 
The introduction of the euro will increase the number of transactions involving 
cross-border use of collateral We must therefore ensure that collateral provisions 
are mutually compatible to avoid undue disturbances to financial markets, and 
potential repercussions for the EU economy at large 
In its subsequent Action Plan of May 1999, entitled 'Financial Services: 
Implementing the Framework for Financial Markets', the Commission 
labelled the formulation of a European directive on the cross-border use 
of collateral as a priority, deserving immediate attention. With this direc-
tive, the Commission intended to facilitate the development of a liquid 
cross-border cash and securities market in the European Union. The 
introduction of a directive relating to collateral can be considered as a 
follow-up to the Settlement Finality Directive of 1998,5 which relates to the 
finality of payments of book-entry cash and securities in designated settle-
ment systems. Both directives aim at an optimally functioning financial 
market in the European Union. Particularly in the field of insolvency law, 
the approaches of the Settlement Finality Directive and the Collateral 
Directive coincide. 
3 See the list of documents that appeared in the course of the legislative history of the 
Collateral Directive at the end of this book 
4 See section 43 of the Financial Services Framework for Action 
5 Directive 98/26/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 1998 
on Settlement Finality in Payment and Securities Settlement Systems, Official Journal 
L 166,11 June 1998, pp 45-50 See also the list of legislation at the end of this book 
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The text of the European Collateral Directive was initially developed by 
a Forum Group on Collateral and subsequently amended several times in 
the course of the legislative process. The final text of the Collateral Direc-
tive entered into force on 27 June 2002, the day of its publication in the 
Official Journal of the European Communities. It sets out the legislative frame-
work for agreements (such as repurchase and securities lending agree-
ments) relating to financial collateral in the European Union. Officially, 
the final date for its implementation into the national laws of the Member 
States was 27 December 2003. Many Member States, however, had not 
implemented the directive by 2004 (or even 2006), largely because of the 
directive's complexity and far-reaching consequences. 
The Collateral Directive relates to 'financial collateral arrangements', 
which term refers to arrangements whereby parlies provide each other 
with cash and/or securities for an agreed period of time in order to cover 
an exposure. The directive was primarily written for transactions between 
big players on the capital markets, such as commercial and central banks, 
insurance companies, investment funds, certain government bodies, etc., 
the main goal being to stimulate the liquidity of European cash and 
securities markets. In order to facilitate cross-border transactions, and 
thereby to stimulate liquidity, the directive requires Member States to har-
monise certain provisions of property and insolvency law. 
3. PRESENTATION OF QUESTIONS 
This study focuses on the aforementioned issues of property and insolven-
cy law because they play an important role in financial collateral arrange-
ments. For example, parties want to know which requirements to meet in 
order to safely provide financial collateral and what rules to comply with 
in the event of their counterparty's default, specifically if this is caused by 
insolvency. This is reflected in the Collateral Directive, which is intended 
to provide clear and uniform rules of property and insolvency law in 
relation to financial collateral arrangements on a European level. Note 
that the focus on property and insolvency law excludes a number of other 
important issues that arise in connection with financial collateral arrange-
ments, such as the tax and accounting treatment thereof and the capital 
adequacy requirements to which these arrangements give rise. It should 
also be noted that issues of private international law are not considered 
here. The applicability of (mandatory) Dutch rules of property and insol-
vency law is presumed. 
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This leads us to the questions that will be discussed in this study. After an 
overview in chapter II of the markets in which financial collateral arrange-
ments occur, the focus will be on the most important issues of property 
and insolvency law that arise in connection with the Collateral Directive. 
Chapters III and IV examine the two methods used for providing collat-
eral: the title transfer method (chapter III) and that of a security interest 
combined with a collateral taker's general right of disposal (the so-called 
'right of use'), which is critically examined in chapter IV. Chapter V out-
lines the consequences of the Collateral Directive for enforcement by con-
sidering the way in which financial collateral is enforced by a collateral 
taker in the event of default, as well as a number of mandatory changes 
to insolvency law. A central theme throughout this book is the question 
of whether the scope of the Collateral Directive should be limited, and if 
so, how. This theme is given particular attention in chapter VI. The con-
tents of chapters II, III, IV, V and VI will now be outlined in more detail. 
Before it is possible to analyse the legal issues at stake, it is necessary to 
give a more economic and technical overview of the markets in which 
financial collateral arrangements are applied. This is done in chapter II. 
The first sections of this chapter provide an overview of financial prod-
ucts, and explain what financial collateral actually is. They proceed to 
outline the master agreements that are commonly used to document re-
purchase, securities lending and derivatives transactions and describe the 
flows of cash and securities that take place in such transactions. Attention 
will also be given to cross-product arrangements, which link flows of cash 
and securities under different financial products, such as repurchase and 
securities lending agreements. The following two sections identify the 
most significant commercial market participants, as well as examine the 
importance of financial collateral for central banks. The legislative frame-
work is the focus of the last few sections, which give an outline of the 
Collateral Directive and deal with the most important issues relating to 
the implementation of the Collateral Directive in the Netherlands. 
Financial collateral can be provided in two different ways. The focus of 
chapter III is the title transfer method, which is the international market 
standard for the provision of financial collateral. Particular attention is 
paid to the following question: under what circumstances does a transfer 
of title run the risk of being recharacterised as a security interest, or as a 
transaction having a defective underlying causa? This chapter also dis-
cusses whether a transfer of financial collateral should not be charac-
terised as a temporary transfer of title. 
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Chapter IV deals with the second method to provide financial collateral 
envisaged by the Collateral Directive. The directive makes it possible to 
establish a security interest combined with a general right of disposal for 
the collateral taker (a so-called 'right of use'). This innovation, which has 
primarily been inspired by a comparable development in the American 
market, is critically examined in this chapter. 
Chapter V relates to the consequences of the Collateral Directive for the 
enforcement of financial collateral. A distinction is made between the con-
sequences for the way in which financial collateral is enforced and a 
number of issues of insolvency law. The first important theme that is dis-
cussed in chapter V is the liberal enforcement regime that the Collateral 
Directive prescribes in relation to financial collateral. This regime becomes 
particularly evident when one considers the effects of the Collateral 
Directive on the enforcement of a security interest. The directive abolishes 
essential features of security interests, such as the prescribed manner of 
enforcement and the prohibition of appropriation. If financial collateral 
has been provided by way of a title transfer, enforcement takes place by 
way of close-out netting, which is subsequently discussed. 
A second important theme discussed in chapter V covers the changes that 
the Collateral Directive requires in the field of insolvency law, in which 
the Collateral Directive extends the approach of the earlier Settlement 
Finality Directive. Under the Settlement Finality Directive and the Collat-
eral Directive, a declaration of insolvency has no retroactive effect. Both 
directives also contain provisions that offer a level of protection against 
the effects of insolvency to the counterparty of an insolvent entity - even 
in respect of legal acts that have been carried out after the declaration of 
insolvency. Additionally, these directives require the abolition of a freeze 
period in relation to transactions in settlement systems and with financial 
collateral. 
An important theme throughout this study is the desirable scope of appli-
cability of the Collateral Directive and the Dutch Law implementing 
Directive 2002/47/EC on financial collateral arrangements (hereafter 
referred to as 'the Dutch implementing law').6 This issue is relevant be-
cause the Collateral Directive has a number of far-reaching consequences 
for systems of property and insolvency law, which are generally more 
favourable to creditors/security takers and more detrimental to debtors/ 
6 See Staatsblad 2006,15 and Staatsblad 2006,16. 
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security providers. The Dutch Council of State (Raad van State) hit the nail 
on the head when it stated: 
Moreover, the directive deviates on a number of issues from the rules in respect of 
the right of pledge as set out in Book 3 of the NCC, and provides the creditor 
pledgee with a number of extra securities at the expense of the debtor/pledgor. Also 
the proposed amendments to the Bankruptcy Code signify an important change in 
the position of the creditors of the insolvent estate to the benefit of the creditor 
under a financial collateral agreement. 
It is apparent from the provisions of both property and insolvency law of 
the Collateral Directive and the Dutch implementing law that, in general, 
these legislative initiatives enforce the position of credit providers and 
have a negative impact on the position of collateral providers. This is par­
ticularly disturbing if collateral providers, who are in a dependent posi­
tion anyway because they are in need of funding, are relatively powerless 
small and medium-sized enterprises. In light of such far-reaching conse­
quences, the question of the scope of the Collateral Directive and national 
implementing laws requires careful examination: is it desirable to limit 
this scope and, if so, how should this be done? 
There are, broadly speaking, two ways to limit the scope of the legislative 
initiatives mentioned. The first relates to market participants. The Collat­
eral Directive is primarily designed for transactions between major mar­
ket participants but also leaves room for applying its provisions to trans­
actions between these major market participants and other enterprises, 
including small and medium-sized enterprises. A second option would be 
to limit the scope to financial transactions that meet certain functional 
requirements. As arguments for either an extensive or restrictive inter­
pretation can only be made after a thorough analysis of the consequences 
of the Collateral Directive and the Dutch implementing law, this issue will 
be discussed at the end of this book, in chapter VI. This latter chapter also 
contains a number of recommendations for changing the Collateral Direc­
tive and the Settlement Finality Directive so as to restore the balance 
7 See Tweede Kamer, 2002-2003, 28 874, Β, p. 2. Translation: TK. Original Dutch text: 
'De richtlijn wijkt bovendien op een aantal punten af van de regeling van het pand­
recht in Boek 3 BW en verschaft aan de crediteur pandhouder een aantal extra ze­
kerheden ten koste van de debiteur/pandgever. Ook de voorgestelde wijzigingen 
van de Faillissementswet betekenen een belangrijke wijziging in de posities van de 
faillissementscrediteuren ten gunste van de crediteur uit een financiële zekerheids-
overeenkomst.' 
6 
Introduction 
between collateral provider and collateral taker, and between the credit-
ors of an insolvent estate. 
4. SOME ADDITIONAL REMARKS 
While the central focus throughout this book is the Dutch legal analysis, 
American, English and German law also play a role in this study. The dis-
cussion of American and English law mainly serves to provide some 
historical background of the issue. Financial collateral arrangements 
blossomed first in these legal systems, and the internationally applied 
standard agreements to document such arrangements were developed in 
these jurisdictions. Special attention is given to American and English law 
in chapter IV in considering a security interest combined with a general 
right of disposal, because these are the jurisdictions that seem to have 
inspired the introduction of this construction in the European Union. In 
a number of instances, German law has been used as a comparative, as is 
evident throughout chapters III, IV and V. These comparisons strengthen 
the argument in respect of Dutch law because they make it possible to 
address precisely the same issues from a similar, but somewhat different 
perspective. 
While this book has been written primarily for lawyers, it is not meant 
only for those who are financial market practitioners; it is also intended 
for lawyers who are less familiar with financial collateral arrangements. 
As the main focus of this book is Dutch law, Dutch lawyers are the prima-
ry target group. However, because the issues of property and insolvency 
law discussed here are also relevant in many other European countries, 
this book has been written in English in order to make this information 
accessible to foreign readers. Another reason for choosing English is that 
this is the language that is commonly used in financial markets. 
In order to facilitate the reader, this book contains appendices with the 
texts of the Settlement Finality Directive and the Collateral Directive. The 
sources consulted have been set out in a bibliography and in an overview 
of legislative acts, guidelines and principles discussed (including a short 
outline of the subject matter of each). A full list of the official documents 
that have led to the adoption of the Collateral Directive has been included, 
as well as a list of some useful websites. For further reference, a subject 
index is provided at the end of this study. 
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Unless mentioned otherwise, this book takes into account materials that 
have appeared up to and including January 2006, by which time the Col-
lateral Directive had been implemented in the countries that play a central 
role in this study, i.e. the United Kingdom (December 2003), Germany 
(April 2004) and the Netherlands (January 2006). In the Netherlands, the 
first draft law for implementing the Collateral Directive was rejected by 
the First Chamber of Parliament in March 2005, because it envisaged legis-
lation wider in scope than that of the Collateral Directive because it 
included transactions between enterprises. A revised law for imple-
menting the Collateral Directive, with a more limited scope of applicabili-
ty, was published and came into force on 20 January 2006.8 
8 See Staatsblad 2006, 15 and Staatsblad 2006,16. 
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THE MARKET 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introductory remark 
This chapter provides an overview of the markets in which financial col-
lateral arrangements are entered into. Sections 2, 3, 4 and 5 present the 
financial products involved. Sections 6 and 7 describe the most important 
market participants. The last sections of this chapter outline the legislative 
framework for collateralised transactions. A further analysis of certain 
issues of property and insolvency law is made in chapters III, IV and V. 
1.2 Financial products 
Section 2 below examines what financial collateral actually is. Repo and 
securities lending transactions are examples of collateralised transactions. 
Financial collateral may also play a role in derivatives transactions. The 
term 'collateral' has a special meaning for the purposes of these financial 
instruments. In addition to having a recovery function, it usually enhances 
the liquidity of the financial markets. 
Section 3 deals with special standard agreements that have been devel-
oped for use in the commercial markets in order to document repurchase, 
securities lending and derivatives transactions. These agreements demon-
strate the flows of cash and securities that commonly take place in repo 
and securities lending transactions (section 4). Market needs have also 
given rise to standardised 'cross-product' agreements. Cross-product ar-
rangements are designed to link flows of cash and securities in different 
financial products (in repo and securities lending transactions, for in-
stance) and are the topic of section 5. 
1.3 Market participants 
While the use of financial collateral arrangements in the commercial 
markets is the focus of section 6, the use of financial collateral by central 
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banks in the course of their monetary policy operations and the manage-
ment of their foreign reserve assets is reviewed in section 7. 
1.4 Legislative framework 
The European Collateral Directive, the topic of section 8, is intended to 
harmonise legal issues that are relevant in the case of financial collateral 
arrangements. It relates to the provision of financial collateral by way of 
a title transfer or by way of a security interest combined with a right of 
use. It also contains a simplified regime for the enforcement of financial 
collateral and a number of rules of insolvency law. The Dutch law imple-
menting the Collateral Directive is outlined in section 9 below. 
2. WHAT IS FINANCIAL COLLATERAL? 
2.1 Introduction 
This section examines a number of different financial products in which 
financial collateral is used, it sets out the two methods of providing finan-
cial collateral, and it takes a look at the two functions that such collateral 
fulfils. 
2.2 The financial products 
This section outlines the most important financial products that make use 
of financial collateral, namely repurchase agreements, securities lending 
agreements and derivatives. The market has developed standard 'master' 
agreements that are used to document these financial products. The 
master agreements serve as a framework under which individual trans-
actions can be concluded. These master agreements contain general provi-
sions that apply to all transactions concluded under that agreement, but 
can also be complemented with specific provisions for each individual 
transaction. The most important of these agreements, which are used 
internationally, are the Global Master Repurchase Agreement (GMRA) for 
repurchase transactions, the Global Master Securities Lending Agreement 
(GMSLA) for securities lending transactions and the International Swaps 
and Derivatives Association's (ISDA) Master Agreements for the docu-
mentation of derivatives transactions. These and other domestic agree-
ments are further discussed in section 3 below. This section outlines the 
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basic structure of repurchase, securities lending and certain derivatives 
transactions.1 
2.2.2 Repurchase transactions 
Repurchase, or, in short, 'repo' transactions can be defined as transactions 
in which party A (the seller) transfers certain securities sold to party Β 
(the buyer) for an amount of cash (the purchase price) at moment T, while 
Β agrees to sell and transfer equivalent securities at a future moment T+X 
for a certain amount of money, including an interest component (the 
repurchase price). The need for cash is usually the principal reason for 
entering into a repo, thus the prmcipal flow is the cash flow at the outset 
of the transaction. The collateral flow is defined as the flow of securities 
in return for this principal flow. 
Graphically, a repo transaction can be depicted as follows:2 
Repurchase transaction 
Moment Τ cash 
-* 
A Β 
seller *- buyer 
collateral securities 
Moment T+X cash (including interest) 
»-
A Β 
seller -< buyer 
equivalent securities 
In the course of a repurchase transaction, the value of securities or cash 
provided earlier in the course of the transaction may change. These price 
fluctuations can lead to a net exposure of one of the parties. A net expo­
sure can be defined as the risk that one of the parties to an agreement 
faces in respect of his counterparty. This risk is calculated by netting the 
monetary value of all mutual rights and obligations under one or more 
transactions concluded under that agreement. In order to eliminate this 
1 For a legal analysis of the structure of repurchase and securities lending trans­
actions under Dutch law, see sections 2 3 and 2 4 of chapter ΙΠ 
2 This is a simplified reproduction, in which payment obligations arising in the 
course of a transaction, in connection with price fluctuations or dividend and other 
income payments, have not been taken into account 
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net exposure arising from price fluctuations, transfers of collateral cash 
and/or securities may be made in the course of repo transactions. Such 
transfers are usually referred to as margin transfers. The standard master 
agreements for repos determine how much margin collateral should be 
provided, in what manner, at what time, etc.3 
There is a variety of different forms of repos, each developed for a specific 
purpose. For example, 'intra-day' repos are terminated on the same day 
that they are entered into, 'overnight' repos are concluded for one night 
only, whereas 'term' or 'open' repos are concluded with or without a fixed 
ending date. In addition, buy/sell back transactions, in which party A 
buys securities from party B, while being under an obligation to sell 
equivalent securities to Β at a later date, may be seen as a form of repo. 
Traditionally, however, the structure of a buy/sell back transaction is 
simpler than that of a repo. For example, margin transfers, as a rule, do 
not take place in the course of a buy/sell back transaction.4 
Sometimes a distinction is made between 'repurchase' and 'reverse repur­
chase' agreements or transactions. While both terms refer to exactly the 
same agreement or transaction, they reflect the different perspectives of 
the seller and the buyer respectively. In a 'repurchase' agreement or trans­
action, the seller is obliged to repurchase equivalent securities at T+X. The 
term 'reverse repurchase' relates to the opposing point of view held by the 
buyer. In this study, the distinction between repurchase and reverse 
repurchase agreements or transactions is not made, unless indicated 
otherwise. 
2.2.2 Securities lending transactions 
In a securities lending transaction, borrower A receives specific securities 
from lender Β for an amount of cash or other securities at moment T, 
while the lender and borrower commit themselves to transferring equiva­
lent securities and/or cash at a later moment T+X. At this moment, the 
borrower usually pays an interest component also. The need for specific 
securities is the main reason for entering into securities lending trans­
actions. The flow of securities from lender to borrower is, therefore, the 
principal flow. The collateral flow at the outset of a transaction can be 
defined as the flow of securities and/or cash in a direction opposite from 
3 See also section 4.3 below. 
4 On the differences between repos and buy/sell back transactions, see Brown 1996 
II and Corrigan / Georgiou / Gollow 1999, chapter 2. 
12 
The Market 
this principal flow. Graphically, a securities lending transaction can be 
represented as follows:5 
Securities lending transaction 
Moment Τ securities 
A Β 
borrower »- lender 
collateral cash and/or 
securities 
equivalent securities 
plus an interest component 
*-
Β 
lender 
equivalent cash and/or 
securities 
A net exposure, as described above, may also arise in the course of a 
securities lending arrangement. As with repos, the standard documen­
tation for securities lending agreements also provides for the elimination 
of such a net exposure by way of margin transfers.6 
The main difference between repos and securities lending is that in a repo, 
the need for cash is usually the principal reason for entering into trans­
actions, while in the case of securities lending, it is the need for certain 
securities that leads to deals between parties. Other differences between 
repos and securities lending follow from this main difference. For 
example, in a repo, the seller (who received cash) is obliged to pay interest 
at the end of a transaction, while in the case of securities lending, the 
borrower (who received a specific type of security) usually pays interest.7 
Sometimes a distinction is made between the term 'securities lending' and 
'securities borrowing'. These terms reflect the perspective of the lender 
and the borrower respectively. This study generally uses the term 'secu-
5 Payment obligations arising in the course of a transaction due to price fluctuations 
in the market and income payments have not been taken into account. 
6 See also section 4.3 below. 
7 For a further elaboration of the differences between repos and securities lending 
arrangements see Brown 1996 III, pp. 51-52; Steiner 1997, pp. 69-118; Corrigan / 
Georgiou / Gollow 1999, chapter 2. 
Moment T+X 
A 
borrower -*-
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rities lending' and does not make this distmction, unless indicated other­
wise. 
2.2.3 Derivatives transactions 
Derivatives agreements and transactions play a less prominent role in this 
study than repurchase and securities lending arrangements. Still, there are 
good reasons to pay some attention to derivatives. 
First, certain types of derivatives transactions have a structure that is 
comparable to that of a repurchase or securities lending transaction. As 
with a repurchase or securities lending transaction, in certain derivatives 
transactions parties also transfer cash and/or securities at moment T, 
while agreeing that they will transfer equivalent assets at moment T+X. 
An example of such a derivatives transaction is a currency swap, in which 
A transfers dollars to Β at moment Τ in exchange for euros. The amounts 
paid at the outset of a transaction are the 'principal amounts'. Until 
maturity at T+X, the parties commit themselves to a periodical exchange 
of interest payments received on the swapped currencies. The parties also 
agree that upon the maturity date of the transaction, they will pay 
amounts equivalent to the principal amounts in the same currency.8 A 
currency swap transaction appears as follows:9 
Currency swap transaction 
Moment Τ euros 
-* 
A ^ Β 
dollars 
Moment T+X euros 
»-
A ^ Β 
dollars 
8 The Corporate Finance Risk Management & Derivatives Yearbook 1995, ρ XIV, 
dehnes a currency swap as follows 'The spot sale/purchase of one currency for 
another combined with a simultaneous forward agreement to repurchase the 
agreed currency amounts at a preset date and an agreement by the counterparties 
to exchange the interest payments on their swapped currenaes ' See also Gooch / 
Klem 2002, ρ 505 et seq , and Nijenhuis 1998, section 2 
9 Obligations to pay interest in the course of the transaction have not been reflected 
in this diagram 
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It should be noted that the term 'derivatives' encompasses a wide range 
of financial products, and that not all of these products have the same 
structure as a repurchase or securities lending transaction. The above 
example of a currency swap, however, shows that there are types of deriv-
atives that have a close connection with repurchase and securities lending 
arrangements. One could even go so far as to state that repos and secu-
rities lending arrangements are essentially types of derivatives. Repur-
chase and securities lending transactions are documented under separate 
master agreements but are structured in the same way as a currency swap. 
A second reason to pay attention to derivatives is the International Swaps 
and Derivatives Association's (ISDA) credit support documents, which are 
used in connection with the ISDA's Master Agreements. As with repur-
chase and securities lending transactions, in the case of derivatives trans-
actions it can also be agreed that margin collateral in the form of cash or 
securities should be provided to eliminate a net exposure arising from 
price fluctuations in the course of a transaction. In the case of derivatives, 
such an agreement is usually documented in a credit support document. 
Even though older credit support documents, such as the 1994 ISDA 
Credit Support Annex (New York law) and the 1995 ISDA credit support 
documentation (designed for English law), are still widely applied in 
practice, the focus hereafter will be on the ISDA May 2001 Margin 
Provisions, as this is the most recent credit support documentation. The 
version of the ISDA Margin Provisions designed for use in the New York 
market is highlighted below, because this is the primary example of a 
standardized agreement which applies a security interest combined with 
a secured party's general right of disposal as a way to provide financial 
collateral. 
2.3 Title transfer or security interest 
There are basically two methods of providing financial collateral: the first 
is by means of a 'title' or 'outright' transfer'10, and the second, by estab-
lishing a security interest. Both methods are illustrated in the standard 
documentation used to document repurchase, securities lending and 
derivatives transactions. The title transfer method, for example, is used in 
the Global Master Repurchase Agreement (GMRA) for repos, the Global 
Master Securities Lending Agreement (GMSLA) for securities lending 
and, if English law applies, the ISDA Margin Provisions for derivatives. 
10 For an elaboration of the terminology applied, see section 1.2 of chapter III. 
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According to this method, the parties deliberately opt for an outright 
transfer of collateral because they want to give the collateral taker an un-
limited right to dispose of the collateral. If a security interest were to be 
established, the collateral taker customarily has a right to dispose of the 
collateral only in the event of default. For this reason. Section 3.1 of Part 
3 ('Elective Provisions - Title Transfer Approach (English Law)') of the 
ISDA Margin Provisions designed for English law makes a clear distinc-
tion between these two methods: 
Section 3 1 Transfer of Title and No Secunty Interest 
(a) Transfer of Title Each party agrees that all nght, title and interest in and to 
any Lock-up Margin, Eligible Margin, Equivalent Margin, Substitute Margin, 
Equivalent Distributions or Interest Amount which it Transfers to the other 
party under these Provisions will vest in the recipient free and clear of any 
liens, claims, charges or encumbrances or any other interest of the Transferring 
party or of any third person (other than a hen routinely imposed on all 
securities in a relevant clearance system) Each Transfer under these Provi-
sions will be made so as to constitute or result in a valid and legally effective 
transfer of the Transferring party's legal and beneficial title to the recipient 
(b) No Secunty Interest The parties do not intend to create in favour of either 
party any mortgage, charge, hen, pledge, encumbrance or other secunty 
interest in any Cash or other property, to which this Part 3 applies. Transferred 
by one party under these Provisions. 
In the American derivatives and securities lending markets, however, 
financial collateral is often provided by vesting a security interest. The 
security interest approach is adopted in Part 2 ('Elective Provisions -
Security Interest Approach (New York Law)') of the ISDA Margin Provi-
sions in those cases where New York law is applicable, as well as in 
American domestic securities lending documentation. The security 
interest is, in these instances, combined with a 'right of use' for the collat-
eral taker, which means that the collateral taker is given an unlimited 
right of disposal in respect of the collateral provided, even if no event of 
default has occurred. This means that he can, for example, repledge or sell 
the collateral as he deems fit. 
2.4 Two functions of financial collateral 
2.4.1 Recovery and tradeabihty 
From an economic point of view, the securities and cash transferred in the 
repo, securities lending and derivatives transactions outlined above fulfil 
two functions. They can be used for the purposes of recourse if anything 
goes wrong in the relationship between the parties (thus serving a 
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recovery function). In addition, they can be used as a means of entering 
into further trading in the market (thus serving a tradeability function). 
It is because of this latter function that repos and securities lending 
arrangements play an important role in the liquidity of the international 
capital markets.11 The tradeability function enhances liquidity. If a well-
functioning repo and securities lending market is in place, cash and 
securities are readily available. It is this that makes the Collateral Direc-
tive (see section 8 below) so important, as its drafters intended that 
through harmonising rules throughout Europe, a liquid European cash 
and securities market could be achieved. Liquidity will not be enhanced 
if the cash or securities collateral provided cannot be used to enter into 
further trading. Like recovery, tradeability is therefore a characteristic 
feature of the financial products discussed in this book. The master agree-
ments used for financial collateral agreements provide for recovery and 
tradeability when the title transfer and the security interest methods are 
used. 
2.4.2 The title transfer method 
In title transfer structures, both functions of recovery and tradeability are 
guaranteed. The collateral transferred serves as a security object in the 
event that anything should go wrong. Moreover, the transferee is also 
allowed to dispose of the collateral received under 'normal' circumstances, 
because the transferor has transferred all right, title and interest. The 
transferee has a contractual obligation to provide equivalent assets only 
at the end of the transaction. 
In the United States of America, the country in which most of the financial 
products discussed first appeared, it has been argued that both trade-
ability and recovery are characteristic features of financial collateral 
arrangements. In her analysis of repurchase agreements under American 
civil law, J.L. Schroeder points out that there is an essential difference 
between repo transactions and traditional security interests. Both types of 
transactions serve a recovery function and can also be compared in other 
11 On the liquidity-enhancing role of finandal collateral, see CPB 2001, chapter 7. See 
also the letter dated 30 May 2001 by The Bond Market Association (joined by the 
European Repo Council) relating to the New Basel Capital Accord, which is en-
lightening in this respect. For more general information about the role of repurchase 
and securities lending agreements in the international financial markets, see BIS 
1996, Appendix 2 ('Repos and the international finandal markets'); BIS 1999; IOSCO 
1999; BIS 2001 I; and BIS 2001II. 
17 
Chapter II 
respects. However, according to Schroeder, repurchase agreements can 
be distinguished from traditional security interests in that repurchase 
agreements give the collateral taker an unlimited power to dispose of the 
assets that have been provided. For this reason, these assets are custom-
arily provided on the basis of an outright sale.12 
2.4.3 The security interest method 
Over the past decades, a second method to provide financial collateral has 
been developed in the American derivatives and securities lending mar-
kets. This method is the combination of a security interest with a general 
right of disposal for the collateral taker. The right of disposal distin-
guishes collateralised derivatives and securities lending transactions from 
traditional security interests. Under traditional security interest structures, 
only the recovery function of collateral is self-evident. In this case, the 
collateral taker has a right to dispose of the encumbered collateral only in 
the case of default. In order to enhance the tradeability of the collateral 
provided in derivatives and securities lending transactions, the collateral 
taker is, however, also granted a general right of disposal, the so-called 
'right of use'.13 
The ISDA Margin Provisions (New York law) are the principle example 
of a master agreement that envisages such a right of use. Section 2.2(c) of 
the 2001 ISDA Margin Provisions gives a secured party the right to 'sell, 
pledge, rehypothecate, assign, invest, use, commingle or otherwise dis-
pose of, or otherwise use in its business, any Margin Received [...]'. A 
similar right of use was envisaged under New York law in Article 6(c) of 
the 1994 NY Annex, which is one of the earlier ISDA Credit Support 
Documents. The 1995 UK Deed, another of these Credit Support Docu-
ments, also envisaged the establishment of a security interest under Eng-
lish law, but prohibited a right of use in Article 6(d). The approach of the 
2001 ISDA Margin Provisions in respect of English law is different from 
that of the 1995 UK Deed. The Margin Provisions only envisage the title 
transfer method under English law, and as such, guarantee tradeability. 
Whereas a security interest with a right of use therefore appears possible 
under New York law, this does not seem to be the case under general 
principles of English law. 
12 See Schroeder 1996. 
13 See Johnson 1997; Kettering 1999 1; Kettering 1999 II. 
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American domestic stock lending documentation also envisages a security 
interest combined with a right of use. In this case, however, it is subject to 
limitations in addition to those of the ISDA documentation. The right of 
use in the American derivatives and securities lending markets is dis-
cussed further in section 2 of chapter FV. 
The Collateral Directive introduces a security interest combined with a 
general right of disposal in the European Union under the heading 'secu-
rity financial collateral arrangement'. The consequences of this develop-
ment are discussed further in chapter IV below. It is important to note that 
this construction encompasses both the recovery and the tradeability 
functions. 
2.4.4 Terminology 
The word 'collateral' has a 'security interest-related' meaning in the con-
text of Anglo-American law. However, in both the title transfer and the 
security interest methods outlined above, financial collateral is available 
as an object for recovery, but may at the same time also be used to engage 
in further transactions. The collateral terminology, therefore, does not do 
full justice to the dual nature of the financial products discussed.14 
Paragraph 6(f) of the GMRA and Paragraph 2.3 of the GMSLA contain 
explicit statements in respect of this discrepancy between terminology 
and intent. Paragraph 6(f) of the GMRA states: 
Notwithstanding the use of expressions such as "Repurchase Date", "Repurchase 
Price", "margin", "Net Margin", "Margin Ratio" and "substitution", which are used 
to reflect terminology used in the market for transactions of the kind provided for 
in this Agreement, all right, title and interest in and to Securities and money 
transferred or paid under this Agreement shall pass to the transferee upon transfer 
or payment [...]. 
Paragraph 2.3 of the GMSLA states: 
Notwithstanding the use of expressions such as "borrow", "lend", "Collateral", 
"Margin", "redeliver" etc. which are used to reflect terminology used in the market 
for transactions of the kind provided for in this Agreement, title to Securities 
"borrowed" or "lent" and "Collateral" provided in accordance with this Agreement 
shall pass from one Party to another as provided for in this Agreement [...]. 
14 For an elaboration of the misleading use of collateral terminology, see De Haas / 
Keijser 2001, pp. 6-7, and Keijser / De Haas 2001, p. 11. 
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These provisions make clear that the GMRA and the GMSLA actually 
intend a transfer of all right, title and interest, notwithstanding the termi-
nology used in these agreements (such as the word 'collateral'), which 
only reflects the terms commonly used by market participants. 
3. MASTER AGREEMENTS 
3.1 Introduction 
Associations representing the interests of the financial industry have 
developed master agreements for the documentation of repurchase and 
securities lending transactions. Qualitative legal documentation leads to 
an orderly market in which legal risks are transparent and limited as far 
as possible. Most repurchase and securities lending transactions are in-
deed entered into on the basis of the model contracts developed by these 
associations. Usually, the contracting parties enter into a master agree-
ment once, and this agreement contains general provisions that apply to 
all transactions to be concluded. Subsequently, they enter into multiple 
transactions, each with its own specific terms (time frame, interest rates, 
etc.). Master agreements are not compulsory, but flexible instruments that 
can be adapted in accordance with the wishes of the contracting parties. 
This section shows the most important master agreements for the docu-
mentation of repurchase, securities lending and derivatives transactions, 
which are used in both an international and domestic context. 
3.2 Repos 
The most important master agreement used internationally to document 
repo transactions is the year 2000 version of the Global Master Repurchase 
Agreement (GMRA). This agreement was published by The Bond Market 
Association (TBMA) and by the International Securities Market Associa-
tion (ISMA). TBMA is an American-based international trade association 
representing the interests of securities firms and banks active in the 
securities markets. TBMA was incorporated as the Public Securities 
Association in 1976, but changed its name to The Bond Market Association 
in 1997.15 The ISMA was founded in 1969 as the Association of Interna-
tional Bond Dealers, but changed its name to the International Securities 
Market Association in 1991. In July 2005, the ISMA merged with the 
15 For more information about TBMA, see www.bondmarkets.com. 
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International Primary Market Association to form the International 
Capital Market Association (ICMA), a trade association representing the 
interests of players in the capital markets.16 Constituent bodies of the 
ICMA are the International Repo Council (IRC) and the European Repo 
Council (ERC), both of which represent the interests of participants in the 
repo markets.17 
The structure of the GMRA is as follows. The GMRA master agreement 
sets out a number of general provisions that apply to all the transactions 
concluded under the terms of the master agreement. In order to further 
determine the content of the master agreement, the parties have to specify 
supplemental terms and conditions in Annex I to the GMRA. These 
supplemental terms and conditions apply to all transactions concluded 
between the parties. The specific content of individual transactions is 
determined in Annex II to the GMRA, which contains a Form of Confir-
mation. There are also a number of further Annexes to the GMRA, which 
deal with special types of securities (notably bills or equities), document 
agency or buy/sell back transactions, and which take into account legal 
issues in certain countries (such as Canada, Italy, Japan and the Nether-
lands). The most important substantive provisions of the GMRA are dis-
cussed in section 4 below, which relates to the flows of cash and securities 
in repo and securities lending transactions. 
An earlier version of the GMRA was published in 1995 by the Public 
Securities Association (PSA; the predecessor of TBMA) and the ISMA. For 
an account of the differences between the 1995 and the 2000 versions, see 
the 'TBMA/ISMA Global Master Repurchase Agreement 2000 Version; 
Note of Principal Changes from the November 1995 Version'. The changes 
to the 1995 agreement are not discussed here, because they are largely of 
a technical nature. The basic structure of repo transactions, as described 
in section 4 below, is the same under the 1995 and the 2000 agreements. 
At present, the 1995 version is still used by a considerable number of 
market participants. An Amendment Agreement is, however, available to 
those parties who have entered into a GMRA 1995 and wish to use the 
16 For more information about the ICMA, see www.icma-group.org. 
17 Before the establishment of the IRC and ERC, the interests of repo market par-
ticipants were represented in the repo sub-committee of the ISMA's council of 
reporting dealers. The IRC and ERC are governed by section 1000 ('Repo Dealers') 
of the ICMA's rules and recommendations, which form part of the ICMA Rule 
Book. More information on the IRC and ERC can be found on www.icma-group. 
org. 
21 
Chapter II 
GMRA 2000 in order to document their repo business. Representative 
bodies of the financial industry, such as the European Repo Council, 
intend the GMRA 2000 to be the only agreement applied in the near 
future.18 
There are also a number of standard agreements, which are used prima-
rily in national markets. The TBMA Master Repurchase Agreement is 
principally used for repos in the American market, but can also be used 
for international transactions (see Annex III and Schedule III.A to the 
Agreement).19 The Rahmenvertrag fur echte Penswnsgeschafte (Repos) is used 
in the German repo market, and the Convention-Cadre Relative aux Opéra-
tions de Pension Livrée is used in documenting French repos.20 In order to 
come to a more uniform European legal framework for documenting 
repos, the Master Agreement for Financial Transactions, commonly 
known as the European Master Agreement (EMA), is intended to replace 
the German and the French master agreements.21 
3.3 Securities lending 
At present, the master agreement that is the international market standard 
for entering into securities lending transactions is the Global Master 
Securities Lending Agreement (GMSLA). The GMSLA is issued by the 
International Securities Lenders Association (ISLA). The ISLA is a trade 
association established m 1989 to represent the common interests of the 
securities lending industry.22 
Before the introduction of the GMSLA, three agreements were applied. 
Each agreement was designed with a particular issuer of securities in 
mind. The Master Gilt Edged Stock Lending Agreement (MGESLA; in the 
market sometìmes also referred to as GESLA) was used for gilts (govern-
ment paper) issued by the British government. The Master Equity & Fixed 
Interest Stock Lending Agreement (MEFISLA) was used by British lenders 
for all kinds of other paper, such as equities or securities with a fixed 
interest rate issued by corporate entities. The Overseas Securities Lender's 
18 For the GMRA materials, see www icma-group org and www bondmarkets com 
19 For the TBMA Master Repurchase Agreement, see www bondmarkets com 
20 For more information on the French master agreement, see Mouy / Nalbantian 1995 
I, pp 17-18 See also Besse / Auckenthaler 1995 
21 The EMA can be found on www fbe be The EMA is discussed further in section 5 
on cross-product arrangements 
22 For more information, see www isla co uk 
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Agreement (OSLA; December 1995 version) was used to document trans-
actions by 'overseas' lenders involving all kinds of government and 
corporate paper. 
The GMSLA is intended to replace the OSLA, the MEFISLA and the 
MGESLA. The GMSLA can be used for all types of securities. It is 
designed for international use. Provisions specific to the United Kingdom 
in the OSLA, MEFISLA and MGESLA have been omitted.23 In practice, the 
OSLA is still applied by international market participants along with the 
GMSLA. The GMSLA consists of general provisions that apply to all 
transactions concluded under the agreement and of a Schedule, in which 
the parties specify the details of a particular transaction. Since the GMSLA 
is the most recent standard agreement, the most important provisions of 
the GMSLA are discussed in section 4 on the flows of cash and securities 
in securities lending and repo transactions. 
In addition to international agreements, domestic securities lending agree-
ments are also available. For the American market, TBMA and the Ameri-
can Securities Industry Association (SIA) have issued the Master Securi-
ties Loan Agreement (2000 version).24 In Germany, for example, the 
Rahmenvertrag fur Wertpapierleihgeschafte im Interbankenverkehr and the 
Rahmenvertrag far Wertpapierdarlehen are available for entering into loans 
of securities25, while in France the Contrat cadre de prêts de titres26 is avail-
able. In Europe, it is now possible to enter into securities lending trans-
actions under the European Master Agreement (EMA) which is intended 
to replace earlier domestic master agreements that were applied in a 
single jurisdiction, such as the German or French master agreements.27 
3.4 Derivatives 
The standard agreements issued by the International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association (ISDA) are the most important agreements used 
23 For the texts of the GMSLA, OSLA, MEFISLA and the MGESLA, see www isla 
co uk 
24 The TBMA/SIA documentation can be found on www bondmarkets com 
25 The Rahmenvertrag fur Wertpapierdarlehen is issued by the Federal Association of 
German Banks and is intended to replace the 1994 Rahmenvertrag fur Wertpapier-
leihgeschafte im Interbankenverkehr See the Clifford Chance July/August 2000 Secu-
rities and Derivatives Newsletter 
26 Issued by the Association Française des Professioneis des Titres 
27 The EMA can be found on www fbe be For more detailed information on the EMA, 
see section 5 on cross-product arrangements below 
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internationally for documenting derivatives transactions. The ISDA is the 
global trade association representing the derivatives industry; it was 
chartered in 1985.2e 
The most recent basic agreement for entering into derivatives transactions 
issued by the ISDA is the 2002 Master Agreement, which succeeds the 
1992 standard documentation. In practice, both the 2002 and the 1992 
documentation are applied. Standard provisions that complement the 
2002 and the 1992 basic documentation are available for the purposes of 
marking-to-market and margining in the course of a transaction. To this 
end, the 2002 Master Agreement can be complemented with the ISDA 
2001 Margin Provisions. In addition to a more general section containing 
operational provisions, the ISDA Margin Provisions contain special, com-
plementary sections relating to New York, English and Japanese law. The 
predecessors of the 2001 Margin Provisions are the earlier ISDA Credit 
Support Documents, such as the 1994 ISDA Credit Support Annex (New 
York law; security interest), the 1995 ISDA Credit Support Deed (English 
law; security interest), the 1995 ISDA Credit Support Annex (English law; 
transfer of title) and the ISDA Credit Support Annex (Japanese law). Both 
the 2001 Margin Provisions and the earlier Credit Support Documents are 
currently widely applied by market participants. 
There are also domestic derivatives agreements, such as the German 
Rahmenvertrag fìir Finanztermingeschäfte, the French Convention-cadre 
relative aux operations de marché à terme, and the Dutch Raamovereenkomst 
Financiële Derivaten2''. Since 2004, it has been possible to document over-
the-counter10 derivatives transactions under the European Master Agree-
ment (EMA). The EMA is intended to provide a uniform European legal 
framework for documenting different types of financial transactions, and 
is discussed further in section 5 below. 
28 For more information about the ISDA, see www isda.org 
29 This latter agreement has been commissioned by the Nederlandse Vereniging van 
Banken (the Netherlands Bankers' Association) 
30 'Over-the-counter' derivatives transactions are derivatives transactions that are 
entered into in a market outside an officially recognized and regulated exchange 
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4. FLOWS OF CASH AND SECURITIES IN REPOS AND SECURI-
TIES LENDING 
4.1 Introduction 
The aim of this section is to describe the different flows of cash and 
securities that take place in repurchase and securities lending transactions 
under normal circumstances as well as in the event of default. This topic 
can be sub-divided into further questions, which contribute to the struc-
ture of this section. It will be determined: (1) what flows of cash exist at 
the outset and at the termination of a transaction; (2) whether any 
methods of margin maintenance have been provided for; (3) whether 
substitution can take place; (4) what happens to interest, dividends and 
other income payments on transferred bonds or equities paid by the 
issuer; and last but not least, (5) in what circumstances interest rate pay-
ments take place in relation to flows of cash and securities in a transaction. 
These issues are considered in sections 4.2 - 4.6. In addition, the payment 
obligations arising in the event of default, such as insolvency, are con-
sidered in section 4.7.31 
In short, the flows of cash and securities in repo and securities lending 
transactions under normal circumstances are as follows. At the outset of 
a repo transaction a seller receives cash from a buyer, to whom he transfers 
securities. At the end of the transaction, the seller transfers cash (con-
sisting of a principal amount plus a sum calculated according to a rate of 
interest), in exchange for the transfer of equivalent securities. However, 
it is usually the case that payments also take place during the course of a 
transaction. First, the parties usually agree upon so-called 'margin main-
tenance' mechanisms in order to take into account changes in the value of 
the securities and cash transferred at an earlier moment in a transaction. 
Different methods of margin maintenance, described in more detail 
below, are used to ensure that neither of the parties is exposed to the other 
beyond such limits as have been agreed upon between them. Second, it is 
possible, if so agreed, to substitute securities transferred earlier in the 
transaction for other securities. Substitution is a way of recovering securi-
ties that were transferred earlier in the course of a transaction in exchange 
for other securities. Substitution may relate to securities provided at the 
outset of a transaction, or to margin securities that were transferred to 
compensate for price fluctuations. Third, the transferee of securities is 
31 Payments related to any tax or duties imposed are not dealt with in this study. 
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usually under a contractual obligation to pay to the transferor of such 
securities amounts of income that are equal to that paid in the course of 
a transaction in respect of the securities transferred. In addition, cash 
collateral and payments due but not yet paid are, as a rule, subject to 
interest. 
In a securities lending transaction, there is at the outset a flow of securities 
from the lender to the borrower, which is usually collateralised by a flow 
of cash or securities.32 Equivalent securities plus an amount calculated by 
applying an agreed rate of interest are delivered by the borrower to the 
lender at the end of a transaction, while a transfer of equivalent collateral 
is effected at the same time. As a rule, the parties to a securities lending 
agreement (like the parties to a repurchase agreement) envisage the 
following: margin maintenance methods to take price fluctuations into 
account, the possibility of substitution, the payment of amounts equiva­
lent to income payments, and the accrual of interest in respect of cash 
collateral and payments due but not yet paid. 
The issues introduced above, including the regime applicable in the event 
of default, will be explained in the context of repos and securities lending 
as documented in standard agreements used in the markets. For repos, the 
Global Master Repurchase Agreement (GMRA) will be used as an exam­
ple; for securities lending, the Global Master Securities Lending Agree­
ment (GMSLA) will be used. 
4.2 Initial and final flows 
4.2.2 Repos 
Paragraph 1(a) of the GMRA provides a clear illustration of the principal 
flows of cash and securities that take place at the outset and at the end of 
a repo transaction: 
From time to time the parties hereto may enter into transactions in which one party, 
acting through a Designated Office, ("Seller") agrees to sell to the other, acting 
through a Designated Office, ("Buyer") securities and financial instruments ("Securi­
ties") [...] against the payment of the purchase price by Buyer to Seller, with a 
simultaneous agreement by Buyer to sell to Seller Securities equivalent to such 
32 In practice, uncollateralized transactions also occur. In this case, the lender has an 
unsecured exposure towards the borrower. Following the GMSLA, an agreement 
which presumes collateralisation, this section only deals with collateralised trans­
actions. 
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Securities at a date certain or on demand against the payment of the repurchase 
price by Seller to Buyer 
In a repo transaction, securities are transferred outright at moment Τ from 
party A (seller) to party Β (buyer) in exchange for a sum of money. Para­
graph 3(c) of the GMRA states: 
On the Purchase Date for a Transaction, Seller shall transfer the Purchased Secu­
rities to Buyer or its agent against the payment of the Purchase Price by Buyer 
The securities transferred at moment Τ are usually valued at market prices 
and a certain percentage is then discounted from this price. The percentage 
discounted from the market value of the securities is usually referred to 
as 'margin ratio' or 'haircut', while the resulting amount discounted on the 
basis of such percentage is called 'initial margin'. The effect of this initial 
margin is that the buyer (i.e. the party who provides the principal cash 
flow) is ensured a buffer against downward price fluctuations of the col­
lateral provided from the outset of a transaction. This buffer is maintained 
during the entire course of the transaction.33 
The initial transfer at moment Τ is followed at moment T+X by a transfer 
of equivalent securities by buyer Β to seller A, in exchange for a sum of 
money equal to that transferred at the outset of the transaction plus a 
price differential (the 'repurchase price'). Article 3(f) of the GMRA states: 
On the Repurchase Date, Buyer shall transfer to Seller or its agent Equivalent 
Securities against the payment of the Repurchase Price by Seller (less any amount 
then payable and unpaid by Buyer to Seller pursuant to paragraph 5 [relating to 
income payments, TK]) 
The price differential, which is a component of the repurchase price, is 
essentially an amount of interest. The interest percentage is called the 
'pricing rate' or 'repo rate'.34 
33 See Paragraphs 2(z) and 2(ww) of the GMRA For more about this 'over-collateral-
isahon', see also Rank 1998 I, ρ 17, Rank 1998 II, ρ 373 
34 See Paragraphs 2(ii) (definition of 'price differential') and 2(jj) (definition of 'pricing 
rate') of the GMRA 
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4.2.2 Securities lending 
Paragraph 1.1 of the GMSLA provides a good illustration of the principal 
flows of cash and securities that commonly take place at the outset and at 
the end of a securities lending transaction: 
From time to time the parties may enter into transactions in which one party 
("Lender") will transfer to the other ("Borrower") securities and financial instru­
ments ("Securities") against the transfer of Collateral (as defined in paragraph 2) 
with a simultaneous agreement by Borrower to transfer to Lender Securities 
equivalent to such Securities on a fixed date or on demand against the transfer to 
Borrower by Lender of assets equivalent to such Collateral. 
In a securities lending transaction, party A (the lender) typically transfers 
securities to party Β (the borrower) at the beginning of a transaction 
against a simultaneous transfer of cash or securities from party Β to party 
A as collateral.35 Like the GMRA, the GMSLA also envisages an initial 
margin that protects the lender (i.e. the party delivering the principal 
performance) against downward price fluctuations from the outset of a 
transaction. This level of over-collateralisation of the lender is a way to 
protect the lender against the possible insolvency of his counterparty and 
is maintained during the entire course of a transaction.36 At the end of the 
transaction, borrower Β transfers equivalent securities to lender A, and in 
addition pays an amount of interest37, which is also called the 'lending 
fee'. At that moment, A is obliged to transfer collateral equivalent to that 
provided by party Β at the start of the transaction. 
4.3 Margin maintenance 
4.3.1 Introduction 
Both the GMRA and the GMSLA set out margin maintenance methods 
that take price fluctuations of transferred securities into account. These 
methods basically have the same goal: to prevent one of the parties from 
being exposed to a risk in relation to the other as a result of an increase or 
decrease in the value of the securities and/or cash transferred in trans­
actions. All margin maintenance methods have in common that the trans­
feror of securities or cash economically carries the risk of such price 
35 Uncollateralized transactions (in line with the structure of the GMSLA) will not be 
discussed. Cf. footnote 32. 
36 See section 1.2 of the Schedule to the GMSLA. 
37 See Paragraph 7.1 of the GMSLA. 
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fluctuations. This section describes the different margin maintenance 
methods set out in the GMRA and the GMSLA.36 
4.3.2 Repos 
Three different methods of margin maintenance can be distinguished 
under the GMRA: (1) margin transfers; (2) repricing; and (3) adjustment. 
These methods will now be considered in more detail. 
a Margin transfers 
The most common way of taking into account changes in the value of 
securities and cash transferred is by realising margin transfers, as described 
in Paragraphs 4 (a) - (h) of the GMRA. The text of these provisions is as 
follows: 
4 Margin Maintenance 
(a) If at any time either party has a Net Exposure in respect of the other party it may 
by notice to the other party require the other party to make a Margin Transfer to it 
of an aggregate amount or value at least equal to that Net Exposure 
(b) A notice under sub-paragraph (a) above may be given orally or in writing 
(c) For the purposes of this Agreement a party has a Net Exposure in respect of the 
other party if the aggregate of all the first party's Transaction Exposures plus any 
amount payable to the first party under paragraph 5 [relating to income payments, 
TK] but unpaid less the amount of any Net Margin provided to the first party 
exceeds the aggregate of all the other party's Transaction Exposures plus any 
amount payable to the other party under paragraph 5 but unpaid less the amount 
of any Net Margin provided to the other party, and the amount of the Net Exposure 
is the amount of the excess For this purpose any amounts not denominated m the 
Base Currency shall be converted into the Base Currency at the Spot Rate prevailing 
at the relevant time 
(d) To the extent that a party calling for a Margin Transfer has previously paid 
Cash Margin which has not been repaid or delivered Margin Securities m respect 
of which Equivalent Margin Securities have not been delivered to it, that party shall 
be entitled to require that such Margin Transfer be satisfied first by the repayment 
of such Cash Margin or the delivery of Equivalent Margin Securities but, subject to 
this, the composition of a Margin Transfer shall be at the option of the party making 
such Margin Transfer 
(e) Any Cash Margin transferred shall be m the Base Currency or such other 
currency as the parties may agree 
(f) A payment of Cash Margin shall give rise to a debt owmg from the party 
receiving such payment to the party making such payment. Such debt shall bear 
interest at such rate, payable at such hmes, as may be specified in Annex I hereto 
38 The legal characterisation of these methods will be further discussed m section 2 6 
of chapter III 
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in respect of the relevant currency or otherwise agreed between the parties, and 
shall be repayable subject to the terms of this Agreement. 
(g) Where Seller or Buyer becomes obliged under sub-paragraph (a) above to make 
a Margin Transfer, it shall transfer Cash Margin or Margin Securities or Equivalent 
Margin Securities within the minimum period specified in Annex I hereto or, if no 
period is there specified, such minimum period as is customarily required for the 
settlement or delivery of money. Margin Securities or Equivalent Margin Secunhes 
of the relevant kind 
(h) The parties may agree that, with respect to any Transaction, the provisions of 
subparagraphs (a) to (g) above shall not apply but instead that margin may be 
provided separately in respect of that Transaction in which case -
(i) that Transaction shall not be taken into account when calculating whether 
either party has a Net Exposure, 
(n) margin shall be provided in respect of that Transaction in such manner as 
the parties may agree, and 
(in) margin provided in respect of that Transaction shall not be taken into 
account for the purposes of sub-paragraphs (a) to (g) above 
Subsequent to these provisions, the buyer is obliged to deliver margin in 
the form of cash or securities to the seller if the prices of securities trans­
ferred by the seller at the outset of a transaction have increased. If the 
prices have decreased, the seller is obliged to provide margin in the form 
of cash or securities to the buyer. Price fluctuations in respect of margin 
securities provided earlier in the course of a transaction are taken into 
account in the same way. Margin transfers are usually made on the basis 
of a net exposure, as calculated on the basis of all the transactions entered 
into by the parties to a GMRA. The determination of obligations to pro­
vide margin on the basis of all outstanding transactions is sometimes 
referred to as 'global margining'. The exact way the net exposure is 
calculated is described in Paragraphs 4 (a) - (g) of the GMRA. However, 
it is also possible to make margin transfers per transaction. This possibility 
has been provided for in subparagraph (h). Margin can be provided in the 
form of securities or cash. The parties to a GMRA usually agree before­
hand what they consider to be 'eligible' collateral. The party who is under 
an obligation to transfer margin usually determines exactly what eligible 
collateral will be transferred, unless he has received margin cash or 
securities from his counterparty at an earlier moment in the transaction. 
In this case, the counterparty may first require the payment of equivalent 
cash or securities. 
At the end of a transaction, equivalent margin must be transferred by the 
transferee of margin to the transferor. This is illustrated in the following 
example. Seller A receives 100 euro from buyer Β for 100 securities of type 
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X with a total value of 100 euro.39 Because the total value of the securities 
X drops to 90 euro in the course of the transaction, seller A transfers 10 
margin securities of type Y to buyer Β with a total value of 10 euro. At the 
end of the transaction, seller A is obliged to pay 100 euro to buyer B, 
whereas buyer Β is under an obligation to transfer both 100 securities of 
type X with a total value of 90 euro and 10 securities of type Y with a total 
value of 10 euro. The payment of equivalent margin at the end of the 
transaction ensures that the parties are in an economically equal position 
again. 
b. Repricing and adjustment 
Margin transfers are not the most appropriate method in the case of 
extreme changes in value. It is, of course, possible to realise margin trans­
fers in such situations, but the ultimate result will be that the value of 
margin transferred by one of the parties is disproportionally high com­
pared to the value of the securities and cash originally provided. This is 
why two other methods have been introduced, i.e. repricing and adjust­
ment. See Paragraphs 4 (i) - (k) of the GMRA: 
(i) The parhes may agree that any Net Exposure which may arise shall be elimi­
nated not by Margin Transfers under the preceding provisions of this paragraph 
but by the repricing of Transactions under sub-paragraph (j) below, the adjustment 
of Transactions under sub-paragraph (k) below or a combination of both these 
methods 
(j) Where the parties agree that a Transaction is to be repriced under this sub-para­
graph, such repricing shall be effected as follows -
(i) the Repurchase Date under the relevant Transachon (the "Original Trans­
action") shall be deemed to occur on the date on which the repricing is to be 
effected (the "Repricing Date"), 
(n) the parties shall be deemed to have entered into a new Transaction (the 
"Repriced Transaction") on the terms set out m (m) to (vi) below, 
(m) the Purchased Securities under the Repriced Transaction shall be Securities 
equivalent to the Purchased Securities under the Original Transaction, 
(iv) the Purchase Date under the Repriced Transaction shall be the Repricing 
Date, 
(v) the Purchase Price under the Repriced Transaction shall be such amount 
as shall, when multiplied by the Margin Ratio applicable to the Original Trans­
action, be equal to the Market Value of such Securities on the Repricing Date, 
(vi) the Repurchase Date, the Pricing Rate, the Margin Ratio and, subject as 
aforesaid, the other terms of the Repriced Transaction shall be identical to 
those of the Original Transaction, 
39 No margin raho is applied m this example 
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(vii) the obligations of the parties with respect to the delivery of the Purchased 
Securities and the payment of the Purchase Price under the Repriced Trans-
action shall be set off against their obligations with respect to the delivery of 
Equivalent Securities and payment of the Repurchase Price under the Origmal 
Transaction and accordingly only a net cash sum shall be paid by one party to 
the other Such net cash sum shall be paid within the period specified in sub-
paragraph (g) above 
(k) The adjustment of a Transaction (the "Original Transaction") under this sub-
paragraph shall be effected by the parties agreeing that on the date on which the 
adjustment is to be made (the "Adjustment Date") the Original Transaction shall be 
terminated and they shall enter into a new Transaction (the "Replacement Trans-
action") in accordance with the following provisions -
(i) the Origmal Transaction shall be terminated on the Adjustment Date on 
such terms as the parties shall agree on or before the Adjustment Date, 
(n) the Purchased Securities under the Replacement Transaction shall be such 
Securities as the parties shall agree on or before the Adjustment Date (being 
Securities the aggregate Market Value of which at the Adjustment Date is 
substantially equal to the Repurchase Price under the Original Transaction at 
the Adjustment Date multiplied by the Margin Ratio applicable to the Original 
Transaction), 
(m) the Purchase Date under the Replacement Transaction shall be the Adjust-
ment Date, 
(iv) the other terms of the Replacement Transachon shall be such as the parties 
shall agree on or before the Adjustment Date, and 
(v) the obligations of the parties with respect to payment and delivery of 
Securities on the Adjustment Date under the Original Transaction and the 
Replacement Transaction shall be settled in accordance with paragraph 6 
within the minimum period specified in sub-paragraph (g) above 
In the case of repricing, the original transaction is terminated, and a new 
transaction is entered into. The idea is that the original securities are 
maintained, but their price is adjusted to the actual prices in the market. 
Thus, if the market prices of securities transferred under the original 
transaction have gone up, the cash to be provided under the new trans-
action will be higher, whereas if the market prices of the transferred secu-
rities have gone down since the moment the original transaction was 
entered into, the amount of cash to be provided will be lower than in the 
original transaction. 
In the case of an adjustment, the parties elect to alter the securities side of 
a transaction and not the cash side as is the case with repricing. In this 
instance, although the original transaction is also terminated and a new 
transaction is entered into, the parties agree on a different kind or amount 
of securities as a means of credit risk mitigation. These securities will be 
transferred at market value at the outset of the new transaction, taking 
into account the margin ratio or 'haircut', as agreed between the parties. 
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4.3.3 Securities lending 
Securities lending agreements usually contain margin maintenance provi-
sions that are comparable to the margin transfer method under the 
GMRA.40 In the GMSLA, Paragraphs 5.4 and 5.5 address this matter: 
5 4 Marking to Market of Collateral during the currency of a Loan on aggregated 
basis 
Unless paragraph 1 3 of the Schedule indicates that paragraph 5 5 shall apply in 
lieu of this paragraph 5 4, or unless otherwise agreed between the Parties -
(i) the aggregate Market Value of the Collateral delivered to or deposited with 
Lender (excluding any Equivalent Collateral repaid or redelivered under 
Paragraphs 5 4(ii) or 5 5(ii) (as the case may be)) ("Posted Collateral") in respect 
of all Loans outstanding under this Agreement shall equal the aggrega te of the 
Market Value of the Loaned Securities and the applicable Margin (the 
"Required Collateral Value") in respect of such Loans, 
(n) if at any time on any Business Day the aggregate Market Value of the 
Posted Collateral in respect of all Loans outstanding under this Agreement 
exceeds the aggregate of the Required Collateral Values m respect of such 
Loans, Lender shall (on demand) repay and/or redeliver, as the case may be, 
to Borrower such Equivalent Collateral as will eliminate the excess, 
(m) if at any time on any Business Day the aggregate Market Value of the 
Posted Collateral in respect of all Loans outstanding under this Agreement 
falls below the aggregate of Required Collateral Values in respect of all such 
Loans, Borrower shall (on demand) provide such further Collateral to Lender 
as will eliminate the deficiency 
5 5 Marking to Market of Collateral during the currency of a Loan on a Loan by 
Loan basis 
If paragraph 1 3 of the Schedule indicates this paragraph 5 5 shall apply in lieu of 
paragraph 5 4, the Posted Collateral in respect of any Loan shall bear from day to 
day and at any tune the same proportion to the Market Value of the Loaned Secu-
rities as the Posted Collateral bore at the commencement of such Loan Accordingly 
(i) the Market Value of the Posted Collateral to be delivered or deposited while 
the Loan continues shall be equal to the Required Collateral Value, 
(n) if at any time on any Busmess Day the Market Value of the Posted Collat-
eral in respect of any Loan exceeds the Required Collateral Value in respect of 
such Loan, Lender shall (on demand) repay and/or redeliver, as the case may 
be, to Borrower such Equivalent Collateral as will eliminate the excess, and 
(in) if at any time on any Business Day the Market Value of the Posted Collat-
eral falls below the Required Collateral Value, Borrower shall (on demand) 
provide such further Collateral to Lender as will eliminate the deficiency 
If there is a discrepancy between the value of the lent securities and the 
collateral provided (taking the margin haircut into account), one of the 
parties will be obliged to make a margin transfer. If the value of the 
40 Repricing and adjustment are not envisaged under the GMSLA 
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collateral has become higher than the value of the securities lent, the 
lender is obliged to transfer equivalent collateral. The borrower must 
transfer additional collateral if the loaned securities have become more 
valuable than the collateral provided to the lender. The determination of 
the market value of the loaned securities and the collateral securities pro-
vided is usually called 'marking to market'. Under the GMSLA, marking 
to market of collateral is possible both on an aggregated basis (see Para-
graph 5.4), as well as on a loan by loan basis, i.e. per transaction (see Para-
graph 5.5). As in the case of a margin transfer under a repurchase trans-
action, the transferee of margin collateral in a securities lending trans-
action is obliged to transfer equivalent margin collateral to the transferor 
of that margin collateral at the end of the transaction they entered into.41 
4.4 Substitution 
If substitution has been agreed upon, the transferor of purchased or 
margin securities under a repo transaction may substitute the securities 
originally transferred for other acceptable securities. In a securities 
lending transaction, too, the transferor of collateral or margin collateral 
securities can call for substitution.42 For repos, substitution has been set 
out in Paragraph 8 of the GMRA. 
8 Subshtuhon 
(a) A Transachon may at any tame between the Purchase Date and Repurchase 
Date, if Seller so requests and Buyer so agrees, be varied by the transfer by Buyer 
to Seller of Securities equivalent to the Purchased Secunhes, or to such of the 
Purchased Securities as shall be agreed, m exchange for the transfer by Seller to 
Buyer of other Secunhes of such amount and description as shall be agreed ("New 
Purchased Secunhes") (being Securities having a Market Value at the date of the 
variation at least equal to the Market Value of the Equivalent Secunhes transferred 
to Seller) 
(b) Any variation under sub-paragraph (a) above shall be effected, subject to 
paragraph 6(d) [relating to payment and transfer, TK], by the simultaneous transfer 
of the Equivalent Secunhes and New Purchased Secunhes concerned. 
(c) A Transachon which is varied under sub-paragraph (a) above shall thereafter 
continue m effect as though the Purchased Securities under that Transaction 
consisted of or included the New Purchased Secunhes instead of the Secunhes in 
respect of which Equivalent Secunhes have been transferred to Seller 
(d) Where either party has transferred Margin Secunhes to the other party it may 
at any hme before Equivalent Margin Securities are hansferred to it under 
41 See Paragraph 8 4 of the GMSLA 
42 In the context of secunhes lending, it should be noted that loaned secunhes cannot 
be subshtuted (because this is the principal flow, see sechon 2 2 2 above) and that 
subshtuhon is only possible m relation to collateral and margin collateral provided 
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paragraph 4 [relating to margin maintenance, TK] request the other party to 
transfer Equivalent Margin Securities to it in exchange for the transfer to the other 
party of new Margin Securities having a Market Value at the time of transfer at 
least equal to that of such Equivalent Margin Securities If the other party agrees to 
the request, the exchange shall be effected, subject to paragraph 6(d) [relating to 
payment and transfers, TK], by the simultaneous transfer of the Equivalent Margin 
Securities and new Margin Securities concerned [ ] 
In the case of a securities lending transaction. Paragraph 5.3 of the 
GMSLA determines the situations in which substitution can take place.43 
5 3 Substitutions of Collateral 
Borrower may from time to time call for the repayment of Cash Collateral or the 
redelivery of Collateral equivalent to any Collateral delivered to Lender prior to the 
date on which the same would otherwise have been repayable or redehverable 
provided that at the time of such repayment or redelivery Borrower shall have 
delivered or delivers Alternative Collateral acceptable to Lender and Borrower is 
in compliance with paragraph 5 4 or paragraph 5 5 [relating to marking to market, 
TK], as applicable 
The rationale behind substitution is different from that behind adjust-
ment. Adjustment is a margin maintenance method, which takes into 
account changes in the market value of the securities originally trans-
ferred by replacing those securities. Substitution, in turn, reflects the 
desire of the transferor of securities to have the securities originally trans-
ferred returned and used for other purposes, while in exchange he trans-
fers other securities as a substitute. Substitution can take place with the 
consent of the transferee of financial collateral. Such consent can be given 
beforehand (in the Form of Confirmation to a GMRA or the Schedule to 
a GMSLA), or in the course of a transaction.44 
4.5 Income payments 
After the transfer of securities by a transferor to a transferee in a repur-
chase or securities lending transaction, income payments in respect of 
such securities are payable to the transferee. Income payments are, for 
example, interest, dividends or other earnings of any kind on the secu-
43 Paragraph 5 9 of the GMSLA contains a specific regulation for the substitution of 
letters of credit 
44 The legal interpretation of substitution is the topic of section 2 7 of chapter III For 
substitution arrangements m the context of derivatives transactions, see Section 1 7 
of the 2001ISDA Margin Provisions The earlier ISDA Credit Support Documents 
also envisage a right of substitution See the 1994 NY Annex, Article 4(d), the 1995 
UK Deed, Article 4(d), and the 1995 UK Annex, Article 3(c) 
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rities transferred. As a rule, an amount equal to such income payments is 
subsequently transferred by the transferee of such securities to the trans-
feror. Such a method has been set out for repos in Paragraph 5 of the 
GMRA. 
5 Income Payments 
Unless otherwise agreed -
(i) where the Term of a particular Transaction extends over an Income Payment 
Date in respect of any Secunties subject to that Transaction, Buyer shall on the date 
such Income is paid by the issuer transfer to or credit to the account of Seller an 
amount equal to (and in the same currency as) the amount paid by the issuer, 
(11) where Margin Secunties are transferred from one party ("the first party") to the 
other party ("the second party") and an Income Payment Date in respect of such 
Secunhes occurs before Equivalent Margin Secunhes are transferred by the second 
party to the first party, the second party shall on the date such Income is paid by 
the issuer transfer to or credit to the account of the first party an amount equal to 
(and in the same currency as) the amount paid by the issuer [ ] 
In the case of securities lending transactions. Paragraphs 6.1, 6.2 and 4.4 
of the GMSLA should be considered. Paragraph 6.1 relates to income pay-
ments generally, which are often made in the form of cash. Paragraph 6.2 
of the GMSLA relates to the special case of income provided in the form 
of securities. Paragraph 4.4 of the GMSLA is included in Paragraph 4 on 
'Delivery' and contains a technical description of the way that equivalent 
income should be made available. 
6 1 Manufactured Payments 
Where Income is paid in relation to any Loaned Secunhes or Collateral (other than 
Cash Collateral) on or by reference to an Income Payment Date Borrower, in the 
case of Loaned Secunhes, and Lender, in the case of Collateral, shall, on the date 
of the payment of such Income, or on such other date as the Parhes may from time 
to time agree, (the "Relevant Payment Date") pay and deliver a sum of money or 
property equivalent to the type and amount of such Income that, in the case of 
Loaned Secunhes, Lender would have been entitled to receive had such Secunhes 
not been loaned to Borrower and had been retained by Lender on the Income 
Payment Date, and, m the case of Collateral, Borrower would have been entitled to 
receive had such Collateral not been provided to Lender and had been retamed by 
Borrower on the Income Payment Date unless a different sum is agreed between the 
Parties 
6 2 Income in the form of Secunhes 
Where Income, in the form of secunties, is paid in relation to any Loaned Secunhes 
or Collateral, such secunhes shall be added to such Loaned Secunhes or Collateral 
(and shall conshtute Loaned Secunhes or Collateral, as the case may be, and be part 
of the relevant Loan) and will not be delivered to Lender, in the case of Loaned 
Secunhes, or to Borrower, m the case of Collateral, until the end of the relevant 
Loan, provided that the Lender or Borrower (as the case may be) fulfils their 
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obligations under paragraph 5 4 or 5 5 (as applicable) [relating to marking to 
market, TK] with respect to the additional Loaned Securities or Collateral, as the 
case may be 
4 4 Deliveries of Income 
In respect of Income being paid in relation to any Loaned Securities or Collateral, 
Borrower in the case of Income being paid in respect of Loaned Secunhes and 
Lender in the case of Income being paid in respect of Collateral shall provide to the 
other Party, as the case may be, any endorsements or assignments as shall be 
customary and appropriate to effect the delivery of money or property equivalent 
to the type and amount of such Income to Lender, irrespective of whether Borrower 
received the same m respect of any Loaned Securities or to Borrower, irrespective 
of whether Lender received the same in respect of any Collateral 
A regulation such as that contained in the GMRA and the GMSLA 
provides the best way of compensating the transferor of the securities for 
income payments, as it may be difficult to provide for such compensation 
in advance, particularly when the amount of dividend that will be dis-
tributed cannot be established in advance or in transactions with an un-
specified duration. 
4.6 Interest 
4.6.2 Price differential and lending fee 
The payment of the price differential for repos and the lending fee in 
securities lending as discussed in section 4.2 above may be considered as 
a payment of interest. In a repo transaction, this interest is paid by the 
seller in respect of the cash provided by the buyer at the outset of the 
transaction. In a securities lending transaction, the borrower pays an 
amount of interest for the securities provided by the lender at the outset 
of the transaction. The price differential in the case of a repo transaction 
is payable on the repurchase date.45 The lending fee accrues until the date 
when equivalent securities are redelivered.46 
4.6.2 Cash collateral 
In addition, the GMRA and the GMSLA also contain provisions relating 
to the payment of interest when cash collateral is provided. In repo trans-
actions, cash collateral can only be paid in the course of a transaction in 
the form of margin. The GMRA contains a provision for a rate payable in 
45 See Paragraphs 2 (n) and (jj) of the GMRA 
46 See Paragraphs 7 1 and 7 3 of the GMSLA 
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respect of cash margin in Paragraph 4(f), a provision already quoted in 
section 4.3.2 above. In the case of securities lending transactions, cash 
collateral can be provided both at the outset of a transaction by the 
borrower and in the course of the transaction by either party. In respect 
of such cash collateral the GMSLA also determines that an interest rate 
should be paid, which accrues until the date of the repayment of the cash 
collateral (see Paragraphs 7.2 and 7.3 of the GMSLA). 
4.6.3 Interest on other sums due 
Other interest payments may also take place. Paragraph 12 of the GMRA 
sets out a general provision for the payment of interest on sums due, but 
not yet paid. The applicable interest rate is the greater of either the repo 
rate under the relevant transaction (if it is possible to relate a sum to a 
transaction) or LIBOR. Paragraph 15, in conjunction with Paragraph 10.7 
of the GMSLA, provides a comparable provision for outstanding pay-
ments in securities lending transactions. 
4.7 Events of default 
Paragraph 10 of the GMRA sets out the regime which is applicable in the 
event of a default that leads to the termination of a single transaction or 
to that of the relationship between the parties as such.47 Paragraph 10(a) 
of the GMRA specifies the different events of default that can arise, such 
as non-compliance with specified contractual obligations or the insol-
vency of one of the parties. Under Paragraph 10 of the GMRA an event 
which amounts to default in principle results in the early termination of 
all outstanding transactions between the parties. However, in certain cir-
cumstances a single transaction only may be terminated.48 Early ter-
mination takes place automatically when certain events of insolvency 
occur, but in most cases, prior notice is required. Essentially, early ter-
mination means that all payment obligations the parties have towards 
each other are accelerated. Delivery obligations of equivalent securities, 
including equivalent margin securities, and all other applicable obliga-
tions, are converted into cash sums payable on the basis of market value. 
Subsequently, all cash sums due are converted into a single 'base' curren-
cy, if necessary. A set-off is then applied to all resulting cash obligations 
47 Because of its length, the text of Article 10 of the GMRA is not reproduced here. 
48 See Paragraphs 10(g)(iii) and 10(h)(iii) of the GMRA. 
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of the parties. The result is that one of the parties is obliged to pay a net 
sum to the other party.49 
The issue of valuation of securities (including equivalent securities), 
which is addressed in Paragraphs 10(e) and (f) of the GMRA, is crucial, 
and plays a role in the analysis in chapter V below. In fact, the non-
defaulting party may, within the limits of Paragraph 10, determine how 
valuation will take place. He has three options, one of which should be 
exercised within a period of five dealing days. These options are outlined 
below; a more precise description can be found in the text of the GMRA. 
First, the non-defaulting party can sell securities that he should normally 
have delivered to the defaulting party and/or buy securities that he 
normally would have received from the defaulting party. In this case, his 
valuation is based on actual market prices received or paid. Second, he 
can obtain price quotes from two or more market makers or regular 
dealers in the most appropriate market for the securities concerned. Third, 
under certain circumstances he is allowed to determine a commercially 
reasonable price for the securities himself. 
Similar provisions are set out in Paragraphs 9,10 and 14 of the GMSLA for 
securities lending arrangements. Paragraph 14 of the GMSLA sets out the 
different events of default that may occur. Paragraph 10 of the GMSLA 
determines what happens when an event of default occurs. Basically, this 
again boils down to an early termination of all outstanding rights and 
obligations that are valued and converted into a single currency (if 
necessary), after which set-off takes place. The result is again a single 
amount payable by one of the parties. As a rule, an event of default leads 
to a close-out of all outstanding transactions between the parties. See, 
however. Paragraph 9 of the GMSLA for the possibility of a mini-close-out 
of individual transactions.50 
In the case of the GMSLA, valuation can take place on the basis of the 
actual sale price or cost of a buy-in. This sale or buy-in should take place 
within a period of five business days.51 If no actual sale or buy-in takes 
place, the prices of securities should be commercially reasonable, and 
49 In addition to the text of Paragraph 10 of the GMRA, see also the relevant Guidance 
Notes. 
50 Because of their length. Paragraphs 9,10 and 14 of the GMSLA are not reproduced 
here. 
51 See Paragraph 10.5 of the GMSLA. 
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should be established within two business days at most.52 Unlike the 
GMRA, the GMSLA contains no explicit reference to market makers or 
regular dealers as a means of objectively determining a reasonable price. 
5. CROSS-PRODUCT ARRANGEMENTS 
5.1 Introduction 
Cross-product arrangements are entered into between parties who con-
clude different types of financial agreements and transactions. Cross-
product arrangements make it possible to link flows of cash and securities 
in different types of financial products. If, for example, two parties have 
both entered into repurchase and securities lending agreements and trans-
actions, they may wish to link the flows of cash and securities under these 
arrangements. Under 'normal' circumstances, they may wish to net pay-
ment obligations arising, whereas it may also be attractive to determine 
margin requirements on a consolidated basis. In the case of an event of 
default, the parties may wish to terminate both their repurchase and their 
securities lending agreements at the same time and pay only a single net 
sum after close-out netting of all outstanding repurchase and securities 
lending transactions. 
This section explores different ways in which flows of cash and securities 
in different financial products can be linked to one another through cross-
product arrangements. It is possible to distinguish at least three means of 
connecting different financial agreements in such a way that mutual obli-
gations between the parties arising under those agreements can be netted. 
First, flows of cash and securities under different agreements can be con-
nected by including a clause in one or more agreements that refers to the 
other agreement(s) involved. This way of linking agreements is usually 
referred to as the 'bridge provision' approach. The second possibility is to 
document different financial products in a single master agreement. A 
third approach is that of the 'master master' agreement. In this case, the 
parties conclude several master agreements to document different finan-
cial transactions. In addition, they conclude a 'master master' agreement 
that makes it possible to link the flows of cash and securities under the 
52 See the définitions of 'Bid Value' and 'Offer Value' in Paragraph 10.1 of the GMSLA, 
and Paragraphs 10.3 and 10.4 of the GMSLA. 
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respective master agreements for different financial products. These three 
possibilities are discussed in sections 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 below. 
Over the past ten years, several legal initiatives have been developed, 
such as the ISDA Cross-Agreement Bridge, the European Master Agree-
ment (EMA) and the Cross-Product Master Agreement (CPMA) to be dis-
cussed below, which demonstrate the growing importance of cross-
product arrangements in the financial markets. Some remarks about the 
practical application of these different agreements, which to a large extent 
have the same goal, are made in section 5.5. 
5.2 Bridge provisions 
5.2.2 Introduction 
One way to link flows of cash and securities under different financial 
agreements is to include a bridge provision in one or more agreements, 
which refers to the other agreement(s) involved. Different types of bridge 
provisions can be envisaged. One type would make it possible to net pay-
ment obligations under 'normal' circumstances. Such a provision seems 
to be of particular importance in linking cash flows in different financial 
products. Securities flows can consist of so many different types of securi-
ties that under normal circumstances, the netting of securities flows will 
often be of less importance. A second type of bridge provision limits the 
scope of such provisions to default situations, so that set-off of mutual 
obligations (which occurs after determining the monetary value of securi-
ties and converting cash obligations into a single currency) under dif-
ferent financial products takes place only in that event. 
5.2.2 ISDA Cross-Agreement Bridge 
The 2001 ISDA Cross-Agreement Bridge is an example of a bridge 
provision that operates in the event of a default. This Cross-Agreement 
Bridge is incorporated into an ISDA Master Agreement and is intended 
to achieve cross-product netting between the ISDA Master Agreement 
and other financial master agreements, such as repurchase or securities 
lending master agreements. In the Cross-Product Bridge, the parties 
specify the events ('bridging events') that lead to a close-out under all the 
master agreements indicated in the Cross-Product Bridge ('bridged agree-
ments'). When a bridging event occurs, all bridged agreements are closed-
out according to the provisions of those agreements. This means that no 
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uniform close-out netting procedure is envisaged in the ISDA Cross-
Agreements Bridge. The procedures set out in the individual bridged 
agreements are left intact. The close-out netting of each bridged agree-
ment leads to a payment obligation for one of the parties. All individual 
payment obligations under the bridged agreements involved are subse-
quently netted in accordance with the Cross-Agreement Bridge. The result 
of the netting of the different close-out netting amounts due is that a 
single net sum is payable by one of the parties.53 
5.3 Single master agreement for multiple financial products 
5.3.2 Introduction 
A second way in which to link different financial products is by docu-
menting them in a single master agreement. A good example of such an 
approach can be found in the Master Agreements of the International 
Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), under which a large variety 
of derivatives products can be documented. Another example is the Euro-
pean Master Agreement (EMA), under which repos, securities lending 
and derivatives transactions can be entered into. The European Master 
Agreement and its cross-product character in particular, is examined 
below. 
5.3.2 European Master Agreement 
The European Master Agreement (EMA) is officially called the Master 
Agreement for Financial Transactions. The EMA was launched by the 
European Banking Federation in co-operation with the European Savings 
Banks Group and the European Association of Co-operative Banks. The 
EMA is intended to establish a uniform legal framework for the documen-
tation of repurchase, securities lending and derivatives transactions in the 
euro zone. As such, the EMA replaces domestic master agreements for 
collateralised transactions, such as German and French master agreements 
for repurchase transactions.54 The uniform provisions of the EMA cannot 
only be applied to document domestic transactions in all European Eco-
nomic Area countries, but are also suitable for cross-border transactions.55 
53 For more information see the Commentary on the 2001 ISDA Cross-Agreement 
Bridge, issued by the ISDA. 
54 See section 3 above. 
55 The text of the agreement can be found on www.fbe.be. See also Lastenouse 2004. 
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The European Master Agreement (EMA) is a special agreement in that 
different financial products can be documented under it. The first edition 
of the EMA was issued in October 1999 and was designed for repurchase 
transactions and securities loans. This edition was revised in January 2001. 
A subsequent January 2004 edition of the EMA also makes it possible to 
enter into derivatives transactions under the EMA. Whereas repurchase, 
securities lending and derivatives transactions are documented in 
different agreements on the international level (e.g. the Global Master 
Repurchase Agreement, the Global Master Securities Lending Agreement 
and the ISDA Master Agreements respectively), in Europe these financial 
products can now be documented under one agreement, the EMA.'6 
The EMA consists of General Provisions which apply to all financial 
products and which are negotiated in finer detail in the Special Provisions 
by the parties. The General and Special Provisions are complemented by 
Product Annexes. Three kinds of Product Annexes have been issued: for 
repurchase transactions, for securities lending and for derivatives trans-
actions. In addition, a general Margin Maintenance Annex is available for 
all financial transactions concluded under the EMA. 
The EMA offers cross-product facilities tobe used both in 'normal circum-
stances' as well as in circumstances in which the parties wish to terminate 
their relationship prematurely. The cross-product character of the EMA 
becomes apparent when one examines the payment netting, the margin 
maintenance and the termination provisions of the agreement. 
a. Payment netting 
Section 3(4) of the General Provisions sets out the foundation for payment 
netting in respect of cash and/or other fungible assets under the EMA. 
This section makes it possible for parties to limit payment netting either 
to one transaction, or to a specified type of transaction (for example, to 
repos, securities lending and derivatives separately), although payment 
56 References to the EMA in the text below relate to the latest available edition of the 
constituents of the agreement, i.e. to the 2004 General Provisions, the 2004 Special 
Provisions, the 2001 Product Annex for Repurchase Transactions, the 2001 Product 
Annex for Securities Loans, the 2004 Product Annex for Derivative Transactions 
and the 2004 Margin Maintenance Annex. 
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netting may also be applied on a consolidated basis to all types of trans-
actions under the EMA.57 
b. Margin maintenance 
In the EMA, margin maintenance is regulated on a uniform basis in one 
Margin Maintenance Annex for repo, securities lending and derivatives 
transactions. The Product Annexes of these financial products contain 
provisions on margin maintenance which refer to the Margin Annex.58 
The Margin Annex basically provides several means of margin manage-
ment: (1) per transaction; (2) per group of transactions (for example, by 
treating repos, securities lending and derivative transactions separately, 
or by distinguishing between transactions relating to fixed income and 
equity securities); (3) in relation to an aggregate of all transactions under 
the EMA, or (4) otherwise, as agreed by the parties.59 As in the case of 
payment netting, margin maintenance can, therefore, also take place on 
a cross-product basis, if the parties so agree. 
c. Termination 
The termination provisions of the EMA also clearly show the cross-
product character of the agreement. The EMA's General Provisions 
determine what happens when a termination event occurs which leads to 
a premature end to one or more transactions concluded between the 
parties. The uniform procedures concerning the termination, calculation 
and payment of a final settlement amount are set out in Sections 6 and 7 
of the General Provisions. Transactions concluded under the EMA may 
be terminated prematurely in the event of a default or a change of circum-
stances.60 The cross-product character of the EMA is particularly apparent 
in the case of a default. In the event of default, all the transactions under 
an agreement are terminated, i.e. all repo, securities lending and deriv-
atives transactions. The consequences of a change of circumstances are 
usually limited to one or more transactions. For the transaction(s) termi-
nated upon an event of default or a change of circumstances, a final 
57 Parties make their choice m the Special Provisions (Section 1(1) of the Elections and 
Amendments) 
58 See Section 6(1) of the Repurchase Annex, Section 5 of the Securities Loan Annex 
and Section 3 of the Derivatives Annex. 
59 See Section 1 (1 ) of the Margin Maintenance Annex, in conjunction with the Special 
Provisions (Section 11(1) of the Elections and Amendments). 
60 See Sections 6(1) ('Termination due to an Event of Default') and 6(2) ('Termination 
due to Change of Circumstances') of the EMA General Provisions respectively 
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settlement amount is established on the basis of Section 7 of the EMA. The 
final settlement amount is a single net amount payable by one of the 
parties. 
5.4 'Master master' agreements 
5.4.1 Introduction 
A third way to link different financial products, in addition to bridge 
provisions and the documentation of different financial products in a 
single master agreement, is through so-called 'master master' agreements. 
Over the past decades, several master agreements for the documentation 
of different financial products have come into use. Examples of such 
master agreements are the Global Master Repurchase Agreement (GMRA) 
for repos, the Global Master Securities Lending Agreement (GMSLA) for 
securities lending arrangements and the ISDA's Master Agreements for 
derivatives. A 'master master' is an agreement that links master agree-
ments for special financial products, notably in an event of default. 
Without a master master agreement, the situation upon default would be 
such that net sums payable arise under, for example, the GMRA, the 
GMSLA and the ISDA Master Agreements separately. Three payment 
obligations thus come into being. In this scenario, there is still a consider-
able level of counterparty risk. The effect of an additional master master 
agreement is that these three net sums payable are also netted, resulting 
in a single net sum payable. The result is a further limitation of risk. 
Master master agreements are, for example, used by the European Central 
Bank.61 Another relevant example of a master netting agreement is the 
Cross-Product Master Agreement discussed below.62 
5.4.2 Cross-Product Master Agreement 
In February 2000, a number of associations representing the financial 
industry63 launched the Cross-Product Master Agreement ('CPMA1 '). The 
61 See Annex 2 to Guideline ECB/2000/1 (as amended) 
62 The text of the Cross-Product Master Agreement can be found on www 
bondmarkets com 
63 These associations include. The Bond Market Association, the British Bankers' Asso-
ciation, the Emerging Markets Traders Association, the Foreign Exchange Com-
mittee, the International Primary Market Association, the International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association, the Japan Securities Dealers Assoaation, the London 
Investment Bankmg Assoaation, and the Investment Dealers Assoaation of 
Canada 
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goal of this master master agreement is to reduce risk by determining 
what should happen when two parties enter into multiple master agree­
ments for specific financial transactions. The CPMA 1 considers situations 
in which a default takes place under one or more master agreements. It 
does not consider netting under 'normal circumstances'. Under the CPMA 
1, an event of default arising under one agreement will, as a rule, also 
constitute an event of default under all other master agreements64 and so-
called 'uncovered' transactions, i.e. transactions between parties that do 
not fall within the framework of a standard agreement65, to which the 
CPMA 1 applies. This means that all master agreements to which the 
CPMA 1 applies can be terminated. If the non-defaulting party elects that 
the CPMA 1 should indeed apply, not only will the agreement under 
which the default occurs be closed out, but so will all other agreements 
between the parties. It is not necessary for an event of default which leads 
to a CPMA 1 close-out to be envisaged in all agreements to which the 
CPMA 1 applies; it is sufficient that the event is an event of default under 
one of the agreements. Additional events of default may be specified in 
the CPMA 1 itself, while limitations may also be drafted regarding events 
of default in the underlying agreements which can trigger the applica­
bility of the CPMA 1. 
It is obvious that different agreements may contain different procedures 
for the determination of net settlement amounts. In order to take such 
different procedures into account, the CPMA 1 envisages (1) that each of 
the underlying agreements determines the way in which settlement 
amounts are to be calculated under that agreement, including time 
frames, and (2) that, under the CPMA 1, each time such a settlement 
amount falls due, it is to be set-off against settlement amounts which fell 
due earlier under other agreements. The process described under (2) 
continues and payment is deferred until all settlement amounts under the 
agreements falling under the CPMA 1 have been set off and a final net 
settlement amount has been reached. This final net settlement amount is 
the amount payable by one party to the other.66 
64 See the Schedule to the CPMA 1, Part I, which contains a list of master agreements 
which can be brought under the CPMA 1 
65 When 'agreements' are referred to in this section, it is understood that they also 
refer to uncovered transactions 
66 For a more detailed treatment of the CPMA 1, see the Guidance Notes to the agree­
ment 
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The CPMA issued in February 2000 ('CPMA 1') is limited to bilateral 
relationships. In June 2003, the associations that had issued the CPMA 1 
also issued the Cross-Product Master Agreement (Cross-Affiliate Version 
2) ('CPMA 2'). The CPMA 2 has been designed to extend the risk-
mitigating effects of CPMA 1 to a scenario in which multiple, affiliated 
entities have entered into multiple master agreements for specific finan-
cial products with a single common counterparty.67 
5.5 Practical application 
In sections 5.2,5.3 and 5.4 above, three means of linking flows of cash and 
securities under different financial products have been discussed. The 
results of the different cross-product arrangements that have appeared 
over the last decade are largely the same. In all circumstances, the parties 
reduce their counterparty risk because they net payment obligations 
under different financial agreements and have only one resulting net 
claim for the payment of money. One wonders under what circumstances 
a certain cross-product arrangement should be applied. To a large extent, 
this seems to depend upon the financial transactions that the parties 
usually conclude. For parties who regularly enter into derivatives trans-
actions under ISDA documentation, opting for the ISDA Cross-Agreement 
Bridge is logical. For parties operating in the European repo, securities 
lending and/or derivatives markets, the EMA is an appropriate cross-
product arrangement. In other relationships, the parties can opt for the 
CPMA to apply. 
The choice of a particular cross-product agreement may also be influenced 
by the fact that the EMA does not only apply in the event of a default, but 
also under 'normal' circumstances, whereas the ISDA Cross-Agreement 
Bridge and the CPMA are designed for application in default situations 
only. Another significant factor has been pointed out by Lastenouse and 
relates specifically to default situations. The advantage of using the single 
agreement structure available to European market participants in the form 
of the EMA is that the contractual provisions of the EMA that set out 
events of default, valuation mechanisms and time frames, are identical for 
repurchase, securities lending and derivatives transactions. This leads to 
a reduction in the risk of mismatches between related transactions. 
Bridging different agreements, or applying a 'master master' agreement 
67 For a further discussion of CPMA 2, see the text of the agreement and the Guidance 
Notes thereto. 
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can lead to mismatches because of differences in events of default, valua-
tion mechanisms and time frames. In any case, the bridging approach and 
the 'master master' approach require careful legal drafting which takes 
into account different agreements, whereas the EMA is a single agreement 
with standardised provisions for all types of financial transactions 
involved.68 
In this context, the joint letter of TBMA and the ISDA, dated 15 October 
2004 and relating to the regulatory treatment of securities financing trans-
actions, is also noteworthy. It appears from this letter that the choice of the 
ISDA Cross-Agreement Bridge, the EMA or the CPMA is not relevant for 
regulatory purposes. In all instances, the reduction of counterparty risk 
will generally lead to lower capital adequacy requirements. 
6. COMMERCIAL MARKET PARTICIPANTS 
6.1 Introduction 
Repurchase and securities lending arrangements are entered into on a 
very wide scale by commercial market participants." Derivatives trans-
actions, too, are very common and represent enormous values; this also 
holds true for margin collateral provided in the course of such trans-
actions.70 The bulk of transactions involving financial collateral are 
entered into between traders at the trading desks of major financial insti-
tutions. Sometimes an agreement and one or more transactions are also 
entered into on a more customized basis, in structured finance trans-
actions, for example, but this is typically not the case. The text of the 
March 2001 Proposal for a Collateral Directive and the final text of the 
Collateral Directive give a good indication of the most important par-
ticipants in the financial collateral markets. 
6.2 The March 2001 Proposal for a Collateral Directive 
Article 2(4) of the March 2001 Proposal for a Collateral Directive identifies 
the market participants to which the draft directive was intended to 
apply. It states: 
68 See Lastenouse 2004, in particular the section on the 'Single Agreement Structure'. 
69 See the European Repo Surveys mentioned in section 1 of chapter I. 
70 See e.g. the ISDA Margin Survey 2005. 
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The collateral provider and the collateral taker must each be: 
(a) a public authority or a central bank; 
(b) a financial institution under prudential supervision; or 
(c) a person other than a natural person whose capital base exceeds EUR 100 
million or whose gross assets exceed EUR 1000 million, at the time where financial 
collateral is actually delivered, according to the most recently prepared account 
published within a period no greater than two years prior to that time. 
This rather simple formula related only to major market participants. 
Public authorities (such as ministries of finance), central banks and finan-
cial institutions under prudential supervision were intended to fall within 
the scope of the Collateral Directive. In addition, the directive was to be 
applicable to transactions between a collateral provider and a collateral 
taker who both met considerable quantitative requirements in respect of 
their capital base (minimum: 100 million euro) or gross assets (minimum: 
1000 million euro). 
6.3 The final text of the Collateral Directive 
The final text of the Collateral Directive is far more detailed than that of 
the March 2001 Proposal. Article 1(2) of the Collateral Directive states: 
The collateral taker and the collateral provider must each belong to one of the 
following categories: 
(a) a public authority (excluding publicly guaranteed undertakings unless they fall 
under points (b) to (e)) including: 
(i) public sector bodies of Member States charged with or intervening in the 
management of public debt, and 
(ii) public sector bodies of Member States authorised to hold accounts for 
customers; 
(b) a central bank, the European Central Bank, the Bank for International Settle-
ments, a multilateral development bank as defined in Article 1(19) of Directive 
2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 March 2000 
relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions71, the 
International Monetary Fund and the European Investment Bank; 
(c) a financial institution subject to prudential supervision including: 
(i) a credit institution as defined in Article 1(1) of Directive 2000/12/EC, in-
cluding the institutions listed in Article 2(3) of that Directive; 
(ii) an investment firm as defined in Article 1(2) of Council Directive 93/22/ 
EEC of 10 May 1993 on investment services in the securities field72; 
(iii) a financial institution as defined in Article 1(5) of Directive 2000/12/EC; 
71 OJ L 126, 26.5.2000, p. 1. Directive as amended by Directive 2000/28/EC (OJ L 275, 
27.10.2000, p. 37). 
72 OJ L 141,11.6.1993, p. 27. Directive as last amended by Directive 2000/64/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 290,17.11.2000, p. 27). 
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(iv) an insurance undertaking as defined in Article 1(a) of Council Directive 
92/49/EEC of 18 June 1992 on the coordination of laws, regulations and admin­
istrative provisions relating to direct insurance other than life assurance73 and 
a life assurance undertaking as defined in Article 1(a) of Council Directive 
92/96/EEC of 10 November 1992 on the coordination of laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions relating to direct life assurance 4, 
(v) an undertaking for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) 
as defined in Article 1(2) of Council Directive 85/611/EEC of 20 December 1985 
on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating 
to undertakings for collective investment m transferable securities (UCITS) , 
(vi) a management company as defmed in Article la(2) of Directive 85/611/ 
EEC, 
(d) a central counterparty, settlement agent or clearing house, as defined respec­
tively in Article 2(c), (d) and (e) of Directive 98/26/EC, including similar institutions 
regulated under national law acting in the futures, options and derivatives markets 
to the extent not covered by that Directive, and a person, other than a natural 
person, who acts in a trust or representative capacity on behalf of any one or more 
persons that includes any bondholders or holders of other forms of secuntised debt 
or any insti tu hon as dehned in points (a) to (d), 
(e) a person other than a natural person, including unincorporated firms and 
partnerships, provided that the other party is an institution as defined in points (a) 
to(d) 
Subsections (a)-(d) of Article 1(2) of the Collateral Directive now contain 
a more detailed description of the major market participants. These in­
clude public authorities, central banks, the European Central Bank, finan­
cial institutions under prudential supervision (such as credit institutions, 
investment firms and insurance undertakings), central counterparties, 
settlement agents, clearing houses, and other comparable market par­
ticipants. Essentially, this list more precisely defines the major market par­
ticipants mentioned in the March 2001 Proposal. 
It should, however, be noted that not all major market participants are 
mentioned in subsections (a)-(d) of Article 1(2) of the Collateral Directive. 
An example of a category that is absent is pension funds. It is likely that 
pension funds have not been mentioned in the Collateral Directive 
because the European directive regulating their activities76 was adopted 
73 OJ L 228,118 1992, ρ 1 Directive as last amended by Directive 2000/64/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council. 
74 OJ L 360, 9 12 1992, p. 1 Directive as last amended by Directive 2000/64/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council 
75 OJL375,31 121985,p 3 Directive as last amended by Directi ve 2001/108/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 41,13 2 2002, ρ 35) 
76 Directive 2003/41/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 June 2003 
on the activities and supervision of institutions for occupational rehrement provi­
sion, Official Journal L 235, 23 9 2003, ρ 10-21 
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in June 2003, roughly one year after the Collateral Directive. If interpreted 
broadly, a pension fund can indeed be considered a 'financial institution 
subject to prudential supervision' in the sense of Article l(2)(c) of the 
Collateral Directive. Nevertheless, this example shows the weakness of 
the approach taken in the current version of the Collateral Directive, 
which sets out a list of major market participants. Some of them may not 
have been mentioned explicitly, which causes uncertainty. This dis-
advantage was overcome in the March 2001 Proposal discussed in section 
6.2 above, by envisaging a fall-back provision including enterprises with 
a capital base or gross assets of a certain amount. 
Moreover, the final text of the Collateral Directive contains a material 
change in comparison to the March 2001 Proposal. The final text of the 
Collateral Directive relates not only to major market participants, but, as 
a rule, relates to all persons other than natural persons. This follows in 
particular from subsection (e) of Article 1(2) of the Collateral Directive. 
Some caution is also required with regard to the entities mentioned in the 
second half of Article l(2)(d), because 'a person [...] who acts in a trust or 
representative capacity [...]' for bondholders, for example, will often be 
a major market participant, but this is not always the case. The scope of 
applicability of the Collateral Directive has thus been widened con-
siderably, as it now relates to small and medium-sized enterprises also. 
Small and medium-sized enterprises, however, are not traditional par-
ticipants in the financial collateral markets, which are customarily 
operated through specialized trading desks. 
To a large extent, the inclusion of enterprises, irrespective of their size, in 
the scope of the Collateral Directive seems to have resulted from pressure 
exerted by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) 
and the Fédération Bancaire de l'Union Européenne (FBE). In its Statement of 
Position in relation to the March 2001 Proposal for a Collateral Directive, 
the ISDA urged the European Parliament and the Council to widen the 
scope of the Collateral Directive to include all corporate counterparties. 
In its Preliminary Observations of October 2001 relating to the March 2001 
proposal for a Collateral Directive, the FBE also argued for the application 
of the directive to both large and small commercial entities. The European 
Parliament has followed the suggestions of these bodies who represent 
the financial industry, and has proposed the inclusion of all companies in 
the scope of the directive provided that their counterparty is a financial 
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institution.77 The Belgian Presidency of the European Union subsequently 
developed a proposal integrating the changes proposed by the European 
Parliament. In a letter of 3 December 2001 the ISDA and the FBE reacted 
as follows in a joint letter: 
We strongly support an enlarged scop« for the directive to include corporales of all 
sizes. We therefore welcome the Belgian Presidency's proposal, according to which 
corporates of all sizes would be included in the scope on the condition that the 
counterparty is either a financial institution or a public authority/central bank/other 
similar institution (Article 2 of the draft Directive). 
On the 13 December 2001, the ECOFIN Council unanimously agreed upon 
the text proposed by the Belgian Presidency. The Common Position of 5 
March 2002 also features a broad scope of applicability, to which the Euro-
pean Parliament subsequently agreed without any further amendments.78 
The types of enterprises mentioned in Article l(2)(e) of the Collateral Di-
rective may, however, be excluded from the scope of applicability of the 
Collateral Directive by the national legislator. Article 1 (3) of the Collateral 
Directive states: 
Member States may exclude from the scope of this Directive financial collateral 
arrangements where one of the parties is a person mentioned in paragraph 2(e). 
If they make use of this option Member States shall inform the Commission which 
shall inform the other Member States thereof. 
The Council has introduced this provision because it feared that a broad 
scope of applicability of the Collateral Directive would, in an insolvency 
situation, be beneficial to the creditor under a financial collateral arrange-
ment and detrimental to all other creditors of small and medium-sized 
enterprises. On the other hand, the Council did not want to exclude per 
definition small and medium-sized enterprises. It left the issue to be 
decided by the national legislator.79 In light of the argument that a fair 
balance should be reached between the parties involved in financial col-
lateral arrangements, this book advocates the exclusion of small and 
medium-sized enterprises. 
77 See the Report of the European Parliament (amendments 5-9). 
78 See the European Parliament's Recommendation for the Second Reading. 
79 See the Common Position, p. 21. 
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7. CENTRAL BANKS 
7.1 Introduction 
Financial collateral arrangements are not entered into by commercial 
banks only. They are also very important to central banks, which apply 
financial collateral arrangements in order to conduct monetary policy. 
Moreover, central banks can use them for other purposes, such as for the 
management of foreign reserve assets. This section examines ways in 
which the European Central Bank (ECB) and the National Central Banks 
(NCBs) of the euro area make use of financial collateral. Section 7.2 deals 
with the monetary policy framework as it has functioned since the start 
of Stage Three of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) on 1 January 
1999. The outline provided below makes clear that the provision of finan-
cial collateral in the course of reverse transactions (i.e. repurchase trans-
actions or secured loans) or foreign exchange transactions, plays an im-
portant role in the monetary policy framework. This general outline is 
followed by an examination of the central role of reverse transactions in 
this framework. Section 7.3 describes how the NCBs in the euro area use 
financial collateral arrangements for the management of the foreign 
reserve assets of the ECB.80 
7.2 Monetary reverse transactions 
7.2.2 Monetary polio/framework 
a. Introduction 
The Eurosystem formulates and carries out the monetary policy in the 
euro area. The Eurosystem consists of the European Central Bank (ECB) 
and the National Central Banks (NCBs) of the countries of the European 
Union, which have adopted the euro as their single currency. Monetary 
policy is conducted in order to achieve the goals of the European System 
of Central Banks (ESCB)81, primarily price stability and also to support the 
general economic policies in the European Community.82 Monetary policy 
80 On central banks and collateral see BIS 1999; BIS 2001 I, section 1.3. For more 
general background information, see e.g. Smits 1997 and Jansen 2001. 
81 A distinction should be made between the Eurosystem and the ESCB. The ESCB 
consists of the ECB and of the NCBs of all countries belonging to the European 
Union (i.e. including those countries which have not yet adopted the euro). 
82 See Article 2 of the Statute of the ESCB and the ECB. 
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decisions are taken by the Governing Council of the ECB, whereas the 
ECB's Executing Board is responsible for the implementation of these 
decisions. As a rule, for reasons of operational efficiency in particular, 
monetary policy decisions are executed on a decentralised level by the 
NCBs in the euro area. 
The three main components of the monetary policy framework of the Eu­
rosystem are: (1) the obligation for credit institutions to hold minimum 
reserves with the Eurosystem, (2) open market operations and (3) the 
standing facilities. One of the main objectives of these three 'pillars' of the 
monetary policy framework is to manage the liquidity in the euro area. 
These three pillars will now be discussed.83 
b. Minimum reserves 
Minimum reserve requirements are the first pillar of the Eurosystem's 
monetary policy framework. One of the main goals of these reserve 
requirements is the creation of a structural liquidity shortage in the com­
mercial markets. This goal is attained as follows. Minimum reserve 
requirements apply to commercial financial institutions. Such institutions 
are obliged to hold a certain amount of money in an account with a central 
bank. Because this money is no longer available in the market, the result 
is a structural liquidity shortage in the commercial markets. Because of 
this structural deficit, commercial market participants are interested in the 
liquidity that a central bank has to offer. The minimum reserve system 
therefore enables the Eurosystem to actively influence the amount of 
money in the market. Commercial market participants will be interested 
in entering into 'open market operations' (as described below) with a cen­
tral bank in order to enhance their liquidity. Minimum reserves are, for 
this reason, a precondition for the effective management of the liquidity 
in the euro area. Without a structural liquidity shortage, commercial 
banks would not necessarily be interested in conducting open market 
operations with central banks. 
Compliance with minimum reserve requirements is calculated on average 
over a period of about one month. This means that financial institutions 
are not always obliged to meet minimum reserves standards. Only at the 
end of each reserve maintenance period of about one month (over which 
83 For a general outline of the single monetary policy framework in the euro area, see 
ECB 2004 I (in particular chapter 4) and ECB 2005. 
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the average of reserves is calculated), should they comply with the 
minimum reserve requirements. At that moment they must calculate the 
average of the daily balances of their reserve accounts over the whole 
reserve maintenance period. At the end of the maintenance period, the 
financial institution's average daily balances should match the minimum 
reserve requirements.84 
c. Open market operations 
Open market operations are the second pillar of the Eurosystem's 
monetary policy framework. Open market operations are those operations 
through which central banks actually influence the liquidity in the euro 
zone. These operations are the core part of the Eurosystem's monetary 
policy framework, which, after all, aims to enhance or limit the overall 
liquidity in the euro zone. Open market operations are always executed 
on the initiative of the Eurosystem. They can be carried out in different 
ways. The most common instrument used to conduct open market opera-
tions is a reverse transaction (a repurchase transaction or a collateralised 
loan), however, outright sales and purchases, the issuance of central bank 
debt certificates, the collection of deposits, and foreign exchange swaps 
are also ways to execute open market operations. The 2004 publication on 
the monetary policy of the ECB clearly indicates the different instruments 
used to conduct open market operations by defining them as operations 
executed on the initiative of the central bank in the financial markets that 
involve one of the following transactions: 
(i) buying or selling assets outright (spot or fonvard); (ii) buying or selling assets 
under a repurchase agreement; (iii) lending or borrowing against underlying assets 
as collateral; (iv) issuing central bank debt certificates; (v) accepting fixed-term 
deposits; or (vi) conducting foreign exchange swaps between domestic and foreign 
currenaes. 
The different instruments mentioned in the definition of open market 
operations will now be discussed in more detail. The buying and selling 
of assets under a repurchase agreement (subsection ii of the definition) 
and the lending or borrowing against underlying assets as collateral 
84 See section 4.3 of ECB 2004 I and chapter 7 of ECB 2005 for more background 
information. 
85 See ECB 20041, p. 116. The definition of 'open market operation' in ECB 2004 II, p. 
224 is less illuminating in this respect. 
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(subsection iii of the definition) will be considered together in subsection 
2 below on reverse transactions.86 
1. Outright sales and purchases 
The first way in which a central bank can influence liquidity is by con­
ducting outright sales. A central bank can buy or sell euros on an outright 
basis, for example, in exchange for securities. When a central bank sells 
euros, this means that the euro liquidity of the markets is enhanced. When 
it buys euros, the total amount of euros in the commercial market 
decreases. 
2. Reverse transactions 
Central banks can also influence liquidity by way of reverse transactions. 
As will be shown in section 7.2.2, such transactions are most commonly 
applied in conducting open market operations. Reverse transactions are 
carried out in the form of a repurchase transaction or as a coUateralised 
loan. The Annual Report of the ECB defines a 'reverse transaction' as 'an 
operation whereby the central bank buys or sells assets under a repur­
chase agreement or conducts credit operations against collateral'.87 
In the case of a reverse transaction carried out in the form of a repurchase 
transaction, a central bank usually buys securities from a commercial bank 
and pays the commercial bank in euros. This enhances the cash liquidity 
of the commercial bank and of the market in general. At the same time, 
the central bank and the commercial bank agree that, at a later moment in 
time, the euros will be returned to the central bank in exchange for securi­
ties equivalent to those transferred at the outset of the transaction.88 
Economically, such a repurchase arrangement is similar to a coUateralised 
loan. In a coUateralised loan, the central bank provides a commercial bank 
with euros in exchange for securities as collateral. The difference between 
a repurchase transaction and a coUateralised loan is that in a coUateralised 
86 See section 4.4 of ECB 2004 I and chapter 3 of ECB 2005 for a description of open 
market operations. 
87 See ECB 2004 Π, p. 225. 
88 The repurchase of equivalent securities has not been taken into account in the 
definition of 'repurchase agreement' in e.g. ECB 2004 I, p. 117; ECB 2004 II, p. 225; 
and ECB 2005, p. 83. 
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loan, the commercial bank retains title to the securities, whereas in a repo 
transaction it does not. 
Originally, the Eurosystem distinguished two types of collateral eligible 
for use in repurchase transactions or collateralised loans. Only the securi-
ties listed as 'Tier One' or 'Tier Two' were suitable to serve as collateral in 
monetary reverse transactions. Tier One securities were recognised 
throughout the euro area. Tier Two securities were of particular impor-
tance for operations in individual countries. Currently the Tier One / Tier 
Two structure is being revised. There will ultimately be a single list of col-
lateral eligible for use in monetary policy operations.89 
Reverse transactions as described above enhance the euro liquidity of the 
markets. These transactions are sometimes also used, however, to absorb 
liquidity. In such cases, a central bank sells securities to a commercial 
market participant in exchange for euros (repurchase transaction) or bor-
rows euros against underlying collateral (collateralised loan). 
3. Issuance of central bank debt certificates 
The issuance of central bank debt certificates is a way for a central bank 
to decrease the liquidity of the markets. This is so because commercial 
banks will pay cash (usually euros) for these debt certificates. 
4. Collection of deposits 
The collection of deposits is another way to limit liquidity. In this case, 
commercial market participants are obliged to put a certain amount of 
money in an account with a central bank. 
5. Foreign exchange swaps 
It is also possible to influence the quantity of euros in the market by 
entering into foreign exchange swaps with domestic and foreign cur-
rencies. Basically, this means that foreign currencies are put into the 
89 See ECB 2005, chapter 6. On the revision process see the ECB Press Releases of 10 
May 2004, 5 August 2004, 30 May 2005 and 22 July 2005; the ECB Governing 
Council decisions (other than decisions setting interest rates) of February 2005 and 
July 2005 (available on www.ecb.int); the Minutes of the meetings of the European 
Repo Council that took place in London on 21 October 2004 and in Luxembourg on 
21 September 2005 (available on www.icma-group.org). 
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market in exchange for euros, which leads to a reduction of euro liquidity. 
Of course, the opposite is also possible: a central bank can put euros into 
the market in exchange for foreign currencies. Like reverse transactions, 
foreign exchange swaps usually have a second 'leg', i.e. after a certain 
period of time, a mirrored 'forward' transaction takes place. The effect on 
liquidity of foreign exchange swaps is therefore always limited by time. 
d. Standing facilities 
Standing facilities are the third and last pillar of the monetary policy 
framework. They are meant to manage overnight liquidity. Standing 
facilities offer solutions to commercial banks that have a shortage or a 
surplus of money at the end of the day. A commercial bank can make use 
of the 'margin lending facility' if it is in need of an amount of money at the 
end of the day. It can use a central bank's overnight 'deposit facility' if it 
has a surplus of money at the end of the day. Standing facilities are 
available to commercial market participants through their own initiative. 
The 'marginal lending facility' is meant to provide euros to commercial 
banks that are not liquid enough at the end of the day. However, the rate 
set by central banks for this facility is the top rate in the market. The 
required liquidity is usually available on a cheaper basis with other com-
mercial banks. A central bank is therefore a 'lender of last resort'. 
The 'deposit facility' is meant to absorb a commercial bank's residual 
liquidity at the end of the day. For a commercial bank, it will always be 
better to lend this liquidity to another commercial bank, because the 
market rate this commercial bank pays is usually higher than the bottom 
rate set by the central bank.90 
7.2.2 The central role of reverse transactions 
a. Introduction 
Whereas section 7.2.1.c ('Open market operations') above outlines the 
instruments for influencing the liquidity in the euro area through open 
market operations, these operations can be further divided into four more 
specific categories, each with a specific goal: (1) main refinancing opera-
tions, (2) longer-term refinancing operations, (3) fine-tuning operations, 
90 See section 4.5 of ECB 2004 I and chapter 4 of ECB 2005 for more information. 
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and (4) structural operations. Main and longer-term refinancing opera-
tions are the principal methods used to determine the market's level of 
liquidity on a regular basis. Fine-tuning operations are applied to manage 
sudden, unexpected changes in the level of liquidity. Structural operations 
allow the Eurosystem to adjust the amount of liquidity in the financial 
markets over the longer term. 
The subsections below show that reverse transactions play a central role 
in these four types of open market operations. Moreover, reverse trans-
actions are applied in the margin lending facility (see section 7.2.l.d 
('Standing facilities') above). The central role of reverse transactions is also 
clear from the following table: 
Eurosystem Monetary Policy Operations91 
Monetary 
policy 
operations 
Types of transactions 
Liquidity-providing Liquidity-absorbing 
Maturity Frequency 
Open market operations 
Main 
refinan-
cing 
operations 
Longer-
term re-
financing 
operations 
Fine-
tuning 
operations 
Strucural 
operations 
* Reverse 
transachons 
* Reverse 
transactions 
* Reverse 
transactions 
* Foreign exchange 
swaps 
* Outright purchases 
* Reverse 
transactions 
* Outright purchases 
* Foreign exchange 
swaps 
* Collection of fixed-
term deposits 
* Reverse transactions 
* Outright sales 
* Issuance of debt 
certificates 
* Outnght sales 
* One week 
"Three 
months 
* Non-stan-
dardised 
* Standard-
ised/non-
standard-
ised 
"Weekly 
* Monthly 
•Non-
regular 
* Regular 
and non-
regular 
* Non-
regular 
91 Source: ECB 2004 I, p. 73. See also ECB 2005, p. 11. 
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Standing facilities 
Marginal 
lending 
facility 
Deposit 
facility 
* Reverse transactions 
* Deposits 
* Overnight 
* Overnight 
* Access at 
the dis­
cretion of 
counter­
parties 
* Access at 
the dis­
cretion of 
counter­
parties 
b. Refinancing operations 
The most important monetary operations of the Eurosystem are refinan­
cing operations. These operations are the main instrument used by the 
Eurosystem to influence the liquidity of the financial markets. They are 
conducted on the basis of reverse transactions with a fixed maturity. The 
so-called 'main refinancing operations' are the most important refinancing 
operations from a quantitative point of view. They take place weekly and 
have a maturity of one week.92 This frequency allows accurate determina­
tion of the liquidity in the euro area. If the Eurosystem determines that the 
overall liquidity of the commercial markets should be lowered, the total 
amount of outstanding reverse transactions will be lowered at the next 
weekly main refinancing operation. If liquidity ought to be enhanced, this 
can be done at the next weekly main refinancing operation by heightening 
the total volume of outstanding reverse transactions. 'Longer-term re­
financing operations', which aim to provide longer-term liquidity, have 
a maturity of three months and are executed monthly. From a quantitative 
point of view, these longer-term refinancing operations are less important 
than the main refinancing operations. They are convenient, however, in 
placing euros in the market for a longer period of time. With main re­
financing operations, the same result could only be reached by renewing 
or 'rolling over' outstanding transactions every week. 
Refinancing operations are carried out on the basis of public tenders. In 
these tenders commercial banks offer a rate for the euros on sale. In the 
case of mam refinancing operations, the Eurosystem sets a minimum bid 
92 Before March 2004, reverse transactions entered into in the course of main 
refinancing operations normally matured after two weeks For policy reasons, this 
term of matunty has been shortened to one week See ECB 20041, ρ 80 and Box 4 2 
on ρ 81 
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rate.93 Commercial banks offer this minimum rate or a higher rate. The 
highest bids are awarded first, followed by the bids with successively 
lower rates, until the Eurosystem has placed the total amount of money 
available in the market. If the bid of a commercial bank in the tender is 
indeed awarded, a reverse transaction can be carried out. In the case of a 
longer-term refinancing operation, no fixed minimum rate is set. In this case, 
the central bank acts as a 'rate taker', i.e. it accepts or does not accept the 
rate offered by a commercial bank. The minimum bid rate, or 'reverse rate' 
in a main refinancing operation is the most important central bank rate. 
This reverse rate is the central bank equivalent of a repo rate in the com-
mercial market. 
The three key rates of the Eurosystem are therefore:94 
r a t e for marginal lending facility (ceiling overnight rate) 
reverse rate 
rate for deposit facility (floor overnight rate) 
The spread between the rate for the marginal lending facility and the 
reverse rate is commonly 1%. The spread between the key reverse rate 
and the rate for the deposit facility is also 1%. If, for example, the reverse 
rate is 3%, the ceiling overnight rate would be 4%, whereas the floor over-
night rate in this instance would be 2%.95 
c. Fine-tuning operations 
Reverse transactions can also be used in 'fine-tuning operations', which 
manage unexpected liquidity fluctuations in the market. It follows from 
the table above that this is the only instance in which reverse transactions 
can be used to both provide and absorb liquidity. In a liquidity-providing 
transaction, the Eurosystem sells euros for securities. In a liquidity-
absorbing transaction, the Eurosystem buys euros for securities. 
93 From early 1999 to June 2000 the Eurosystem conducted its main refinancing 
operations as fixed rate tenders. This, however, led to some instances in which 
severe overbidding took place. For this reason, the Eurosystem switched to a system 
of variable rate tenders combined with a minimum bid rate. See ECB 20041, pp. 80-
82. 
94 See also section 7.2.1.d ('Standing facilities') above. 
95 The reverse rate is also applied for purposes other than monetary policy trans-
actions. For example, the Dutch statutory interest (wettelijke rente) mentioned in 
Article 6:120(2) of the NCC is equal to the ECB reverse rate plus 0.7 %. 
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d Structural operations 
In addition, reverse transactions can be used in 'structural operations' 
when the ECB wishes to adjust the structural liquidity position of the 
Eurosystem over the longer term vis-à-vis the financial sector. In fine-
tuning operations and structural operations, however, a number of the 
other instruments listed in section 7.2.1.c ('Open market operations') can 
also be used. 
e. Marginal lending facility 
Finally, reverse transactions are the tool with which the marginal lending 
facility is executed (see section 7.2.1.d on 'Standing facilities' above). If a 
commercial bank wishes to make use of this facility and borrows money 
from the central bank, it should provide collateral to the central bank. 
7.3 The management of foreign reserve assets of the ECB 
Foreign reserve assets comprise foreign exchange reserves and holdings 
in gold, as well as claims against international institutions such as the 
IMF. Foreign reserve assets are traditionally used by central banks in con-
ducting foreign exchange operations, such as interventions in the foreign 
exchange markets. At the beginning of Stage Three of the EMU, the NCBs 
transferred a part of their foreign reserve assets to the ECB in line with 
Article 30 of the Statute of the ESCB and the ECB. The NCBs now manage 
their own remaining foreign reserve assets and also the foreign reserve 
assets transferred to the ECB in line with Article 10596 of the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community and Article 31 of the Statute of the 
ESCB and the ECB. Both in relation to their own foreign reserve assets and 
in relation to those of the ECB, the NCBs should act in accordance with 
the aims of the ESCB and in conformity with ECB policy decisions.97 This 
section examines the management of the foreign reserve assets of the ECB 
96 See subsechon 2, third indent, and subsection 3 of this provision 
97 A level of autonomy in respect of one's own foreign reserve assets remains in (1) 
transactions by NCBs in fulfilment of obligations towards international organi-
zations, (2) transactions by NCBs under a certain limit, and (3) Member States' 
transactions with their foreign exchange working balances under a certain limit See 
Article 105(3) of the Treaty Establishing the European Community and Article 31 
of the Statute of the ESCB and the ECB 
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for which the ECB has issued specific guidelines in which repo and 
derivatives transactions play an important role.98 
The first published guideline, which sets out how the management of the 
foreign reserve assets of the ECB should take place is the Guideline on the 
Management of the Foreign Reserve Assets of the ECB (Guideline ECB/ 
2000/1)." This Guideline was amended first in June and then November 
2001, and again in September 2002, March and December 2005.10C 
Guideline ECB/2000/1, as amended, sets out the standard documentation 
that should be used when entering into repo and derivatives transactions 
which involve the foreign reserve assets of the ECB. The standard Euro-
system documentation is based on master agreements used by commercial 
market participants such as the EMA, the GMRA, the TBMA Master 
Repurchase Agreement and ISDA documentation.101 The standard docu-
mentation used in the commercial markets, however, is adapted so as to 
take into account the special nature of transactions with a central bank. 
For example, the specific Eurosystem provisions contain a strict confiden-
tiality clause (along the lines of Article 38 of the Statute of the ESCB and 
the ECB) and a special clause on the immunity of the ECB (in line with 
Article 40 of the Statute of the ESCB and the ECB).102 
Guideline ECB/2000/1 contains an Annex concerning cross-product net-
ting arrangements.103 In addition, the Guideline ECB/2002/6 of September 
2002 sets out minimum standards for the conduct of the personnel of 
NCBs which apply when it handles the ECB's foreign reserve assets. 
98 On foreign exchange operations and official foreign reserves, see also Smits 1997, 
pp. 197-202. 
99 Earlier versions of this Guideline were not made public. 
100 For sources, see the overview of Legislation, Guidelines and Principles at the end 
of this book. 
101 See the latest version of Annex 3 on 'Standard agreements for collateralised opera-
tions, over-the-counter derivatives operations and deposits' in the March 2005 
Amendment to Guideline ECB/2000/1, as amended by the December 2005 Amend-
ment to Guideline ECB/2000/1. 
102 See Article 3(2) and Annex 1 of Guideline ECB/2000/1, as amended by the Novem-
ber 2001 and March 2005 Amendments to Guideline ECB/2000/1. 
103 See Article 3(3) and Annex 2 of Guideline ECB/2000/1, as amended by the March 
2005 and December 2005 Amendments to Guideline ECB/2000/1. 
63 
Chapter II 
8. THE COLLATERAL DIRECTIVE 
8.1 Introduction 
The Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on financial 
collateral arrangements ('Collateral Directive')104 is an important step 
towards achieving a uniform legal regime for collateralised transactions 
in the European Union.105 This section examines the main provisions and 
'opt-out' clauses of the Collateral Directive and will consider the practical 
application of the opt-out clauses in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom 
and Germany. A further legal analysis of core issues in property and 
insolvency law will take place in chapters III, IV and V. 
Section 8.2 begins by setting out the limitations to the Collateral Directive. 
These limitations are important m light of the far-reaching consequences 
of the Collateral Directive. The two methods set out in the Collateral Di-
rective for the provision of financial collateral will then be examined. 
First, section 8.3 explores the way in which the Collateral Directive 
approaches title transfer structures and the risk of such a structure being 
recharacterised as a security interest. Second, section 8.4 considers the 
introduction of a security interest combined with a general right of dis-
posal for the collateral taker (a 'right of use'). Furthermore, the way in 
which the Collateral Directive addresses the enforceability of margin 
transfers and substitution arrangements will be discussed in sections 8.5 
and 8.6 respectively. 
The Collateral Directive also contains provisions relating to the enforce-
ment of financial collateral. Such enforcement takes place upon the 
occurrence of an enforcement event and means that the parties terminate 
their contractual relationship. The Collateral Directive addresses two im-
portant issues in this respect: the manner of enforcement and the (non-) 
applicability of certain provisions of insolvency law. The first of these. 
104 See the list of official documents that appeared in the course of the legislative 
history of the Collateral Directive at the end of this book 
105 In studies which were earned out before the introduction of the Collateral Directive, 
divergent legal practices in the Member States of the European Union were 
pinpointed as an obstacle to the development of a liquid cross-border collateral 
market in the European Union See, for example, Giovanmm 1999, Ciampolmi / 
Rohde 2000, the ISDA Report 2000, and the analysis by the European Financial 
Market Lawyers Group (EFMLG) in the EFMLG Proposal for an EU Directive on 
Collaterahsahon (this latter document also forms Annex F of the Commission 
Working Document) 
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relating to the enforcement regime envisaged in the Collateral Directive, 
is addressed in section 8.7. If a security interest has been established in 
respect of financial collateral, the secured party can apply the liberal 
enforcement regime set out in the Collateral Directive. If financial collat-
eral has been transferred outright, enforcement is effectuated by invoking 
contractual close-out netting provisions, a method sanctioned by the Col-
lateral Directive. The topic of section 8.8 is the approach of the Collateral 
Directive with regard to national provisions of insolvency law that may 
apply in the enforcement of financial collateral. In this instance, the 
Collateral Directive follows the approach that was taken earlier in the 
Settlement Finality Directive. Like the Settlement Finality Directive, the 
Collateral Directive contains provisions that (1) prohibit the retroactive 
effect of a declaration of insolvency by a court; (2) allow under certain 
circumstances the enforceability of legal acts concluded after the moment 
of such a declaration; and (3) render inoperable a freeze period that 
possibly applies in insolvency.106107 
8.2 Scope of the Collateral Directive 
8.2.1 Introduction 
Article 1 of the Collateral Directive limits its scope in three ways: (1) it 
allows the directive to apply only to financial products that involve 
collateral in the form of cash or securities ('financial collateral'); (2) it states 
that collateral arrangements must fulfil certain requirements to fall within 
the scope of the Collateral Directive; and (3) it allows the directive to 
apply only to transactions between certain market participants. In ad-
dition to the limitations that follow from the text of the Collateral Direc-
tive itself, a further limitation is possible in connection with the two func-
tions of recovery and tradeability that financial collateral usually fulfils. 
106 This study does not address issues of private international law For this reason, 
Article 9 of the CD, which sets out conflict of law rules in respect of book-entry 
secunhes, is not discussed in this section 
107 For a basic introduction to the Settlement Finality Directive and the Collateral 
Directive, see e g Goode / Kronke / McKendnck / Wool 2004, chapter 9, and 
Johansson 2005, in particular sections 3 and 4 For more information about the 
Settlement Finality Directive, see Vereecken / Nijenhuis 2003; and Pitt 2003 For 
general information on the Collateral Directive, see also Coiley 2001, Clifford 
Chance 2002, and Turing 2002 
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8.2.2 Financial collateral 
The Collateral Directive is limited to financial collateral in the form of 
cash or financial instruments.108 Article 2(l)(d) of the Collateral Directive 
defines cash as 'money credited to an account in any currency, or similar 
claims for the repayment of money, such as money market deposits'. This 
means that cash in hand (banknotes and coins) falls outside the scope of 
the Collateral Directive."" Article 2(l)(e) defines financial instruments as: 
shares in companies and other securihes equivalent to shares in companies and 
bonds and other forms of debt instruments if these are negotiable on the capital 
market, and any other securities which are normally dealt in and which give the 
right to acquire any such shares, bonds or other securities by subscription, purchase 
or exchange or which give rise to a cash settlement (excluding instruments of 
payment), including units in collective investment undertakings, money market 
instruments and claims relating to or rights in or in respect of any of the foregoing 
These financial instruments will be referred to hereafter as securities. The 
most important quality of these securities is that they are actually tradable 
in a market. 
As shown above, financial collateral in the form of cash or securities is 
typically provided in repos, securities lending agreements and deri-
vatives. The Collateral Directive does not, for example, extend to trans-
actions with commodities (e.g. grain, or precious metals) as collateral. 
A first 'opt-out' provision is set out in Article l(4)(b) of the Collateral 
Directive. This provision states: 
Member States may exclude from the scope of this Directive financial collateral 
consisting of the collateral provider's own shares, shares in affiliated undertakings 
within the meaning of seventh Council Directive 83/349/EEC of 13 June 1983 on 
consolidated accounts , and shares in undertakings whose exclusive purpose is 
to own means of production that are essential for the collateral provider's business 
or to own real property. 
The most important part of this provision relates to transactions in which 
the collateral provider transfers financial collateral, the value of which is 
closely linked to the financial position of the collateral provider. The 
108 See Article l(4)(a) of the CD. 
109 See also recital 18 of the CD. 
110 OJ L 193,18.7.1983, p. 1. Directive as last amended by Directive 2001/65/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 283, 27.10.2001, p. 28). 
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national legislator does not have to apply the provisions of the Collateral 
Directive to such transactions. The value of the collateral is closely con-
nected to the financial position of the collateral provider, if, for example, 
the collateral provider transfers securities that he has issued himself, or 
securities issued by enterprises whose existence depends on the economic 
well-being of the collateral provider (e.g. a contractor that almost exclu-
sively supplies the collateral provider). And indeed, if the collateral 
provider were to run into financial difficulties in such instances, there is 
the added risk of such financial collateral turning out to be worthless as 
an object for recovery. It is likely that the value of such securities would 
decrease substantially and that the market for such securities would 
become non-liquid. In addition. Article l(4)(b) of the Collateral Directive 
makes it possible to exclude shares in undertakings whose exclusive 
purpose is to own real estate. This provision was included to meet the 
needs of a Member State (not the Netherlands), in which houses are 
usually owned by enterprises that have been established for this purpose 
only.111 
The Netherlands and the United Kingdom have not made use of this opt-
out possibility.112 In Germany, a limited use of the opt-out clause is made. 
If an entity mentioned in Article l(2)(e) of the Collateral Directive, such 
as a small or medium-sized enterprise, provides collateral in the form of 
his own shares or shares of defined affiliated enterprises, such collateral 
does not fall within the scope of the German law implementing the 
Collateral Directive."3 
8.2.3 Requirements 
Article 1(5) of the Collateral Directive sets out two requirements which 
collateral arrangements have to meet in order to fall within the scope of 
the Collateral Directive. Financial collateral must actually be provided, 
and it must be possible to produce evidence of the provision of financial 
111 See Tweede Kamer 2002-2003, 28 874, no. 3, pp. 3-4; Tweede Kamer 2004-2005,30 138, 
no. 3, p. 4. 
112 For Dutch law, see the definition of 'securities' (effecten) in Article 7:51(e) of the 
NCC. The Explanatory Notes (Tweede Kamer 2002-2003,28 874, no. 3, pp. 3-4; Tweede 
Kamer 2004-2005,30138, no. 3, p. 4) in relation to this provision do not explain why 
financial collateral, the value of which is closely linked with the financial position 
of the collateral provider, has not been excluded. For UK law, see the definition of 
'financial instruments' in Regulation 3 of the Financial Collateral Arrangements 
(No. 2) Regulations 2003. 
113 See § 1(17) of the Kreditwesengesetz. 
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collateral as well as evidence of the financial collateral arrangement itself. 
The text of Article 1(5) of the Collateral Directive states: 
This Directive applies to financial collateral once it has been provided and if that 
provision can be evidenced in writing 
The evidencing of the provision of financial collateral must allow for the iden-
tification of the financial collateral to which it applies For this purpose, it is suffi-
cient to prove that the book entry securities collateral has been credited to, or forms 
a credit in, the relevant account and that the cash collateral has been credited to, or 
forms a credit in, a designated account 
This Directive applies to financial collateral arrangements if that arrangement can 
be evidenced in writing or in a legally equivalent manner 
The first requirement is that financial collateral must be provided. Gener-
ally, the approach of the Collateral Directive is that the provision of collat-
eral should not depend on any formal act. The only real requirement is 
- to paraphrase recital 10 of the Collateral Directive - that some form of 
dispossession should take place on the part of the collateral provider. This 
means that the collateral provided should come into the possession of or 
fall under the control of the collateral taker or of a person acting on his 
behalf. Article 2(2) of the Collateral Directive states: 
References in this Directive to financial collateral being 'provided', or to the 
'provision' of financial collateral, are to the financial collateral being delivered, 
transferred, held, registered or otherwise designated so as to be in the possession 
or under the control of the collateral taker or of a person acting on the collateral 
taker's behalf. Any right of subshtuhon or to withdraw excess financial collateral 
m favour of the collateral provider shall not prejudice the financial collateral having 
been provided to the collateral taker as mentioned in this Directive 
It should, nonetheless, be noted that recital 10 of the Collateral Directive 
also makes clear that formal requirements under national law for the 
transfer or the vesting of a security interest in relation to financial instru-
ments other than book-entry securities (such as endorsement in the case 
of instruments to order, or recording on the issuer's register in the case of 
registered instruments), do not have to be rendered inapplicable.115 
Secondly, Article 1(5) makes clear that the parties to a financial collateral 
arrangement must be able to produce evidence of the existence of the 
114 See also recitals 9 and 10 and Article 3 of the CD 
115 The issue of formal requirements for the transfer or establishment of a right of 
pledge in relation to financial instruments is not discussed further 
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actual arrangement and of the provision of financial collateral under such 
an arrangement. The provision of financial collateral must be evidenced 
in writing, which includes recording by electronic means or any other 
durable medium.116 The existence of the financial collateral arrangement 
can be evidenced in writing, including recordings by electronic means or 
any other durable medium, or in a legally equivalent manner.117 
8.2.4 Market participants 
The provisions concerning the market participants to which the Collateral 
Directive applies have been discussed in section 6 above. For the sake of 
legal clarity, the present text of Article 1(2) of the Collateral Directive aims 
to provide an exhaustive list of these market participants. Article 1(2) is 
broad in scope and relates to both major participants in the financial 
markets and to small and medium-sized enterprises. Only transactions 
between small and medium-sized enterprises and transactions involving 
individual consumers are not covered by the Collateral Directive. At least 
one major market participant should be a party to a financial collateral 
arrangement for the Collateral Directive to apply. 
Article 1(3) of the Collateral Directive contains a second 'opt-out' pos­
sibility for the national legislator. Member States may exclude from the 
scope of the directive financial collateral arrangements entered into by 
entities listed in Article l(2)(e) which will, in practice, often be collateral 
arrangements entered into by small and medium-sized enterprises.11β The 
United Kingdom has not made use of this option. The British regulations 
implementing the Collateral Directive envisage an even wider scope than 
the Collateral Directive. The regulations apply to all transactions with 
financial collateral, except to those involving natural persons.119 The 
Netherlands has also not made use of the opt-out possibility set out in 
Article l(2)(e) of the Collateral Directive. The Dutch implementing law, 
however, quite strictly follows the text of the Collateral Directive and, 
unlike the British regulations, does not extend its scope.120 On the basis of 
§ 1(17) of the German Kreditwesengesetz, financial collateral arrangements 
116 See Article 2(3) of the CD. 
117 On the issue of evidence, see also recitals 10 and 11 and Article 3(2) of the CD. 
118 For the text of the opt-out clause, see section 6.3 above or Appendix 2. 
119 See the definitions of 'non-natural persons', 'security financial collateral arrange­
ment' and 'title transfer financial collateral arrangement' in Regulation 3 of the 
Financial Collateral Arrangements (No. 2) Regulations 2003. 
120 See Article 7:52 of the NCC, and section 9.2.2 below. 
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under German law can be entered into with the entities mentioned in 
Article l(2)(e) of the Collateral Directive, who are also able to enter into 
such arrangements amongst themselves. If the collateral provider is an 
entity mentioned in Article 1 (2)(e) of the Collateral Directive, the arrange-
ment should nonetheless meet certain requirements, i.e. the agreement 
between the parties should relate to a purchase or a disposal of financial 
instruments, there should be a repurchase, a securities lending or com-
parable transaction, or the parties should agree on a loan of fungibles in 
order to finance the buy-in of financial instruments.121 Generally, most 
Member States seem to have applied the Collateral Directive to trans-
actions between major financial institutions, and between such insti-
tutions and other enterprises. Only a limited number of Member States 
have applied the opt-out possibility of Article 1(3) of the Collateral Direc-
tive, or, on the contrary, have taken a more liberal approach that does not 
require one of the counterparties to be a major financial institution for a 
transaction to fall within the scope of the directive.122 
8.2.5 Interpretation of the Collateral Directive: two functions of collateral 
One of the central issues of interpretation arising in connection with the 
Collateral Directive is the scope of the term 'financial collateral arrange-
ment'. Is it that only arrangements that serve both a recovery and a 
tradeability function fall within the scope of this term, or are arrange-
ments that serve a recovery function only also covered? The answer to this 
question is uncertain. In any case, it is clear that the Collateral Directive 
applies to financial products in which financial collateral serves both a 
recovery and a tradeability function. As was shown in section 2.4 above, 
these two functions are customarily present in repurchase, securities 
lending, and certain derivatives transactions. It is, however, open to 
debate whether the Collateral Directive should be interpreted extensively, 
and relate to transactions that are not characterised by both functions. An 
extensive interpretation would mean that traditional security interests 
(such as a pledge without a right of use, or a fiduciary transfer of title) 
would also fall within the scope of the Collateral Directive. Such tradi-
tional security interests serve a recovery function only. In this instance, 
the collateral taker does not have an unlimited right of disposal in respect 
of the collateral provided and the tradeability function is absent. 
121 See Löber 2005 on the German approach. 
122 For more information and further references see also section 3.2 of chapter VI. 
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Since the Collateral Directive generally enforces the position of credit 
providers/collateral takers, financial institutions will naturally be inclined 
towards an extensive interpretation of the term 'financial collateral 
arrangement', which would include traditional security interests. How-
ever, the analysis in the chapters below shows that such an interpretation 
may have negative consequences for collateral providers, such as small 
and medium-sized enterprises in particular. The argument that those in 
a weaker position deserve a level of protection supports the more restric-
tive interpretation of the Collateral Directive proposed in chapter VI. 
8.3 Title transfers: no recharacterisation 
Article 6 of the Collateral Directive sanctions the enforceability of title 
transfer arrangements. The text of this provision reads as follows: 
Member States shall ensure that a title transfer financial collateral arrangement can 
take effect in accordance with its terms 
Before the introduction of the Collateral Directive a recharacterisation risk 
was perceived in collateralised transactions in a number of countries of 
the European Union. Recharacterisation means that an outright transfer 
of title is treated as a security interest in line with the actual intentions of 
the parties in the course of legal proceedings, for example. The Collateral 
Directive is intended to eliminate this risk. In recital 13 of the Collateral 
Directive, this is phrased as follows: 
This Directive seeks to protect the validity of financial collateral arrangements 
which are based upon the transfer of the full ownership of the financial collateral, 
such as by eliminating the so-called re-characterisation of such financial collateral 
arrangements (including repurchase agreements) as security interests 
The rationale behind the approach of the Collateral Directive is that the 
recharacterisation of a title transfer as a security interest can, under 
ordinary national rules of law, have serious implications for the collateral 
taker. For instance, the collateral taker could forfeit all his rights to the 
collateral if a title to transfer assets for recovery purposes is considered to 
be invalid under national law, or if mandatory requirements for the 
establishment of the security interest should have been met. 
It is not certain whether Article 6 of the Collateral Directive also applies 
to fiduciary transfers of title. Fiduciary arrangements are somewhat 
hybrid in character. On the one hand, there is a transfer of title, on the 
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other, the main purpose of the arrangement is to give the transferee an 
object for recourse. This prompts the question of whether a fiduciary 
transfer of financial collateral should be characterised as a 'title transfer 
financial collateral arrangement' or a 'security financial collateral arrange-
ment' in the sense of the Collateral Directive.123 From a formal point of 
view, one could argue that under Dutch and German law a fiduciary 
transfer is primarily a transfer, under which the rights of the transferee 
are subsequently limited in a number of ways. According to this view, a 
fiduciary arrangement is a 'title transfer financial collateral arrangement' 
in the sense of the Collateral Directive. However, a fiduciary transfer of 
title is essentially a security interest. For those who allow substance to 
prevail over form, it is therefore logical to characterise a fiduciary 
arrangement as a 'security financial collateral arrangement'. A far more 
important question, however, is whether fiduciary arrangements fall 
within the scope of the Collateral Directive at all. This book advocates the 
view that fiduciary transfers should not fall within the scope of the Col-
lateral Directive because the rights of a fiduciary are confined to recovery, 
which excludes the second characteristic function of financial collateral, 
namely tradeability. This approach is intended to protect collateral pro-
viders against credit providers, who are often in a stronger position.124 
8.4 Security interests: right of use 
If collateral is provided by way of the security interest method. Article 5 
of the Collateral Directive allows the establishment of a so-called 'right of 
use' in respect of that collateral for the benefit of the collateral taker. 
Article 5 of the Collateral Directive on the right of use of financial collat-
eral under security financial collateral arrangements reads as follows: 
1. If and to the extent that the terms of a security financial collateral arrangement 
so provide. Member States shall ensure that the collateral taker is entitled to 
exercise a right of use in relation to financial collateral provided under the security 
financial collateral arrangement. 
2. Where a collateral taker exercises a right of use, he thereby incurs an obligation 
to transfer equivalent collateral to replace the original financial collateral at the 
latest on the due date for the performance of the relevant financial obligations 
covered by the security financial collateral arrangement. Alternatively, the collat-
eral taker shall, on the due date for the performance of the relevant financial 
123 See the definitions in Articles 2(l)(b) and 2(l)(c) of the CD. 
124 See also section 8.2.5 above. For a further elaboration of fiduciary transfers of 
ownership and the limitations to which they are subject, see sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 
of chapter III below. 
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obligations, either transfer equivalent collateral, or, if and to the extent that the 
terms of a security financial collateral arrangement so provide, set off the value of 
the equivalent collateral against or apply it in discharge of the relevant financial 
obligations 
3 The equivalent collateral transferred in discharge of an obligation as described 
in paragraph 2, first subparagraph, shall be subject to the same security financial 
collateral agreement to which the original financial collateral was subject and shall 
be treated as having been provided under the security financial collateral arrange­
ment at the same time as the original financial collateral was first provided 
4 Member States shall ensure that the use of financial collateral by the collateral 
taker according to this Article does not render invalid or unenforceable the rights 
of the collateral taker under the security financial collateral arrangement in relation 
to the financial collateral transferred by the collateral taker in discharge of an 
obligation as described in paragraph 2, first subparagraph 
5 If an enforcement event occurs while an obligation as described in paragraph 2 
first subparagraph remains outstanding, the obligation may be the subject of a 
close-out netting provision 
A right of use means that the collateral taker has the right to dispose of the 
collateral in favour of a third party by transferring ownership or by vest­
ing a security interest. Article 2(l)(m) defines a right of use as 'the right of 
the collateral taker to use and dispose of financial collateral provided 
under a security financial collateral arrangement as the owner of it in 
accordance with the terms of the security financial collateral arrange­
ment'. By introducing the possibility of granting a general right of dispo­
sal to collateral takers, the Collateral Directive enhances the liquidity of 
the cash and securities markets.125 
If the collateral taker exercises his right of use, he becomes obliged to 
transfer equivalent assets to the collateral provider. He must do so at the 
end of the transaction at the very latest. The equivalent collateral is subject 
to the same financial collateral arrangement as the collateral originally 
provided, and is treated as if it has been provided at the same time that 
the original collateral was first provided. The equivalent collateral is thus 
a substitute for the original collateral.126 
125 See recital 19 of the CD 
126 On the legislative history of the 'right of use' see the Commission Working Docu­
ment, ρ 12, Annex A, ρ 7 and 8, Annex Β (m particular section 3), and Annex F, ρ 
11 of the Commission Working Document; and the different proposed texts in 
respect of the right of use provision throughou t the legislative process leading to the 
Collateral Directive See also the 2001ISDA Statement of Position in relation to the 
March 2001 Proposal 
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Before the introduction of the right of use in the European Collateral 
Directive, a security interest combined with a general right of disposal 
occurred in the American financial markets. The right of use envisaged by 
the Collateral Directive, however, seems incompatible with the systems 
of property law of many, if not all, European countries. After all, it is in 
keeping with the nature of a security interest that the beneficiary thereof 
is only entitled to dispose of the object in respect of which he has a right, 
if the collateral provider defaults. His rights are limited to having recourse 
to the proceeds of the financial collateral up to the amount of the secured 
claim which he has against the provider of security. It is therefore unlikely 
that an unlimited right of disposal under 'normal circumstances' is con­
sistent with the nature of a security interest. 
A security interest combined with a right of use is investigated further in 
chapter IV. As stated in section 8.2.5 above, this book examines whether 
the Collateral Directive applies only to liquidity-enhancing security inter­
ests combined with a right of use, or if it is also applicable to traditional 
security interests in respect of financial collateral (i.e. those interests) 
without a general right of disposal for the collateral taker).127 
8.5 Margin transfers 
Article 8(3)(a) of the Collateral Directive offers protection to margin 
transfers that occur in the course of a transaction.128 Article 8(3) of the Col­
lateral Directive reads as follows: 
Where a financial collateral arrangement contains: 
(a) an obligation to provide financial collateral or additional financial collateral in 
order to take account of changes in the value of the financial collateral or in the 
amount of the relevant financial obligations, or 
(b) a right to withdraw financial collateral on providing, by way of substitution or 
exchange, financial collateral of substantially the same value. 
Member States shall ensure that the provision of financial collateral, additional 
financial collateral or substitute or replacement financial collateral under such an 
obligation or right shall not be treated as invalid or reversed or declared void on the 
sole basis that: 
127 See also section 8.2.5 above. 
128 See also section 4.3 ('Margin maintenance') above. Note that Article 8(3)(a) of the 
CD calls margin transfers the 'provision of financial collateral or additional financial 
collateral', whereas recitals 5 and 16 of the CD speak of 'top-up collateral'. On 
margin transfers see also recital 9 and the last sentence of Article 2(2) of the CD 
('withdrawal of excess collateral'). 
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(ι) such provision was made on the day of the commencement of winding-up 
proceedings or reorganisation measures, but pnor to the order or decree 
making that commencement or in a prescribed penod pnor to, and defined by 
reference to, the commencement of winding-up proceedings or reorganisation 
measures or by reference to the making of any order or decree or the takmg of 
any other action or occurrence of any other event m the course of such pro­
ceedings or measures, and/or 
(n) the relevant financial obligations were incurred pnor to the date of the 
provision of the financial collateral, additional financial collateral or substitute 
or replacement financial collateral 
The overall purpose of this provision is to prevent any uncertainty 
surrounding the provision of margin collateral. First, it is not possible to 
question a margin transfer solely on the basis that it was carried out on 
the day that insolvency proceedings129 commenced, but before the actual 
declaration of the start of such proceedings. This means that an insolvency 
takes effect at the actual moment the insolvency is declared, and that the 
declaration of insolvency should not be applied retroactively to the be­
ginning of the day of that declaration. In addition, the provision of margin 
cannot be questioned solely on the basis that it is provided during a 
'prescribed' period before insolvency (e.g. under a provision of national 
law intended to protect the joint creditors of the insolvent party by stating 
that all transactions entered into by the insolvent party during a defined 
period before insolvency are automatically invalid).130 Third, the provision 
of margin cannot be declared invalid solely on the basis that the margin 
collateral was provided after the date that the obligation secured by that 
collateral arose. 
An important advantage of the regular provision of margin (e.g. daily) is 
that the credit exposures between the parties are kept to a minimum. 
Thus, margin transfers serve a recovery function. Moreover, where mar­
gin cash and securities can also be used to enter into further trading, they 
promote the liquidity of the market.131 
Note that the Collateral Directive only mentions margin transfers that are 
related to price fluctuations in the market. Margin transfers related to a 
lower credit rating fall outside the scope of the directive. The reasoning 
behind this is that a lower credit rating may anticipate insolvency and 
129 On the term 'insolvency proceedings' see the introduction to section 8 8 below 
130 Compare the approach to 'prescribed periods' set out in recital 16 and in Articles 
8(1) and 8(4) of the CD 
131 On the economic function of marking-to-market and margining see BIS 1999, 
sections 4 51 and 4 5 2 
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that, if insolvency were to occur, such a margin transfer would adversely 
affect the position of other creditors of the transferor of margin.132 Such a 
transfer may also amount to fraud or a similar breach of avoidance rules 
in order to protect the joint creditors of the insolvent estate.133 
8.6 Substitution 
A right of substitution permits the transferor of securities to substitute the 
securities originally provided with other acceptable collateral. A right of 
substitution can only be exercised with the consent of the counterparty. 
If no agreement to this effect is made beforehand, consent must be 
obtained during the course of the transaction.134 
Article 8(3) of the Collateral Directive, which was cited in section 8.5 
above, also applies to substitution arrangements. Subsection 8(3)(b) of the 
Collateral Directive offers the same kind of protection to substitution 
arrangements as it does to margin transfers.135 This means that the sub-
stitution of securities cannot be questioned solely on the basis that it takes 
place on the day that insolvency proceedings are commenced, but before 
the actual start of such proceedings, which implies that a declaration of 
insolvency should not be applied retroactively to the beginning of the day 
it was issued. Nor is substitution invalid merely because it takes place 
during a 'prescribed' period before insolvency. Moreover, substitution 
cannot be questioned solely on the basis that the substitute securities that 
take the place of the original securities are transferred on a date later than 
that on which the obligation they secure came into existence. The protec-
tion offered by Article 8(3) of the Collateral Directive does not impair the 
possibility of invalidating the substitution of securities if it is intentionally 
done to the detriment of other creditors in a prescribed period prior to in-
solvency.136 
Substitution has an impact on the liquidity of the markets. On the one 
hand, the right of substitution enhances the flexibility of the securities 
portfolio of the collateral provider (who may now be able to enter into 
transactions which would otherwise have been impossible without a right 
132 See, in particular, the examination of Article 9 of the CD in the Explanatory 
Memorandum to the Collateral Directive (March 2001 Proposal). 
133 See recital 16 and Article 8(4) of the CD. 
134 See also section 4.4 ('Substitution') above. 
135 See also recitals 5, 9 and 16 and Article 2(2) of the CD. 
136 See recital 16 and Article 8(4) of the CD. 
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of substitution) and, as such, fosters liquidity. On the other hand, the 
substitution arrangement restricts the collateral taker if he gave his prior 
consent to substitutions. In such cases, the collateral taker must ensure 
that equivalent collateral is available to the collateral provider whenever 
the latter invokes his right of substitution, and he must bear this in mind 
when trading with the collateral provided. Thus, the right of substitution 
enhances the liquidity of financial collateral from the point of view of the 
collateral provider, while it may put a strain on liquidity from the per-
spective of the collateral taker. On the whole, however, substitution 
arrangements contribute to flexible and liquid markets.117 
8.7 Manner of enforcement 
8.7.2 Introduction 
One of the aims of the Collateral Directive is to guarantee the rapid 
enforcement of financial collateral upon the occurrence of an enforcement 
event. Enforcement events are events which lead to the premature ter-
mination of the contractual relationship between the parties to an agree-
ment (either automatically or after notice is given). Insolvency is usually 
specified as an enforcement event, but other, non-insolvency related 
events can also lead to the early termination of the contractual relation-
ship. The contractual relationship is not necessarily terminated complete-
ly; a so-called 'mini-close-out' of specified transactions is also possible.138 
The Collateral Directive deals with the issue of enforcement in two 
separate articles. Article 4 of the directive covers the enforcement of a 
security interest, while Article 7 relates to the recognition of close-out 
netting when collateral has been provided by way of a title transfer. The 
Collateral Directive stipulates that it must be possible to put contractual 
enforcement mechanisms in place, whether these relate to financial collat-
eral that has been provided by establishing a security interest or on the 
137 Rights of substitution as a means of encouraging liquidity are under discussion by 
the European Repo Council (ERC) See, for example, the Minutes of the ERC 
Steering Committee Meeting of 20 November 2000, the Minutes of the New York 
Meeting between the International Securities Market Association's ERC Steering 
Committee and The Bond Market Association's North Amencan Repo Council of 
13 December 2000, the Minutes of the ERC General Meehngs of 15 January 2001 and 
14 May 2001 Some of these documents are available on www icma-group org See 
also BIS 1999, section 4 5 7 
138 Cf the definition of 'enforcement event' in Article 2(1 )(1) of the CD See also section 
4 7 above on events of default 
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basis of a title transfer. As is shown below, under the directive the 
enforcement of financial collateral may not be subject to statutory require-
ments under national laws, such as a notice prior to enforcement or a 
prescribed method of sale (e.g. a public sale or a sale approved by a 
judge). Under the Collateral Directive, financial collateral can be im-
mediately enforced in line with contractual provisions.139 
8.7.2 Security interests: a liberal enforcement regime 
Article 4 of the Collateral Directive relates to the enforcement of security 
financial collateral arrangements and reads as follows: 
1 Member States shall ensure that on the occurrence of an enforcement event, the 
collateral taker shall be able to realise m the following manners, any financial 
collateral provided under, and subject to the terms agreed in, a security financial 
collateral arrangement 
(a) financial instruments by sale or appropriation and by setting off their value 
against, or applying their value m discharge of, the relevant financial obligations, 
(b) cash by setting off the amount against or applymg it m discharge of the relevant 
financial obligations 
2 Appropriation is possible only if: 
(a) this has been agreed by the parties m the secunty financial collateral arrange-
ment, and 
(b) the parties have agreed in the security financial collateral arrangement on the 
valuation of the financial instruments 
3. Member States which do not allow appropriation on 27 June 2002 are not obliged 
to recognise it. If they make use of this option. Member States shall inform the 
Commission which in turn shall inform the other Member States thereof 
4 The manners of realising the financial collateral referred to in paragraph 1 shall, 
subject to the terms agreed in the security financial collateral arrangement, be 
without any requirement to the effect that. 
(a) prior notice of the intention to realise must have been given, 
(b) the terms of the realisation be approved by any court, public officer or other 
person, 
(c) the realisation be conducted by public auchon or m any other prescribed 
manner, or 
(d) any additional time penod must have elapsed 
5 Member States shall ensure that a financial collateral arrangement can take effect 
m accordance with its terms notwithstanding the commencement or continuation 
139 See also reatals 5, 14, 15 and 17 and Articles 2(1)(1) and 2(l)(n) of the CD See 
sections 2 and 3 of chapter V for a further discussion of the manner of enforcement 
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of winding-up proceedings or reorganisation measures in respect of the collateral 
provider or collateral taker 
6 This Article and Articles 5 [relating to the right of use of financial collateral under 
secunty financial collateral arrangements, TK], 6 [relating to the recognition of hue 
transfer financial collateral arrangements, TK] and 7 [relating to the recognition of 
close-out netting provisions, TK] shall be without prejudice to any requirements 
under national law to the effect that the realisation or valuation of financial 
collateral and the calculation of the relevant financial obligations must be con-
ducted in a commercially reasonable manner 
One of the key issues in security law is the valuation of the assets, which 
are the object of recovery. National laws usually set out rather strict pro-
cedures in order to prevent abuse and to guarantee maximum proceeds 
from such assets. These procedures are designed to protect the collateral 
provider and, particularly in insolvency situations, the other creditors of 
the collateral provider. Such procedures may, for example, envisage a 
prior notice of the intention to enforce a security interest, a prescribed sale 
in the form of a public sale or a sale subject to approval by a court, and a 
prohibition to appropriate encumbered assets. 
The Collateral Directive, however, does not lay down such strict pro-
cedures and even prohibits them in Article 4(4). What justifies this 
deviation from the traditional approach which protects the interests of the 
collateral provider and his creditors? In this respect in particular the text 
of recital 17 of the Collateral Directive is informative: 
This Directive provides for rapid and non-formahstic enforcement procedures in 
order to safeguard financial stability and limit contagion effects in case of a default 
of a party to a financial collateral arrangement However, this Directive balances 
the latter objectives with the protechon of the collateral provider and third parhes 
by explicitly confirming the possibility for Member States to keep or introduce in 
their national legislation an a posteriori control which the Courts can exercise in 
relation to the realisation or valuation of financial collateral and the calculation of 
the relevant financial obligations Such control should allow for the judicial 
authorities to verify that the realisation or valuation has been conducted in a 
commercially reasonable manner 
Rapid enforcement guarantees the continued availability of financial 
collateral and thus the liquidity of the markets. Rapid enforcement limits 
contagion effects and thus systemic risk. In addition to the enhancement 
of market liquidity, there are two other factors which justify deviation 
from the traditionally strict approach. First, the market participants to 
whom the Collateral Directive applies are, as a rule, professional players 
who are equally powerful and may therefore be expected to agree on a 
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reasonable valuation mechanism. Second, the Collateral Directive states 
that national legislators may determine that enforcement should be 
conducted in a commercially reasonable manner.140 
One wonders, however, whether the liberal enforcement regime en­
visaged in the Collateral Directive leads to a desirable result in all circum­
stances. The prohibition of appropriation and strict enforcement pro­
cedures are intended to protect the interests of collateral providers, who 
are in need of credit, against often more powerful providers of credit/ 
collateral takers. Now that the Collateral Directive is applicable to a wide 
range of entities, including relatively weak small and medium-sized 
enterprises, the enforcement regime envisaged in the directive could 
favour their more powerful major counterparties in the collateral market 
too much. It is open to question whether an a posteriori control relating to 
the enforcement of assets by a judge is a sufficient safeguard. 
In light of this imbalance, the inclusion of small and medium-sized 
enterprises seems inappropriate. Such enterprises play a limited role in 
the liquidity of the cash and securities markets. They are also less power­
ful than the major market participants, who can determine on what basis 
valuation will take place. Small and medium-sized enterprises deserve a 
certain level of protection. For these reasons, the applicability of the Col­
lateral Directive should, arguably, be limited to transactions between 
major market participants which actually enhance the liquidity of the cash 
and securities markets.141 The issue of the liberal enforcement of security 
interests is discussed further in section 2 of chapter V; the issue of the 
limitation of the scope of the Collateral Directive in chapter VI. 
Note that Article 4(3) of the Collateral Directive offers a third way of 
Opting out'. Upon the occurrence of an enforcement event, financial 
instruments can be sold or appropriated.142 Member States that do not 
permit appropriation, however, are not obliged to recognize the appro­
priation technique in respect of financial collateral. This opt-out provision 
has been included because 'this technique is unknown in some Member 
States and it was feared that its introduction solely in respect of financial 
collateral arrangements could give rise to legal uncertainty in those parts 
140 On this latter issue see recital 17 and Article 4(6) of the CD 
141 On this issue see the Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee, the Common 
Position, ρ 21 (bottom of page), the Recommendation for the Second Reading, pp 
7-8, and (on behalf of the major market participants) the ISDA Statement of Position 
142 See Articles 4(1 ) and 4(2) of the CD 
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of the Community where it has never been used'.143 The Netherlands, the 
United Kingdom and Germany have not made use of this possibility of 
opting out.144 
8.7.3 Title transfers: close-out netting 
Article 7 of the Collateral Directive relates to the recognition of close-out 
netting provisions and states: 
1. Member States shall ensure that a close-out netting provision can take effect in 
accordance with its terms: 
(a) notwithstanding the commencement or continuation of winding-up proceedings 
or reorganisation measures in respect of the collateral provider and/or the collateral 
taker; and/or 
(b) notwithstanding any purported assignment, judicial or other attachment or 
other disposition of or in respect of such rights. 
2. Member States shall ensure that the operation of a close-out netting provision 
may not be subject to any of the requirements that are mentioned in Article 4(4), 
unless otherwise agreed by the parties. 
Article 7 relates to the enforceability of close-out netting provisions, which 
usually occur in title transfer financial collateral arrangements. Contrac-
tual close-out netting provisions become effective upon the occurrence of 
an enforcement event, such as insolvency. Close-out netting is usually 
effectuated in three stages: (1) early termination of the contractual rela-
tionship between the parties and the acceleration of all obligations there-
under, (2) valuation of these obligations (and, if necessary, conversion of 
all cash sums due into a single currency) and (3) subsequent set-off, 
resulting in a single amount payable by one of the parties.145 Contractual 
close-out netting is generally enforceable under Article 7 of the Collateral 
Directive. Some issues, however, must still be determined under national 
law. This is true for the questions of whether obligations are reciprocal 
and similar (and thus eligible for set-off), whether they can be netted in 
light of rules on voidable preference (actio pauliana), and in determining 
143 See the Common Position, p. 23 ('5. Enforcement - Article 4'). 
144 For Dutch law, see subsections 1(a) and 3 of Article 7:54 of the NCC; for UK law. 
Regulations 17 and 18 of the Financial Collateral Arrangements (No. 2) Regulations 
2003; and for German law, § 1259 of the GCC (to which provision also § 1279 and 
§ 1295 of the GCC refer). 
145 See also section 4.7 above. 
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the moment at which valuation should take place.146 The issue of close-out 
netting is discussed further in section 3 of chapter V. 
8.8 Insolvency law 
8.8.1 Introduction 
The Collateral Directive contains a number of important provisions 
relating to insolvency law. It prohibits the retroactive effect of a decla-
ration of insolvency. It also allows a level of protection in respect of legal 
acts concluded after the moment of the declaration of insolvency. In 
addition, when financial collateral is enforced it does not allow the appli-
cation of a freeze period that might otherwise be applicable under 
national law. A comparable approach was already envisaged in the Settle-
ment Finality Directive in 1998. This section discusses the three issues 
mentioned in more detail.147 
A brief remark on the use of terminology will precede the discussion of 
the substantive insolvency law provisions. The Collateral Directive 
distinguishes between 'reorganisation measures' and 'winding-up pro-
ceedings'. Reorganisation measures are defined as 'measures which 
involve any intervention by administrative or judicial authorities which 
are intended to preserve or restore the financial situation and which affect 
pre-existing rights of third parties, including but not limited to measures 
involving a suspension of payments, suspension of enforcement measures 
or reduction of claims'. Winding-up proceedings are 'collective pro-
ceedings involving realisation of the assets and distribution of the 
proceeds among the creditors, shareholders or members as appropriate, 
which involve any intervention by administrative or judicial authorities, 
including where the collective proceedings are terminated by a com-
position or other analogous measure, whether or not they are founded on 
insolvency or are voluntary or compulsory'. In this study the collective 
term 'insolvency proceedings' is used to refer to both reorganisation 
measures (such as the Dutch surséance van betaling) and winding-up 
proceedings (such as the Dutch faillissement) that may apply in a state of 
insolvency. 
146 See, in particular, recital 15 of the CD. 
147 The issue of voidable preference (such as the Dutch actio pauhana) has not been 
addressed because Article 8(4) of the CD states that national rules in this respect are 
not affected by the directive. 
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8.8.2 The declaration of insolvency has no retroactive effect 
The Collateral Directive prohibits the retroactive effect of a declaration of 
insolvency in relation to transactions involving financial collateral. Article 
8(l)(a) states: 
Member States shall ensure that a financial collateral arrangement, as well as the 
provision of financial collateral under such arrangement, may not be declared 
invalid or void or be reversed on the sole basis that the financial collateral 
arrangement has come into existence, or the financial collateral has been provided 
[... ] on the day of the commencement of winding-up proceedings or reorganisation 
measures, but prior to the order or decree making that commencement 
The result of this provision is that transfers of cash or securities that are 
made on the day of the declaration of insolvency, but before the actual 
moment of that declaration, are enforceable.148 A comparable approach 
was already envisaged in Articles 3, 6(1) and 7 of the Settlement Finality 
Directive. 
8.8.3 Protection after the declaration of insolvency 
Under Article 8(2) of the Collateral Directive, legal acts relating to finan-
cial collateral that have been concluded on the day of the declaration of 
insolvency, but after the moment of that declaration, are enforceable if the 
collateral taker can prove that he was not aware and should not have been 
aware of the commencement of insolvency proceedings. The text of Ar-
ticle 8(2) of the Collateral Directive reads as follows: 
Member States shall ensure that where a financial collateral arrangement or a 
relevant financial obligation has come into existence, or financial collateral has been 
provided on the day of, but after the moment of the commencement of, winding-up 
proceedings or reorganisation measures, it shall be legally enforceable and binding 
on third parties if the collateral taker can prove that he was not aware, nor should 
have been aware, of the commencement of such proceedings or measures. 
A comparable provision was already envisaged in Article 3(1) of the 
Settlement Finality Directive in 1998. 
148 See also Article 8(3) of the CD for a comparable provision relating to transfers of 
securities under margin maintenance or substitution arrangements, a provision 
which was discussed in sections 8.5 and 8.6 above. 
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8.8.4 No freeze period 
The fact that financial collateral can be enforced irrespective of a freeze 
period that may normally be applicable under national law follows from 
Articles 4(4)(d), 4(5), 7(l)(a) and 7(2) of the Collateral Directive, which 
were cited above in section 8.7. According to these provisions the com­
mencement or continuation of insolvency proceedings may not be an 
impediment to the immediate enforcement of financial collateral, whether 
provided on the basis of a security interest or by way of a title transfer. It 
should be possible to enforce rights in respect of financial collateral 
without any requirement to the effect that 'any additional time period' 
(e.g. a freeze period) must have elapsed. Article 9(1) of the Settlement 
Finality Directive sets out a comparable provision. 
8.8.5 The favourable position of the collateral taker 
The insolvency provisions of the Collateral Directive mentioned above all 
favour the collateral taker under a financial collateral arrangement. If the 
collateral taker has received financial collateral from a counterparty on the 
day of the insolvency of that counterparty, but before the insolvency was 
declared, the collateral taker may keep such collateral. The collateral taker 
enjoys a certain level of protection in the case of legal acts concluded after 
the insolvency of his counterparty, provided that he was not aware, nor 
should have been aware, of that insolvency. In addition, a collateral taker 
can enforce financial collateral without having to take a possibly appli­
cable freeze period into account. The strong position of a collateral taker 
under a financial collateral arrangement has repercussions for the position 
of other creditors of the insolvent estate. The topic of insolvency law is 
discussed further in sections 4 and 5 of chapter V. 
8.9 Conclusion 
The European Collateral Directive is a legislative initiative that is in­
tended to enhance the liquidity of the European markets for cash and 
securities by harmonising a number of provisions of property and insol­
vency law. The directive only relates to transactions involving financial 
collateral (cash and securities). The Collateral Directive relates primarily 
to major participants in the financial markets, but can also be applied to 
transactions involving small or medium-sized enterprises. 
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The Collateral Directive contains several provisions in relation to the 
provision of financial collateral both at the outset and in the course of a 
transaction. As far as the method of title transfer is concerned, the 
directive makes clear that such transfers should not run the risk of being 
recharacterised as security interests. In respect of the security interest 
method, the Collateral Directive envisages the possibility of conferring an 
unlimited right of disposal, a 'right of use' upon the collateral taker. In ad-
dition, the Collateral Directive protects the provision of margin collateral 
and substitution arrangements. 
As far as the enforcement regime envisaged in the Collateral Directive is 
concerned, it is possible to make a distinction between the provisions of 
the directive relating to the enforcement of security interests and close-out 
netting, and provisions relating specifically to insolvency law. 
The Collateral Directive sets out a liberal regime for the enforcement of a 
security interest in respect of financial collateral. Strict national regula-
tions aimed at preventing abuse and guaranteeing maximum proceeds in 
the event of the enforcement of security interests (thereby protecting the 
collateral provider and his creditors) should only be relaxed if there are 
good reasons for doing so. The liberal regime in respect of the enforce-
ment of financial collateral envisaged in the Collateral Directive is 
justified in the case of major market participants. It guarantees the con-
tinued liquidity of the cash and securities markets and limits systemic 
risk. Furthermore, the valuation of financial collateral is likely to be 
reasonable when transactions with financial collateral are entered into 
primarily by major market participants who are equally powerful. More-
over, the Collateral Directive allows for an a posteriori check on the com-
mercial validity of the valuation of financial collateral. If financial collat-
eral is provided on the basis of a title transfer, the enforcement of such 
collateral usually takes place on the basis of contractual close-out netting 
provisions. The Collateral Directive generally sanctions the enforceability 
of such close-out netting. 
In the field of insolvency law, the Collateral Directive contains provisions 
that state that a declaration of insolvency should not have retroactive 
effect in the case of collateralised transactions, that allow, under certain 
circumstances, the enforceability of legal acts concluded by an insolvent 
entity even after the declaration of insolvency, and that prohibit the 
applicability of a freeze period when financial collateral is enforced. 
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There are two ways to limit the scope of the Collateral Directive. First, it 
is possible to apply the directive only to major market participants. Small 
and medium-sized enterprises can be excluded from the scope of the 
Collateral Directive. A number of arguments against their inclusion can 
be made, such as their subordinate role in the liquidity of the cash and 
securities markets, and the level of protection they deserve against major, 
more powerful market participants. A second way of setting a limit on the 
scope of the Collateral Directive is by applying it only to financial prod­
ucts that meet a dual function requirement (recovery and tradeability). 
Should security interest structures and fiduciary arrangements, which are 
entered into for recovery purposes only, fall outside the scope of the 
Collateral Directive? This approach would conform to the structure of the 
standard documentation currently in use by the markets and would be 
consistent with the function of collateralised transactions in enhancing the 
liquidity of the cash and securities markets. 
9. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COLLATERAL DIRECTIVE IN 
THE NETHERLANDS 
9.1 Introduction 
In the Netherlands, the Collateral Directive has been implemented by the 
Law implementing Directive 2002/47/EC on financial collateral arrange­
ments (hereafter, the 'Dutch implementing law').149 On the basis of the 
Dutch implementing law, several provisions have been added to Book 7 
of the Netherlands Civil Code (NCC), and to the Netherlands Bankruptcy 
Code (NBC). The most important of these provisions are outlined in this 
section. A more comprehensive legal analysis can be found in chapters III, 
IV and V.150 ^ 
149 See Staatsblad 2006,15 and Staatsblad 2006,16 
150 The implementation of the Collateral Directive in Dutch law has given rise to 
debate SeetheparliamentaryhistoryinrespectoftheDutchimplemenhnglaw See 
also Lunsingh Scheurleer 2002, Rank 2002, Keijser 2003 I, Dalhuisen / Van Setten 
2003, Keijser / Verdaas 2003, Raijmakers / Van Beek 2003, Keijser 2003II, De Senère 
2004, Keijser 2004, Westrik 20041, Van Erp 2004II, Westrik 2004II, Meulman 2005, 
Van Erp 2005, Lieverse / Wiggers-Rust 2005, Verstijlen 2005, Silverentand 2005, 
Snijders 2005, Van Vliet 2005 
151 Since this book does not address issues of private internahonal law. Article 7 56 of 
the NCC, which lays down conflict of law rules in relation to book-entry secunhes, 
is not discussed in this section 
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9.2 General remarks 
9.2.2 Some definitions 
On the basis of financial collateral arrangements, parties intend to provide 
each other with money and/or securities on a temporary basis. Like the 
Collateral Directive, the Dutch implementing law also distinguishes 
between title transfer financial collateral arrangements (financiëlezeker-
heidsovereenkomst tot overdracht) and security financial collateral arrange-
ments (financiëlezekerheidsovereenkomst tot vestiging van een pandrecht)}52 
In order for a title transfer or security interest to fall within the scope of 
the Dutch implementing law, it must relate to money and/or securities, i.e. 
financial collateral. Money transferred or encumbered must be credited 
to an account or on a deposit. Cash in hand falls outside the scope of the 
implementing law. Securities should be tradable on the capital markets. 
For example, shares in a limited joint stock company (besloten vennoot-
schap) will usually fall outside the scope of the implementing law because 
of a mandatory 'blockade' regulation that prevents shareholders from 
selling shares freely on the market.153 The same holds true for other secu-
rities that are not traded on a market.154 
9.2.2 Scope of applicability 
Originally, the Dutch government was in favour of a particularly broad 
scope of applicability ratio personae of the implementing law. The only 
limitation envisaged by the government was that the implementing law 
should not be applied to private individuals. It envisaged the application 
of the implementing law not only amongst financial institutions them-
selves, but also concerning financial collateral arrangements between 
financial institutions and enterprises, and enterprises amongst them-
selves. The original draft implementing law did not relate to legal entities 
only. Individuals who act in a professional capacity were also covered. For 
the applicability of the implementing law a link with the financial markets 
was therefore not required. The Dutch government envisaged an imple-
152 See Article 7:51(a-c) of the NCC. 
153 See, however. De Serière 2004, section 5, who states that shares of a limited joint 
stock company are sometimes traded in the market. 
154 See Article 7:51(d-e) of the NCC. 
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menting law with a scope broader than that of the Collateral Directive 
itself.155 
The First Chamber of the Dutch Parliament, however, did not share this 
point of view. It was of the opinion that the consequences of the Collateral 
Directive are so far-reaching that an extension of the directive's scope to 
transactions amongst enterprises themselves should in any case not be 
possible. For this reason the First Chamber rejected the government's 
original proposal. Consequently a new draft law had to be presented to 
Parliament, which came into force in January 2006. The final version of the 
Dutch implementing law closely follows Article l(2)(a)-(e) of the Col-
lateral Directive and applies to transactions amongst financial institutions 
themselves and to transactions between financial institutions and other 
enterprises.156 
9.3 Title transfer and right of use 
9.3.2 Title transfers 
For the sake of clarity. Article 7:55 of the NCC states that Article 3:84(3) of 
the NCC, which prohibits fiduciary transfers of title, does not apply to 
title transfer financial collateral arrangements. In addition. Article 7:55 of 
the NCC states that the provisions of pledge law may not be applied by 
way of analogy to title transfer financial collateral arrangements. 
According to the Explanatory Comments, Article 7:55 of the NCC is 
actually superfluous. Still, Article 7:55 raises an important issue of inter-
pretation. As in the case of the Collateral Directive itself, one could ask 
what the scope of the term 'title transfer financial collateral arrangement' 
exactly is. In order to limit the negative consequences of the Dutch im-
plementing law for those in a weaker position, this term should, arguably, 
only relate to title transfers in which both recovery and tradeability func-
tions are envisaged (and which, as such, substantially enhance liquidity). 
155 The first proposal for a Dutch implementing law was given the parliamentary 
number 28 874 
156 The second proposal for a Dutch implementing law was given the parliamentary 
number 30 138 For more information on the entities to which the Dutch imple-
menting law applies, see Article 7 52 of the NCC 
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and not to fiduciary transfers of title in which only the recovery function 
plays a role.157 
9.3.2 Right of use 
An important provision is Article 7:53 of the NCC, which envisages the 
so-called 'right of use' for a pledgee. According to this provision, this right 
of use means that a pledgee can be given an unlimited right to 'use or sell' 
('gebruiken of verkopen') the pledged assets. This phrasing is somewhat mis-
leading. It is clearly the case that the legislator intended to give the 
pledgee an unlimited right of disposal. If a right of use has been granted, 
the pledge is allowed to sell the pledged assets, or to encumber them with 
a limited right. 
If the pledgee disposes of the pledged assets, he may keep the proceeds. 
He is under an obligation, though, to transfer equivalent assets to the 
pledgor at the end of the transaction at the very latest. The term 'equiva-
lent assets' has been elaborated in Article 7:51 (f) of the NCC. Where cash 
is involved, the same amount of cash should be paid in the same currency. 
Securities are equivalent if they are from the same issuing institution or 
debtor, of the same emission or category, of the same nominal value, in 
the same currency and of the same kind. These equivalent assets auto-
matically fall under the right of pledge (a kind of substitution). 
An important issue of interpretation that arises in connection with the 
Collateral Directive and the Dutch implementing law is the scope of the 
term 'financial collateral arrangement' as set out in Article 7:51(a-c) of the 
NCC. In order to protect those in a weaker position arguably only a 
pledge combined with a right of use should fall within the scope of these 
legislative instruments, whereas a pledge without a general right of dis-
posal should not, as it has hardly any impact on liquidity. 
9.4 Enforcement 
9.4.2 Enforcement of a right of pledge 
Article 7:54 of the NCC, which relates to the enforcement of a right of 
pledge in respect of financial collateral, is an important deviation from the 
157 For more on the issue of interpretation, see in particular section 3 of chapter VI 
below. 
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standard enforcement procedure of a right of pledge. If an event of default 
as defined in Article 7:51(g) of the NCC occurs, the enforcement of a right 
of pledge in respect of cash or securities can take place as follows. 
Securities can be enforced by way of (a) a sale and recourse to the pro-
ceeds, or (b) appropriation. In the case of a sale, the securities should be 
sold by an intermediary in a market or on an exchange - under certain 
circumstances even by the collateral taker himself - according to the 
generally applicable rules governing that market or exchange. Appro-
priation is only possible if this has been agreed upon and if valuation is 
based on prices in a market or on an exchange. Cash is enforced by way 
of 'netting'.15e The general provisions of pledge law concerning terms, 
notifications and the formal manner of sale (public sale, approval by a 
judge) are not applicable in the enforcement of a right of pledge in respect 
of financial collateral. 
9.4.2 Close-out netting 
If a title transfer arrangement is ended prematurely, the parties will 
usually want contractual close-out netting provisions to take effect. Article 
7 of the Collateral Directive aims at the enforceability of such contractual 
provisions.159 According to the Explanatory Comments to the Dutch im-
plementing law such contractual provisions are enforceable under Ar-
ticles 53 and 234 of the NBC. Consequently, the implementing law does 
not contain a provision which sanctions contractual close-out netting 
provisions. 
9.4.3 Insolvency law 
The Dutch implementing law also contains a number of amendments to 
the NBC. Two changes, which are set out in the new Articles 63e and 241 e 
of the NBC, relate to the declaration of insolvency and its effects. First, as 
far as financial collateral arrangements are concerned, a declaration of 
insolvency cannot be applied retroactively (as it normally would be) to the 
beginning of the day of that declaration.160 In connection with the 
158 The Dutch implementing law and the Explanatory Comments thereto use set-off 
terminology when referring to the enforcement of a right of pledge in respect of 
cash. This is not appropriate, as a pledgee has recourse, but does not set off. For 
more information, see section 2.2.3 of chapter V. 
159 See also section 8.7.3 above. 
160 If necessary. Articles 23, 35 and 217 of the NBC will, for this reason, not be applied 
to financial collateral arrangements. 
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abolition of this so-called 'zero hour rule', the revised Articles 14 and 216 
of the NBC set out an obligation for the judge to mention in each and 
every declaration of insolvency the exact time it has been issued. Second, 
the protection of contractual counterparties of an insolvent party to a 
collateral agreement is expanded, even after the declaration of insol-
vency.161 A third change is that, in accordance with the new Articles 63d 
and 241 d of the NBC, the freeze period set out in Articles 63a and 241a of 
the NBC does not apply when a right of pledge in respect of financial 
collateral is enforced. Apart from that. Articles 42 et seq. of the NBC 
relating to voidable preference (the Dutch actio pauhana) will remain in 
force m line with Article 8(4) of the Collateral Directive.162 
161 This is a different approach than that of Articles 23, 24, 35, 53(1), 54(2), 217, 228, 
234(1), 235(2) of the NBC and Article 3 72(a) of the NCC, which will, if necessary, 
not be applied in the case of a financial collateral arrangement 
162 The Dutch implementing law leads to comparable changes in respect of the 
retroactive effect of the declaration of insolvency, the enforceability of legal acts 
after the declaration of insolvency and the freeze period in the Credit System 
Supervision Act 1992 (Wei toezicht kredietwezen 1992), the Insurance Undertakings 
Supervision Act 1993 (Wet toezicht verzekeringsbedrijf 1993) and the Insurance 
Undertakings (Benefits in Kind for Funerals) Supervision Act (Wet toezicht natura-
uitvaartverzekermgsbedrijj) These laws will not be discussed here 
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CHAPTER III 
TRANSFER OF TITLE 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Contents 
This chapter deals with title transfers, which are the most commonly used 
method of providing financial collateral in repurchase and securities 
lending transactions. In a title transfer, a party transfers all right, title and 
interest in respect of financial collateral to a transferee without limitations. 
Financial collateral can also be provided by vesting a security interest 
combined with a general right of disposal (a 'right of use'), which is the 
topic of chapter IV. 
Section 2 of this chapter considers the title transfer method set out in 
standard documentation that is used internationally. It will become 
apparent that market participants in the Netherlands apply different legal 
constructions, such as a sale or a loan of fungibles, to effect an unlimited 
transfer of financial collateral. 
Section 3 examines the reasons why market participants choose to provide 
financial collateral through the title transfer method and why they are 
concerned about the recharacterisation of a title transfer as a security 
interest. Under the general principles of Dutch (and German) civil law, for 
instance, what are the circumstances under which the parties should 
choose either an outright transfer of title or the establishment of a security 
interest in respect of financial collateral? To answer this question, the dif-
ferent functions of title transfers and security interests must be examined. 
Recognising a clear distinction between the functions of a title transfer 
and a security interest provides a key to understanding the risk related to 
recharacterisation. This section also considers the approach of the Collat-
eral Directive and Dutch implementing law in this respect. 
Section 4 examines a second recharacterisation risk: whether a transfer of 
collateral under, for example, a repo or a securities lending transaction is 
not actually a temporary transfer of ownership. This is important because. 
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under Dutch law, a temporary transfer of ownership is recharacterised as 
a right of usufruct. 
While this chapter focuses on Dutch law, some comparisons to German 
law have been made so as to stress the importance of the core principles 
of security interests outlined in the next section and to support the argu-
ment that there is an essential difference between the functions of a trans-
fer of title and a security interest. In this chapter, American and English 
law research play a relatively subordinate role, except in section 3.3.3, 
where they are used to provide an extra illustration. American and Eng-
lish law are considered in more detail in chapter IV in connection with 
security interests combined with a general right of disposal. While the 
latter construction is American in origin, it meets the needs of London 
market participants, a factor that has contributed to its becoming part of 
European law. 
1.2 Terminology 
In this book, the term 'security interest' will be used as a general term to 
refer to a limited proprietary right that is established for the purpose of 
recovery. An example of a security interest is the Dutch right of pledge. 
A fiduciary transfer of title, which was recognised under old Dutch law 
and is currently applied under, for example, German law, is (from an eco-
nomic point of view in any case) essentially a security interest. While from 
a strictly legal point of view, a fiduciary transfer entails a transfer of title, 
the powers of the transferee are limited to such an extent that, in effect, he 
has a security interest for the purpose of recovery only.1 In Article 2(l)(c) 
of the Collateral Directive, a 'security financial collateral agreement' is 
defined as 'an arrangement under which a collateral provider provides 
financial collateral by way of security in favour of, or to, a collateral taker, 
and where the full ownership of the financial collateral remains with the 
collateral provider when the security right is established.' 
Security interests are distinguished from 'outright transfers of title' or 'title 
transfers', terms that are generally used as synonyms to refer to the un-
limited passing from one party to another of all right, title and interest in 
respect of an asset. In collateral markets, terminology related to title trans-
fer is indeed commonly applied to indicate an outright transfer of title, i.e. 
an unlimited transfer of all right, title and interest. 
1 See also section 8.3 of chapter II and sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 of this chapter 
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This is apparent in the GMRA: (1) Paragraph 6(e): 'all right, title and inter-
est [...] shall pass to the party to which transfer is being made'; (2) Page 
10 of the Guidance Notes to the GMRA: 'All transfers of securities [...] 
pass absolute title to those securities to the transferee'; (3) Paragraph 6(f): 
'Notwithstanding the use of expressions such as "Repurchase Date", 
"Repurchase Price", "margin", "Net Margin", "Margin Ratio" and "substitu-
tion", which are used to reflect terminology used in the market for 
transactions of the kind provided for in this Agreement, all right, title and 
interest in and to Securities and money transferred or paid under this 
Agreement shall pass to the transferee upon transfer or payment [...]', 
which makes clear that in the case of a transfer of securities under the 
GMRA - notwithstanding the use of market terminology that points in the 
direction of a continuous proprietary interest of the transferor - all right, 
title and interest pass to the transferee. 
The GMSLA also applies title transfer terminology to indicate an outright 
transfer. See, for example: (1) Paragraph 4.2: 'all right, title and interest 
[...] shall pass from one Party to the other [...] with full title guarantee, 
free from all liens, charges and encumbrances'; (2) Paragraph 2.3: 'Not-
withstanding the use of expressions such as "borrow", "lend", "Collateral", 
"Margin", "redeliver" etc. which are used to reflect terminology used in 
the market for transactions of the kind provided for in this Agreement, 
title to Securities "borrowed" or "lent" and "Collateral" provided in accord-
ance with this Agreement shall pass from one Party to another as provid-
ed for in this Agreement [...]', which makes clear that - notwithstanding 
the use of market terminology that points in the direction of a lasting 
proprietary interest of the transferor - the parties to the GMSLA intend 
a transfer of title from one party to the other. 
Title transfer terminology is also used in the heading of Part 3 of the ISDA 
2001 Margin Provisions ('Elective Provisions - Title Transfer Approach') 
and in Section 3.1 of these Margin Provisions, where it indicates that the 
parties intend to transfer all right, title and interest and do not intend to 
create a security interest.2 See also Article 2(l)(b) of the Collateral Direc-
tive, which defines a 'title transfer financial collateral arrangement' as 'an 
arrangement, including repurchase agreements, under which a collateral 
provider transfers full ownership of financial collateral to a collateral 
2 The text of Section 3.1 of the ISDA 2001 Margin Provisions is quoted in section 2.3 
of chapter II. 
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taker for the purpose of securing or otherwise covering the performance 
of relevant obligations.' 
It should, however, be noted that the term 'title transfer' is not entirely 
unambiguous. Often title transfers are indeed 'outright', which means that 
the transferee obtains all right, title and interest without limitation. How-
ever, in the context of a fiduciary relationship, this is not the case. If, for 
example, a transfer takes place for security purposes, such as in the case 
of a fiduciary transfer of title, this transfer is not outright because, even if 
title has been transferred, the powers of the transferee are limited to 
having recourse. Such a transfer is essentially a security interest (see 
above).3 Likewise, in a trust context, a title transfer is not outright. In this 
case, a distinction must be made between 'legal' title and 'equitable' or 
'beneficial' title. When establishing a trust, a beneficiary transfers legal 
title of certain assets to his trustee, while remaining equitably entitled 
thereto.4 Therefore the term 'title transfer' does not necessarily imply an 
outright passing of title; it may also relate to a fiduciary relationship. In 
collateralised transactions, such as repo or securities lending transactions, 
a party generally transfers to his counterparty all right, title and interest 
in respect of securities or cash, without limitations. For this reason, and in 
conformity with the terminology applied in the markets, no sharp distinc-
tion between the terms 'outright transfer' and 'title transfer' is made here. 
If a transfer is of a fiduciary nature, this is explicitly stated. 
The term 'transfer of ownership' is also sometimes applied in this book to 
indicate an unlimited outright title transfer. The term 'transfer of owner-
ship' is not fully appropriate in the securities market. In particular, in the 
case of securities registered in book-entry systems, it is not the 'ownership' 
of securities that is transferred, but rather a claim of a proprietary or 
contractual nature in respect of securities.5 Still, in practice, the termi-
3 As was already indicated in section 8 3 of chapter II, it is not that easy to qualify a 
fiduciary transfer for recovery purposes as either a title transfer or a security finan-
cial collateral arrangement in the sense of Articles 2(1 )(b) and 2(1 )(c) of the CD 
Neither does the collateral taker obtain full, unlimited ownership in the sense of 
Article 2(1 )(b) of the CD, nor does full ownership remain with the collateral 
provider in the sense of Article 2(l)(c) of the CD But, after all, it is not the label that 
matters but the (fiduciary) content of the arrangement See in particular séchons 
3 2 2 and 3 2 3 below on the limitations of the rights of the fiduciary 
4 Cf the term 'title' in Black's Law Dictionary, and in particular 'equitable title' and 
'legal title' 
5 It has even been argued that no proprietary transfer takes place at all when a 
transfer order in respect of book-entry cash and/or secunhes is executed, but that 
such an act should be charactensed as a mechanism sui generis that is comparable 
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nology of ownership is sometimes applied. This is evident in, for example. 
Articles 2(l)(b) and 2(l)(c) of the Collateral Directive (cited above) and 
Articles 12(c) and 13(c) of the GMSLA, which presume that the parties to 
this agreement are entitled to pass 'full legal and beneficial ownership'. 
1.3 Core characteristics of security interests 
Security interests, such as a right of pledge or a fiduciary transfer of title, 
traditionally have a number of essential characteristics, several of which 
are outlined here because they play a key role throughout chapters III, IV 
and V. Particular attention is given to those characteristics that shape the 
fiduciary relationship between collateral provider and collateral taker. A 
number of other core features are also mentioned, even though they play 
a less significant role in this study. The following list of the characteristics 
of security interests is not meant to be exhaustive. They are sketched brief-
ly to serve as a point of reference and are elaborated upon in more detail 
later. 
Under Dutch and German law, security interests, such as a right of pledge 
or a fiduciary transfer of title, grosso modo have the following characteristic 
features that shape the fiduciary relationship between the parties:6 
1. The secured party has a duty of due care in respect of the assets in 
which he has a security interest. This means, for example, that he 
should, within reasonable limits, do his best to prevent any damage 
to or destruction of the encumbered assets. The duty of due care is 
of particular importance in the case of a possessory security interest, 
in which the encumbered objects are in the possession of the 
secured party.7 
2. The collateral provider has a right of redemption. This means that he 
regains full title to the encumbered assets if he pays the secured 
debt. A right of pledge becomes void and ceases to exist once the 
secured debt is fulfilled. This means that from that moment, the 
to novation. See, for example, Schim 2002, Van Setten in Dalhuisen / Van Setten 
2003, and Schim 2004. 
6 Because the fiduciary transfer of title was not codified under old Dutch law or 
German law, references to the NCC and the GCC in the footnotes of this section 
relate to the right of pledge only. Fiduciary transfers of title under old Dutch and 
current German law are further elaborated upon in sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3. 
7 See Articles 3:243 and 3:257 of the NCC, and §§ 1215-1217 of the GCC. 
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pledged asset is no longer encumbered with the right of pledge.8 In 
the case of a fiduciary transfer of title, the title either falls back auto-
matically or should be re-transferred upon the fulfilment of the 
secured debt.' 
3. A secured party has the right to sell upon default of his counterparty. 
The goal of a security interest is to create an object for recourse if a 
secured debt cannot be fulfilled. It is for this reason that a security 
interest can be exercised only in the event of default. The secured 
party has no right to dispose of the encumbered object under 
'normal' circumstances.10 
4. If a pledgee sells the encumbered assets upon default, he must do so 
in a prescribed manner. This usually means, for example, that he 
should give prior notice of his intention to sell the encumbered 
assets and that he is obliged to sell them in public or with the con-
sent of a judge in order to prevent abuse and to yield maximum 
proceeds.11 Under old Dutch law, the formal requirements relating 
to the enforcement of a right of pledge were, to a large extent, 
applied by way of analogy to fiduciary transfers of title. Under Ger-
man law, the original owner and the fiduciary can themselves 
determine in an agreement how enforcement should take place, 
even though the provisions of pledge law are likely to be applied by 
way of analogy in the absence of such an agreement.12 
5. The secured party is not allowed to appropriate the assets upon 
default. The prohibition of appropriation is an additional mecha-
nism to prevent abuse and to guarantee maximum proceeds for the 
benefit of the collateral provider (and his creditors). Because the 
secured party cannot appropriate the encumbered assets, he must 
sell them in a transparent way and in a prescribed manner (see no. 
4 above).13 
8 See ArHcles 3:227 and 3:249(2) of the NCC, and § 1204, § 1223 and § 1252 of the 
GCC. 
9 See sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3. 
10 See Artìcle 3:248 of the NCC and § 1228 of the GCC. See sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 
below for fiduciary transfers of title. 
11 See Articles 3:249-251 of the NCC, and § 1221, §§ 1234-1240 and §§ 1245-1246 of the 
GCC. 
12 See sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3. 
13 See Article 3:235 of the NCC and § 1229 of the GCC. See also sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 
below. 
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6. Should there be any surplus value upon enforcement and fulfilment 
of the secured obligation, the secured party must pay this amount 
to the collateral provider. This reflects the fact that a security interest 
is meant as a safeguard to ensure that the secured debt will be ful-
filled, and nothing more. Any surplus value upon enforcement 
must be transferred to the collateral provider, which is also in the 
interests of the collateral provider's other creditors.14 
These characteristics, which are also referred to as 'pledge principles' in 
the text below, shape the fiduciary relationship between collateral pro-
vider and collateral taker through clearly defining their mutual rights and 
obligations. In particular, they guarantee a balance between the interests 
of collateral providers, their creditors, and collateral takers. This balance 
is generally considered to be fundamental because collateral providers 
who are in need of credit are in a dependent position and therefore 
deserve a level of protection against collateral takers. For this reason, the 
characteristics of security interests mentioned are also, to a large extent, 
issues of mandatory law. They are essentially an elaboration of the prin-
ciple that parties should act in a reasonable manner towards each other. 
The application of the core characteristics of security interests is particu-
larly important in a situation in which there is no equal balance of power 
between the provider of credit and his debtor, who provides an object for 
recovery. 
Security interests also have a number of other characteristìc features, 
which play a less important role in this study because they are not prima-
rily aimed at shaping the fiduciary relationship between collateral pro-
vider and collateral taker. As far as the Dutch right of pledge is concerned, 
the following features may be mentioned:15 
7. The absolute character of the right of pledge, i.e. its enforceability 
against third parties also. 
8. The right of pledge is vested in the encumbered assets, even if those 
assets have been transferred to a third party (droit de suite, zaaksge-
volg). 
14 See Article 3:253 of the NCC and § 1247 of the GCC. See also sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 
below. 
15 The German right of pledge and the fiduciary transfer of title under old Dutch and 
current German law differ in a number of respects. These differences are not dis-
cussed here. 
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9. The accessory relationship between a right of pledge and the 
secured debt, which implies, for example, that the right of pledge 
ceases to exist when the secured debt is fulfilled (see also no. 2 
above) and that the right of pledge follows the secured debt when 
it is assigned to a third party, i.e. the third party then becomes 
entitled to the right of pledge. 
10. In the event of default, a pledgee is entitled to enforce his right of 
pledge without a prior judicial writ authorizing enforcement (recht 
van parate executie), and to separate assets from those of an insolvent 
entity. Moreover, the pledgee has a preferential position in relation 
to other creditors (voorrang).,16 
2. TRANSFER OF TITLE: THE MARKET APPROACH 
2.1 Introduction 
A number of important standard agreements used within and outside 
Europe envisage the transfer of title for financial collateral (see section 2.2 
below). In Dutch practice, collateral is also customarily provided on the 
basis of an outright transfer of title in the course of repos and securities 
lending transactions. Sections 2.3-2.5 examine the different legal causae 
(titels) used by Dutch market participants on which they base the transfer 
of title for financial collateral at the outset and at the end of a repo or 
securities lending transaction. Sections 2.6 and 2.7 pay particular attention 
to transfers of financial collateral in the course of such transactions under 
margin and substitution arrangements. 
2.2 The approach of the standard documentation 
Under the common standard agreements used to document repo and 
securiaties lending transactions within and outside Europe, financial 
collateral is provided on the basis of a title transfer.17 
16 For more information about security interests under Dutch law, see, for example. 
Van Mierlo 1988 (fiduciary transfers of title); Pitlo / Reehuis, Heisterkamp 2001, 
chapter 14.1-4 (pledge law). For security interests under German law, refer to, e.g., 
Baur / Stümer 1999, §§ 55-59; Serick 1990; Strothmann 1995; Jäkel 2001. 
17 See section 3 of chapter II for an overview of the different standard agreements. For 
the title transfer method, see also sections 2.3 and 2.4 of chapter II and section 1.2 
on terminology above. 
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In the case of repos, the Global Master Repurchase Agreement (GMRA) 
envisages a title transfer method of providing financial collateral. It does 
so in relation to financial collateral provided on the basis of a sale at the 
outset and at the end of a transaction (see Paragraphs 1(a), 3(c) and 3(f) of 
the GMRA), in respect of margin securities (see Paragraph 4 of the 
GMRA) and in the event of substitution (see Paragraph 8 of the GMRA). 
Paragraph 6 of the GMRA on 'Payment and Transfer' is the key provision 
that makes it clear that transfers of these types of financial collateral are 
outright, whether at the outset, in the course or at the end of a transaction. 
In particular, subsections (e) and (f) of this provision make it clear that 'all 
right, title and interest' pass to the transferee in the case of a transfer of 
cash or securities under the GMRA. 
In the case of securities lending transactions documented under the Glob­
al Master Securities Lending Agreement (GMSLA), the approach is essen­
tially the same. Under the GMSLA, financial collateral is transferred at the 
outset and at the end of a transaction, as well as in margin and substitu­
tion arrangements (see Paragraphs 1.1, 5 and 8 of the GMSLA). Para­
graphs 2.3 and 4 of the GMSLA make clear that such transfers are out­
right, ι e. that in these cases, all right, title and interest pass to the trans­
feree. 
In the case of repos documented under the European Master Agreement 
(EMA), transfers of financial collateral are similarly outright, including 
payments under margin and substitution arrangements.18 The same 
approach is taken in the EMA where transfers of financial collateral under 
securities lending transactions are concerned, including transfers of cash 
or securities as margin.19 
2.3 Repos under Dutch law 
Participants in the Dutch repo market follow the title transfer approach 
set out in standard agreements such as the GMRA and the EMA. Under 
Dutch law, the transfer of title for financial collateral at the outset and at 
18 See Section 3(2) of the EMA General Provisions in connection with the EMA Prod­
uct Annex for Repurchase Transactions and the EMA Margin Maintenance Annex 
19 See Section 3(2) of the EMA General Provisions in connection with the EMA 
Product Annex for Securities Loans and the EMA Margin Maintenance Annex. Note 
that, whereas Section 3 of the Product Annex for Repurchase Transactions relates 
to substitution, the Product Annex for Securities Loans contains no comparable 
provision See also section 4 4 on substitution, in chapter II 
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the end of repurchase transactions is based on two sale agreements. This 
section relates to these transfers and does not consider flows of cash and 
securities arising in the course of a transaction.20 
Graphically, the legal structure of a repo transaction under Dutch law can 
be represented as follows: 
Moment Τ Transfers on the basis of sale agreement 1 
securities 
A 
seller _^ 
cash 
Moment T+X Transfers on the basis of sale agreement 2 
equivalent securities 
-« 
A Β 
seller ^_ buyer 
cash 
At the outset of a transaction (at moment T), a seller and a buyer conclude 
a sale agreement. On the basis of this agreement, the seller delivers securi­
ties to the buyer for an amount of cash. Under Dutch law, the combination 
of a valid title or causa (the sale agreement) and a formal act of delivery 
results in an outright transfer of title, if the party who intends to transfer 
assets is entitled to dispose of them. 
At the same moment T, the parties agree that the buyer must transfer 
equivalent securities to the seller in exchange for an amount of cash at the 
end of the transaction at moment T+X. This second transfer of financial 
collateral, too, can only be effected on the basis of a valid causa (i.e. in this 
case a second sale agreement) combined with an act of delivery by a party 
who is entitled to dispose of that collateral. A second sale agreement is 
therefore necessary as a basis for the transfer of financial collateral at the 
end of the transaction. This second sale agreement can be concluded at 
moment T, which is common practice in the Netherlands.21 Alternatively, 
at moment Τ the parties can agree upon an obligation to conclude a sale 
20 See section 4 of chapter II for a more detailed description of the flows of cash and 
securities in a repo transaction. The causae of transfers of financial collateral under 
margin and substitution arrangements are considered in sections 2.6 and 2.7 below. 
21 See, for example. Rank 1998 II, p. 372, who states that there is a transfer of assets 
based on a sale agreement at moment T, with a simultaneous sale agreement that 
serves as a basis for the transfer of equivalent assets at T+X. 
Β 
buyer 
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agreement at moment T+X. In this latter case, one could speak of a pre­
sale agreement at moment T.22 The moment that the actual sale agreement 
is concluded can be shaped according to the wishes of the parties. All in 
all, it is not that important to establish the moment that the sale agreement 
is concluded because the transfer of financial collateral at T+X is definite 
only when the sale agreement has been completed by an act of delivery 
by a party who is entitled to dispose of the collateral involved.23 
2.4 Securities lending under Dutch law 
2.4 1 Market practice 
This section deals with transfers of financial collateral at the outset and at 
the end of a securities lending transaction. At the outset of a securities 
lending transaction, a lender provides securities to a borrower in ex­
change for collateral in the form of cash or securities. At the end of the 
transaction, the lender receives equivalent securities and is obliged to 
transfer equivalent collateral assets to the borrower. This section relates 
to the causae of the transfers at the outset and end of a transaction and 
does not consider flows of cash and securities occurring in the course of 
it.24 
In securities lending transactions, a distinction must be made between the 
causa of the transfer of the lent securities and that of the collateral securi­
ties. In a securities lending transaction under Dutch law, the lent securities 
are customarily transferred on the basis of a loan of fungibles (verbruikle-
ntng). It should be noted, however, that in practice, different means of 
providing collateral are used, as they can be provided on the basis of a 
loan of fungibles, a sale or exchange agreement, or a pledge. These are 
considered in more detail below.25 
22 In this respect, see, for example, Paragraph 1(a) of the GMRA, which mentions a 
'simultaneous agreement [. ] to sell [ .] at a date certam or on demand', which 
seems to point in the direction of an actual sale at moment T+X 
23 See Schroeder 1997, section 3 2, Rank 1998 I, pp 17-20; Rank 1998 Π, pp 372-377 
24 See section 4 of chapter II for a more detailed description of the flows of cash and 
securities in a securities lending transaction The causae of transfers of financial 
collateral under margin and substitution arrangements are considered in sections 
2 6 and 2 7 below 
25 See Van Ardenne-Stachiw 1995, m particular chapter 2, Rank / Van Ardenne-
Stachiw/LeRûttel996,pp 9-1 ^ Schroeder 1997,section3 1,Rank 19981,pp 21-22, 
Rank 1998 II, pp 379-380 
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a. Option 1: loan of fungibles 
The first option would be to transfer the lent securities on the basis of a 
loan of fungibles, and the collateral cash and/or securities on the basis of 
a 'counter'-loan of fungibles. Graphically, the structure of such a securities 
lending transaction can be represented as follows: 
Moment Τ 
securities (legal basis: loan of fungibles, 1) 
A Β 
lender -« borrower 
collateral securities and/or cash 
(legal basis: loan of fungibles, 2) 
Moment T+X 
equivalent securities 
(legal basis: redelivery obligation under loan 
of fungibles, 1) 
A Β 
lender ^ borrower 
equivalent collateral securities 
and/or cash (legal basis: redelivery 
obligation under loan of fungibles, 2) 
When a borrower is in need of particular securities, the lender can transfer 
these securities to him at moment Τ on the basis of a loan of fungibles. 
Such a transfer is outright, because a loan of fungibles entails an outright 
transfer (see section 2.4.2). This means that the borrower has the right to 
dispose of the securities provided as he pleases during the entire course 
of the transaction. The loan of fungibles only gives rise to an obligation to 
transfer equivalent securities to the lender at the end of the transaction, 
at moment T+X. 
At the same time, the lender does not want to be unsecured and, more­
over, would like to be able to dispose of any collateral received from the 
borrower. To this end, the parties enter into a 'counter'-loan of fungibles. 
The borrower 'lends' financial collateral consisting of securities and/or 
cash to the lender at moment T. Because a loan of fungibles entails an out­
right transfer (see section 2.4.2), the lender is entitled to dispose of the 
collateral received during the course of the transaction, but is also under 
an obligation to transfer equivalent collateral to the borrower at the end 
of the transaction, at T+X. 
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b. Option 2: sale I exchange agreement 
In the second option, the lent securities are again transferred by the lender 
to the borrower on the basis of a loan of fungibles. This means that the 
borrower is entitled to dispose of the securities transferred, but is obliged 
to transfer equivalent assets at the end of the transaction. In this case, 
however, the collateral securities and/or cash are transferred by the bor­
rower to the lender at the outset of the transaction on the basis of a sale or 
an exchange agreement. Under Dutch law, a sale agreement should be 
concluded if the sale price is paid in cash.26 If the exchange value is differ­
ent (e.g., securities), an exchange agreement is appropriate.27 The ex­
change agreement has been regulated in Articles 7:49-50 of the NCC and 
- like the sale agreement - leads to an outright transfer of assets if com­
bined with an act of delivery by a party entitled to dispose of the assets 
concerned.28 Note that in this case, the parties agree that the sale price or 
the assets exchanged will only be provided by the lender at the end of the 
transaction in the form of equivalent securities and/or cash. 
Moment Τ 
A 
lender 
Moment T+X 
A 
lender 
securities (legal basis: loan of fungibles) 
collateral securities and/or cash 
(legal basis: sale or exchange) 
equivalent securities 
(legal basis: redelivery obligation 
under loan of fungibles) 
Β 
borrower 
Β 
borrower 
equivalent collateral securities and/ 
or cash (legal basis: payment of sale 
price or transfer of exchanged assets 
at a future date) 
26 
27 
28 
See the definition of a sale agreement in Article 7:1 of the NCC. 
See the definition of an exchange agreement in Article 7:49 of the NCC. The text of 
this provision relates to physical assets (zaken) only, but the Explanatory Comments 
to Article 7:49 of the NCC make it clear that an exchange can relate to assets (goede­
ren) in general, i.e. to securities as well. See Parliamentary History of the NCC, Boek 
7; Bijzondere Overeenkomsten, pp. 299-300. 
The provisions of the NCC concerning the agreement of sale apply to exchange 
agreements by way of analogy. 
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This structure, consisting of transfers based on a loan of fungibles and a 
sale or an exchange agreement, is comparable to the first structure (which 
was based on a loan of fungibles and a 'counter'-loan of fungibles). In both 
cases, the lent securities and the collateral cash and/or securities are trans­
ferred outright, which means that both the borrower and the lender have 
an unlimited right of disposal in respect of the assets that they have 
received at the outset of the transaction. Moreover, the parties are under 
an obligation to transfer equivalent assets at the end of the transaction. 
c. Option 3: pledge 
In the third scenario, the lent securities are also transferred at the outset 
of the transaction by the lender to the borrower on the basis of a loan of 
fungibles. But in this case, the borrower does not transfer collateral secu­
rities and/or cash to the lender; rather, he establishes a right of pledge in 
such collateral for the benefit of the lender. At the end of the transaction, 
the borrower transfers equivalent securities to the lender. At that same 
moment, the right of pledge is terminated because the secured obligation 
is fulfilled. 
Moment Τ 
A 
lender 
Moment T+X 
A 
lender 
securities (legal basis: loan of fungibles) 
collateral securities and/or cash 
(legal basis: pledge) 
equivalent securities 
(legal basis: redelivery obligation 
under loan of fugibles) 
identical collateral securities and/ 
or cash (legal basis: redemption) 
Β 
borrower 
Β 
borrower 
The major difference between this structure and the first two is that the 
lender has no unlimited right of disposal in respect of the collateral pro­
vided by the borrower. The lender has a right to dispose only in the event 
of default, and not in the normal course of business. When the borrower 
fulfils his obligation under the loan of fungibles contract and transfers 
equivalent securities to the lender at the end of the transaction, the right 
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of pledge is terminated as well. The borrower is again fully entitled to 
exactly the same assets to which he had established a right of pledge at 
the outset of the transaction. 
It should be noted that with the introduction of the Collateral Directive, 
the collateral taker (the lender) can be granted a so-called 'right of use', i.e. 
the right to dispose of pledged assets in the course of the transaction. The 
issue of a right of use is discussed further in chapter IV. Chapter VI dis­
cusses the question of whether transactions in which a traditional right of 
pledge (without a general right of disposal) has been established, fall 
within the scope of the Collateral Directive. 
2.4.2 A loan of fungibles: transfer of ownership 
The loan of fungibles (verbruiklenmg, Sachdarlehen) has been regulated 
under Dutch law in Articles 7A:1791-1806 of the NCC and under German 
law in §§ 607-609 of the GCC. Under both Dutch and German law, a loan 
of fungibles entails a transfer of ownership.29 In the case of a loan of 
fungibles, the reason for passing ownership from one party to another is 
based on the concept of replaceability. In the case of a loan of fungibles, 
the lender makes assets replaceable when he grants the borrower the right 
to dispose of the lent fungibles, while the borrower consents to an obliga­
tion to transfer equivalent assets to the lender at a later date. These two 
features (i.e. the right of disposal combined with an obligation to transfer 
equivalent assets) make assets replaceable. This concept, which entails a 
passing of ownership, plays a role in a number of legal structures in civil 
law. In addition to in the loan of fungibles, the irregular structures dis­
cussed more in-depth in chapter IV (the irregular right of pledge, the ir­
regular right of usufruct and an irregular custody arrangement) also show 
that, in principle, a passing of ownership takes place when assets are 
made replaceable.30 
29 For Dutch law, see Asser Series 5-IV, chapter III, Pabbruwe 1979, Van Ardenne-
Stachiw 1995, chapter 2 For the recently revised German law, see the Palandt Com­
mentary, 64th edition, pp 870-871 For old German law, see the Munich Com­
mentary, volume 4, 3rd edition, ρ 8, no 5, for a special analysis of securities 
lending, see the Soergel Commentary, volume 4/1,12th edition, pp 1415-1416, no 
37 
30 See chapter IV, in particular section 4 6 
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2.5 The different legal structures of repo and securities lending trans­
actions 
Economically and structurally, repo and securities lending arrangements 
are very similar. The only difference is that a repo transaction is usually 
entered into because the seller is in need of cash, while a securities lend­
ing transaction is normally entered into because the borrower needs a 
particular kind of security. Otherwise, the economic rationale (obtaining 
liquidity in the form of cash or securities) and the structure of repos and 
securities lending transactions (consisting of two 'legs' that are activated 
at moment Τ and at moment T+X) are to a large extent the same. In Dutch 
practice, however, the causa is different for financial collateral transferred 
under repo and securities lending transactions. As was shown above, 
financial collateral is customarily transferred on the basis of a sale in the 
case of a repo transaction. In a securities lending transaction, financial 
collateral is usually transferred on the basis of a loan of fungibles (even 
though collateral may also be transferred on the basis of a sale or ex­
change agreement, or be pledged; see section 2.4 above). 
How have these different legal structures come into existence under 
Dutch law? An important factor in this respect is probably the structure 
of international standard agreements. The sale is mentioned as the causa 
of a transfer of financial collateral as early as Paragraph 1 (a) in the GMRA, 
whereas the GMSLA is an agreement that relates to the 'lending' of secu­
rities, with the step to a 'loan' of fungibles easy to take. Another factor is 
that a sale agreement, as defined in Article 7:1 of the NCC, is an agree­
ment under which one party gives an asset for which the counterparty 
pays a price in money. This concept fits repurchase transactions well: in 
this case, securities are sold for money. But a securities lending trans­
action often involves an exchange of a specific type of security for other 
collateral securities, and not necessarily the payment of a price in money. 
The sale concept, therefore, does not fit such transactions, and this neces­
sitates another causa, i.e. an exchange agreement, or a loan of fungibles.31 
All in all, it does not really seem to matter how financial collateral is trans­
ferred, whether on the basis of a sale or an exchange agreement, or on the 
basis of a loan of fungibles. The economic rationale of repurchase and 
securities lending transactions can be realised by applying any of the 
above. An outright transfer of title can be based on a sale or an exchange 
31 Cf. Van Ardenne-Stachiw 1995, section 2.6. 
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agreement, or on a loan of fungibles. In all cases, the effect is that both 
parties have the right to dispose of the assets transferred during the entire 
course of the transaction. In addition, the parties to both repurchase and 
securities lending transactions are obliged to deliver equivalent cash and 
securities at the end of the transaction. In a repurchase transaction, this 
obligation follows from a second sale agreement. In the case of a securities 
lending transaction, the obligation to transfer equivalent assets arises for 
the borrower in connection with the initial loan of fungibles, whereas for 
the lender (depending on the structure chosen by the parties for the pro-
vision of collateral) it is in connection with, for example, a second loan of 
fungibles or a loan or exchange agreement. 
2.6 Margin arrangements 
This section relates to the provision of margin cash and/or securities 
under one of the methods of margin maintenance outlined in section 4.3 
of chapter II. In particular, it investigates on the basis of what causa 
margin collateral is provided. The focus is on margin transfers, the most 
common method of margin maintenance. Some attention will also be paid 
to methods based on repricing and adjustment. 
2.6.2 Margin transfers 
The GMRA and GMSLA make it clear that margin, in the form of secu-
rities and/or cash, is transferred outright, but they do not specify what the 
causa of this transfer is.32 In this section, the functions of such margin 
collateral are the point of reference when determining this causa under 
Dutch law. Margin collateral is transferred in order to cover an exposure 
attributable to price fluctuations in the market. Margin collateral thereby 
serves a security function. The circumstance that equivalent margin should 
be provided at the end of a transaction shows, however, that the party 
who is obliged to pay margin under a GMRA or GMSLA agreement, for 
example, does not intend to provide security only. He also intends to 
grant his counterparty an unlimited right of disposal in respect of the 
collateral transferred, which thereby also serves a tradeability function. 
Under general principles of civil law, such a right of disposal can only be 
granted on the basis of an outright transfer of title. 
32 See Paragraphs 4 and 6 of the GMRA, and Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the GMSLA. 
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Rank seems to feel that the causa of the transfer of margin collateral is an 
agreement aimed at security only.33 In my view, this is not entirely correct. 
It is true that the reason for the transfer is a net exposure, which is meant 
to be eliminated by the margin collateral. But the margin collateral also 
serves an additional function. As stated above, the transferee of the mar-
gin collateral is also able to dispose of it. These two functions require an 
outright transfer that runs no risk of being recharacterised as a security 
interest. From this perspective. Rank's statement that margin transfers run 
a bigger risk of recharacterisation than transfers of cash and/or securities 
at the outset of a transaction is, in my view, also not convincing.34 Margin 
collateral, like financial collateral transferred at the outset of a transaction, 
serves more than a security purpose. It is also meant to be traded. 
Unlike Rank, Schroeder puts forth an argument that does justice to the 
actual intentions of the parties. Essentially, he adheres to the view that 
margin collateral is transferred outright. He has some difficulties, though, 
in establishing the causa of this transfer, particularly where margin 
transfers in repo transactions are concerned. For margin transferred in 
securities lending transactions, he proposes either repayment of the origi-
nal loan of fungibles as a causa, or the establishment of a new loan of fun-
gibles, both of which entail an outright transfer.35 A simpler solution that 
can be applied in the case of repo, securities lending or other financial 
collateral arrangements is available, however. 
In Dutch law, the concept of replaceability seems to take most fully into 
account the actual intentions of the parties. Assets are made replaceable 
when a party grants his counterparty in a transaction a right of disposal 
in respect of these assets, and if that counterparty is under an obligation 
to transfer equivalent assets at a later date. Replaceability entails an out-
right transfer, as has already been shown above in the case of a loan of 
fungibles36 and as will also be shown below in chapter IV for the irregular 
right of pledge, the irregular right of usufruct and irregular custody 
arrangements. The causa of a transfer of margin collateral under Dutch 
law can therefore be established by referring to the concept of replace-
ability. 
33 See Rank 1998 II, p. 404 and p. 413. 
34 See Rank 1998 I, p. 26. 
35 See Schroeder 1997, p. 207 and p. 211. 
36 See section 2.4.2 above. 
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If the parties consider the provision of margin collateral for purposes of 
recourse only, they should establish a right of pledge.37 It is questionable, 
however, whether margin that is provided in this way can be classified as 
collateral in the sense of the Collateral Directive because it does not fulfil 
the dual function requirement. Whether such collateral falls within or 
outside the scope of this directive will be discussed in chapter VI. 
2.6.2 Repricing and adjustment 
Repricing and adjustment are margin maintenance methods that entail the 
premature termination of a transaction and the conclusion of a new trans-
action in which price fluctuations have been taken into account.38 The 
method applied in the case of repricing and adjustment, therefore, differs 
from that applied in the case of margin transfers. In this case, margin 
collateral is not transferred in the course of one and the same transaction 
by making assets replaceable; it is done by entering into a new trans-
action. Essentially, however, repricing and adjustment are, to a large 
extent, comparable to margin transfers. The goal of each of these margin 
maintenance methods is the elimination of exposure arising from price 
fluctuations in the market. In addition, in the case of repricing and adjust-
ment, the transferee of cash and/or securities also has the right to dispose 
of the assets transferred and is under an obligation to transfer equivalent 
assets at a later date. Cash and/or securities are therefore made replace-
able, which means that they are transferred outright.39 
2.7 Substitution 
As discussed in section 4.4 of chapter II, substitution allows a collateral 
provider to exchange collateral provided at an earlier moment for another 
type of collateral of the same value. This means that the financial collateral 
initially provided is transferred from a collateral taker to a collateral 
provider, while at the same time the collateral provider replaces this 
financial collateral with other financial collateral acceptable to the collat-
eral taker. The Dutch causa that is most applicable to these transfers is an 
agreement to exchange assets (ruil). As noted in section 2.4.1 (Option 2: 
sale / exchange agreement) above, the agreement to exchange is regulated 
in Articles 7:49-50 of the NCC and, if combined with the actual delivery 
37 On the provision of collateral by way of a right of pledge in securities lending 
transactions, see section 2.4.l.c above. 
38 See section 4.3 of chapter II. 
39 On this issue, see also Graaf 1998/1999, section 3.4. 
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of assets by parties entitled to dispose of those assets, entails an outright 
transfer. 
In any case, it is evident that transfers under a substitution arrangement 
are, just like transfers under a margin arrangement, not carried out for re-
covery purposes only. The financial collateral transferred does, of course, 
serve a recovery purpose, but in line with the provisions of, for example, 
the GMRA and the GMSLA, it can also be used by the parties to enter into 
further trading activities. Under general principles of civil law, these two 
goals can only be reached by an outright transfer of title. 
2.8 Conclusion: an outright transfer of title is the market standard 
The conclusion is that an outright transfer of title is the market standard 
for providing financial collateral in repo and securities lending trans-
actions. This is evident in different standard agreements, such as the 
GMRA and the GMSLA, which are used to document such transactions. 
The method of outright transfer is also customarily used by market 
participants in the Netherlands in the course of repurchase and securities 
lending transactions. Different Dutch legal constructions are used to 
shape the title transfer method set out in international standard documen-
tation. In the case of repos, financial collateral is customarily transferred 
on the basis of an agreement of sale, whereas in securities lending trans-
actions, financial collateral is usually provided on the basis of a loan of 
fungibles. When determining the causa of margin collateral transferred in 
repo or securities lending transactions, the concept of replaceability is 
most appropriate. An asset is made replaceable when the transferee of 
that asset is given an unlimited right of disposal, while also being under 
the obligation to transfer equivalent assets at a later date. Replaceability 
entails an outright transfer. The causa in the case of substitution arrange-
ments is the agreement to exchange assets. 
3. RECHARACTERISATION AS A SECURITY INTEREST? 
3.1 Introduction 
Based on the discussion in section 2 above, it appears that market partici-
pants usually choose the title transfer method of providing financial col-
lateral. The current section investigates why they do so and why they are 
afraid of a title transfer being recharacterised as a security interest. 
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In many jurisdictions, a so-called 'recharacterisation risk' is perceived 
when collateral is transferred outright. Recharacterisation occurs when an 
outright transfer of title is recharacterised - for example, in the course of 
legal proceedings - as a security interest, such as a pledge or a fiduciary 
transfer of title. Recharacterisation can be harmful to secured parties. If 
under Dutch law, for example, a title of transfer should actually be quali-
fied as a title to establish a security interest, no transfer can take place, 
whereas a security interest arises only if the formal requirements for es-
tablishing a security interest have been met (see section 3.2.4 below). Like-
wise, in other jurisdictions, such as the United Kingdom, the consequence 
of characterising a title transfer as a security interest may be that the 
requirements for the valid establishment of the security interest (e.g., 
registration of the security interest) should have been complied with. 
Non-compliance with such requirements can result in a situation in which 
no collateral at all has been provided.40 
The perception of a recharacterisation risk arises from the fact that 
different rights in respect of assets can be granted to a counterparty. One 
can transfer full title to the counterparty (such as an unlimited transfer of 
the right of ownership of an asset or an outright transfer of a contractual 
claim), or a limited proprietary right can be established in respect of an 
asset (such as a right of pledge). A third option would be to transfer title 
while, at the same time, limiting the powers of the transferee. This latter 
option is usually referred to as a 'fiduciary' transfer of title, which, in its 
legal consequences, is very similar to a right of pledge. Choosing any of 
these options is dependent on the actual intentions of the parties and on 
the structure of the legal system in which they operate. If a collateral 
provider wishes to grant the fullest spectre of rights, he will choose an 
unconditional transfer of title. If he wishes to provide a right to have 
recourse only, he should vest a security interest, for example, by vesting 
a right of pledge or (if allowed under the applicable national law) by 
transferring title on a fiduciary basis. The consequence of vesting a secu-
rity interest is that a fiduciary relationship arises between the parties in 
which their mutual interests should be taken into account. In the case of 
an outright transfer, a comparable fiduciary relationship does not arise. 
In this case, the transferee is the one and only party entitled to the assets 
transferred. 
40 See, for example, McCormack 2003. 
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This section starts with an overview of the different types of security 
interests that can be established under Dutch and German law (section 
3.2). The focus is on the practical inconveniences related to the statutory 
right of pledge under the old Dutch Civil Code and the German Civil 
Code, then on to the appearance of a fiduciary transfer of title on the basis 
of case law in the beginning of the twentieth century, to subsequent 
refinements in case law that established the contents of the fiduciary 
relationship and struck a fair balance between the interests of the parties 
involved, and finally, to the prohibition of fiduciary transfers of title in the 
Netherlands in 1992 and the simultaneous introduction of a non-pos-
sessory right of pledge in relation to physical assets and a right of pledge 
in respect of claims without a notification requirement. 
Section 3.3 compares security interests and title transfers by investigating 
the different functions they fulfil. In particular, it examines the extent to 
which a clear distinction between these functions serves as a key to under-
standing the issue of recharacterisation risk in repurchase and securities 
lending transactions. 
Sections 3.4 - 3.6 investigate three developments that occurred under 
Dutch law after the introduction of the current Dutch Civil Code in 1992, 
in which fiduciary transfers of title were prohibited. The focus of section 
3.4 is on the Dutch Supreme Court's 1995 Sogelease decision, a landmark 
case concerning the scope of the prohibition of fiduciary transfers of title, 
with particular attention to the relevance of this decision for repo and 
securities lending arrangements. The subject matter of section 3.5 is the 
subsidiary right of pledge that is sometimes envisaged in repurchase and 
securities lending contracts in the Netherlands because of the perceived 
recharacterisation risk of a title transfer of financial collateral. Section 3.6 
considers special legislation (Article 2a of the STSA) enacted in 1999, 
which was intended to eliminate the recharacterisation risk in repurchase 
transactions. 
Section 3.7 deals with the approach of the Collateral Directive in respect 
of recharacterisation risk and the implementation of the directive's provi-
sions in the Netherlands. 
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3.2 Security interests in the Netherlands and Germany 
3.2.2 Introduction 
This section gives a more detailed, historical overview of the different 
ways in which a security interest can be established under Dutch and Ger-
man law. Section 3.2.2 deals with security interests under the old Dutch 
Civil Code. Section 3.2.3 makes a comparison with current German law, 
which resembles old Dutch law in many respects. Finally, section 3.2.4 de-
scribes the security interests that can be vested under current Dutch law. 
3.2.2 Security interests under the old Dutch Civil Code 
a. The Netherlands Civil Code of 1838 
The Netherlands Civil Code of 1838 envisaged a possessory right of 
pledge in relation to physical assets and a public right of pledge in respect 
of claims.41 Both types of pledge had practical disadvantages. A pos-
sessory right of pledge in respect of physical assets could only be vested 
by giving the pledgee actual possession of the pledged assets. The absence 
of the possibility of vesting a non-possessory right of pledge turned out 
to be cumbersome in practice, particularly for enterprises. No security in-
terest was available that could attract credit without risking the loss of 
assets that might be needed for conducting business (e.g., machinery or 
raw goods). Moreover, the lack of a non-possessory right of pledge was 
impractical to providers of credit (particularly banks) because they some-
how had to store all assets in respect of which security interests were 
obtained. Likewise, the public right of pledge in respect of claims had 
certain drawbacks: a public right of pledge could only be established by 
giving notice to the debtor of the claim. One of the disadvantages of this 
requirement was that a party in need of credit often did not want others 
to know about this need, and thus did not want to notify his debtors when 
establishing a right of pledge in respect of his claims against those debt-
ors. These drawbacks led to a certain amount of social pressure. 
41 In particular, see Articles 1196, 1198 and 1199 of the Netherlands Civil Code of 
1838. In 1990 the approach was still essentially the same; see (revised) Articles 1196, 
1198,1198bis and 1199 of the old Dutch Civil Code in Fruin 1990. 
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b. The recognition of a fiduciary transfer of title 
It is probably in light of these drawbacks and the resulting social pressure 
that, in the beginning of the twentieth century, the Dutch Supreme Court 
recognised a fiduciary transfer of title, i.e. a transfer for recovery purposes 
(fiducia cum creditore). From an economic point of view, such a fiduciary 
transfer in many ways fulfils the same functions as a right of pledge. The 
fiduciary transfer of title provided a solution to the main drawbacks of the 
requirements of possession and notification when establishing a right of 
pledge under the old Dutch Civil Code. 
In the case of a fiduciary transfer of physical assets, the fiduciary normally 
did not obtain physical custody of the assets transferred. Delivery of the 
assets to the fiduciary customarily took place by means of a constitutum 
possessorium. This means that the transferor physically kept the assets in 
his power but declared that he was no longer entitled to them - that he 
held them for the fiduciary.42 If the assets were physically located with a 
third party, delivery was effected by informing this third party of the fact 
that 'indirect' or 'constructive' possession was now vested in the transferee 
(delivery longa manu). Only rarely did a fiduciary transfer of title take 
place in order to establish a possessory security interest. In this instance, 
a title transfer, albeit limited in its consequences, would have meant an 
unnecessary over-endowment of the security taker's rights, because the 
over-endowment related to the title transfer method could easily be pre-
vented by establishing a possessory right of pledge. 
A fiduciary transfer of claims also provided a solution for the mandatory 
notification of the debtor under pledge law. In case of a fiduciary transfer 
of a claim, no notification of the debtor was required because a transfer of 
a claim under the old Dutch Civil Code could be realised by the transferor 
and transferee, without notification of the debtor. 
The first decision of the Dutch Supreme Court that recognised a fiduciary 
transfer of title was the Bierbrouwerij decision.43 Shortly afterwards the 
Supreme Court issued the Hakkers I Van Tilburg decision, in which the 
approach taken in the Bierbrouwerij decision was confirmed.44 The Bier-
brouwerij and the Hakkers I Van Tilburg decisions were rather straight-
42 Under current Dutch law, the delivery by way of constitutum possessorium is 
regulated in Article 3:115(a) of the NCC. See also Article 3:90(2) of the NCC. 
43 Decision of 25 January 1929, Nederlandsche jurisprudentie 1929, pp. 616-621. 
44 Decision of 21 June 1929, Nederlandsche Jurisprudentie 1929, pp. 1096-1098. 
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forward decisions that sanctioned the fiduciary transfer of title, but which 
did not yet determine the exact contents of the fiduciary relationship 
between the parties. These were further developed and refined both in 
doctrine and, in particular, by a number of additional decisions of the 
Supreme Court (see subsection c on the 'Limitations to the rights of the 
fiduciary' below). The fiduciary transfer of title figured as a security in-
terest until the revision of the Dutch Civil Code which, as far as security 
interests are concerned, took effect in 1992.45 
c. Limitations to the rights of the fiduciary 
In general, under old Dutch law, a fiduciary transfer of title was not pri-
marily considered as a security interest. It was considered first of all as a 
transfer of title. Nonetheless, the rights of the transferee/fiduciary were 
limited on a number of accounts in the jurisprudence that appeared after 
the Bierbrouwerij and the Hakkers I Van Tilburg decisions. It became neces-
sary to further determine the rights and obligations of all the parties 
involved in such a transfer, and specifically to establish the exact content 
of the fiduciary relationship between transferor and fiduciary. Subsequent 
decisions of the Supreme Court (see the references in footnotes 47,48, 50 
and 51 below) indeed established a balance between the interests of collat-
eral provider and collateral taker. They prevented an over-endowment of 
rights of the fiduciary, and took the interests of the collateral provider and 
his creditors into account. The most important limitations to the rights of 
the fiduciary are outlined below.46 
1. One limitation to the right of the fiduciary was that, in principle, the 
assets transferred automatically fell back to the original title-holder upon 
fulfilment of the secured obligation. The reason for this is that a fiduciary 
transfer of title was generally considered to be a transfer under a con-
dition subsequent (ontbindende voorwaarde). If the condition of payment of 
the secured debt was fulfilled, the fiduciary lost his interest, and title 
automatically fell back to the original title-holder. It should, however, be 
mentioned that the parties could have agreed upon a contractual re-
delivery obligation of the fiduciary upon fulfilment of the secured debt. 
45 See Asser Series 3-1, nos. 219 and 265; Van Mierlo 1988; Pitlo / Reehuis, Heister-
kamp 2001, particularly sections 760 and 806. 
46 See Van Mierlo 1988; Snijders 1970, pp. 30-32; Reehuis 1997, pp. 32-34. 
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In the absence of such an agreement, the principal rule of the condition 
subsequent would have applied.47 
2. The fiduciary had only a limited right of disposal; he did not have 
the right to transfer full title to a third party (i.e. title not subject to the 
condition subsequent mentioned above), unless his counterparty de­
faulted in respect of the secured claim. 
3. It was generally accepted that the fiduciary should, in the event of 
a default, have recourse in accordance with the provisions of pledge law. 
This meant, for example, that the fiduciary was not allowed to appropriate 
the assets to which his fiduciary right related; rather, he was obliged to 
sell them and have recourse to the proceeds of the sale. Any remaining 
surplus value should be paid by the fiduciary to the original title-holder.48 
4. The title that the fiduciary had acquired was not always enforceable 
against the rights of the collateral provider's other creditors. Under certain 
circumstances the rights of certain other, third party creditors could pre­
vail over those of the fiduciary. In cases that came before the Dutch 
Supreme Court, the rights of those other creditors prevailed where assets 
that were transferred to the fiduciary by way of a constitutum possessorium 
and that were still under the control of the beneficiary were concerned.49 
One case related to a claim of a creditor with a privileged position arising 
out of a sale agreement (verkopersvoorrecht), another to certain claims of a 
creditor with a privileged position based on the General law relating to 
customs and excise duties.50 Yet another decision of the Supreme Court 
47 See the Supreme Court's decision of 3 October 1980, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1981, 
no 60 (Ontvanger I Schnks q q), with an annotation by Kleijn, and further discussed 
in Van der Grinten 1981 See also as affirming the approach of the Ontvanger / 
Schnks decision, the Supreme Court's decision of 18 February 1994 in Nederlandse 
Jurisprudentie 1994, no 462 (Nijverdal Ten Cate I Wildervank q q ), with an annotation 
by Kleijn, and further discussed m Faber / Van Hees 1994 and in Kortmann 1994 III 
See also Asser Senes 3-1, no 219, Van Mierlo 1988, chapter 2, Snijders 1970, pp SU­
SI (section a) The approach of German law is different, see below 
48 See the Supreme Court's decisions of 3 January 1941, Nederlandsche Jurisprudentie 
1941, no 470 (Boerenleenbank Hazersivoude-Koudekerk I Los) and of 30 January 1953, 
Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1953, no 578 (Bank van Doyer en Kalff/ Bauman qq), with 
an annotation by Houwing, and section 3 4 2 of the Supreme Court's decision of 19 
May 1995, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1996, no 119 (Sogelease) See also Van Mierlo 
1988, section 4 3, Reehuis 1997, ρ 33 
49 On this topic, see Van Mierlo 1988, section 4 2 
50 See the Supreme Court's decisions of 6 March 1970, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1970, 
no 433 (Van Wessem qq I Traffic), further discussed m Van der Gnnten 1970, and 
of 7 March 1975, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1976, no 91 (Van Gend en Loos), further 
118 
Transfer of Title 
related to a conflict between a reservation of title and a subsequent fidu-
ciary transfer of ownership in respect of the same assets. In this latter case, 
the prior reservation of title prevailed over the fiduciary transfer.51 
These limitations make up the fiduciary relationship between transferor 
and fiduciary and are generally in line with the pledge principles outlined 
in section 1.3 of this chapter. Limiting the rights of the fiduciary protected 
the interests of the original title-holder and his creditors. In effect, the title 
that the fiduciary had acquired was a security interest.52 
3.2.3 Security interests under the German Civil Code 
a. Introduction 
This section relates to security interests under the German Civil Code. 
German law went through a development comparable to that of Dutch 
law (see section 3.2.2 above). The security interests currently available un-
der German law are, in many respects, comparable to those of old Dutch 
law.53 
b. The German Civil Code of 1900 
Like the Dutch legislator in 1838, the German Civil Code of 1900 only en-
visaged a possessory right of pledge in relation to physical assets and 
required notification of the debtor for the establishment of a right of 
pledge in a claim. These limitations also led to practical inconveniences in 
Germany. An enterprise could not vest a security interest in the assets that 
it needed in the course of its business, and credit providers were faced 
with the difficulty of storing those assets in which they had received a 
discussed in Van der Grinten 1975. For a case in which the right of a fiduciary 
prevailed over that of a creditor with a preferential position arising out of a sale 
agreement (verkopersvoorrecht), see the Supreme Court's decision of 18 September 
1987, Rechtspraak van de Week 1987, no. 166 (Berg & Sons Ltd.). 
51 See the Supreme Court's decision of 4 December 1998, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 
1999, no. 549 (Potharst I Serrée), with an annotation by Kleijn and with a further 
analysis by Van Mierlo in Ars Aequi 48 (1999) 4, pp. 288-296. 
52 Note, however, that there are also differences between the right of pledge and a 
right of fiduciary ownership. For example, the question of whether a fiduciary 
ownership right has an accessory character is disputed. Most authors are of the 
view that it has no accessory character. On this issue, see e.g. Snijders 1970, pp. 30-
31 (section a); Faber / Van Hees 1994; Kortmann 1994 III. 
53 For an excellent outline of security interests in movables under German law, see 
Serick 1990. See also Baur /Stümer 1999, §§ 57 and 58; Jäkel 2001; Strothmann 1995. 
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security interest. The notification requirement for establishing a right of 
pledge in a claim was also inconvenient. Sometimes a creditor simply did 
not want his debtors (and others) to know that he was seeking external 
credit from, for example, a bank. Another inconvenience was that a 
pledge on a future claim could not be established under German law 
because the identity of the creditor who should be notified was not clear 
- meaning that no notice could be given.54 For these reasons, an alterna-
tive legal construction was necessary: the fiduciary transfer of title was 
debated. It was, however, questioned whether a 'secret' security interest, 
in which no actual possession was provided or no notification was given, 
was compatible with the legislator's position of allowing a public right of 
pledge (with the provision of actual possession or notification) only. 
c. The recognition of a fiduciary transfer of title 
As in the Netherlands, the German judiciary sanctioned the concept of a 
fiduciary transfer of title. The legislator's choice to envisage only a right 
of pledge in the German Civil Code of 1900 was not seen as an im-
pediment to allowing the fiduciary transfer of title. At present, this con-
struction is fully recognised as customary law (Gewohnheitsrecht) by legal 
scholars and the judiciary. While it has not been explicitly regulated in the 
German Civil Code, it is structured in accordance with principles con-
tained in the Code. 
Under German law, as under old Dutch law, a transferor does not custom-
arily provide the transferee with immediate possession in a fiduciary 
transfer of physical assets. If the transferor is actually in the possession of 
the goods transferred, delivery usually takes place by way of a constitutum 
possessorium (see § 930 of the GCC). If the assets are physically located 
with a third party, delivery is effected by informing this third party that 
'indirect' or 'constructive' possession is now vested in the transferee. A 
fiduciary transfer of physical assets can also be based on the actual 
provision of possession, but in this case, the traditional possessory pledge 
is available. This new, non-possessory security interest gave enterprises 
the possibility of continuing the use of those assets in which they had 
vested a security interest, and ensured that security takers would not be 
faced with the burden of storing all sorts of assets from the providers of 
54 On the inconveniences connected with the pledge of claims and the notification 
requirement, see Serick 1990, section 5.II.3-4. 
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security. As far as the fiduciary transfer of claims is concerned, no noti­
fication to the debtor of the claim is required for an effective transfer.55 
d. Limitattons to the right of fiduciary 
As in old Dutch law, under current German law a fiduciary transfer of 
title is considered primarily as a transfer of title and not as a security 
interest. However, under German law, the fiduciary's rights are limited 
in order to balance the interests of the parties involved. Fiduciary trans­
fers can be structured as a transfer under a condition subsequent, as under 
Dutch law, but often they are not.56 The transferee is normally under an 
obligation to retransfer title to the transferor once the transferor has ful­
filled his obligation towards the transferee.57 This, however, does not 
mean that the transferee has an absolute right. In Serick's view, for exam­
ple, a fiduciary transfer should be distinguished from an outright transfer. 
The parties are in a fiduciary relationship. This is particularly evident in 
the event of the fiduciary's insolvency, in which case the original title-
holder can ward off the claims of the fiduciary's creditors, as if no transfer 
had taken place. The rights of the original title-holder in this case have a 
'quasi-real effect'.58 
Moreover, the fiduciary relationship between the parties sets a number of 
additional limitations on the powers of the fiduciary. Although the fidu­
ciary as an owner may be able to execute certain powers in respect of the 
assets transferred, the fiduciary relationship does not allow him to do so. 
For example, the fiduciary is not allowed to dispose of the assets trans­
ferred as if he had full title. It is only when the transferor does not fulfil 
the obligation that the assets transferred on a fiduciary basis intend to 
secure, that the transferee is entitled to transfer full title of these assets to 
55 In relation to this historical development, see the Drafters of the GCC, pp 390-439, 
Senck 1990, particularly Chapter 1 13, Chapter 5 and Chapter 711 
56 Under old Dutch law, in principle, assets that are transferred on a fiduciary basis 
automatically fall back to the original title-holder upon fulfilment of the secured 
claim because they are deemed to be transferred under a condition subsequent, no 
act of (re-)delivery is required (see section 3 2 2 above) 
57 See Baur / Stumer 1999, § 57(45), Snijders 1970, ρ 30 
58 Under certain circumstances, German insolvency and execuhon law (Insolvenzrecht 
and Vollstreckungsrecht) recognises that claims of a non-proprietary nature, such as 
the claim for re-delivery against a fiduciary, can also be successfully mvoked 
should the fiduciary be subject to insolvency or execution proceedings This is 
because, even if, from a strictly legal point of view, the claim against the fiduciary 
is of a non-proprietary nature, from an economic point of view, the assets trans­
ferred for security purposes are those of the original title-holder 
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a third party. The original owner and the fiduciary may agree that, in the 
event of default, the fiduciary has the right to enforce his rights in accord-
ance with the terms of the contract between the parties, but in the absence 
thereof, the enforcement procedures of pledge law are applied by way of 
analogy.59 In addition, in the event of default, the transferee is not allowed 
to appropriate the assets but, like a pledgee, has only the right of separate 
and privileged satisfaction out of the proceeds of a sale, with any surplus 
value falling to the original owner and his creditors.60 
The limitations of the rights of the fiduciary follow from the security func-
tion of the fiduciary transfer of title. In part, these limitations (particularly 
in the case of insolvency) have quasi-real effects on third parties. The 
result of the limitations is that the fiduciary essentially has only the rights 
that a pledgee would have if a right of pledge had been established. If the 
structure is considered in its entirety, the conclusion is that, in effect, the 
fiduciary has not obtained full title, only a security interest.61 
e. Security interests under current German law 
The security interests that can be established under current German law 
are comparable to those available under old Dutch law. Statutory law 
provides for a possessory right of pledge in respect of physical assets and 
for a right of pledge in respect of claims that can only be established if the 
debtor is notified. In addition, both the judiciary and legal literature 
recognise fiduciary transfers of title. This makes it possible to establish a 
non-possessory security interest in respect of physical assets, and a secu-
rity interest in relation to claims, for the establishment of which notifica-
tion of the debtor is not compulsory. 
59 See Baur / Stumer 1999, § 57(41-42) In this respect, German law is more liberal than 
Dutch law, which sticks more closely to the provisions of the NCC relating to the 
enforcement of a right of pledge See section 3 2 2 above 
60 The issue of appropriation is somewhat controversial See Baur / Stumer 1999, 
§ 57(16) 
61 In regard to these different issues, see Serick 1990, Baur / Stumer 1999, §§ 57 and 
58 On the quasi-real effects of fiduciary transfers in particular, see Serick 1990, 
section 1 IV (with further references) 
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3.2.4 The abolition of fiduciary transfers of title in the new Dutch Civil Code 
a. The view of Meijers 
Meijers, who was asked to design a new Dutch Civil Code in 1947, was no 
protagonist of fiduciary structures, whether sfiducia cum creditore (which 
relates to a transfer of property for the purposes of security; overdracht tot 
zekerheid) or a fiducia cum amico (a transfer of property to an administrator, 
whose task is the management of that property in the original title-
holder's interest; overdracht ten titel van beheer). In Meijers's view, the out-
right transfer method was not appropriate for the establishment of either 
a security interest or an administration relationship. He believed that a 
security interest should be established by way of a pledge and that if one 
party desired to provide assets to another party for administration, he 
should do so by establishing an administration relationship (bewind). An 
outright transfer of, for example, the right of ownership or of claims 
should not be used to confer only a limited right upon another party 
(whether for the purposes of security or administration).62 " 
Meijers passed away in 1954, at which time he had completed a consider-
able part of the draft of the new Civil Code, including the parts on transfer 
of title and the law of pledge and of hypothec (mortgage). In his draft, he 
proposed a prohibition of fiduciary transfers of title and laid the basis for 
the introduction of a right of pledge without notification requirements 
(such as the provision of actual possession of physical assets or notifica-
tion of the debtor of a claim).64 
b. The view of Snijders 
After Meijers' death, there was still a lot of work to do before the new 
Civil Code could be enacted. One of Meijers' successors. Government 
Commissioner Snijders, was, like Meijers, in favour of introducing a right 
of pledge without publication requirements in the new Civil Code. He 
pointed out that there were a lot of uncertainties connected to the fidu-
ciary transfer of title as developed by the judiciary and in legal literature. 
62 See Meijers' Explanatory Notes, Article 3.4.2.2; Meijers 1948, pp. 89-90. 
63 The fiducia cum amico will not be further considered here because it is the pro-
hibition of the fiducia cum creditore that has led to doubts in the collateral market, 
and in particular the question of under what circumstances an outright transfer of 
title runs the risk of being recharacterised as a security interest. 
64 See Meijers' Explanatory Notes, Title 3.4 and Title 3.9. 
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A codified right of pledge could, in his view, eliminate these doubts to a 
large extent. In addition, the legislator could, when codifying the right of 
pledge in the new Dutch Civil Code, balance the interests of all the parties 
involved.65 
c. Security interests under current Dutch law 
In 1992, the Dutch legislator did indeed abolish fiduciary transfers of title 
in Article 3:84(3) of the NCC, as follows: 
A juridical act intended to transfer property for purposes of security or which does 
not have the purpose of vesting title in the acquirer, after transfer, does not 
constitute valid title for transfer of that property 
A valid title is one of the three mandatory requirements for a valid trans-
fer under Dutch law, in addition to the transferor's right to dispose of the 
assets concerned and a formal act of delivery.67 Therefore, if the title of 
transfer is invalid under Article 3:84(3) of the NCC, no transfer takes place 
at all. 
Simultaneous with the introduction of Article 3:84(3) of the NCC, the 
legislator introduced a non-possessory right of pledge in respect of physi-
cal assets in Article 3:237 of the NCC. In addition. Article 3:239 of the NCC 
envisages a right of pledge without mandatory notification to the debtor, 
so as to replace the fiduciary assignment of claims. Therefore, if parties 
currently wish to establish a security interest under Dutch law, they must 
vest a right of pledge.68 
65 See Snijders 1970 
66 Translation Netherlands Business Legislation Original Dutch text 'Een rechtshan-
deling die ten doel heeft een goed over te dragen tot zekerheid of die de strekking 
mist het goed na de overdracht m het vermogen van de verkrijger te doen vallen, 
is geen geldige titel van overdracht van dat goed ' 
67 See Article 3 84(1 ) of the NCC 
68 See Reehuis 1997, section 2, for a historical overview of the system of secunty 
interests in the Netherlands See also the Parliamentary History of the NCC, Boek 
3, Vermogensrecht m het algemeen. Article 3 4 2 2, pp 316-319, Asser Series 3-1, nos 
219, 239,241-242 and 265, Pitlo / Reehuis, Heisterkamp 2001, séchons 760 and 806 
See Florijn 1994 for a general overview of the history of the current Dutch Civil 
Code 
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3.3 Recharacterisation risk: a function-based approach 
3.3.2 Introduction 
The parties to repurchase and securities lending agreements often fear the 
re-characterisation of a title transfer as a security interest. This section 
investigates whether the risk of recharacterisation can be assessed by 
taking a 'function-based approach', i.e. an approach in which this risk is 
determined on the basis of the functions that financial collateral should 
fulfil according to the parties to a financial collateral arrangement. 
Section 3.3.2 relates to the functions of title transfers and security interests 
in general (without specific reference to financial collateral arrangements). 
This section compares the functions of a title transfer to those of a security 
interest. Section 3.3.3 applies this analysis to financial collateral arrange-
ments. It examines whether analysing the functions of security interests 
and title transfers can be helpful in determining whether any recharac-
terisation risk exists in such arrangements. To this end, the functions of 
financial collateral arrangements are investigated to determine whether 
they point in the direction of a title transfer or a security interest. 
3.3.2 The functions of title transfers as opposed to security interests 
A title transfer and a security interest serve essentially different functions. 
A title transfer entails a transfer of all right, title and interest without 
limitations. While the establishment of a security interest can also be 
viewed as a transfer of rights, this transfer only relates to those rights that 
serve the goal of creating an object for recourse. Title is, in this case, still 
vested in the collateral provider, even when this title has been encum-
bered with a security interest. In other words, a security interest is a 
limited right: the collateral provider only provides the collateral taker 
with those rights that serve the goal of recovery. If more rights were to be 
transferred, it would lead to an over-endowment of rights to the benefit 
of the collateral taker. In order to guarantee a balance between the in-
terests of the collateral provider and collateral taker, security interests 
have certain characteristic features that have already been outlined in sec-
tion 1.3 of this chapter. These features reflect the fact that the collateral 
provider and the collateral taker are in a fiduciary relationship. This sec-
tion examines in more detail the features of security interests that are 
directly connected with its recovery function: the prescribed method of 
sale, the prohibition of appropriation and the collateral provider's right to 
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a possible surplus value. These limitations on the collateral taker's rights 
are inherent to security interests and do not exist in the case of an outright 
transfer of title, which entails an unlimited transfer of rights. 
a. A prescribed method of sale 
Under normal circumstances, a pledgee is not allowed to dispose of the 
assets in which he has a security interest. Only upon an event of default, 
if the pledgor does not or cannot properly fulfil the secured obligation, 
may a pledgee dispose of pledged assets. In the case of default, the sale of 
these assets by the pledgor is subject to strict requirements, which are 
intended to protect the interests of the collateral provider and his cre-
ditors against fraudulent enforcement by a collateral taker and to maxi-
mise proceeds. 
Under Dutch law, the first way a pledgee can enforce his rights is by con-
ducting a public sale of the encumbered assets. This ensures that assets 
are not sold at too low a value. The requirement for a public sale follows 
from Article 3:250(1) of the NCC, which states: 
The sale shall take place in public according to local customs and upon the usual 
conditions. 
In the case of property that is traded in a market or on an exchange, a sale 
with a public character in the sense of Article 3:250(1) of the NCC does not 
necessarily have to take place. The sale may also be carried out in that 
market or on that exchange by an appropriate broker or a qualified inter-
mediary. In this case, there are two factors that guarantee an objective 
price: the fact that the prices in a market or on an exchange are usually 
transparent, and the involvement of an impartial broker or intermediary. 
See Article 3:250(2) of the NCC, which states: 
The sale of pledged property which can be traded in a market or on an exchange 
may take place in the market through an appropriate broker or, on an exchange, 
through a qualified intermediary, according to the rules and usages applicable to 
an ordinary sale in such market or on such exchange. 
69 Translation: Netherlands Business Legislation. Original Dutch text: 'De verkoop 
geschiedt in het openbaar naar de plaatselijke gewoonten en op de gebruikelijke 
voorwaarden.' 
70 Translation: Netherlands Business Legislation. Original Dutch text: 'Bestaat het 
pand uit goederen die op een markt of beurs verhandelbaar zijn, dan kan de ver-
koop geschieden op een markt door tussenkomst van een tussenpersoon in het vak 
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Article 3:251 of the NCC provides for two other ways to enforce a right of 
pledge. First, on the basis of Article 3:251(1) of the NCC, the pledgor or 
the pledgee can - unless otherwise stipulated - ask the interim provisions 
judge (voorziemngenrechter) to intervene, in which case the interim pro-
visions judge determines how the sale should be conducted, or for what 
price the pledgee may buy the property. Here, the intervention of the 
interim provisions judge guarantees fair enforcement. Article 3:251(1) of 
the NCC states: 
Unless otherwise stipulated, the interim provisions judge of the district court may 
determme, at the request of the pledgee or the pledgor, that the pledged property 
will be sold m a manner which deviates from the preceding article; at the request 
of the pledgee, the interim provisions judge of the district court may also determine 
that the pledged property will remain with the pledgee as buyer for an amount to 
be determmed by him ' 
A second alternative to the public sale of Article 3:250 of the NCC is set 
out in Article 3:251(2). This provision makes it possible, if no provision to 
the contrary has been agreed upon, for the pledgor and the pledgee to 
conclude an agreement between themselves on an alternative manner of 
sale. This agreement, however, can only be concluded after the moment 
of default to ensure that the pledgor (or the insolvency administrator who 
represents the interests of the insolvent estate) is no longer in a dependent 
position. Again, this guarantees that pledged assets are not sold at too low 
a price. Article 3:251(2) of the NCC states: 
A pledgee who has become entitled to proceeds to a sale may agree with the 
pledgor to a manner of sale which deviates from the preceding article [ ]72 
The requirements under German pledge law that guarantee maximum 
proceeds are comparable to those set out under Dutch law. As a matter of 
principle, § 1235(1) of the GCC requires a public sale: 
of ter beurze door die van een bevoegde tussenpersoon overeenkomstig de regels 
en gebruiken die aldaar voor een gewone verkoop gelden ' 
71 Translation Netherlands Business Legislation Original Dutch text 'Tenzij anders 
is bedongen, kan de voorziemngenrechter van de rechtbank op verzoek van de 
pandhouder of de pandgever bepalen dat het pand zal worden verkocht op een van 
het vorige artikel afwijkende wijze, of op verzoek van de pandhouder bepalen dat 
het pand voor een door de voorziemngenrechter van de rechtbank vast te stellen be-
drag aan de pandhouder als koper zal verblijven.' 
72 Translation Netherlands Business Legislation. Original Dutch text 'Nadatdepand-
houder bevoegd is geworden tot verkoop over te gaan, kunnen pandhouder en 
pandgever een van het vorige artikel afwijkende wijze van verkoop overeenkomen 
[ 1' 
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The sale of the pledge shall be effected by public auctions. 
For pledged assets that are traded on an exchange or in a market, § 1235(2) 
of the GCC refers to § 1221 of the GCC, which allows for the sale of those 
assets on the stock exchange or market by an independent intermediary: 
If the pledge has a stock exchange or a market price, the pledgee may effect the sale 
privately at the current price through a broker officially authorised to carry out 
such sales or through an authorised public auctioneer. 
Like Dutch law, German law also allows an agreement between the 
pledgor and the pledgee in relation to the manner of sale. Insofar as such 
an agreement deviates from the public sale requirement of § 1235, it can, 
however, only be concluded after the moment of default. After that mo-
ment, the pledgor is no longer deemed to be in a dependent position and 
can represent his interests (and those of his creditors) properly. See § 1245 
of the GCC: 
The owner and the pledgee may agree on selling the pledge in a manner which 
deviates from the provisions of §§ 1234 to 1240. [...] Compliance with the 
provisions of § 1235 [...] may not be waived before the right of sale arises. 
Moreover, an alternative manner of sale can be claimed by one of the 
parties on the basis of reasonableness. If the counterparty does not agree 
to the proposed manner of sale, the court decides. See § 1246 of the GCC, 
which states: 
1. If a manner of sale deviating from the provisions of §§ 1235 to 1240 corresponds 
equitably with the interests of the parties concerned, each of them may demand that 
the sale be made in such manner. 
2. If there is a failure to agree, the court decides.76 
73 Translation: Goren 1994. Original German text: 'Der Verkauf des Pfandes ist im 
Wege öffentlicher Versteigerung zu bewirken.' 
74 Translation: Goren 1994. Original German text: 'Hat das Pfand einen Börsen- oder 
Marktpreis, so kann der Pfandgläubiger den Verkauf aus freier Hand durch einen 
zu solchen Verkäufen öffentlich ermächtigten Handelsmäkler oder durch eine zur 
öffentlichen Versteigerung befugte Person zum laufenden Preis bewirken.' 
75 Translation: Goren 1994. Original German text: 'Der Eigentümer und der Pfand-
gläubiger können eine von den Vorschriften der §§ 1234 bis 1240 abweichende Art 
des Pf and Verkaufs vereinbaren. [...] Auf die Beobachtung der Vorschriften des § 
1235 [...] kann nicht vor dem Eintritt der Verkaufsberechtigung verzichtet werden.' 
76 Translation: Goren 1994. Original German text: '1. Entspricht eine von den Vor-
schriften der §§ 1235 bis 1240 abweichende Art des Pfandverkaufs nach billigem 
Ermessen den Interessen der Beteiligten, so kann jeder von ihnen verlangen, dass 
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In the case of a fiduciary transfer of title, it is sometimes argued that the 
manner of enforcement is not subject to formal requirements, as is true for 
a right of pledge. In particular, under German law, the parties have the 
freedom to determine the manner in which enforcement takes place. In 
the absence of an agreement, however, the above-mentioned provisions 
and principles of pledge law apply. By contrast, the common opinion 
under old Dutch law was that the fiduciary should act as much as possible 
as a pledgee when enforcing his security interests. Like a pledgee, a fidu-
ciary has fiduciary obligations towards the provider of security. By 
applying the enforcement provisions of pledge law to fiduciary transfers 
of title, maximum proceeds were guaranteed and the original title-holder 
and his creditors were protected against unfairness on the side of the fidu-
77 
ciary. 
b. The prohibition of appropriation 
A shared characteristic of a right of pledge and (under old Dutch and 
current German law) a fiduciary transfer of title is the prohibition of 
appropriation, which is closely linked to the requirements relating to a 
prescribed manner of sale. This prohibition means that the security taker 
is not entitled to appropriate the pledged assets upon default. Such appro-
priation is prohibited because it is feared that the valuation by the security 
taker will not be transparent, as in, for example, a public sale, and will not 
result in maximum proceeds. For the right of pledge, the prohibition of 
appropriation has been codified in Article 3:235 of the NCC and § 1229 of 
the GCC78 
Article 3:235 of the NCC states: 
Any stipulation whereby the pledgee or the hypothecary creditor (mortgagee) is 
given the power to appropriate the secured property is null. ' 
§ 1229 of the GCC states: 
der Verkauf in dieser Art erfolgt. 2. Kommt eine Einigung nicht zustande, so 
entscheidet das Gericht.' 
77 See the jurisprudence and literature mentioned in sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 above. 
78 For a comparable approach in relation to fiduciary transfers of title, see sections 
3.2.2 and 3.2.3 above. 
79 Translation: Netherlands Business Legislation. Original Dutch text: 'Elk beding 
waarbij de pand- of hypotheekhouder de bevoegdheid wordt gegeven zich het ver-
bonden goed toe te eigenen, is nietig.' 
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An agreement made before the existence of the right to sell, by which the 
ownership of the thing falls to the pledgee or is transferred to him, in case he does 
not, or does not in due time, receive satisfaction, is void. 
c. Right to surplus value 
Another characteristic feature of both the right of pledge and (under old 
Dutch and current German law) a fiduciary transfer of title is that any 
possible surplus value upon enforcement of the security interest and 
fulfilment of the secured obligation must be paid by the security taker to 
the security provider. For the right of pledge, this principle has been laid 
down in Article 253 of the NCC and in § 1247 of the GCC.ei 
Article 253 of the NCC states: 
After paying the costs of the execution, the pledgee shall deduct from the net pro-
ceeds the amount owed to him and for which he has a right of pledge. The balance 
shall be paid to the pledgor [...] 2 
§ 1247 of the GCC states: 
Insofar as the proceeds from the pledge belong to the pledgee for his satisfaction, 
the claim is deemed as settled by the owner. In other respects the proceeds take the 
place of (he pledge. 
d. Balance of power between the parties 
The core characteristics of security interests discussed above reflect the 
limited goal of a security interest. It serves a recovery function, and the 
collateral taker should not be given more rights than necessary. The core 
characteristics reflect the reality that a collateral provider and a collateral 
80 Translation: Goren 1994. Original German text: 'Eine vor dem Eintritt der Verkaufs-
berechtigung getroffene Vereinbarung, nach welcher dem Pfandgläubiger, falls er 
nicht oder nicht rechtzeitig befriedigt wird, das Eigentum an der Sache zufallen 
oder übertragen werden soll, ist nichtig.' 
81 For a comparable approach in relation to fiduciary transfers of title, see sections 
3.2.2 and 3.2.3 above. 
82 Translation: Netherlands Business Legislation. Original Dutch text: 'De pandhouder 
houdt, na voldoening van de kosten van executie, van de netto-opbrengst af het aan 
hem verschuldigde bedrag waarvoor hij pandrecht heeft. Het overschot wordt aan 
de pandgever uitgekeerd [...]'. 
83 Translation: Goren 1994. Original German text: 'Soweit der Erlös aus dem Pfände 
dem Pfandgläubiger zu seiner Befriedigung gebührt, gilt die Forderung als von 
dem Eigentümer berichtigt. Im Übrigen tritt der Erlös an die Stelle des Pfandes.' 
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taker are in a fiduciary relationship and that a balance must be reached 
between their respective interests and those of their creditors. Because 
both the core characteristics discussed above and the goal of reaching a 
fair balance between the interests of the parties involved in a security in-
terest are deemed to be fundamental, the core characteristics are issues of 
mandatory law. 
Basically, the core characteristics of security interests and the methods 
used to balance the interests of the parties are applications of the general 
principle that parties should behave in a fair and reasonable manner 
towards each other. The application of these characteristics as a guarantee 
for reasonable behaviour is particularly important when the parties to an 
agreement are not in an equally powerful position. This is the case, for 
example, when a financial institution provides credit to an individual 
person or to a small or medium-sized enterprise. 
In the case of an outright transfer of title, a comparable fiduciary relation-
ship between the transferor and the transferee does not arise. In this case, 
the transferor intends to transfer all right, title and interest to the trans-
feree. This means that, in this case, the application of the characteristics of 
security interests outlined above is not mandatory. 
3.3.3 The functions of financial collateral 
a. Introduction 
This section reviews the functions of financial collateral and examines 
whether these functions lean in the direction of a security interest or in the 
direction of a title transfer. It has already been argued in section 2.4 of 
chapter II that financial collateral provided in the course of repos, secu-
rities lending transactions or derivatives usually serves at least two func-
tions: it is used for purposes of recovery ('recovery function') and for en-
gaging in further activities ('tradeability function'). This section examines 
whether this dual function requirement is more compatible with an out-
right transfer of title or with vesting a security interest.84 
84 On the two functions of collateral, see De Haas / Keijser 2001, pp. 6-7 and Keijser / 
De Haas 2001, p. 11. See also Wood 1995 II, pp. 3-24, for a general analysis of cir-
cumstances that are relevant in establishing either a security interest or a title 
transfer. 
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b. Recovery function 
In many respects, financial collateral serves the same functions as security 
interests (see section 3.3.2). A collateral flow has a recovery function. In 
repos, for example, collateral provided at the outset of a transaction is a 
safeguard against a defaulting seller; in securities lending, collateral in the 
form of cash and/or securities covers the risk in relation to the borrower, 
whereas margin securities, provided in the course of repo or securities 
lending transactions or under the ISDA Margin Provisions, secure a net 
exposure arising during a transaction. In other words, financial collateral 
is intended to secure a net exposure in relation to the counterparty. 
The close-out netting mechanisms that are applied in the event of default 
or termination illustrate this recovery function. The main internationally 
used standard agreements for repos, securities lending transactions and 
derivatives (i.e. the Global Master Repurchase Agreement, the Global 
Master Securities Lending Agreement and the 2002 ISDA Master Agree-
ments) all contain detailed provisions on the process of close-out netting. 
Generally speaking, this process amounts to the following: after the occur-
rence of an event of default (e.g., insolvency) or termination (e.g., a 
merger resulting in diminished creditworthiness), all or a limited number 
of the parties' transactions are terminated prematurely (either after a 
notice has been served or automatically). The value of the obligations of 
the parties is then calculated in accordance with the different procedures 
set out in the standard documentation, which generally aim at a fair 
valuation in accordance with market prices (for example, by requiring 
different price quotes in established markets). The obligations are sub-
sequently expressed in a single currency, and netted. The result is always 
a single net amount payable by one of the parties.85 
To a large extent, this procedure is compatible with the core principles of 
pledge law outlined in section 3.3.2 above, which aim at an economically 
fair valuation achieved through a prescribed sale and the prohibition of 
appropriation. In addition, the obligation to pay the single net amount is 
comparable to the collateral taker's obligation under the pledge principles 
to pay any surplus value to the collateral provider upon fulfilment of the 
secured obligation. 
85 See also sections 4.7 and 8.7 of chapter II and section 3 of chapter V. 
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A situation in which the economic risk lies with the transferor of financial 
collateral also fails to support the view that an outright transfer has taken 
place. The transferor has to account for price fluctuations in respect of 
collateral transferred in line with the margin maintenance methods dis-
cussed in section 4.3 of chapter II. Moreover, the transferee is usually 
obliged to pay to the transferor amounts equivalent to income payments.86 
These circumstances could lead to the interpretation that the parties have 
not intended an unlimited transfer of title, but rather the establishment of 
a security interest.97 
c. Tradeability function 
As a rule, however, in addition to its recovery function, financial collateral 
also serves a tradeability function, which means that the collateral can be 
(and usually is) used to engage in further trading activities. It is for this 
reason that the transferee of the collateral is under the obligation to 
transfer equivalent (but not identical) collateral at the end of a transaction. 
It is essentially this function of tradeability that distinguishes a financial 
collateral arrangement from traditional security interests. Traditional 
security interests under Dutch or German law have only a recovery func-
tion. The secured party cannot dispose of the secured assets (e.g., to cover 
a short position or to make money on the markets in any other way) if no 
default has taken place. The feature of tradeability in addition to recovery 
is therefore not compatible with a security interest and necessitates an 
outright transfer of collateral. 
d. Extra illustration: the approach under English and American law 
Under English and American law, the functions that financial collateral 
fulfil arguably play a crucial role in determining whether a title transfer 
is valid or whether it should be recharacterised as a security interest. This 
section serves as an extra illustration to the argument above: that a title 
transfer is enforceable if the collateral transferred serves both a recovery 
and a tradeability function. 
86 See sechon 4.5 of chapter II 
87 The approach of the GMRA and the GMSLA in respect of voting rights in equity 
transactions does not clearly show which party carries the economic risk The 
approaches of the GMRA and the GMSLA differ Under the GMRA, the collateral 
provider is, as a rule, entitled to give voting instructions, whereas under the 
GMSLA, the collateral taker can vote at his own discretion For further information, 
see section 3 4.3 b ('Economic risks and benefits') below 
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Under English law, title transfers of financial collateral are generally con-
sidered to be safe. However, provisions in a master agreement or an 
annex thereto, which reflect the desire of the parties to transfer collateral 
for recovery purposes only, raise recharacterisation concerns. The limited 
tradeability of collateral securities may be an indicator that the title trans-
fer structure does not reflect the substance of the parties' intents and that 
collateral should actually have been provided by establishing a security 
interest.88 
The same is true for American law. Schroeder concludes her treatise on 
repurchase agreements as follows: 
I suggest that a repo is a genuine sale and not a security interest if the repo seller 
loses all of its property interest in the security when it is sold to the repo buyer. This 
should be evidenced not by self-serving subjective statements of the repo parties, 
but by the objective evidence of the contractual terms. Specifically, if the repo buyer 
has the right to sell the repo security and merely sell a substitute security back to 
the repo seller, the repo should be recognised as a true sale. 
As with English law, the 'objective' intent of the parties is decisive under 
American law. It is not the subjective statements of the parties that are 
normative, but rather the economic intent of the parties, as this can be 
objectively established on the basis of the terms of their agreement, for 
instance. If the collateral taker has both a right to recourse and an un-
limited right of disposal, an outright transfer will not be recharacterised 
as a security interest.90 
3.3.4 Conclusion 
It is submitted that an approach in which the different functions of 
financial collateral are taken into account, provides a key to under-
standing the issue of recharacterisation risk. The actual intentions of the 
parties are decisive when determining whether recharacterisation should 
take place. In particular, the role the collateral is intended to fulfil should 
be established: does it serve a recovery function only, or a tradeability 
88 See Benjamin 1997 II, pp. 514-515, and the case law there mentioned; Benjamin 
2000, pp. 132-134; and the case Re Curtain Dream pic published in Butterworths Com-
pany Law Cases, 1990, pp. 925-939. See also section 3 of chapter IV. 
89 See Schroeder 1996, pp. 1049-1050. 
90 See Schroeder 1996. Refer also to UCC (2004 edition). Article 8, Prefatory Note III 
C, sections 10 and 11, pp. 806-808; Kettering 1999 I, pp. 1135-1136; Kettering 1999 
II, pp. 205-206; and Scott Pryor 2001, A.2 ('When Less is More Part 2 - Repos'). See 
also section 2 of chapter IV. 
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function as well? If the intention of the parties has been to provide assets 
for recovery purposes only, a security interest should have been estab-
lished. In this case, the collateral taker and the collateral provider are in 
a fiduciary relationship, which means, among other things, that the collat-
eral taker is not allowed to dispose of the collateral under normal circum-
stances. In this event, the tradeability function is therefore absent. The 
fiduciary relationship arising in the case of a security interest is not com-
patible with the secured party's general right of disposal. But if both 
recovery and tradeability functions are envisaged, financial collateral 
should be provided on the basis of an outright transfer of title. 
3.4 The Sogelease decision 
In section 3.2, a historical overview of the different security interests 
available under Dutch and German law was provided. In addition, section 
3.3 analysed the functions of security interests and compared them to the 
functions of title transfers. It is now time to pay further attention to the 
legal situation in the Netherlands after the introduction of the current 
Dutch Civil Code in 1992, which abolished fiduciary transfers. This in turn 
requires the exact scope of this prohibition to be determined. A landmark 
case in this respect is the Sogelease decision of the Dutch Supreme Court,91 
which is the topic of this section. Section 3.4.1 below outlines the Supreme 
Court's decision. Section 3.4.2 discusses the merits and the deficiencies of 
the Sogelease decision, and section 3.4.3 examines the relevance of this 
decision for transfers of financial collateral under repurchase and secu-
rities lending agreements. In addition, the focus in section 3.4.4 is on the 
recent BTL Lease decision of the Dutch Supreme Court. 
This section also discusses whether applying the function-based approach 
set out in section 3.3 above, leads to fair results. 
3.4.1 The contents of the Sogelease decision 
The Sogelease decision concerns a sale and financial leaseback transaction. 
In this case, company A bought printing presses from company B. In or-
der to finance the presses, company A sold them to Sogelease and Soge-
lease leased them back to company A. The parties agreed to a so-called 
'financial lease', in which the lessor wished to have legal ownership as a 
means of security, whereas all economic risks were carried by the lessee. 
91 Decision of 19 May 1995. See Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1996, no. 119. 
135 
Chapter III 
This lease was structured on the basis of a reservation of title. Upon the 
normal expiry of the lease agreement, company A had the right to buy the 
presses for a symbolic price. It was agreed that company A would carry 
all economic risks and would activate the presses on its balance sheet. 
Upon default, Sogelease had stipulated the right to dissolve the lease 
agreement and sell the presses to a third party.92 
The Supreme Court ruled that the sale and financial leaseback construc-
tion was valid. The construction consists of two parts. According to the 
Supreme Court, the first part (i.e. the sale by company A to Sogelease) was 
an outright transfer of ownership that was not invalid under Article 
3:84(3) NCC. On the basis of this right of full ownership, Sogelease was 
entitled to lease back the printing presses to company A (the second part) 
on the basis of reserving its right of ownership until all the lease instal-
ments had been paid. 
In order to determine whether a prohibited fiduciary transfer of title has 
taken place, the following circumstances should be considered in line with 
the Sogelease decision: (1) the rights and obligations upon default, in-
cluding those relating to a prescribed sale, appropriation and surplus 
value; (2) the party carrying the economic risk in respect of the assets 
transferred; and (3) the purpose of the transaction according to the real 
intentions of the parties. These three issues will now be examined in 
further detail. 
a. Rights and obligations upon default 
The Supreme Court considered that 'an agreement which in the case of an 
event of default limits the rights of the party to whom the property is 
transferred to the right to realise the transferred property in order to have 
recourse to the proceeds thereof, while this party is also under the 
obligation to pass on any surplus value to the counterparty, does not 
constitute a valid legal ground pursuant to Article 3:84(3) of the NCC: in 
this case the parties should establish a (non-public) right of pledge or a 
right of hypothec (mortgage)."3 Essentially, the Supreme Court refers to 
92 See Van Hees 1997 on leasing 
93 Section 3 4 3, second paragraph, of the Sogelease decision Translation. TK. Original 
Dutch text 'Dienovereenkomstig levert een overeenkomst die de bevoegdheden van 
degene aan wie het goed wordt overgedragen, in geval van wanprestatie van zijn 
wederpartij beperkt tot het recht het hem overgredragen goed te gelde te maken ten 
einde zich uit de opbrengst daarvan te bevredigen onder gehoudenheid een 
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the core characteristics of security interests, outlined in section 1.3 of this 
chapter, particularly to the prescribed sale, the prohibition of appropria-
tion and the right of the security provider to any surplus value. In order 
to establish whether the prohibition of Article 3:84(3) of the NCC to trans-
fer title on a fiduciary basis has been violated, the rights and duties upon 
default should be assessed. Is the secured party (in this case the lessor) 
free to do with the object whatever he pleases (e.g., to appropriate it or 
sell it to a third party), or is he obliged to sell the asset in question upon 
default? If the secured party is obliged to sell, it is important to determine 
whether this sale has the character of a public sale and is carried out for 
purposes of recourse. In addition, it must be determined whether the 
secured party is under the obligation to transfer any surplus value to his 
counterparty after the realisation has taken place. 
The outright transfer method can, as the Sogelease decision shows, be 
applied to provide security. A transfer is not in violation of Article 3:84(3) 
of the NCC if the parties have agreed that, in the event of default on the 
part of the counterparty, the secured party only needs to dissolve the 
agreement in order to again have the unlimited right to dispose of the 
property freely (which basically boils down to an appropriation of the 
property) and that the secured party is not under any obligation to pay 
any surplus value to the counterparty upon default. If, however, the 
secured party must, like a pledgee, conduct a public sale in order to gua-
rantee maximum proceeds and is obliged to transfer any surplus value to 
the provider of security, these are very strong indicators that the parties 
should actually have established a right of pledge. 
b. Economic risk 
Is economic risk a factor that indicates whether an outright transfer or a 
fiduciary transfer has taken place? In the Sogelease case, it had been agreed 
that the provider of security (the lessee) would carry the economic risk 
and would bear the maintenance costs in relation to the sold and leased 
printing presses. The assets transferred were even registered on the les-
see's balance sheet. Because economic risk is usually vested in the owner 
of assets, it could be concluded that Sogelease (the lessor) had not become 
the owner of the printing presses but that it had been the intention of the 
eventueel overschot aan zijn wederpartij ten goede te doen komen, ingevolge art. 
3:84 lid 3 niet een geldige titel voor overdracht op: partijen dienen dan gebruik te 
maken van (stil) pandrecht, onderscheidenlijk van hypotheek.' 
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parties to give Sogelease a limited proprietary right only. The Supreme 
Court's decision, however, makes it clear that the question of whether an 
outright or fiduciary transfer of title has taken place is not determined by 
which party carries the economic risk arising in connection with the 
property transferred. The Supreme Court ruled: 'Also a contractual pro-
vision under which the maintenance costs and risk remain for the account 
of the transferor does not mean that no "true transfer" as mentioned above 
has taken place.'94 Even though the economic risks were not carried by the 
transferee of the printing presses (the lessor), the Supreme Court con-
sidered the lessor to be the full owner thereof. The factor of economic 
liability, therefore, does not determine whether the parties should transfer 
ownership outright or establish a security interest. 
The Supreme Court's decision is in line with the explanation of Article 
3:84(3) of the NCC given by the Minister of Justice, making it clear that a 
transfer of title is not necessarily of a fiduciary nature if it is accompanied 
by a contractual arrangement that states that (1) the fruits and other 
advantages of the transferred assets are for the benefit of the original title-
holder and (2) the original title-holder carries the economic risk arising in 
respect of these assets.95 Such contractual provisions have no direct effect 
on the level of property law, even though they may give an indication of 
the actual intentions of the parties. If economic risk is vested in the trans-
feree, this is a strong indicator that an outright transfer has taken place, 
whereas if the transferor remains economically liable, this can be an 
indication that he is still the owner and that it was intended that the trans-
feree be given a security interest only. 
c. Motivations other than security 
The Supreme Court explicitly stated that the fact that a transaction has 
also been entered into for security purposes (in addition to other pur-
poses) does not necessarily mean that the transaction is in violation of 
Article 3:84(3) of the NCC.96 It should, therefore, be determined what the 
exact intentions of the parties to a transaction are. If they have transferred 
94 Section 3.4.3, fourth paragraph, of the Sogelease decision. Translation: TK. Original 
Dutch text: 'Evenmin staat een beding krachtens hetwelk onderhoud en risico voor 
rekening van de overdrager blijven, eraan in de weg aan te nemen dat de overeen-
komst strekt tot een "werkelijke overdracht" in voormelde zin.' 
95 See the Parliamentary History of the NCC, Boek 3; Vermogensrecht in het algemeen. 
Article 3.4.2.2, pp. 318-319 (M.v.A. II). 
96 See, in particular, section 3.4.3, fourth and fifth paragraphs, of the Sogelease decision. 
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title with the sole intention of securing an outstanding debt, the transfer 
is invalid under Article 3:84(3) of the NCC. But if the transaction is also 
entered into for other reasons, the title transfer method can, under some 
circumstances, be used. The Sogelease case shows that the Supreme Court 
is inclined to accept the presence of other such motivations to justify the 
use of the title transfer method. 
Essentially, a sale and financial leaseback is a financing construction in 
which objects are transferred as security for a loan that is paid back in the 
form of lease instalments. According to the Supreme Court, such construc-
tions are not in violation of Article 3:84(3) of the NCC. The circumstance 
in the Sogelease case that distinguished the sale and financial leaseback 
construction from a traditional security interest in the view of the 
Supreme Court was, in particular, a contractual agreement that allowed 
the security taker to dissolve the sale and financial leaseback agreement 
and to freely dispose of the assets involved. 
d. Conclusion 
It follows from the Sogelease decision that title cannot be transferred under 
Article 3:84(3) of the NCC if the rights of the secured party are limited to 
seizing the property, selling it and having recourse to the proceeds there-
of, while a duty exists to pay any surplus value to the provider of security. 
Under such conditions, the secured party is essentially in the same 
position as a pledgee. In this case, a right of pledge should have been 
established. The Supreme Court has, however, given Article 3:84(3) of the 
NCC very limited scope. In line with the Court's decision, a transfer is 
possible and not in violation of the prohibition of fiduciary transfers of 
title, as soon as the collateral taker is contractually granted the right to 
appropriate assets upon default and sell them to a third party. 
3.4.2 The merits and deficiencies of the Sogelease decision 
In general, the Sogelease decision was well received because it sanctioned 
sale and financial leaseback transactions. This financing construction and 
comparable financial transactions, in which the title transfer method is 
used to provide security, serve viable economic goals and were widely 
applied in the Netherlands before the introduction of the current Civil 
Code. 
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The Supreme Court's decision, however, also has drawbacks. The first 
subsection below investigates the extent to which the Sogelease decision 
limited the scope of the prohibition of fiduciary transfers of title set out in 
Article 3:84(3) of the NCC, and to what extent it made fiduciary transfers 
possible. The second subsection examines what a fiduciary relationship 
arising from a transfer of title for security purposes should look like after 
the Sogelease decision. Particular attention will be paid to the legal con-
structions that can be applied in order to guarantee a fair balance between 
the interests of collateral provider and collateral taker.97 
a. Are fiduciary transfers of title now possible? 
The sale and financial leaseback construction of the Sogelease case is a 
financing construction in which the lessor finances the lessee. The lessee 
provides the lessor with security by transferring to him outright title to 
assets that are subsequently leased back to the lessee. In spite of the Dutch 
prohibition on transferring title for security purposes, the Supreme Court 
has recognised this construction. According to the Supreme Court, a 
transfer of title is therefore allowed, even if its main function is the pro-
vision of security, so long as a 'true transfer' has taken place. The Sogelease 
decision shows that it is very easy to structure a transaction as a 'true 
transfer'. The only circumstance that gave the lessor more rights than a 
secured party (such as a pledgor), was the contractual provision that he 
could dissolve the agreement upon default; he would then have an un-
limited, unconditional right of disposal. According to the Supreme Court, 
only a transfer of title having all the characteristic features of a right of 
pledge would be considered invalid under Article 3:84(3) NCC. Arguably, 
the consequence of this decision is that the scope of the prohibition of 
fiduciary transfers of title has been considerably limited. The Sogelease 
decision relates to sale and leaseback transactions, but has been for-
mulated in very general terms and can therefore also be considered rele-
vant for other title transfer structures in which, from an economic point 
of view, security is provided. 
97 The impact of the prohibition of fiduciary transfers of title in Article 3:84(3) of the 
NCC has been discussed extensively in Dutch legal literature. Before the Sogelease 
decision, for example, the following articles appeared: Heyman 1994; Kleijn 1994; 
Kortmann 1994 II. The Sogelease decision was discussed in the following publica-
tions, among others: Van Hees 1997; Kortmann / Van Hees 19951; Kortmann / Van 
Hees 1995 II; Reehuis 1997; Reehuis 1998; Rongen 1996; Salomons 1995; Salomons 
1996; Struycken 1996 I; Struycken 1996 II; Verhagen 1997. See, more specifically in 
relation to transactions with financial collateral, the literature mentioned in footnote 
116. 
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The remarkable thing about the Supreme Court's decision is that it now 
seems possible to put aside the core characteristics of security interests on 
the basis of a contract. The Supreme Court already seems to assume a 'true 
transfer' only if the parties agree that the security taker has full title upon 
default (which is basically the same as an appropriation of the assets 
involved), and if they agree that the security taker is not obliged to trans-
fer any surplus value to the provider of the security. This is also the 
greatest weakness of the Supreme Court's decision. Whereas it was good 
that the Supreme Court sanctioned sale and leaseback constructions and, 
more generally, fiduciary transfers of title, it should not be possible to put 
aside the fiduciary relationship arising in the provision of security on the 
basis of an agreement between the parties. The core characteristics of 
security interests are generally issues of mandatory law, if only because 
a balance between the interests of the parties involved in a fiduciary 
relationship is deemed to be essential. The method applied is not impor-
tant; the core characteristics of security interests should apply whether 
security has been provided by way of a right of pledge or by transferring 
title on a fiduciary basis. It is not desirable that these characteristics be put 
aside on the basis of a mere agreement. The issue of the contents of the 
fiduciary relationship is discussed further in the next subsection.98 
b. The contents of the fiduciary relationship 
Kortmann and Van Hees have argued that the Sogelease decision is a step 
back to the time of the Bierbrouwerij and Hakkers I Van Tilburg decisions of 
1929," in which the Dutch Supreme Court recognised the possibility of 
fiduciary transfers of title.100 The main deficiency of these decisions was 
that the contents of the fiduciary relationship had not yet been estab-
lished. The interests of collateral provider and collateral taker were to be 
balanced in a series of Supreme Court decisions in the years to come. 
Indeed, the Sogelease decision has exactly the same drawbacks as the Bier-
brouwerij and the Hakkers I Van Tilburg decisions. The recognition of the 
possibility of transferring title on a fiduciary basis is positive, but deter-
mination of the content of the resulting fiduciary relationship is lacking. 
Sigman puts it in even stronger terms. He states: 
98 See also section 1.3 above. 
99 On these decisions, see section 3.2.2 above. 
100 See Kortmann / Van Hees 1995 I; Kortmann / Van Hees 1995 II. 
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The Court gave financier/lessors far more than they need to secure repayment of 
monies advanced, and, correlatively, diminished excessively the rights of user/ 
lessees [...].101 
This subsection investigates what the fiduciary relationship should look 
like in the case of fiduciary transfers of title after the Sogelease decision. 
This is done by considering a number of legal constructions that lead to 
a fiduciary relationship, and by exploring a number of methods that can 
be applied in order to achieve a fair balance of the interests of the parties 
involved. 
The situation where a party (from an economic point of view) provides 
security to a counterparty has legal consequences. The parties in a secured 
transaction are in a special fiduciary relationship, the exact nature of 
which depends on the way in which the security has been provided. 
Security can be provided in several ways. It is possible to vest a right of 
pledge or, if permitted under national law, to transfer title on a fiduciary 
basis. From an economic point of view, the seller is also secured in the 
case of a reservation of title. Under Dutch law, the general provision 
relating to reservation of title (eigendomsvoorbehoud) is Article 3:92 of the 
NCC. The more specific regulation relating to hire-purchase contracts 
(huurkoop) is set out in Articles 7A:1576h-1576x of the NCC. As the Soge-
lease decision shows, other arrangements, such as a sale and financial 
leaseback construction can also be applied to provide security. Econom­
ically, a sale combined with a financial lease (structured as a reservation 
of title) is essentially a secured loan.102 What all these arrangements have 
in common is that, in one way or another, the interests of the secured 
party and the counterparty are balanced. 
Pledge and fiduciary transfer of title 
In the case of a pledge or a fiduciary transfer of title, the latter of which 
was applied under old Dutch law and is currently applied under German 
law, the core characteristics of security interests apply. The application of 
these characteristics guarantees a fair balance between the interests of the 
provider of security and the secured party. Over-endowment of the 
secured party is prevented in these cases by applying the following rules. 
Enforcement should take place in such a way that assets are valued on a 
commercially reasonable basis, which is usually guaranteed by a manda­
tory sale with a public character, without appropriation of those assets by 
101 See Sigman 1996, p. 170. 
102 On this latter issue, see, for example, Heyman 1994; Sigman 1996; Reehuis 1997. 
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the secured party. In addition, any possible surplus value upon enforce-
ment should be transferred to the provider of the security.'03 
Reservation of title and hire-purchase contracts 
From an economic point of view, when a seller reserves title, he secures 
the payment of the sale price by the buyer. The fiduciary relationship 
between the parties is reflected in the buyer's expectation of ownership, 
the Anwartschaftsrecht. If the buyer defaults, however, the seller can 
rescind the sale agreement on the basis of Article 6:265 of the NCC and 
claim the asset transferred from the buyer, with the result that unrestric-
ted title is again vested in the seller. In this case, the position of the buyer 
is protected by Article 6:271, which obliges the seller, upon rescinding the 
sale contract, to return payments already made by the buyer. In practice, 
however, a payment by the seller to the buyer under Article 6:271 of the 
NCC may well fail to occur because the parties may have agreed upon 
damages to be paid by the buyer in the event of his default. The buyer 
may, for example, be liable for any decrease in the value of the assets 
concerned, as well as any costs that have been made by the seller in 
connection with the default (claiming back the assets, legal advice, etc.). 
Because reservation of title arrangements are essentially security interests, 
it should be determined whether the core features of security interests 
that apply in the case of a right of pledge and a fiduciary transfer of title 
are also applicable in the case of a buyer's default under a reservation of 
title arrangement. Should the seller conduct a prescribed sale in order to 
obtain maximum proceeds, without appropriation of the assets involved, 
and should he pay any surplus value to the buyer? As in a fiduciary trans-
fer of title, the secured party in a reservation of title arrangement (i.e. the 
seller) has an ownership interest. Even so, in the event of default, there is 
no complete parallel between fiduciary transfer of title and reservation of 
title arrangements. Not all of the principles of security interests are 
applied in the case of a reservation of title arrangement. The fact that the 
seller has always been the owner of the sold assets is stressed. For this 
reason, it is generally accepted that the seller is, in this case, not obliged 
to carry out a prescribed sale. In addition, the prohibition of appropriation 
is not applied in the case of reservation of title arrangements.104 Article 
3:92 of the NCC does not make it clear whether the seller under a reserva-
103 See sections 1.3, 3.2 and 3.3.2 above. 
104 See chapter 10 of Reehuis 1998. See also, however, Zwalve 1995, section 4, who has 
argued that a seller that has reserved title should - like a pledgee - carry out a 
prescribed sale in the event of the buyer's default. 
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tion of title arrangement is under the obligation to pay any surplus value 
to the buyer upon enforcement. The special regulation of Article 7A:1576t 
of the NCC relating to hire-purchase contracts, however, requires 'full 
compensation' of the buyer if, after rescinding a hire-purchase agreement, 
the seller were to be financially better off than if the agreement had 
remained intact. This means that the seller should pay back any instal-
ments already paid by the buyer. It can also mean that the seller should 
compensate the buyer if the assets involved have increased in value.105 
Balancing the interests of the parties 
This prompts the question of what the fiduciary relationship should look 
like in the case of a fiduciary transfer of title under the Sogelease decision. 
It has already been noted above that, according to the Supreme Court, the 
sale in a sale and financial leaseback transaction leads to a 'real transfer of 
title'. To what extent does such a real passing of title leave room for 
mechanisms that balance the interests of the parties to be applied? These 
mechanisms relate, in particular, to the way enforcement should take 
place (a prescribed sale), to the prohibition of appropriation, and to the 
right to a possible surplus value. The Supreme Court's decision, which 
recognised a contractual provision that gave the secured party an un-
limited right of ownership upon default, seems to suggest that these 
mechanisms can be put aside by simply agreeing that they do not apply. 
However, such an interpretation favours providers of credit too much, 
and is detrimental to the providers of security and their creditors. There 
have, therefore, been several mechanisms outlined in legal literature that 
can be applied in order to balance the interests of all the parties in-
volved.106 
1. Application of the pledge principles by way of analogy107 
Kortmann and Van Hees have argued that the Supreme Court has ex-
cluded the application of the core principles of pledge law to financial sale 
and leaseback transactions, by way of analogy.108 In section 3.4.2 of the 
Sogelease decision, the Supreme Court made it clear that the rules of 
105 See, in the same sense, Van Hees 1997, section 5.3. 
106 See Heyman 1994, p. 10; Kleijn 1994, p. 16; Kleijn's annotation to the Sogelease deci-
sion, section 5; Kortmann / Van Hees 1995 I, pp. 995-996; Reehuis 1997, p. 60; 
Rongen 1996, pp. 279-282; Salomons 1995; Salomons 1996; Struycken 1996 1; 
Struycken 1996 II; Verhagen 1997, p. 56. 
107 See sections 1.3, 3.2 and 3.3.2 above. 
108 See Kortmann / Van Hees 1995 I, pp. 994-995; Kortmann / Van Hees 1995 II. 
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pledge law applied to fiduciary transfers of title under old Dutch law. By 
characterising a transfer under a sale and financial leaseback construction 
as a 'real transfer' in section 3.4.3, and not as a fiduciary one, the Supreme 
Court indeed seems to exclude the application of the rules of pledge law. 
However, as Kortmann and Van Hees also observe, such an interpretation 
would not do justice to the nature of a sale and financial leaseback trans-
action, which, from an economic point of view, involves the provision of 
security and thus leads to a fiduciary relationship between lessor and 
lessee. In my view, it should therefore be possible to use the provisions of 
pledge law in order to shape this and comparable fiduciary relationships. 
2. Application of Article 7A:1576t of the NCC relating to hire purchase 
or comparable contracts109 
As far as the seller's obligation to pay any surplus value to the buyer upon 
default is concerned, there has been a discussion in legal literature about 
the scope of applicability of Article 7A:1576t of the NCC, which requires 
'full compensation' to be paid to the buyer.110 In the context of sale and 
financial leaseback constructions, Salomons has argued that the Sogelease 
decision does not leave room for the payment of any surplus value by 
lessor to lessee, whereas Struycken and Van Hees do not feel comfortable 
with this outcome. Taking into account the fact that the parties to a reser-
vation of title arrangement, a hire-purchase, or a sale and leaseback con-
tract are in a fiduciary relationship (particularly if the buyer/lessee carries 
the economic risks throughout the transaction), it is desirable for Article 
7A:1576t of the NCC to be applied to all the contracts mentioned. The 
seller/lessor should, upon default by the buyer/lessee, pay the buyer/les-
see any surplus value, including that which has arisen due to price fluc-
tuations.111 
3. Application of the rules relating to unjustified enrichment (on-
gerechtvaardigde verrijking) 
Article 6:212 of the NCC sets out an obligation for a person who is en-
riched at the expense of another to repair the damage up to the amount 
of his enrichment, to the extent that this is reasonable. In the event that a 
109 On the basis of Article 7A:1576h(2) of the NCC, the rules relating to hire-purchase 
contracts also apply to contracts that have the same purpose. 
110 See the subsection on reservation of title and hire-purchase contracts above. 
111 See Salomons 1995; Salomons 1996; Struycken 19961; Struycken 1996 II; Van Hees 
1997, section 5.3. 
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secured party appropriates or sells a security provider's assets without 
paying any surplus value to the security provider, the secured party is 
enriched at the cost of the security provider and his other creditors. 
Arguably, this enrichment cannot be justified because it is not in line with 
the fiduciary relationship between the security provider and security 
taker, which requires a balance of their interests. The enrichment should, 
in this view, result in the payment of damages by the security taker.112 
4. Application of the principle of fairness and reasonableness113 
It can also be argued that the appropriation or a sale of encumbered assets 
by a secured party, without payment of any surplus value to the security 
provider, is not fair and reasonable. Withholding surplus value is detri-
mental to the security provider and particularly also to the creditors of the 
security provider. In light of the principle of fairness and reasonableness, 
it is therefore arguable that the contractual relationship between the secu-
rity provider and the security taker entails an obligation for the security 
taker to part with any surplus value.114 
5. Application of the rules relating to voidable preference (actio pau-
liana) 
Under certain circumstances, particularly if a contract appears to have 
been concluded against the interests of other creditors, the rules relating 
to voidable preference (actio pauliana) may also be applicable.115 
These rules are applications of the general principle that parties to an 
agreement should behave in a fair and reasonable manner towards each 
other. If the parties are in a fiduciary relationship, in particular, it is im-
portant to reach a fair balance between the interests of the parties on the 
basis of one of the mechanisms outlined above. This is even more impor-
tant if there is an unequal balance of power between the parties. In this 
case, the application of the pledge principles is crucial in order to protect 
112 In this sense, see Heyman 1994, p. 10; Korhnann / Van Hees 1995 I, p. 996; 
Verhagen 1997, p. 56. 
113 See, for example. Articles 6:2 and 6:248 of the NCC. 
114 In this sense, see Heyman 1994, p. 10; Kortmann / Van Hees 1995 I, p. 996; Verha-
gen 1997, p. 56. 
115 See Article 3:45 et seq. of the NCC and Article 42 et seq. of the NBC. In this sense, see 
Kortmann / Van Hees 1995 I, p. 996; Verhagen 1997, p. 56. 
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the weaker party, usually the security provider, against a more powerful 
counterparty. 
3.4.3 The Sogelease decision and repo and securities lending agreements 
The Sogelease decision relates to a sale and financial leaseback construc­
tion, but it has been formulated in general terms and can therefore also be 
considered relevant to outright transfers of collateral in the course of repo 
and securities lending transactions. This section considers whether such 
collateral transfers should be recharacterised under Article 3:84(3) of the 
NCC. The main arguments for and against the applicability of this pro­
vision to transfers of financial collateral are discussed below in light of the 
Sogelease decision. In line with the analysis in section 3.4.1 above, the 
following issues are considered: (1) the rights of a collateral taker upon 
default, (2) which party carries the economic risks and benefits in a finan­
cial collateral arrangement and (3) whether the parties to such an arrange­
ment envisage any goals other than the provision of security.116 
a. Rights upon default 
If default occurs in relation to the collateral provider, the goals of the 
close-out netting procedure under the GMRA or GMSLA are similar to the 
enforcement of a right of pledge. Although the collateral taker is not 
obliged to sell the financial collateral involved, the procedure of valuation 
set out in the GMRA and GMSLA has the same objective as a public sale: 
i.e. obtaining the best available market price for the collateral. After the 
valuation of all obligations in a single currency, set-off takes place. The 
result is a single net amount payable by one of the parties. This essentially 
means that any surplus value must be refunded. The close-out netting 
mechanism, which applies upon default in a financial collateral arrange­
ment, is therefore in line with the core principles of security interests 
outlined in the general introduction to this chapter. It gives shape to the 
recovery function of financial collateral and points in the direction of a 
security interest.117 
116 On the issue of financial collateral and recharacterisation risk, see also Buist and 
Roos 1994; Van Setten in Dalhuisen / Van Setten 2003; Graaf 1994/1995; Graaf 
1995/1996; Graaf and Van IJlzinga Veenstra 1996/1997; Graaf/Trip 1997/1998; Graaf 
1998/1999; Keijser 2001 II; Keijser 2002 II; Keijser 2004; Rank 1998 I; Rank 1998 II; 
Rank 2000; Rongen 1996; Schroeder 1997; Strik 1998; Verhagen 1997. 
117 See also section 4.7 of chapter Π and section 3.3.3.b of this chapter. 
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b. Economic risks and benefits 
Another factor that can shed some light on the question of whether title 
has been transferred or a security interest has been established is an 
analysis of which party carries the economic risks and benefits in a trans-
action with financial collateral. The economic risk profile can be assessed 
by looking at the agreement between the parties in respect of margin 
maintenance methods, income payments and voting rights. 
In the course of a transaction, the parties are usually under an obligation 
to pay margin in accordance with one of the different margin maintenance 
methods described in section 4.3 of chapter II. In effect, this means that the 
party who was originally entitled to the transferred collateral carries the 
risks and enjoys the benefits of any changes in its value. If prices go up, 
a part of the collateral will be returned. If prices go down, additional col-
lateral must be provided. The economic risk of price movements is there-
fore vested in the original title-holder. 
As discussed in section 4.5 of chapter II, under the GMRA or GMSLA, an 
amount equal to income payments is, as a rule, transferred by the transferee 
of securities to the original title-holder. In this respect, the original title-
holder thus continues enjoying the economic benefits of the securities 
transferred. 
The voting rights in respect of securities transferred in a repurchase or 
securities lending transaction are another indicator that can be used to 
establish which party carries the economic risks of a transaction. This 
issue only plays a role in the case of equity transactions. The approach of 
the GMRA and the GMSLA differs with regard to this issue. In line with 
paragraph 3.6 of the GMRA Equities Annex, the main rule is that the 
original title-holder can give voting instructions that have to be carried 
out by the transferee of equity securities. The approach of paragraph 6.3 
of the GMSLA, on the other hand, is that the transferee of securities is, as 
a rule, not obliged to execute voting rights in line with the instructions of 
the original title-holder, but can act in accordance with his own views. 
The voting rights are thus, as a rule, enjoyed either by the transferee 
(securities lending) or by the original title-holder of securities (repo).118 
118 On voting rights and recharacterisation risk, see also Corrigan / Georgiou / Gollow 
1999, pp. 130-131. 
148 
Transfer of Title 
It should be stressed that these arrangements in respect of margin, income 
payments and voting rights are all of a contractual nature. As such, they 
have no direct impact in the field of property law, i.e. on the question of 
whether the parties should have opted for a security interest or an out-
right transfer of title. These contractual arrangements can nevertheless 
play a role in establishing the real intentions of the parties. If all risks and 
benefits are assumed by collateral taker, this points to a full transfer of 
title. If, on the contrary, the original title-holder carries all risks and bene-
fits, there is a possibility that the parties have only envisaged a recovery 
function for the assets involved, and should actually have established a 
security interest.119 
c. Motivations other than security 
It cannot be denied that, among other things, transfers of collateral under 
repo and securities lending transactions have a recovery function. The 
transferee's rights in respect of the collateral transferred are, however, not 
merely limited to having recourse to the proceeds of collateral upon 
default; the transferee acquires full and unrestricted title to the collateral. 
The transferee is therefore entitled to dispose of the collateral as he deems 
fit. He is not obliged to deliver the same securities at the end of a trans-
action; he has only an obligation to deliver equivalent securities. These are 
the decisive circumstances that both prevent recharacterisation on the 
basis of Article 3:84(3) NCC and explain the reason for choosing the title 
transfer method. Under general principles of Dutch (and German) law, a 
general right of disposal (combined with a duty to transfer equivalent 
assets at a later date) cannot be based on a security interest.120 It is for this 
reason that the title transfer method is traditionally used to provide collat-
eral under repos and securities lending transactions.121 
It is precisely the collateral taker's right of disposal and the tradeability 
function of financial collateral that distinguish repo and securities lending 
agreements from traditional security interests. Under a traditional 
security interest, the secured party has no unlimited right of disposal. A 
119 See also section 3 3 3 above 
120 On this issue, see also section 4 of chapter IV 
121 In this sense, see Van Ardenne-Stachiw 1995, section 2 6 9 and chapter 5, Schroeder 
1997, Verhagen 1997, Seinstra 1998, Keijser 2002 II; Van Setten in Dalhuisen / Van 
Setten 2003, section 8 For example. Rank 19981; Rank 1998II, and Graaf 1998/1999 
are more careful, but in my view they underestimate the crucial role of the 
tradeability function of financial collateral See also section 3 3 3 above 
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pledgee can only dispose of pledged assets when the pledgor does not 
fulfil the secured obligation. A fiduciary owner does not have the right to 
freely dispose of the assets transferred unless default occurs.'22 Likewise, 
in a sale and financial leaseback construction (similar to that in Sogelease), 
a lessor has no general right of disposal in respect of the assets transferred 
and leased during the course of a transaction because the lessee has an 
ownership expectation that the lessor is not allowed to neglect. 
Nonetheless, it should be noted that article 3:84(3) NCC may be applicable 
if the parties have explicitly excluded the tradeability of the financial 
collateral provided and if the documentation between the parties also 
makes it clear that the collateral is transferred for recovery purposes only. 
Indicators of such intentions may, for example, be a transfer of highly 
non-liquid collateral securities that are obviously not tradable, or a provi-
sion in an agreement that collateral securities must be kept on an indi-
vidualised basis in a safe or a separate account for the duration of the 
transaction.123 
3.4.4 The BTL Lease decision 
Recently, the Dutch Supreme Court was faced a second time with a sale 
and leaseback arrangement. In its BTL Lease decision of 18 November 
2005,124 the Supreme Court paid more attention to the position of the 
collateral provider. 
In this case, a number of interrelated companies needed money in order 
to pay lease terms due to BTL Lease under an operational lease agree-
ment. In order to obtain this money, they sold a number of trucks and 
trailers to BTL Lease and subsequently leased them back. Under the terms 
of this latter lease, the companies were supposed to pay three lease instal-
ments and had the option to buy the trucks and trailers at the end of the 
lease period. What is noteworthy about this case is that the trucks and 
trailers were sold for approximately NLG 350,000, whereas their market 
value was approximately NLG 700,000. 
122 E g, in the Bierbrouwerij case, Heineken (the fiduciary owner) was only allowed to 
dispose freely of the furniture of the counterparty in the event of the latter's default 
123 On the recovery and tradeability functions of financial collateral, see also section 2 4 
of chapter II and section 3 3.3 of this chapter. 
124 See case number LJN AT8241 at www.rechtspraak nl 
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When the companies ran into economic difficulties, some of the trucks 
and trailers disappeared, allegedly sold by one of the companies' direc-
tors. BTL Lease sued this director and - as owner of the trucks - claimed 
approximately NLG 350,000 on the basis of tort (unauthorised disposal). 
The director (and later his heirs) countered that BTL Lease was not the 
owner at all, because the sale and leaseback was entered into for security 
purposes only, and was thus essentially a fiduciary transfer. Because such 
transfers are forbidden under Dutch law, the director (and his heirs) 
claimed ownership. One of the main arguments that, in their eyes, pointed 
to a fiduciary and not an outright transfer, was that there was a clear dis-
crepancy between the market value of the trucks and trailers and the sale 
price paid by BTL Lease. 
Following testimony in which it was stated that the only purpose of the 
parties was to establish a security interest for a loan, the district court 
(rechtbank) rejected BTL's claim. The court of appeal (hof) basically stated 
that BTL had to prove that it was the owner, and rejected its claims 
because it had not successfully done so. The Supreme Court annulled this 
decision on the basis of the legal rules relating to proof. According to the 
Supreme Court, it was not BTL that had to prove that an outright transfer 
had taken place, but the director (and his heirs) who had to prove that the 
transfer was a fiduciary one. On this basis, the Supreme Court referred the 
case back to another court of appeal. It is interesting to note that the 
Supreme Court also shed some light on the substantive issue at stake, i.e. 
whether the transfer should be qualified as outright or fiduciary. The 
Court explicitly stated that an imbalance between sale price and market 
value may be taken into account in this respect, and made it clear that the 
disproportion between the market value of the property (in this case 
NLG 700,000) and the sale price paid (NLG 350,000) may well indicate that 
the property has been transferred for recourse purposes, and that the 
parties should actually have established a right of pledge. 
3.4.5 Conclusion 
As of 1992, Article 3:84(3) of the NCC has prohibited fiduciary transfers 
of title. The Sogelease decision of the Dutch Supreme Court interpreted this 
prohibition and considerably limited its scope. One may conclude from 
the Sogelease decision that only title transfers that have been entered into 
solely for recovery purposes are affected by this provision. The fact that 
the Supreme Court has recognised the sale and financial leaseback con-
struction as a viable financing structure is positive. The Sogelease decision 
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has been formulated very generally and leaves room for other financing 
mechanisms involving a fiduciary transfer of title. The decision, however, 
also has a major drawback. It pays hardly any attention to the position of 
collateral providers. No balance is struck between the interests of collat-
eral providers, their creditors and collateral takers. The fiduciary relation-
ship arising from the provision of security from an economic point of view 
has not been clearly defined. In the recent BTL Lease case, which featured 
a clear discrepancy between market value of assets and sale price paid, 
the Supreme Court has somewhat refined its position. 
The prohibition of fiduciary transfers of title in Article 3:84(3) of the NCC 
has given rise to continued doubts in the repurchase and securities 
lending market, stemming from the fact that financial collateral serves a 
recovery function. The fact that genuine collateralised transactions also 
envisage the tradeability of the collateral transferred (including margin 
collateral), is, however, sometimes underestimated as a decisive factor 
that necessitates the use of the title transfer method. If the parties to a 
financial collateral arrangement actually intend to include both the re-
covery and tradeability functions. Article 3:84(3) of the NCC will not be 
applicable. In accordance with the function-based approach set out in sec-
tion 3.3 above, a title transfer of financial collateral will, in this case, be 
valid and will not be recharacterised as a security interest. 
At the same time, market participants should accept that the interests of 
collateral providers, their creditors and collateral takers should be 
balanced if a transaction is entered into for recourse purposes only. 
Mechanisms to this end include, for example, a prescribed sale that gua-
rantees maximum proceeds, an obligation to transfer a possible surplus 
value after enforcement or any comparable mechanism. Such mechanisms 
should, in particular, be applied if a transaction is entered into for re-
course purposes between parties who are not in an equal power position. 
Under such circumstances, it is fair to apply core principles of security 
interests in one way or another and, if necessary, to recharacterise a 
transfer of title as a security interest. This 'risk' for collateral takers (i.e. a 
level of protection for collateral providers) cannot and should not be 
eliminated. 
3.5 Subsidiary right of pledge 
In order to eliminate any uncertainties in relation to transfers of financial 
collateral under Article of the 3:84(3) of the NCC, practicing lawyers have 
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developed two solutions. The first is to transfer securities under a law 
other than that of the Netherlands (in the books of Euroclear or Clear-
stream, for example) in order to evade the applicability of Dutch property 
law altogether. This approach relates to private international law and will 
not be discussed here.1" The second solution, which is the topic of this 
section, is the establishment of a subsidiary right of pledge.126 
In my view, a subsidiary right of pledge as a fall-back provision is super­
fluous in genuine repo and securities lending transactions. As argued 
above, if the parties meet the dual function requirement (recovery and 
tradeability) that is envisaged as a standard in, for example, the GMRA 
and the GMSLA, no recharacterisation will take place. Only if the parties 
have deviated from the provisions of internationally recognized standard 
agreements and have excluded the tradeability of financial collateral, can 
a subsidiary right of pledge be of value. Because a transfer solely for 
recovery purposes is not enforceable under Article 3:84(3) of the NCC, in 
this case the subsidiary pledge provision can take effect. 
A Dutch right of pledge is only enforceable if certain formal requirements 
have been met, such as the provision of actual possession, or, in the case 
of a non-public right of pledge, the drawing up of an authentic deed or a 
registered private instrument.127 If the parties agree to establish a subsidi­
ary right of pledge, they should ensure that these formal requirements are 
indeed complied with. 
There is a drawback, however, to vesting a subsidiary right of pledge. A 
judge may interpret such a provision as an indication of the actual inten­
tion of the parties not to transfer outright title to collateral, but to vest a 
security interest. This is the approach of English law.128 For a more liberal 
approach under American law, refer to Paragraph 6 of the TBMA Master 
Repurchase Agreement, which envisages the establishment of a subsidi­
ary security interest. 
125 On this issue, see, for example, Rank 1997; Rank 19981, pp 28-30, Graaf 1998/1999 
126 The solution of a subsidiary right of pledge was first suggested in Buist and Roos 
1994 See also Rank 1998 I, pp 25-28 
127 See Articles 3 236, 237 and 239 of the NCC Consider also Articles 20 and 42 of the 
SGTA, which require a book-entry for the establishment of a right of pledge in 
respect of a share in a pool of SGTA securities (verzameldepot or girodepot) 
128 See Rank 1998 I, ρ 28, Graaf 1998/1999, ρ 193. 
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Note that the establishment of a subsidiary right of pledge has largely 
been abandoned as far as repo agreements are concerned. Whereas the 
Netherlands Domestic Annex to the GMRA 1995 originally did envisage 
a subsidiary right of pledge,129 such a right was not considered necessary 
after the introduction of Article 2a of the STSA in January ^ g . 1 3 0 The 
Dutch Domestic Annexes of October 2000 to the 1995 and 2000 versions 
of the GMRA, therefore, no longer contain a subsidiary right of pledge. 
Nonetheless, in securities lending agreements, a subsidiary pledge in 
respect of collateral and margin collateral securities is often still envisaged 
in the documentation between the parties.131 
3.6 Article 2a of the STSA 
3.6.1 Introduction 
The importance of repos for De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) and the 
feeling of unease among market participants about possible risks under 
Article 3:84(3) of the NCC led to the introduction of Article 2a of the STSA. 
This provision was intended as an interpretation of Article 3:84(3) of the 
NCC and makes it clear that there is no recharacterisation risk in respect 
of repos under Dutch law. Article 2a of the STSA has largely been in-
troduced for psychological reasons and is actually a superfluous provi-
sion. Before the introduction of this provision, transfers of financial collat-
eral were already safe under Dutch law if they met the dual function 
requirement.132 Article 2a of the STSA has been in effect since 1 January 
1999 and forms part of a broader project to prepare the Netherlands for 
the introduction of Stage Three of the Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU).133 
Article 2a of the STSA states: 
129 See section 2(1) of the Annex dated 16 March 1998. 
130 See section 3.6 below for a more detailed discussion of Article 2a STSA. 
131 See also section 3.6.7 below. 
132 See sections 3.3.3 and 3.4.3 above. 
133 See section 7 of chapter II on the use of repos by central banks. The ECB, when 
asked for an opinion on the introduction of Article 2a of the STSA, welcomed clarity 
about the enforceability of repurchase agreements under Dutch law in light of the 
central role of repurchase transactions in the monetary policy framework of the 
ESCB. See the letter of W. Duisenberg (President of the ECB) to G. Zalm (Dutch 
Minister of Finance) of 16 October 1998, mentioned in Tweede Kamer, 1998-1999, 
26 124, no. 5, p. 1. See also DNB 19981, pp. 23-24; DNB 1998 II, p. 21; DNB 1998 III, 
pp. 145-146. 
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The circumstance that the buyer of securities has agreed, upon making the 
purchase, to subsequently transfer an equal quantity of securities of the same type 
to the seller, does not mean that, in violation of Article 3:84(3) of the Civil Code, the 
purpose of the purchase is to transfer property as a security device or that the intent 
to transfer property into the estate of the transferee is absent, unless the securities 
remain in the hands of the seller after the transfer.134 
This section critically evaluates Article 2a of the STSA. First, the scope of 
Article 2a of the STSA is discussed. Does this provision relate to 'genuine' 
repos only, or is it also applicable to fiduciary transfers of title (section 
3.6.2)? Does Article 2a of the STSA apply to both purchased and margin 
securities (section 3.6.3), to securities lending transactions (section 3.6.4) 
and to other collateralised transactions (section 3.6.5)? Subsequently, the 
focus is on the question of how hold-in-custody arrangements should be 
seen in light of Article 2a of the STSA (section 3.6.6). The deletion of the 
subsidiary right of pledge from the Netherlands Annex to the GMRA 
upon the introduction of Article 2a of the STSA is also discussed (section 
3.6.7). Note that Article 2a of the STSA is repealed in Article IV of the 
Dutch law implementing the Collateral Directive.135 
3.6.2 Genuine repos only 
This section examines the scope of Article 2a of the STSA. Do only 
'genuine' repo transactions fall within its scope (i.e. transactions in which 
financial collateral fulfils the two functions of tradeability and recovery)? 
Or does it also apply to fiduciary transfers of title in which the parties 
envisage a recovery function only? The wording of Article 2a of the STSA 
seems to suggest that the first interpretation is the right one. 
The words 'an equal quantity of securities of the same type' in Article 2a 
of the STSA suggest that a repo must serve more functions than recovery 
alone. Only if the transferee of securities has the power to dispose of these 
securities as he pleases, can he be under an obligation to transfer 
134 Translation: Rank 2000, p. 17. Original Dutch text: 'De omstandigheid dat de koper 
van effecten zich bij de koop heeft verbonden tot een latere overdracht van een 
gelijke hoeveelheid effecten van dezelfde soort aan de verkoper, brengt niet met 
zich dat die koop, in strijd met artikel 84, derde lid, van Boek 3 van het Burgerlijk 
Wetboek, ten doel heeft de effecten over te dragen tot zekerheid of de strekking 
mist de effecten na de overdracht in het vermogen van de koper te doen vallen, ten-
zij de effecten na de levering in handen van de verkoper blijven.' 
135 On Article 2a STSA, see Broekhuizen 1998; Rank 1998 II, particularly section 6; 
Seinstra 1998; Graaf 1998/1999, particularly section 4.3; Nederveen 1999, pp. 249-
251; and Rank 2000. 
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equivalent securities at the end of a transaction. Tradeability, as outlined 
above, is the second characteristic function of financial collateral in addi-
tion to the recovery function. It can therefore be concluded that Article 2a 
of the STSA applies to genuine repos only. 
A second phrase that points in this direction is 'unless the securities 
remain in the hands of the seller after the transfer'. With this formula, the 
legislator intended to prohibit a delivery constituto possessorio.136 But why 
should the legislator wish to forbid a manner of delivery that is explicitly 
allowed in Article 3:115a of the NCC? In my view, this is because the 
legislator had in mind the concept of delivery constituto possessorio that 
was customarily used to effect a fiduciary transfer of title under old Dutch 
law and which is still applied to the same end under current German 
law.137 Consciously or unconsciously, the legislator probably realised that 
genuine repos and fiduciary transfers of title are distinct financial trans-
actions with different goals. It seems that the legislator wanted to make 
sure that genuine repos were protected under Dutch law but did not want 
Article 2a of the STSA to apply to fiduciary transfers of title.138 
3.6.3 Purchased and margin securities 
The text of Article 2a of the STSA suggests that this provision applies only 
to purchased securities, while no reference is made to margin securities. 
After the publication of critical comments by legal practitioners,139 the 
Minister of Finance wrote a letter to Parliament140 stating that part of the 
parliamentary documents regarding margin securities had been erro-
neously omitted and that Article 2a of the STSA should be interpreted as 
if margin transfers had also been covered by this provision. 
An additional problem in this respect is that Article 2a of the STSA has 
unnecessarily been limited to the causa of a sale (foop), whereas under 
136 See Tweede Kamer, 1997-1998, 26 124, A, point 2 
137 See séchons 3 2 2 and 3 2 3 above 
138 If this had indeed been the intention of the legislator, it would have been better to 
explicitly exclude fiduciary transfers that serve a recovery function only, instead of 
prohibiting a method of delivery (constitutum possessorium) It is better to focus on 
content than on method of delivery Fiduciary title can also be transferred on the 
basis of another type of delivery, such as a physical delivery of the assets involved, 
whereas, on the other hand, a delivery consituto possessorio does not necessarily 
mean that a fiduciary transfer takes place, it can also lead to an outnght transfer of 
title 
139 See Broekhuizen 1998, Rank 1998 II, section 6, Graaf 1998/1999, section 4 3 
140 See Tweede Kamer, 1998-1999, 26 124, no. 7 
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Article 3:84(3) of the NCC other causae also cannot serve as a basis for a 
transfer for recovery purposes.141 Purchased securities in a repo are in-
deed transferred on the basis of a sale, but the requirement of a sale is 
somewhat problematic in relation to margin securities. It is more likely for 
the transfer of margin securities to take place on the basis of the concept 
of replaceability than on the basis of a sale.142 However, taking into 
account the intent of Article 2a of the STSA to facilitate a well-functioning 
repo market, and given the letter of the Minister of Finance, Article 2a of 
the STSA must also be considered to apply to transfers of margin secu-
rities. 
3.6.4 Securities lending transactions 
The parliamentary history does mention securities lending contracts as 
contracts to which Article 2a of the STSA applies.143 Still, the wording of 
Article 2a of the STSA and the requirement of a causa in the form of a sale 
agreement are unsatisfactory in this respect. The wording of Article 2a of 
the STSA is not in line with securities lending terminology; e.g., reference 
is made to buyer (koper) and seller (verkoper) and not to borrower and 
lender. 
In addition, the limitation to the causa in the form of a sale agreement is, 
as in the case of margin transfers under repo transactions, problematic in 
relation to securities lending transactions. The parliamentary history 
states that loaned securities under a securities lending transaction should 
be transferred on the basis of a sale in order to be covered by Article 2a of 
the STSA.144 This statement is not accurate for two reasons. First, in prac-
tice, loaned securities are customarily transferred on the basis of a loan of 
fungibles (overeenkomst van verbruiklening) and not on the basis of a sale 
agreement.145 Second, in securities lending transactions, the flows of 
collateral and margin collateral in particular, and not the loaned securities, 
are potentially threatened by Article 3:84(3) of the NCC. In spite of this, 
it is likely that the legislator intended the requirement of a causa in the 
form of a sale agreement to be applied to collateral and margin collateral 
securities as well. In practice, however, collateral securities are often 
141 See Tweede Kamer, 1997-1998, 26 124, A, section 2; and Tweede Kamer, 1998-1999, 
26 124, no. 5, section 3. 
142 See section 2.6 above. 
143 See Tweede Kamer, 1998-1999, 26 124, no. 5, section 3. 
144 See Tweede Kamer, 1998-1999, 26 124, no. 5, section 3. 
145 See section 2.4 above. 
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transferred on the basis of a loan of fungibles.146 Title also passes in the 
case of margin securities, but it is unlikely that this occurs on the basis of 
a sale. It is more likely for a transfer of margin securities to take place on 
the basis of the concept of replaceability.147 Article 2a of the STSA and its 
explanatory comments are not satisfactory in this respect. 
3.6.5 Other collateralised transactions 
It follows from the above that Article 2a of the STSA concerns repos and, 
possibly, securities lending transactions. It is not directly applicable, how-
ever, to a transfer of margin securities under the ISDA Credit Support 
Documents or under the subsequent May 2001 ISDA Margin Provisions. 
The same holds true for transfers of securities under cross-product 
arrangements.148 Therefore, if parties transfer securities under derivatives 
or cross-product arrangements, the risk that this transfer will be recharac-
terised as a security interest must primarily be determined on the basis of 
the scope of Article 3:84(3) of the NCC as interpreted in the Sogelease 
decision. The legislator deemed it necessary to confirm that transfers of 
financial collateral under repo (and securities lending) transactions are 
safe under Dutch law, but the fact that Article 2a of the STSA is limited to 
these financial products only and does not apply to comparable financial 
arrangements is an oversight, which has led to the question of whether 
Article 2a of the STSA can be applied by way of analogy. In my view, 
there is nothing against an application by way of analogy to flows of 
collateral under financial instruments comparable to repos, although it 
does not have added value. The risk profile for transactions with financial 
collateral is arguably the same under Article 3:84(3) of the NCC (as inter-
preted in the Sogelease case) and Article 2a of the STSA. 
146 See section 2.4 above. 
147 See section 2.6 above. 
148 A cross-product example: seller X owes margin securities to buyer Y under a repo 
transaction (in principle. Article 2a STSA applies to a transfer of such margin 
securities). At the same time, Y decides to provide X with securities of the same type 
in the course of margin obligations under a derivatives transaction (such transfer 
is not covered by Article 2a STSA). If these obligations are netted under a bridge 
provision to that end, or under the European Master Agreement (see section 5 of 
chapter II), the protection of Article 2a of the STSA may no longer apply to the 
transfer of the net amount of margin securities, as the text of Article 2a of the STSA 
is limited to repo transfers only. 
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3.6.6 Hold-in-custody transactions 
According to the last phrase of Article 2a of the STSA, this provision is 
applicable 'unless the securities remain in the hands of the seller after the 
transfer'. In legal literature, the question as to how this phrasing should 
be read in connection with so-called 'hold-in-custody transactions' has 
been posed. In a hold-in-custody transaction, the transferor of securities 
(e.g. a bank) books securities from his own account to an account that the 
transferee holds with that transferor and which is administered by that 
transferor. Such book-entry transfers of securities often occur in modem 
practice, for example, in relation to securities that are subject to the Secu-
rities Giro Transfer Act 1995. Hold-in-custody arrangements are compati-
ble with Article 2a of the STSA, if the last words of this provision do 
indeed actually mean 'unless the parties intend a fiduciary transfer of the 
securities', as was suggested in section 3.6.2 above. The situation in which 
securities are held in custody (and therefore, in a sense, remain in the 
hands of the seller) does not necessarily mean that a fiduciary transfer has 
taken place. It is certainly possible that the securities involved are, in this 
case, transferred outright. Whether this is indeed the case should be 
determined on the basis of the actual intentions of the parties.149 
3.6.7 The Netherlands Annex to GMRA 1995 and GMRA 2000: deletion of the 
subsidiary right of pledge 
The Netherlands Domestic Annex to the GMRA 2000 of October 2000 does 
not contain a subsidiary pledge in relation to transferred purchased and 
margin securities, as was the case in the earlier Netherlands Domestic 
Annex to the GMRA 1995. Note that the subsidiary pledge has also been 
deleted from the current version of the GMRA 1995 Netherlands Annex. 
This amendment to the Netherlands Annex, which was developed by 
major market participants in the Netherlands in conjunction with the 
ISMA, demonstrates that after the introduction of Article 2a of the STSA, 
market participants were firmly of the view that neither transfers of 
purchased securities nor transfers of margin securities in a repo run the 
risk of being recharacterised under Article 3:84(3) of the NCC. In a 
genuine repo as well as in a properly structured securities lending trans-
149 See Paragraph 4 of the Netherlands Annex of October 2000 to the GMRA 2000 and 
Section 3 of the Guidance Notes thereto. On this issue, see also Rank 1998 II, pp. 
416-417; Rank 2000, p. 17. See also Tweede Kamer 2002-2003,28 874, no. 3, p. 8; Twee-
de Kamer 2004-2005, 30 138, no. 3, p. 10. 
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action in which financial collateral serves both characteristic functions, a 
subsidiary right of pledge is indeed superfluous.150 
3.6.8 Conclusion 
Article 2a of the Securities Trade Supervision Act 1995, which came into 
force on 1 January 1999, was intended to protect transfers of financial 
collateral in repo transactions against the possible applicability of Article 
3:84(3) of the NCC. This provision was superfluous because transfers of 
financial collateral under genuine repos run no risk of being recharac-
terised as a security interest under Article 3:84(3) of the NCC (as inter-
preted by the Supreme Court in the Sogelease decision). In addition. Article 
2a of the STSA had a number of drawbacks; in particular, the scope of its 
applicability was unclear. Even though it is clear that the legislator also 
intended the provision to apply to transfers of margin in repurchase trans-
actions and to transfers of collateral under securities lending arrange-
ments, the terminology used in this respect is deficient. Other arrange-
ments involving financial collateral, such as derivatives and cross-product 
arrangements, were not mentioned at all. Article 2a of the STSA has been 
rescinded by Article IV of the law implementing the Collateral Direc-
tive.151 The risk of recharacterisation is now addressed in Article 7:55 of 
the NCC, which is an implementation of Article 6 of the Collateral Direc-
tive. These latter provisions will now be discussed in section 3.7. 
3.7 The Collateral Directive 
3.7.1 Article 6 of the Collateral Directive 
Article 6 of the Collateral Directive requires that 'a title transfer financial 
collateral arrangement can take effect in accordance with its terms' under 
the laws of the Member States of the European Union. With this provision, 
the European legislator intended to take away the recharacterisation risk 
in title transfer structures, which should, according to the European 
legislator, not be recharacterised as security interests. This goal is set out 
clearly in recital 13 of the Collateral Directive: 
150 See also section 3.5 above. 
151 See also the Explanatory Comments (Memorie van Toelichting) to this provision in 
Tweede Kamer, 2002-2003,28 874, no. 3, p. 8 and p. 24; and Tweede Kamer, 2004-2005, 
30 138, no. 3, p. 10 and p. 25. 
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This Directive seeks to protect the validity of financial collateral arrangements 
which are based upon the transfer of the full ownership of the financial collateral, 
such as by eliminating the so-called re-characterisation of such financial collateral 
arrangements (including repurchase agreements) as security interests. 
Article 6 of the Collateral Directive protects title transfers. It is, however, 
unclear whether this provision sanctions only outright transfers (en-
visaging both functions of recovery and tradeability) or fiduciary transfers 
of title (intended for recovery purposes alone) as well. 
Without a doubt, an outright transfer of title that envisages both a 
recovery and a tradeability function falls within the scope of the Collateral 
Directive and is protected by Article 6. In the case of an outright transfer, 
the financial collateral provided is not merely an object for recourse 
(recovery function), but it is also used by the parties in order to enter into 
further trading (tradeability function). These two functions cannot, under 
general rules of property law, be established by vesting a security interest, 
such as a right of pledge or a fiduciary transfer of title. Such outright 
transfers take place in, for example, repurchase, securities lending and 
derivatives transactions.152 
It is, however, questionable whether Article 6 also protects fiduciary 
transfers of title or disguised security interests. Where the rights of a 
transferee of collateral are limited to having recourse upon the default of 
the collateral provider, while he does not have the right to dispose of the 
transferred assets under normal circumstances, such a transfer is actually 
a security interest. 
What would be the effect of including security interests, such as fiduciary 
transfers of title, within the scope of the Collateral Directive? The most 
important consequence of applying the directive to secured loans would 
be that the mechanisms protecting collateral providers would be rendered 
inapplicable. The Collateral Directive requires a title transfer to take effect 
'in accordance with its terms'. This means that the parties to a collateral 
arrangement can contractually exclude the applicability of the core charac-
teristics of security interests that were outlined in section 1.3 above. Nor-
mally, the application of principles such as the prescribed manner of 
enforcement (e.g., a public sale), the prohibition of appropriation, and the 
collateral taker's obligation to pay any surplus value to the collateral 
provider is mandatory. By introducing the possibility of excluding these 
152 See also sections 2.4 and 8.3 of chapter II. 
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principles on the basis of a contract, the balance between the collateral 
provider and the collateral taker runs the risk of being distorted. A broad 
application of the Collateral Directive, including fiduciary transfers of 
title, would particularly favour collateral takers who are in a strong posi-
tion to negotiate the terms of the collateral agreement. Such a broad appli-
cation would be particularly harmful in the relationship between a power-
ful financial institution and a less powerful entity in need of credit, such 
as a small or medium-sized enterprise. For this reason, it is arguable that 
Article 6 of the Collateral Directive should apply only to financial collat-
eral arrangements that fulfil the dual function requirement, and not to 
transactions that essentially entail the establishment of a security interest. 
There are additional reasons for restricting the application of the Collat-
eral Directive in this way. First, it is compatible with the standard docu-
mentation used for collateralised transactions, in which the two functions 
of financial collateral are always present. Second, a restrictive approach 
is in line with the economic, liquidity-enhancing function that financial 
collateral fulfils. Only when both collateral provider and collateral taker 
are entitled to dispose of cash and/or securities received will the liquidity 
of the financial markets be truly enhanced. The scope of the Collateral 
Directive will be discussed further in section 3 of chapter VI. 
3.7.2 Implementation in the Netherlands 
Article 6 of the Collateral Directive has been implemented in Dutch law 
by way of Article 7:55 of the NCC, which states: 
A transfer under a title transfer financial collateral arrangement is neither a 
juridical act which is intended to transfer property for purposes of secunty nor does 
it lack the effect of vesting title in the acquirer, after transfer, in the sense of Article 
84(3) of Book 3 The rules of pledge law are applicable neither directly nor by way 
of analogy to such an arrangement or to the enforcement thereof 
Article 7:55 of the NCC sanctions title transfers of financial collateral. As 
in the case of Article 6 of the Collateral Directive, it is clear that Article 
7:55 of the NCC sanctions outright transfers of title in the course of 
153 Translation TK Original Dutch text 'Een overdracht ter nakoming van een finan-
cielezekerheidsovereenkomst tot overdracht is geen overdracht tot zekerheid of een 
overdracht die de strekking mist het goed na de overdracht in het vermogen van 
de verkrijger te doen vallen m de zin van artikel 84 lid 3 van Boek 3 De regels be-
treffende pandrecht zijn op een zodanige overeenkomst en de uitvoering daarvan 
met van toepassing of overeenkomstige toepassing ' 
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repurchase, securities lending and derivatives transactions. In the Ex-
planatory Comments to the implementing law, the Dutch legislator makes 
a distinction between traditional security interests (such as a right of 
pledge or a fiduciary transfer of title) and security provided in the course 
of the financial collateral arrangements mentioned. The legislator does not 
state this explicitly, but in my view collateral provided under financial 
collateral arrangements is distinct from that provided under traditional 
security interests because it serves the two functions of recovery and 
tradeability. These two functions precisely guarantee that a transfer is 
outright and does not fall within the scope of Article 3:84(3) of the NCC.'54 
It is not certain, however, whether a fiduciary transfer of title, which 
serves a recovery but not a tradeability function, can also be classified as 
a financial collateral arrangement in the sense of the Dutch implementing 
law, and whether such a transfer falls within the scope of Article 7:55 of 
the NCC. The definition of 'financial collateral arrangement' in Article 7:51 
a-c of the NCC leaves room for both a narrow and a broad interpretation 
in this respect. As was discussed above, fiduciary transfers of title as they 
existed under the old Dutch Civil Code are currently forbidden under Ar-
ticle 3:84(3) of the NCC, but after the Sogelease decision of the Dutch 
Supreme Court, little remains of this prohibition of fiduciary transfers. A 
broad interpretation of the term 'financial collateral arrangement', includ-
ing fiduciary transfers of title, would in effect mean re-introducing the 
fiduciary transfer of title in Dutch law. Is this desirable? In this respect, it 
is particularly important to note that Article 7:55 explicitly excludes the 
applicability of the rules of pledge law. This means that - contrary to old 
Dutch law155 - principles such as the prescribed manner of enforcement, 
the prohibition of appropriation and the collateral taker's obligation to 
pay any surplus value to the collateral provider are not applicable. Under 
Article 7:55 of the NCC, it would be possible to exclude these principles 
on the basis of a contract, which clearly undermines the balance between 
a collateral provider and a collateral taker that is characteristic of a fidu-
ciary relationship. This is particularly harmful in the relationship between 
a powerful provider of credit and a small or medium-sized entity in need 
of financing. In a fiduciary relationship, it is not desirable to exclude the 
applicability of the rules of pledge law. A broad interpretation of the term 
'financial collateral arrangement' (including fiduciary transfers of financial 
collateral) is therefore not recommended. 
154 See Tweede Kamer 2002-2003, 28 874, no. 3, pp. 7-9 and p. 17; and, with some addi-
tional clarifying examples, Tweede Kamer 2004-2005,30138, no. 3, pp. 8-10 and p. 19. 
155 See section 3.2.2 above. 
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The issue is, however, disputed. The Dutch government is of the view that 
fiduciary transfers should not fall within the scope of Dutch implementing 
law.156 Verstijlen, on the contrary, argues that this approach is not con­
sistent with the goal of Article 6 of the Collateral Directive. In his view, 
fiduciary transfers do fall within the scope of Article 7:55 of the NCC.157 
Van Erp, too, is (implicitly) of the view that fiduciary transfers are covered 
by the Collateral Directive.158 In this context, it is interesting to note that 
under German law a fiduciary transfer of title is covered by the liberal 
regime of the German law implementing the Collateral Directive.159 
In chapter VI, in regard to the term 'financial collateral arrangement' in 
the Collateral Directive and Dutch implementing law, a definite choice is 
made between a narrow interpretation (excluding security interests) and 
a broad interpretation (including both outright transfers of title and secu­
rity interests). Before determining which of these interpretations is 
desirable, it is important to examine the consequences for all parties in­
volved. Chapter IV looks at the 'right of use' envisaged by the Collateral 
Directive and chapter V further examines the consequences of the Collat­
eral Directive and Dutch implementing law for enforcement upon default. 
4. TEMPORARY TRANSFER OF TITLE? 
4.1 Introduction 
In the Netherlands, a second recharacterisation risk of transfers of finan­
cial collateral is sometimes pointed out in connection with Article 3:85 of 
the NCC. This provision states: 
156 See the Additional Explanatory Memorandum (Nadere Memorie van Antwoord), 
Eerste Kamer, 2004-2005, 28 874, E, sections 1 and 15. 
157 See Verstijlen 2005, p. 73 (footnote 69). 
158 See Van Ε φ 2004 II, pp. 540-542. 
159 See the Diskussionsentwurf des Bundesministeriums derjustitz, Entwurf eines Gesetzes 
zur Änderung der Insolvenzverordnung, des Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuches und anderer Ge-
setze, p. 19. Idem: Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung, Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Um-
setzung der Richtlinie 2002/47/EG vom 6 Juni 2002 über Finanzsicherheiten und zur 
Änderung des Hypothekenbankgesetzes und anderer Gesetze, Bundesrat, Drucksache 
563/03,15 August 2003, p. 13; Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung, Entwurf eines Ge-
setzes zur Umsetzung der Richtlinie 2002/47/EG vom 6 Juni 2002 über Finanzsicherheiten 
und zur Änderung des Hypothekenbankgesetzes und anderer Gesetze, Deutscher Bundes-
tag, Drucksache 15/1853, 29 October 2003, p. 12. 
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1 An obligation intended to transfer property for a specific period is deemed to be 
an obligation to establish a usufruct upon the property during that stipulated 
period 
2 An obligation intended to transfer property under a suspensive term (condition 
precedent) is deemed to be an obligation to transfer the property immediately and 
simultaneously estabbshes a usufruct upon the property in favour of the alienator 
during the stipulated period 
A key to understanding Article 3:85 of the NCC is recognising the dis-
tinction between conditions (that may or may not be fulfilled) and future 
events that will, under any circumstances, become reality (such as a future 
moment in time). Under Dutch law, obligations can be entered into under 
a condition subsequent (ontbindende voorwaarde) and a condition precedent 
(opschortende voorwaarde) if the fulfilment of these conditions is uncer-
tain."1 Article 3:85 of the NCC, however, does not allow a transfer that is 
limited to a specific term or which takes effect only after a certain term, as 
it is certain that these terms will irrevocably be realised at a future mo-
ment in time. Article 3:85 of the NCC recharacterises an obligation to 
transfer subject to such terms as an obligation to establish a right of usu-
fruct. In the case of an obligation to transfer property for a specific period 
of time, such an obligation is characterised as an obligation to establish a 
right of usufruct for that period.162 In the case of an obligation intended to 
transfer property under a suspensive term (opschortende tijdsbepaling), this 
is deemed to be an obligation to transfer that property immediately and 
to simultaneously establish a right of usufruct in respect of that property 
in favour of the original owner until the stipulated term.163 U4 
The Dutch legislator introduced the general provision of Article 3:85 of 
the NCC in view of the law of inheritance. He did not want to allow sub-
sequent ownership rights that were limited in time for different heirs. In 
160 Translation Netherlands Business Legislation Original Dutch text '1 Eenverbinte-
nis strekkende tot overdracht van een goed voor een bepaalde tijd, wordt aange-
merkt als een verbintenis tot vestiging van een vruchtgebruik op het goed voor de 
gestelde tijd 2 Een verbintenis strekkende tot overdracht van een goed onder op-
schortende tijdsbepaling, wordt aangemerkt als een verbintenis tot onmiddellijke 
overdracht van het goed met gelijktijdige vestiging van een vruchtgebruik van de 
vervreemder op het goed voor de gestelde tijd ' 
161 See Articles 6-21-26 of the NCC 
162 See Article 3-85(1 ) of the NCC 
163 See Article 3 85(2) of the NCC 
164 On the distinction between conditions and terms see, for example, Asser Series 4-1, 
nos 154 et seq and 231 et seq, and Snijders / Rank Berenschot 2001, sections 5 6 2 
and 5 6 5 
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this case, the right of usufruct should be applied. In other situations as 
well, the legislator was of the view that an ownership right that is limited 
in time should be characterised as a right of usufruct because - as in the 
case of a right of usufruct - the rights of the different parties involved 
should be balanced. In addition, the legislator intended to prevent evasion 
of the rules relating to the right of usufruct.165 
This section examines whether Article 3:85 of the NCC affects transfers of 
financial collateral under repo or securities lending transactions, and in 
particular whether the parties to such transactions actually intend a trans-
fer of title without limitation in time or whether they wish to establish a 
(temporary) right of usufruct. Some attention will also be paid to the 
approach of the Collateral Directive in this respect.166 
4.2 The non-applicability of Article 3:85 of the NCC 
This section investigates how Article 3:85 of the NCC may apply to trans-
actions involving financial collateral. First, it examines instances in which 
the parties follow the structure of standard agreements, such as the 
GMRA or the GMSLA. Subsequently, the focus is on two possible scenar-
ios in which the parties deviate from the terms of the standard agree-
ments. 
Under the GMRA or GMSLA, financial collateral is transferred to a trans-
feree at the outset of a transaction. The transferee has the right to dispose 
of the collateral transferred as he pleases, by transferring the collateral to 
a third party, pledging it, etc. The transferee, however, is contractually 
obligated to transfer equivalent collateral to the transferor at the end of 
the transaction - équivalent collateral, not necessarily meaning the same 
assets as the assets transferred at the outset of the transaction as these 
assets may have been transferred to a third party in the course of the 
transaction. Is this structure allowed under Article 3:85 of the NCC? 
165 On Article 3 85 of the NCC in general, see Meijers' Explanatory Notes, Article 3 2 5, 
ρ 187, the Parliamentary History of the NCC, Boek 3, Vermogensrecht in het algemeen, 
Article 3 2.5, pp 185-188 and Article 3 4 2 2a, pp 319-320, Asser Series 3-1, section 
224, Kortmann 1992, section 8, Rank-Berenschot 1998, Van Gaaien 2001, sections 
203-206, Pitlo / Reehuis, Heisterkamp 2001, sections 128-129 
166 On the specific issue of collaterahsed transactions in light of Article 3 85 of the NCC, 
see Van Ardenne-Stachiw 1995, ρ 72 (footnote 108), Verhagen 1997, ρ 58, Rank-
Berenschot 1998, pp 158-159 
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Article 3:85(1) of the NCC prohibits the transfer of property for a specific 
period of time. This provision does not apply to transfers of financial 
collateral under repo and securities lending transactions if - and this will 
normally be the case - at the end of a transaction, assets different from 
those provided at the start of the transaction are transferred. Because 
different, equivalent assets are involved, this cannot, by definition, be a 
transfer of property for a limited period of time. 
Even if it can be established that exactly the same securities are un-
intentionally transferred at the end of a transaction. Article 3:85(1) of the 
NCC does not apply. In accordance with the GMRA and the GMSLA, the 
parties intend an outright transfer of assets at the outset of a transaction, 
for which Dutch law requires (1) a valid causa (titel) and (2) an executing 
act of delivery (3) by an entity that is entitled to dispose of these assets.167 
In line with the standard documentation, they also agree on a transfer of 
assets (subject to the same requirements) at the end of the transaction. It 
is generally presumed that Article 3:85 applies only when the obligation 
to transfer for a specific period of time (the causa) is combined with certain 
legal acts of a proprietary nature, such as two simultaneous acts of 
delivery or a provision on the basis of which ownership falls back auto-
matically at the end of a transaction.168 The GMRA and GMSLA, however, 
do not envisage an automatic fall-back of assets, and, although they do 
envisage two acts of delivery, these acts are not simultaneous. Whereas an 
outright transfer of financial collateral, including a first act of delivery, 
takes place at the outset of a transaction, the second act of delivery occurs 
only at the end of the transaction. This excludes the applicability of Article 
3:85 of the NCC. Moreover, the parties to a GMRA or GMSLA agreement 
do not intend a transfer that is limited in time. Rather, their intention is 
that unlimited title to assets transferred falls to the transferee. This in-
tention is reflected clearly by the fact that the transferor accepts the risk 
of the transferee's insolvency. It is not at all certain that the transferee will 
be able to fulfil his obligation to transfer equivalent assets at the end of the 
transaction, which may, in particular, be problematic if he is insolvent. For 
these reasons. Article 3:85(1) of the NCC is not applicable when the struc-
ture of internationally applied standard agreements is followed. 
167 See Article 3:84(1 ) of the NCC. 
168 See Rank-Berenschot 1998, pp. 158-159; Van Gaaien 2001, section 205; Pitlo / Ree-
huis, Heisterkamp 2001, section 128 (particularly the examples at the end of the 
section). 
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Article 3:85(2) of the NCC also does not apply to transfers of financial 
collateral under the GMRA and GMSLA, where the parties intend im­
mediate transfers of financial collateral both at the start and at the end of 
the transaction as opposed to transfers under a suspensive term, as 
referred to in Article 3:85(2) of the NCC. 
Only when the parties deviate from the structure set out in standard 
agreements, such as the GMRA and the GMSLA, could there be a problem 
under Article 3:85 of the NCC. What should the analysis be, for example, 
if the parties intend a transferee to sit on financial collateral for the entire 
duration of the transaction (for example, by registering it on a separate 
account) and to transfer exactly the same collateral on termination? In my 
view, such a transaction is allowed under Article 3:85 of the NCC because 
the parties do not intend a transfer that is limited in time. Rather, they 
intend that the collateral involved falls to the transferee, while the latter 
is contractually obliged to transfer that collateral at the end of the trans­
action. Whether the transferee will fulfil this obligation is not certain, and 
can, for instance, be problematic in the event of the transferee's insol­
vency. 
Nonetheless, Article 3:85(1) does prohibit a transfer for a specific period 
of time, construed, for example, as two transfers with two simultaneous 
acts of delivery, or as a transfer at the outset of a transaction combined 
with a provision on the basis of which the collateral falls back automa­
tically (i.e. without an act of re-delivery) to the original transferor at the 
end of the transaction. A title to that end runs the risk of being recharac­
terised as a title to establish a right of usufruct for a limited period of 
time.169 
4.3 Recovery function 
An additional argument against the applicability of Article 3:85 of the 
NCC to transactions with financial collateral relates to the fact that, in 
addition to tradeability, such collateral serves a recovery function.170 The 
legislator characterises an ownership right that is limited in time as a right 
of usufruct. The recovery function envisaged by the parties to a financial 
collateral arrangement is, however, not compatible with a right of usu-
169 Note that in these last two scenarios, in which the parties deviate from the standard 
documentation, a risk also arises under Article 3 84(3) of the NCC because the 
tradeability funchon of the collateral is excluded. 
170 See section 2 4 of chapter Π and section 3 3 3 of this chapter 
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fruct. Recourse can be had by a full owner or by someone who has been 
given a security interest, but not by a usufructuary. 
4.4 Income payments and voting rights 
Another indicator of whether the parties to a financial collateral arrange-
ment intend to establish a right of usufruct involves the arrangements 
between the parties in respect of income payments and voting rights. In-
come payments and voting rights are the typical economic benefits, or 
'fruits', of securities. It is therefore interesting to identify who enjoys these 
fruits. If the transferor of the securities enjoys them, this clearly shows 
that the parties did not intend to establish a right of usufruct. If, on the 
other hand, the transferee of securities enjoys income payments and 
executes voting rights (without any obligation to follow the transferor's 
voting instructions), this may indicate that a right of usufruct should have 
been established. Note, however, that the transferee is also entitled to 
these rights if an outright transfer has taken place. 
As was discussed in section 4.5 of chapter II, under the GMRA or GMSLA, 
an amount equal to income payments is, as a rule, transferred by the trans-
feree of securities to the transferor. Because the one who actually enjoys 
the income payments (which could be considered the fruits of a right of 
usufruct) is thus the original title-holder of the securities, no recharac-
terisation as a right of usufruct should take place. But, even if income 
payments would be for the benefit of the transferee, this would not 
necessarily mean that a right of usufruct should have been established, 
because a full owner also has the right to enjoy the fruits of his property. 
As shown in section 3.4.3.b ('Economic risks and benefits') above, the 
approaches of the GMRA and GMSLA in respect of voting rights differ. In 
the case of an equity repo, voting rights are usually carried out in 
accordance with the instructions of the original title-holder, whereas in a 
securities lending transaction concerning equity securities, the transferee 
himself can choose how to execute voting rights. The fruits (i.e. the voting 
rights) are thus, as a rule, enjoyed either by the original title-holder (repo) 
or by the transferee of securities (securities lending). Where the original 
title-holder is entitled to give voting instructions, no recharacterisation as 
a right of usufruct should take place. But even if the transferee of secu-
rities is free to vote as he deems fit, this does not necessarily mean that a 
right of usufruct should have been established because a full owner also 
has the right to enjoy the fruits of his property. 
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4.5 The Collateral Directive 
Article 6 of the Collateral Directive is intended to guarantee the enforcea-
bility of title transfer financial collateral arrangements in accordance with 
their terms. Recital 13 of the Collateral Directive also makes it clear that 
a title transfer of financial collateral should be valid. A title transfer 
should not be recharacterised as a security interest. Under the Collateral 
Directive, it must also be considered unacceptable, though, to recharac-
terise as a right of usufruct a transfer of collateral that has been carried out 
in line with commonly applied standard agreements. In the Dutch imple-
menting law and the comments thereto, no attention has been paid to the 
risk of recharacterisation under Article 3:85 of the NCC. 
4.6 Conclusion 
Article 3:85 of the NCC does not apply to financial collateral that is 
transferred in line with internationally applied standard documentation 
for repo and securities lending transactions. Full title to such collateral is 
transferred at the outset of a transaction. The transferee of financial collat-
eral is entitled to dispose of the transferred securities and is only under a 
contractual obligation to transfer equivalent securities at the end of the 
transaction. It is uncertain whether these assets will actually be delivered 
at that moment. Only if the parties deviate from the terms of the standard 
agreements and transfer financial collateral for a specific period, would 
such a transfer not be compatible with Article 3:85 of the NCC. 
The fact that financial collateral customarily serves a recovery function is 
an additional argument that shows that the parties did not intend to estab-
lish a right of usufruct. In addition, the analysis of what happens to the 
'fruits' of securities (i.e. the income payments and, in the case of equity 
transactions, the voting rights) confirms that Article 3:85 of the NCC is not 
applicable to transfers of financial collateral. In a repo transaction, the 
original title-holder usually receives an amount equivalent to income 
paid, and can give voting instructions. Likewise, in the case of securities 
lending transactions, income payments are paid to the original title-hold-
er. Even if voting rights are, in this case, usually executed by the trans-
feree, he does so not as a usufructuary but in his capacity as full owner. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
5.1 Market standard 
Under the standard documentation commonly used in Europe and inter-
national markets, financial collateral under repo, securities lending and 
derivatives transactions is provided on the basis of an outright transfer of 
title. 
5.2 Recharacterisation as a security interest? 
This chapter has investigated whether a transfer of financial collateral 
under a repo or securities lending transaction should be considered as a 
security interest under Dutch civil law. In particular. Article 3:84(3) of the 
NCC, which prohibits fiduciary transfers of title, leaves room for recharac-
terisation. 
It is submitted that the issue of recharacterisation should be approached 
by taking a function-based approach. Such an approach does justice to the 
economic intentions of the parties involved, and leads to fair results. An 
outright transfer of title has a function different from that of a security 
interest. In the case of an outright transfer, the parties intend a transfer of 
all right, title and interest, without limitation. A security interest, on the 
other hand, such as a right of pledge or a fiduciary transfer of title, has a 
different, more limited function. It is intended to create an object for 
recovery purposes. When applying this analysis to transfers of financial 
collateral, it appears as though such transfers should be structured as 
outright transfers and not as security interests. Like a security interest, 
financial collateral serves a recovery function. In addition to recovery, 
however, in genuine repo or securities lending transactions financial 
collateral also fulfils a tradeability function that is not compatible with 
security interests. In accordance with general principles of property law, 
collateral that is provided on the basis of a security interest only enables 
the secured party to sell the securities in the event of default. A security 
interest leads to a fiduciary relationship, which, under normal conditions, 
prevents the secured party from disposing of the securities. For this 
reason, there is no recharacterisation risk in genuine repo and securities 
lending transactions, in which both characteristic functions of financial 
collateral (recovery and the possibility of entering into further trading) are 
represented. Moreover, in order to ensure that it fulfils both the recovery 
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and tradeability functions, financial collateral should be provided on the 
basis of an outright transfer of title. 
If financial collateral is not tradable, it is likely that the parties only 
envisage a recovery function for the financial collateral and that they 
should have established a security interest. In such circumstances, there 
is and should be, a risk of recharacterisation. In the case of a security 
interest, the core principles apply, thus striking a balance between the 
interests of the collateral provider, his other creditors and the collateral 
taker. The parties are in a fiduciary relationship, which should apply 
particularly as a matter of mandatory law when the collateral provider 
and the collateral taker are not in equally powerful positions. 
For Dutch law, this means that Article 3:84(3) of the NCC is not applicable 
to transfers of financial collateral in genuine repo and securities lending 
transactions (structured in accordance with internationally applied 
standard agreements, such as the GMRA, the GMSLA or the EMA). A 
transfer of such financial collateral does not envisage giving the transferee 
a security interest only; rather, it intends to give him full title, so that he 
can dispose of the encumbered assets. Because financial collateral is 
transferred outright and can be used to enter into further trading, such a 
transfer is also allowed under the Dutch Supreme Court's Sogelease deci-
sion, in which the Court recognised a sale and financial leaseback con-
struction in which assets were transferred and subsequently leased back 
mainly with the goal of creating an object for recovery. Because an out-
right transfer of financial collateral is enforceable, the subsidiary right of 
pledge, which is often vested by market participants in the Netherlands 
in repo and securities lending transactions, is superfluous. The same is 
true for Article 2a of the STSA, which eliminates a risk that does not exist. 
Article 6 of the Collateral Directive sanctions transfers of financial collat-
eral. It is submitted that Article 6 of the Collateral Directive should be 
interpreted restrictively and should only apply to outright transfers under 
genuine repo and securities lending transactions. The Collateral Directive 
should not apply to traditional security interests, such as fiduciary trans-
fers of title, particularly when the parties are not equally powerful. The 
interests of collateral provider and collateral taker should be balanced, 
notably by setting out a prescribed manner of enforcement, by prohibiting 
appropriation and by stating that any surplus value must be paid to the 
collateral provider. Complete abolition of these mandatory principles is 
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not compatible with the fiduciary nature of a security interest because it 
exclusively favours collateral takers. 
5.3 Temporary transfer of title? 
An outright transfer of financial collateral under a repo or securities 
lending transaction, which has been structured in accordance with inter-
nationally applied standard agreements such as the GMRA and the 
GMSLA, runs no risk to be recharacterised as a right of usufruct under 
Article 3:85 of the NCC. Under the terms of internationally applied stan-
dard agreements, financial collateral is not transferred for a specific 
period of time or under a suspensive term. At the outset of a transaction, 
a collateral taker obtains full title immediately and not title that is limited 
in time. The collateral taker is under a contractual obligation only to trans-
fer equivalent collateral at the end of the transaction. Whether or not he 
is capable of doing so depends on his solvency. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RIGHT OF USE 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introductory remarks 
This chapter deals with the right of use of a collateral taker granted on the 
basis of a security interest as set out in Article 5 of the Collateral Directive. 
In this study, the term 'right of use' refers to a collateral taker's unlimited 
right to dispose of a collateral provider's property in his own name and 
for his own benefit. This chapter focuses on the legal basis upon which 
such a right of use can be granted. Two different constructions are avail-
able. As was shown in chapter III, market participants usually establish 
a right of use in respect of financial collateral on the basis of a transfer of 
title. When an outright transfer of title has taken place, a collateral taker, 
from the point of view of property law, naturally has a right of use based 
on the full and unlimited entitlement he has acquired (subject, of course, 
to contractual limitations).1 The focus of this chapter is, however, on the 
right of use granted in connection with a security interest. This second 
construction first appeared in the standard documentation for collat-
erahsed transactions in the American financial markets, but has now been 
introduced in the European Union with the Collateral Directive.2 Cur-
rently UNIDROIT, too, is considering the introduchon of a secured party's 
general right of disposal in a Preliminary Draft Convention on Substan-
tive Rules regarding Intermediated Securities.3 
1 As was shown in section 2 of chapter III, the title transfer method is used in inter-
nationally applied standard agreements, such as the Global Master Repurchase 
Agreement (GMRA) for repos, the Global Master Secunhes Lending Agreement 
(GMSLA) for secunhes lending and, if English law applies, the 2001 Margin Pro-
visions for derivatives (published by the International Swaps and Derivatives Asso-
ciation, or ISDA) 
2 For example, the security interest approach is adopted m the ISDA 2001 Margin 
Provisions m those cases where New York law applies 
3 See UNIDROIT 2006, Study LXXVIII - Doc 42, March 2006, Appendix 2, Article 25 
The UNIDROIT approach is critically discussed in the Right of Use Report and in 
Johansson 2005, in particular séchons 3 4 and 6 See also sechon 5 2 6 below 
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This chapter examines a secured party's general right of disposal from 
American, English, Dutch and German points of view. The treatment of 
American and English law is largely historical. American market partici-
pants already applied a right of use in connection with a security interest 
before this concept was introduced in the Collateral Directive. Section 2 
discusses how this construction developed under American law, and out-
lines some of the theoretical problems arising in connection with it. Eng-
lish law is considered in section 3, as the demands placed on the London 
market, particularly by its American market participants, have been an 
important factor that has contributed to the introduction of the right of 
use on the basis of a security interest in European legislation. Finally, 
section 4 focuses on Dutch law. This section has a more theoretical 
character and investigates whether the Collateral Directive's right of use 
is compatible with the system of Dutch property law. In the section on 
Dutch law comparisons are made with German law.4 
The use of this construction (a secured party's general right of disposal) 
has blossomed in the securities markets. This chapter focuses on the 
origins of a secured party's general right of disposal, and on the question 
of whether and in what terms this construction can be explained theo-
retically. The practical consequences of this right for collateral providers 
and collateral takers are also considered. No particular attention is paid 
to other issues relating to the securities markets, such as the question of 
the different forms in which securities may appear (e.g. as physical certifi-
cates, or in immobilized or dematerialized form in book-entry systems).5 
Related, but distinct issues of property law, such as the question of who 
is the owner of securities that are co-mingled with other securities (and 
that, as a result, are no longer identifiable), are also not investigated. 
In addition to the issue of the legal basis of a right of use, this right can be 
considered from accounting, regulatory, operational and tax points of 
view. These issues are mentioned briefly in section 1.4 of this general 
introduction, but are not dealt with in the analyses of different countries 
within this chapter.6 
4 For an analysis of Danish and Italian law, see the Right of Use Report. The analysis 
of the compatibility of the right of use envisaged in the Collateral Directive with 
principles of property law in these two countries is to a large extent similar to that 
set out in the analyses of the countries below. 
5 See the EFMLG Report (2003); Goode 1996; Rank 1996 II; Rank / Van Ardenne-
Stachiw / Le Rûtte 1996 for more on this issue. 
6 The tax issue is elaborated upon more extensively by Peters in the Tax Appendix 
to the Right of Use Report. 
176 
Right of Use 
Other consequences of the Collateral Directive relating to the provision 
of collateral on the basis of a security interest, such as, in particular, the 
liberal enforcement regime envisaged, are discussed in chapter V. 
1.2 The title transfer method 
In the case of an outright transfer of title, it is obvious that the transferee 
has a 'right of use', an unlimited right of disposal. He can dispose of the 
assets he has acquired in any way he deems fit. As was shown in section 
2 of chapter III, a number of important standard agreements used inter-
nationally for collateralised transactions envisage a title transfer of collat-
eral.7 For example, it is current market practice in the United Kingdom, 
the Netherlands and Germany that financial collateral is provided on the 
basis of an outright transfer of title (e.g. in the course of repos and 
securities lending transactions). Similarly, under American law, the title 
transfer method is frequently applied to provide financial collateral; in the 
course of repurchase transactions, for example. The title transfer method 
is now also sanctioned by Article 6 of the Collateral Directive. Outright 
transfers of title are a perfectly feasible way of structuring collateralised 
transactions, including a right of use. Its consequences, i.e. the passing of 
all rights to the collateral taker, are evident to all parties involved.8 
1.3 The security interest approach 
Collateral, in the sense of the Collateral Directive, usually serves two func-
tions. A collateral taker uses the collateral both for recovery purposes and 
to enter into further trading. Both functions are guaranteed in the case of 
an outright transfer of title. The transferee has the strongest imaginable 
'security interest' and can dispose of the transferred assets as he pleases. 
However, the European legislator has now enabled a second way of pro-
viding collateral. On the basis of Article 5 of the Collateral Directive, a 
general right to dispose of collateral can be granted on the basis of a secu-
rity interest.9 The security interest guarantees the possibility of recovery, 
whereas the right of disposal ensures the tradeability of the collateral 
7 See, for example, the GMRA, the GMSLA, the 2001ISDA Margin Provisions (Part 
3; English law), and the European Master Agreement for Financial Transactions 
(EMA). 
8 Before the introduction of the Collateral Directive, this was also the only possible 
way to grant a right of use under Danish, Dutch, German, Italian and English law. 
See the relevant chapters of the Right of Use Report. 
9 For the text of Article 5 of the CD see section 8.4 of chapter II or Appendix 2. 
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involved.10 Formerly, the provision of a general right of disposal on the 
basis of a security interest was impossible under the laws of most, if not 
all, European countries.11 Article 5 of the Collateral Directive has changed 
this situation. 
2.3.2 Article 5 of the Collateral Directive 
On the basis of Article 5 of the Collateral Directive, a right of disposal can 
be granted to a collateral taker. This means that a collateral taker can be 
given the right to transfer title to encumbered assets to a third party or to 
vest a security interest in those assets for the benefit of that third party. If 
the collateral taker exercises this right, he is, in return, under an obligation 
to transfer equivalent assets to the collateral provider at the end of a trans-
action at the very latest. According to Article 5 of the Collateral Directive, 
once transferred, these equivalent assets are deemed to have been owned 
by the collateral provider and to have been subject to the collateral taker's 
security interest from the outset of the transaction. This will be referred 
to hereafter as 'proprietary substitution'. Of course, if equivalent collateral 
is provided at the moment that the secured debt is paid off, no proprietary 
substitution takes place, as the security interest has nothing to attach to 
anymore. The alternative to the provision of equivalent collateral is that 
the collateral taker, if the agreement between the parties so provides, can 
offset the value of the equivalent assets against, or apply it in discharge 
of, the value of the secured debt. 
One of the central issues in the analyses in the sections below is the ques-
tion of whether, given no event of default, a general right for a secured 
party to dispose of pledged assets is compatible with key notions of 
property law. In particular, the following sections address the question of 
whether a security interest combined with a right of use is compatible 
with the basic principles of security interests outlined in section 1.3 of 
chapter III. In line with these principles, a security interest serves a 
recovery function, and only gives a collateral taker a right of disposal in 
respect of financial collateral if there is an event of default. Until that 
moment, the collateral provider retains his ownership interest. Until the 
moment of default, the collateral taker has a duty of due care in respect of 
10 On the two functions of collateral, see also sections 2.4 and 8.2.5 of chapter II, and 
section 3.3 of chapter III. 
11 See, for example, the EFMLG Proposal for an EU Directive on Collateralisation, 
section 4.1.3; the Opinion of the European Central Bank, section 16; BIS 20011, p. 13; 
the Right of Use Report; and Wood 1995 I, sections 6.41-43. 
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the encumbered assets. The appropriation or sale of assets is not allowed. 
The collateral provider also has a right to redeem the encumbered assets 
by paying off the secured debt. Whether or not a secured party's general 
right of disposal is in line with these characteristic features of security 
interests is examined in the following sections. 
The most important practical consequence of the right of use is that a 
collateral provider is likely to be left with a contractual claim against the 
collateral taker for a considerable period of time, rather than a claim of a 
proprietary nature relating to the collateral assets. Under the Collateral 
Directive, a collateral provider is fully entitled to assets at the outset of a 
transaction ('moment 1'), is left with a contractual claim after a disposal by 
the collateral taker, possibly during the entire course of the transaction 
('moment 2'), and will only become entitled to equivalent assets again at 
the moment that these are transferred to him by the collateral taker, 
usually at the end of a transaction ('moment 3'). 
Some level of comfort is available to the collateral provider if he is able to 
offset the claim he has against the collateral taker for the delivery of 
equivalent assets against his obligation towards the collateral taker to pay 
off the secured debt. Under the Collateral Directive, contractual close-out 
netting provisions to this end are generally enforceable.12 However, this 
is of no avail to the collateral provider if the prices of the collateral he has 
provided to the collateral taker go up considerably, and in the absence of 
proper margin arrangements that take changes in market prices into 
account. In this case, the collateral provider has an unsecured residual 
exposure in respect of the collateral taker.13 
1.3.2 The 'horizontal' and 'vertical' relationships 
Essentially, a right of use can be envisaged in two relationships - hori-
zontal and vertical. The horizontal right of use refers to the situation in 
which a collateral provider and a collateral taker enter into transactions 
in commercial markets generally. Traditionally, collateralised transactions 
involving cash and/or securities, such as repo or securities lending trans-
actions, are entered into between major participants in the financial 
markets (e.g. commercial and central banks, investment firms, insurance 
companies, etc.). Member States may, however, also apply the Collateral 
12 For some important exceptions, see section 3 of chapter V. 
13 Cf. on the issue of an unsecured exposure Benjamin 2000, section 5.64. 
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Directive to transactions with small and medium-sized enterprises. 
Whereas the collateral provider can therefore be anything from a small or 
medium-sized enterprise to a multinational enterprise or bank, the collat-
eral taker will, in practice, usually be a major financial institution. 
The vertical right of use relates to the special situation in which a client 
grants a right of use to his bank or custodian14 in respect of financial 
collateral that is administered by that the bank or custodian. In this case 
in particular, the fiduciary nature of the relationship between the parties 
(a trust or a comparable relationship) should be taken into account, 
because there is almost per definition an unequal balance of power 
between the financial institution and its client. The financial institution is 
under a fiduciary duty to take the interests of clients who have entrusted 
their assets to its custody into consideration. Clients may well not expect 
to lose their entitlement to assets when they grant a security interest with 
a right of use to their bank or custodian, because when they do so they 
usually remain entitled until an event of default has taken place. In light 
of this fiduciary relationship, it is undesirable that a client, having 
pledged assets to his bank or custodian and given it a right of use, thinks 
he is still entitled to the encumbered assets, while he actually risks losing 
his right to a third party to whom the financial institution has transferred 
that right. In this context it should be mentioned that banks and cus-
todians often routinely stipulate a right of pledge on the credit balances 
of their clients. Can a bank or a custodian also stipulate a right of use on 
the basis of general conditions, or does such an institution have a special 
notification obligation in light of the far-reaching consequences of the 
right of use?15 
In any case, it is clear that the Collateral Directive applies to transactions 
in the over-the-counter market16 generally, but is also applicable if a client 
provides collateral to a bank or custodian. 
14 No sharp distinction is made in this study between the terms 'custodian', 'deposi-
tory' and 'intermediary'. All three terms refer to entities that administer book-entry 
securities. See the Bank of International Settlements, A Glossary of Terms Used in 
Payment and Settlement Systems, March 2003. 
15 The consequences of this probably unintended effect of the Collateral Directive for 
clients of financial institutions are discussed in-depth in the Right of Use Report in 
the chapters on the client-custodian relationship under Danish, Dutch and Italian 
law. For a further discussion of the right of use in the context of the fiduciary 
relationship between a financial institution and its clients under American and 
English law, see sections 2 and 3 below. 
16 The over-the-counter market is the market outside an officially recognised and 
regulated exchange. 
180 
Right of Use 
1.3.3 A right of use in Europe - Why? 
The idea of introducing a security interest combined with a general right 
of disposal in the European Collateral Directive has been put forward by 
the ISDA Collateral Law Reform Group. This group argued that the con­
struction is considered a 'commercial imperative' by financial institutions. 
If collateral takers are able to make use of pledged assets and to dispose 
of them in the course of their own business, they can earn money for 
themselves. This, in turn, allows them to lower the costs of financial 
services provided to collateral providers. On this basis, the ISDA Collat­
eral Law Reform Group recommended that national rules prohibiting a 
secured party's general right of disposal, which were arguably in force in 
all countries of the European Union with the possible exception of Greece, 
should be put aside. The group formulated the following principle for law 
reform: 
The collateral taker should be free to deal with the collateral as though it were the 
outright owner of the assets, and third parties purchasing from the collateral taker 
should be able to obtain clean title to the assets, whether or not they have notice of 
the original interest of the collateral provider.1 
Morton and Potok, members of both the ISDA Collateral Law Reform 
Group and of the European Union Forum Group on Collateral (the latter 
in charge of preparing a draft Collateral Directive), pursued the ISDA 
ideas in their 'Position Paper on the Taking of Securities as Collateral in 
the European Union'18 in December 1999. They present a security interest 
combined with a right of use as an alternative to an outright transfer of 
title. In their view, the market becomes more flexible by introducing this 
new construction, as the collateral taker's right of disposal enhances the 
liquidity of the markets. These ideas, however, were disputed, in par­
ticular because a security interest is, by its nature, a right that is limited to 
having recourse upon default. As such, it is not compatible with an un­
limited right of disposal. But Morton and Potok maintained their position 
in their January 2000 memorandum 'Securities Collateral: Security Interest 
Structure and "Right of Use'".19 In discussions they had with financial 
institutions, these institutions indicated that a right of use was 'of critical 
importance' to them, 'because the ability to use securities constitutes one 
17 See the ISDA Report 2000, sections 2, 4.2 and 5. Quotations: section 4.2, p. 6 and 
sections, p. 11. 
18 See Annex A to the Commission Working Document. 
19 See Annex Β to the Commission Working Document. 
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of the key business advantages of the arrangement, which may cease to 
make economic sense if the ability were to be removed'.20 Whether the 
ability to 'use' collateral has ever existed in the European Union on the 
basis of a security interest, as this quotation suggests, is explored in this 
chapter. In any case, the European legislator has codified the security 
interest combined with a right of use in Article 5 of the Collateral Direc­
tive. 
An important argument that has been put forward in favour of a right of 
use on the basis of a security interest is the positive effect it has on the 
liquidity of the financial markets.21 From a macro-economic point of view, 
the relative scarcity of financial collateral puts strong pressure on market 
participants to make optimal use of available resources, including pledged 
collateral. In 2001, the Committee on the Global Financial System of the 
Bank for International Settlements noted a potential scarcity of available 
collateral.22 As one of the possible solutions put forward to deal with 
increasing scarcity, the Committee suggested a right of use in respect of 
collateral provided on the basis of a security interest.23 
From a micro-economic point of view, in light of the high level of compe­
tition in the financial industry, collateral takers are under strong pressure 
to make optimal use of assets, including collateral pledged to them, so as 
to attract cheap credit from third parties.24 It is therefore not surprising 
that the Collateral Directive's right of use has been proposed and actively 
supported by the financial industry. The European Financial Market 
Lawyers Group (EFMLG), consisting of experts working for major finan­
cial institutions, has advised that a collateral taker's general right of dis­
posal be introduced.25 This construction has also been actively supported 
by financial industry associations, such as the ISDA and the FBE.26 As far 
20 Quotations are from the Commission Working Document, Annex B, section 3 
21 See recital 19 of the CD, and the Opinion of the European Central Bank, section 16 
22 See BIS 2001 I and BIS 2001II 
23 See BIS 20011, ρ 13 
24 See Benjamin 2000, section 5 46 et seq, Benjamin / Yates / Montagu 2002, section 
4 22, Johnson 1997, pp 950-951, and section IIC 
25 See the EFMLG Proposal for an EU Directive on Collaterahsation, sections 3 1 , 4 1 3 
and 6 3 
26 See the strongly affirmative ISDA Report 2000 The 2001 ISDA Statement of Position 
suggests improvements to the text of the provision stated in the draft directive in 
relation to the right of use In section 4 of its Preliminary Observations in relation 
to the Proposal for a Directive on financial collateral arrangements (COM 2001168 
final) of 4 October 2001, the FBE still has some reservations about the right of use 
'As far as the right of use/re-use m the case of pledge is concerned, the European 
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as collateral providers are concerned, an advantage of a secured party's 
general right of disposal is that it usually implies lower funding costs for 
the collateral provider. In exchange for a general right of disposal, the 
collateral taker can, for example, charge a lower interest rate for funding. 
The cost to the collateral provider for such cheap funding, however, is that 
he usually loses his proprietary interest in the collateral provided and 
risks ending up with a contractual claim against the collateral taker, 
which, in the event of the latter's insolvency, ranks on a pari passu basis 
only. 
Another factor that has probably played a role in the introduction of a 
security interest combined with a general right of disposal in Europe, is 
its application in the American market. American participants in the 
London market wished to be able to apply this construction under English 
law as well.27 
Moreover, a special feature of the securities markets may have played a 
role in the appearance of a secured party's general right of disposal, 
particularly in these markets: the perception of ownership in the securities 
markets is not as clearly defined as in other parts of the economy. For 
example, a purchaser in the securities markets will often be protected in 
the case of an unauthorised transfer. In order to guarantee the smooth 
functioning of the markets, a purchaser has only a limited duty to in-
vestigate whether the transferor is indeed entitled to dispose of the assets 
concerned and is considered to be a bona fide purchaser. For this reason, 
it is unlikely that the purchaser would have to face a claim by the original 
title-holder, based on, for instance, tracing or constructive trusteeship. In 
addition, in practice, tracing investment securities or their proceeds is 
usually impracticable as there is typically a chain of intermediaries, 
whereas clearing systems and netting arrangements preclude an iden-
tification of a particular transfer at one end to a particular receipt at the 
other. The result is that an unauthorized disposal of investment securities 
leads, as a rule, to a mere contractual claim for the original title-holder 
against the unauthorised transferor, one based, for instance, on a tort for 
banking industry has some doubts about its necessity for the market.' However, in 
a common letter of 3 December 2001 both the ISDA and the FBE support the right 
of use: 'We also support the right of use/re-use, as this is a common technique which 
increases liquidity in the financial markets (Article 6 of the draft Directive).' 
27 See sections 2 and 3 below for more on this issue. 
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conversion.28 Yet another factor that contributes to a less clear perception 
of ownership in securities markets is that investment securities are usually 
held in fungible pools. The title-holder is generally not too concerned 
about the specific assets to which his interest attaches (to assets originally 
in the pool, or their replacement with equivalent assets) as long as there 
are enough assets available in the pool to fulfil the claims of all title-
holders. 
However, the importance of the special ownership concept in the 
securities markets should not be overestimated. It should be taken into 
account that, for reasons of investor protection, interests in fungible pools 
of securities usually have a proprietary nature. In the US, for example, the 
legislator has given a 'security entitlement' distinct proprietary features.29 
Likewise, in the European Union, a proprietary claim in securities (e.g. a 
direct ownership claim or a co-ownership interest in a pool of securities) 
is the standard. A contractual claim in a pool of securities, which is usu-
ally managed by an insolvency-proof entity (another means of investor 
protection) also occurs, but less frequently.30 Because of these kinds of 
investor protection, interests in respect of book-entry securities cannot be 
equated with, for example, a contractual claim for cash against a financial 
institution. Moreover, irrespective of the nature of the interest in securities 
(proprietary or contractual), a transfer by a secured party inevitably 
means that a third party becomes entitled to the encumbered assets and 
that these assets are no longer available to the provider of security. When 
the secured party becomes insolvent, the provider of security has no inter-
est in securities anymore, but faces the risk of a mere contractual claim 
against the secured party that ranks on a pari passu basis. 
However understandable the wish to be able to use pledged securities 
may be, it is legitimate and important to explore the theoretical foun-
dations of a security interest combined with a general right of disposal. 
Are the concepts of a security interest and a general right of disposal 
compatible? Does this construction with regard to content still have any-
thing in common with a secured transaction or does it resemble an 
28 On this policy issue see Benjamin 2000, sections 2.52-65; for a comparable approach 
under American law, see the UCC (2004 edition). Official Comment to § 8-503 of the 
UCC, section 3. 
29 See Article 8, Part 5 of the UCC, and the related Official Comments. 
30 See the EFMLG Report (2003). Consider also, for example, the Dutch SGTA and 
VABEF structures, which are described in Rank 1996 II; Rank / Van Ardenne-
Stachiw / Le Rûtte 1996; and by Schim in chapter 3 of the Right of Use Report. 
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outright transfer? These issues, and the practical consequences of this 
construction for collateral providers and collateral takers, are further 
examined in this chapter. 
1.4 Other issues 
The following sections of this chapter approach the right of use from a 
civil law point of view. They do not pay in-depth attention to a number 
of other important issues, which are indicated below. 
2.4.2 Income payments and voting rights 
An owner of securities is entitled to receive income payments and, in the 
case of equity securities, to execute voting rights, if any, in respect of those 
securities. It is therefore important for the institutions that issued the 
securities concerned to determine whether and at what moment in time 
a security interest combined with a right of use leads to a change in 
ownership. As soon as ownership passes, the new owner has the right to 
receive income payments and to vote. 
2.4.2 Accounting, capital adequacy, and registration by custodians 
Accounting issues, the capital adequacy treatment of transactions with a 
right of use, and the way a right of use should be registered by custodians 
are not the focus of this chapter. Accountants should decide who will be 
registered in the books as the owner of securities. Regulators should 
determine what capital adequacy regime applies when a right of use has 
been granted. Custodians should show in their records that a general right 
of disposal has been granted in respect of securities on the basis of a 
security interest. The legal analysis of the nature of a security interest 
combined with a right of use (security interest or outright transfer) in the 
sections below can be used as a reference when determining how this 
construction should be treated for accounting and capital adequacy 
purposes, and how it should be registered by custodians. 
2.4.3 Tax 
As noted above, the tax treatment of a right of use should also be 
considered. Should a transaction involving a right of use for tax purposes 
be treated as a security interest or an outright transfer of title? The Tax 
Appendix to the Right of Use Report examines the consequences of the 
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right of use of the Collateral Directive from a tax point of view. It consid-
ers the effect on different taxes. It focuses on consequences for corporate 
income tax and withholding tax, but some attention is also paid to par-
ticipation exemptions. 
2. RIGHT OF USE UNDER AMERICAN LAW 
2.1 Introduction 
This section examines a security interest combined with the secured 
party's unlimited right of disposal under American law. This is the juris-
diction in which this construction was applied before it was introduced 
in the European Union by way of the Collateral Directive. It is likely that 
American law has, through the London market, inspired the approach of 
the Collateral Directive.31 
The main goal of this section is to give an outline, not an in-depth 
analysis, of the reasons why this construction has come into fashion in 
America, and of the theoretical difficulties associated with it.32 As such, 
this section will be helpful in understanding the issues posed by the Col-
lateral Directive's right of use under the laws of the Member States of the 
European Union, among them the United Kingdom (see section 3 below), 
the Netherlands and Germany (see section 4 below).31 
In any case, it is clear that under American law a collateral taker can be 
given an unlimited right to dispose of assets on the basis of an outright 
transfer of title. Full title to assets can, for example, be transferred on the 
basis of a sale agreement. Under American law, repos are, as standard 
practice, structured as an outright transfer. For example, the TBMA 
Master Repurchase Agreement envisages an outright transfer of financial 
collateral under repo transactions.34 In a genuine repo transaction, both 
31 See sechon 3 below for more on this issue 
32 See section 1 3 3 ('A right of use in Europe - Why7') for a general overview of factors 
that may contribute to the appearance of a secured party's general right of disposal 
33 For in-depth analyses of 'rehypothecahon' or 'repledge' under Amencan law see 
Johnson 1997, Kettering 1999 I and Kettering 1999 II See also section 3 of the 
introduction to the Right of Use Report 
34 See Paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 6 and 7 of the TBMA Master Repurchase Agreement 
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the buyer and the seller have an unlimited right of disposal in respect of 
the cash and securities transferred.35 
Whether a general right of disposal can also be granted on the basis of a 
security interest is a more intricate issue. Under American law, security 
interests can, among other things, be vested in investment securities, 
which are dealt with in Article 8 of the UCC. Securities can be held direct-
ly from issuers of the securities, or indirectly through intermediaries. 
Directly held securities can be in certificated or uncertificated form and 
are dealt with in the first Parts of Article 8. Securities held indirectly 
through intermediaries are called 'security entitlements' so as to distin-
guish them from certificated and uncertificated securities. Security entitle-
ments are dealt with in Part 5 of Article 8 of the UCC.36 Article 9 of the 
UCC deals with security interests in all kinds of personal property, in-
cluding securities in certificated or uncertificated form and security en-
titlements. § 9-207 of the UCC relates to the rights and duties of a secured 
party having possession or control of collateral. This section serves, if any-
thing, to emphasize the distinction between an outright transfer and a 
security interest. It sketches the possibilities and rights that a secured 
party has and also contains implicit limitations to his rights. It is, in par-
ticular, under this section that the way in which a security interest and a 
secured party's general right of disposal relate to each other must be 
determined. 
The secured party's right of repledge, which is set out in § 9-207(c)(3) of 
the UCC, comes closest to a secured party's general right of disposal. For 
this reason, the right of repledge is given special attention in this section 
on American law. There are other instances in which a collateral taker 
may move collateral. A secured party has the right to assign the secured 
debt. In this case the collateral generally follows the secured debt. The 
secured party also has the right to foreclose upon and thus dispose of 
collateral upon an event of default. These instances, however, do not have 
much in common with the secured party's right to dispose of encumbered 
assets separate from the secured debt under 'normal', i.e. non-default 
circumstances, and are therefore not discussed hereafter.37 
35 See also section 3.3.3.d ('Extra illustration: the approach under English and Ameri-
can law') of chapter III. 
36 For a good introduction on Article 8 of the UCC, see the Prefatory Note to this 
provision in UCC (2004 edition), pp. 789-822. See also Rogers 1994 and Rogers 1996. 
37 On the different instances in which a secured party can 'dispose' of collateral see 
Johnson 1997, pp. 972-973; Gilmore 1965, § 42.10. 
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Section 2.2 below outlines how repledge was used by stockbrokers in their 
margin lending businesses, and how it was codified in the old and the 
revised UCC. Section 2.3 considers a secured party's general right of dis-
posal, as applied in the American securities lending and derivatives 
markets, and which goes even further than the right of repledge. A num-
ber of theoretical issues that arise in connection with the constructions of 
repledge and a secured party's general right of disposal, such as the duty 
of reasonable care and the equity of redemption, are discussed in section 
2.4. Section 2.5 explores whether a security interest combined with a 
general right of disposal can still be characterised as a security interest, or 
whether it has more in common with an outright transfer. Section 2.6 
contains a conclusion. 
2.2 Impairing repledge: the margin lending practice and the UCC 
Kettering shows that the margin lending facilities offered by stockbrokers 
to their clients at the end of the nineteenth century and in the first decades 
of the twentieth century comprised the traditional setting in which the 
right of repledge was applied. In the course of 'margin account' or 'margin 
lending' facilities (1) a stockbroker attracts money from a third party, (2) 
which money is paid to the stockbroker's client, so that (3) the client can 
acquire assets, typically securities, in the market. Because the third party 
wants to be secured, (4) the client grants a right of pledge over his secu-
rities to the stockbroker, so that (5) the stockbroker can vest a right of 
repledge for the benefit of the third party. These are called 'margin' 
account or lending facilities, because the loan would rarely, if ever, be for 
100% of the value of the property. The arrangement would provide for a 
'margin' of collateral. If the value of the collateral assets should go down, 
there would be a 'margin call' to pay down the loan or provide additional 
collateral. Margin account or lending facilities serve the interests of both 
the client and the stockbroker. The client is content, because the repledge, 
in effect, secures a cash flow from a third party that could be used by the 
client to acquire securities. The stockbroker could earn money on the 
interest rate to be paid by the client. The margin lending practice, how-
ever, did not show a transaction pattern in which a stockbroker's client 
gave the stockbroker the right to transfer the client's pledged assets 
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outright to a third party (for example in exchange for a loan with a low 
interest rate) in the course of the stockbroker's own commercial business.38 
In 1953, the right of repledge was codified in the official model text of 
Article 9-207(2)(e) of the UCC.39 The 1953 provision reads as follows: 
Unless otherwise agreed, when collateral is in the secured party's possession [ ] 
the secured party may repledge the collateral upon terms which do not impair the 
debtor's right to redeem it 
This provision implies that without default, the situation of margin lend­
ing results in a division of the interests in the property between the lender 
and the borrower. The borrower has his ownership right in the collateral 
assets, which right is encumbered with the lender's security interest. The 
secured party's right of repledge or rehypothecation is a limited right of 
disposal. It allows the secured party to create a further security interest in 
the collateral he has received from a debtor. This means that the secured 
party can use the debtor's property in order to secure a debt he has 
towards a third party. If he does so, the starting point is that the secured 
party can use only his portion of the value of the collateral, and cannot 
invade the owner's portion. Article 9-207(2)(e) of the UCC allows the 
repledge of collateral 'upon terms which do not impair the debtor's right 
to redeem it'. This means that, in principle, the debt secured by a repledge 
should not be greater than the original secured debt, and should not 
mature at a later moment. In the case of such a non-impairing security 
interest, if the owner redeems his property by paying the debt he has 
towards the secured party, sufficient value to discharge the debt secured 
by the right of repledge would be provided. The possibility of deviating 
from this starting point by way of an agreement was, however, generally 
accepted. The original owner could - and in practice often did - allow the 
secured party to enter into an 'impairing' repledge, securing a debt that 
was many times larger than the original secured debt.40 
The 1953 model text of Article 9-207(2)(e) of the UCC remained in force 
until 1999. In 1999 it was revised and renumbered m the course of an 
38 See Kettering 19991, in particular pp 1112-1115, and Kettering 1999II, in particular 
section II. See also Gilmore 1965, § 42 10, Johnson 1997, ρ 967, the UCC (2004 
edition). Official Comment to § 8-504, section 2, and Schwarcz 2001 Π, ρ 291 
39 See Kettering 1999 I, pp 1112-1113, Kettering 1999 II, ρ 92 
40 See Kettering 1999 I, pp 1118-1119, Kettenng 1999 II, section III 
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overall revision of Article 9.41 The new 1999 official text of Article 9-
207(c)(3) of the UCC states: 
[... ] a secured party having possession of collateral or control of collateral [... ] may 
create a security interest in the collateral. 
This provision takes a different approach than its predecessor. It allows 
a repledge, but does not require that the original owner be able to redeem 
the collateral assets. This means that the revised UCC allows an impairing 
repledge as a standard. The Official Comments 5 and 6 to § 9-207 of the 
UCC make clear that a collateral provider who grants a counterparty a 
right to repledge, may actually face a complete loss of his proprietary 
interest. Comment 5 states, for example, that 'the debtor's unimpaired 
right to redeem as against the debtor's original secured party nevertheless 
may not be enforceable against the new third party'.42 Comment 6 makes 
clear that impairing repledges may occur frequently in the securities 
markets. If the parties wish to establish a non-impairing right of repledge, 
they must conclude an explicit agreement to that end.43 
The margin lending practice and the provisions of the UCC show that 
under American law, it is possible to establish a right of repledge, even an 
impairing one. The right of repledge, however, is arguably something 
different from a secured party's unlimited right to transfer the collateral 
outright to a third party, which goes even further. Currently, this latter 
right is often envisaged in the standard documentation for securities lend-
ing and derivatives transactions under American law, and is the topic of 
section 2.3. 
2.3 A secured party's general right of disposal: the securities lending 
and derivatives markets 
Over the past few decades, two types of collateralised transactions have 
appeared in the American market, namely securities lending transactions 
and derivatives transactions, which envisage margin transfers that are 
41 See Kettering 1999 I, pp. 1111-1113; Kettering 1999 II, p. 175. 
42 The comment calls the right to redeem 'unimpaired'. However, this is only true in 
the relationship between the original owner and the first secured party. From an 
overall perspective, the right to redeem is indeed impaired, as the original owner's 
ownership claim may not be enforceable against the second secured party. 
43 On this new approach of Article 9-207(c)(3) of the UCC see Kettering 19991, section 
I; Kettering 1999II, section IV. The Official Comments 5 and 6 can be found in UCC 
(2004 edition), pp. 990-992. 
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structured as a security interest combined with the secured party's un-
limited right of disposal. This construction goes further than the right of 
repledge discussed in section 2.2 above, even if it is an impairing re-
pledge, because a right of repledge only gives a right to vest an additional 
security interest. The structure envisaged in securities lending and 
derivatives transactions gives the secured party the right to transfer out-
right title to the collateral assets to a third party. 
The TBMA Master Securities Loan Agreement for securities lending trans-
actions envisages an outright transfer of lent securities from lender to 
borrower, but actually sets out the establishment of a security interest in 
relation to financial collateral provided by borrower to lender.44 In connec-
tion with collateral provided on the basis of a security interest. Paragraph 
4.2 of the TBMA Master Securities Loan Agreement contains a lender's 
right to 'retransfer'. Paragraph 25.43 of the agreement explains that 're-
transfer' here means in respect of any collateral: 
to pledge, repledge, hypothecate, rehypothecate, lend, reiend, sell or otherwise 
transfer such Collateral, or to re-register any such Collateral evidenced by physical 
certificates in any name other than the Borrower's 
This right to retransfer is somewhat limited in scope. It only applies when 
the lender is a broker-dealer or, as a matter of course, m the case of an 
event of default by the borrower.45 
The New York derivatives market provides the most comprehensive 
example of a secured party's general right of disposal. In this market, a 
right to 'use' securities means a right for the secured party to dispose of 
them for his own benefit without any limitation. This right is not limited 
to default situations or to certain types of market participants. Under 
Section 2.2(c) of the 2001 ISDA Margin Provisions (New York law) con-
cerning the 'Use of Margin Received' a secured party will, under all cir-
cumstances: 
notwithstanding Section 9-207 of the New York Uruform Commercial Code, have 
the right to [ ] sell, pledge, rehypothecate, assign, invest, use, commingle or 
otherwise dispose of, or otherwise use in its business, any Margin Received it holds. 
44 See Sections 1,2,3,4, 6, 7,9 and 15 of the TBMA Master Securities Loan Agreement 
45 On securities lendmg transactions see also Kettering 19991, pp 1130-1131; Kettering 
1999 II, pp 200-201, the UCC (2004 edition). Article 8, Prefatory Note III C, section 
11, pp 807-808 
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free from any claim or right of any nature whatsoever of the Provider, including 
any equity or right of redemption by the Provider [...]. 
It should be noted that the interpretation of the word 'use' in the ISDA 
Margin Provisions is not in line with what is commonly meant by the 
word 'use', i.e. the act of employing a thing, without destroying or wasting 
that thing, and not to transfer that thing or encumber it with a security 
interest.47 The interpretation of the word 'use' in the ISDA Margin 
Provisions is, in any case, broader than that under Article 9-207(b)(4) of 
the UCC. This provision makes it possible to agree that a secured party in 
possession of the collateral may 'use or operate' that collateral. In this 
provision 'using' means enjoying an asset (e.g. driving a pledged car), but 
not infringing upon its substance. A collateral taker typically does not 
have the right to sell the encumbered assets outright, and as such infringe 
upon the owner's rights, unless there is a default.48 In the securities mar-
kets, however, a right to 'use' securities does mean a right to dispose of 
them, i.e. to encumber them with a further security interest, or to transfer 
them outright to a third party. 
More important, however, is that the structure envisaged in the American 
documentation for securities lending and derivatives transactions goes a 
step further than the right of repledge. Whereas a right of repledge only 
gives a secured party the right to create a further security interest (even 
if this may, in effect, be an impairing one) the documentation mentioned 
gives a secured party the right to transfer title to collateral assets outright. 
What is the origin of this new construction? 
In the UCC, the only lead to a secured party's general right of disposal can 
be found in Official Comment 3 to Article 9-314 of the UCC. This Official 
Comment states: 
In a transaction in which a secured party who has control grants a security interest 
in investment property or sells outright the investment property, by virtue of the 
46 This appears in almost the same wording in Paragraph 6(c) of the 1994 New York 
Annex (ISDA Credit Support Documents). The ISDA Credit Support Documents are 
the predecessor of the 2001 ISDA Margin Provisions. On the 'right of use' in the 
derivatives markets see Johnson 1997, in particular section ILA; Kettering 19991, pp. 
1115-1116; Kettering 1999 II, pp. 53-55. 
47 See the definition of 'use' in Black's Law Dictionary. 
48 For some examples in case law see UCC Case Digest 1984, pp. 509-513. See also 
Gilmore 1965, § 42.11. Benjamin 2000, footnote 74, erroneously mentions Article 9-
207(4) of the UCC (i.e. an earlier version of current Article 9-207(b)(4) of the UCC) 
as the basis for a secured party's unlimited right of disposal. 
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debtor's consent or applicable legal rules, a purchaser from the secured party 
typically will cut off the debtor's rights in the investment property or be immune 
from the debtor's claims.49 
This text mentions a sale of investment property, such as certificated or 
uncertificated securities or security entitlements, by a secured party who 
has control. What has inspired this comment? It is my impression that a 
secured party's unlimited right of disposal, which came into fashion in the 
securities lending and derivatives markets (as described above), has, to a 
large extent, been inspired by the right of repledge. Both in the case of a 
repledge and in the case of an unlimited right of disposal, the original 
pledgor's proprietary interest can be severely or even completely im-
paired. The secured party's general right of disposal is, in a sense, an 
extension of an impairing repledge. 
An important factor that has contributed to the appearance of an im-
pairing repledge and a secured party's general right of disposal in the 
securities markets, is the fungible nature of the collateral involved. 
Johnson notes that, unlike other types of collateral such as real property, 
equipment or inventory, collateral in the form of securities is in a very 
well-suited form to be 'rehypothecated', i.e. disposed of by the original 
secured party. At the end of a transaction, it is usually no problem for the 
original secured party to acquire equivalent securities in the market and 
transfer them to the original owner.50 Another factor that has led to the 
appearance of impairing repledge and a secured party's general right of 
disposal is the commercial pressure in securities markets. Johnson notes 
that 'financial institutions participating in the derivatives market aggres-
sively seek (and insist upon) the right to use posted collateral pledged to 
them'. They do so because it is commercially very attractive to be able to 
dispose of a counterparty's assets, so as to attract cheap credit, for 
example. The same, of course, holds true for participants in the securities 
lending market.5152 
49 See Official Comment 3 to Article 9-314 in UCC (2004 edition), p. 1031. This 
comment is discussed in Kettering 1999 I, p. 1140 et seq. and in Kettering 1999 II, p. 
211 et seq. 
50 See Johnson 1997, p. 967. 
51 See Johnson 1997, pp. 950-951. See also Johnson 1997, section U.C. 
52 On the factors that have contributed to the appearance of a 'right of use' see also 
section 1.3.3 ('A right of use in Europe - Why?'). 
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2.4 Remarkable characteristics 
2.4.2 Introduction 
The secured party's general right of disposal under the TBMA Master 
Securities Loan Agreement and the ISDA Margin Provisions has a number 
of remarkable characteristics from a theoretical point of view. In com-
parison to the right of repledge, the concept of a secured party's unlimited 
right of disposal deviates more radically from the features of a security 
interest, which, in principle, gives the secured party a right to have 
recourse only. 
2.4.2 No equity of redemption 
Article 9-623 of the UCC gives a debtor the right to redeem collateral from 
a secured party by paying the secured debt and reasonable expenses 
made by the secured party. The right of redemption gives shape to the 
debtor's ownership interest. In the case of a repledge, even an impairing 
repledge, the debtor's right of redemption is arguably still in place, even 
if it may be unattractive to invoke it from a practical point of view. In the 
case of a pre-default transfer by the secured party, however, the en-
cumbered asset, or res, no longer belongs to the pledgor per definition, but 
a third party acquirer becomes entitled to it. In this case, the asset to be 
redeemed has disappeared, which, in effect, makes redemption by the 
debtor impossible. 
For example, the ISDA Margin Provisions, as cited above, state explicitly 
that a collateral taker can dispose of the collateral provider's assets 'free 
from any claim or right of any nature whatsoever, [...] including any 
equity or right of redemption'. It is open to question whether the right of 
redemption can be bereft of its object just like that. In fact, consenting to 
a transfer of pledged assets free from the right of redemption boils down 
to a waiver of that right. Johnson notes that under the 1994 version of 
Article 9 of the UCC the right of redemption could not be waived.53 Like-
wise, under current Articles 9-602(11) and 9-624 of the UCC, the right of 
redemption may not be waived, unless after default. Kettering correctly 
argues that a security interest without a debtor's right of redemption, as 
53 See Articles 9-501(3) and 9-506 of the 1994 version of the UCC, available in UCC 
(2004 edition), pp. 1860-1862 and p. 1867, and discussed in Johnson 1997, p. 975 and 
pp. 978-979. 
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it occurs in securities lending and derivatives transactions, is an anomaly. 
In his view, this anomaly is a consequence of the margin lending practice 
that allowed for an impairing repledge and rendered the right to redeem 
a fiction, if not theoretically, than in any case from a practical point of 
view.54 
2.4.3 Duty of reasonable care 
Article 9-207(a) of the UCC imposes a duty upon a secured party to use 
reasonable care in the custody and preservation of collateral in the 
secured party's possession. Johnson notes that this duty precludes the 
secured party from disposing of the posted collateral without the express 
authorization of the pledgor.55 It is, however, appropriate to take one step 
further and ask whether the duty of reasonable care is at all compatible 
with a secured party's general right of disposal. How can a secured party 
still exercise reasonable care in custody and preservation of collateral, if, 
for instance, the collateral has been transferred outright and belongs to a 
third party? Kettering is right when he argues that a secured party's 
general right of disposal and the duty of reasonable care are, in principle, 
not compatible. Nonetheless, he refers to the accumulated weight of the 
early margin lending practice, which featured an impairing right of 
repledge, in which the duty of reasonable care was also, in fact, bereft of 
meaning.56 
2.4.4 Residual rights? 
It is evident that the rights of a collateral provider have no substance from 
the moment a collateral taker disposes of the collateral assets. The equity 
of redemption no longer has any object to which it attaches, and the duty 
of reasonable care can no longer be exercised. The proprietary claim of the 
collateral provider is replaced by a contractual claim for the transfer of 
equivalent assets. But what is the situation up to the moment of disposal? 
Is it possible to qualify the relationship between the parties up to that 
moment as a secured transaction? 
An argument in favour of a continuing security interest is that the collat-
eral provider retains his ownership interest until the moment the right of 
54 See Kettering 1999 I, pp. 1153-1155; Kettering 1999 II, pp. 226-229. 
55 See Johnson 1997, p. 972. 
56 See Kettering 19991, footnote 7 and, in particular, p. 1154; Kettering 199911, section 
IV.A.2 and, in particular, p. 227. 
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disposal is exercised. Moreover, the collateral provider can reclaim the 
collateral assets by paying off what is due to the collateral taker. It should, 
however, be noted that these are 'weak' rights. Not only are they subject 
to the owner's own default on the secured obligation, as is usually the case 
in a secured transaction, but also to the collateral taker's general right of 
disposal, which can be exercised at any moment and poses a permanent 
threat to the owner's rights (rather like the sword hanging above the head 
of Damocles). 
Note that the same analysis is valid in the event of the secured party's 
insolvency. It is obvious that in this event the secured party's security 
interest does not end. Arguably, the same is true for the right of use. Even 
if the secured party himself may no longer be entitled to exercise the right 
of use (because he is insolvent) the insolvency administrator is entitled to 
do so. In principle, this power does not end with the insolvency of the 
secured party. After all, the secured party will usually only have been able 
to stipulate a right of use in exchange for a low interest rate, for instance. 
In other words, he has 'paid' for this right. If the insolvency administrator 
actually exercises the right of use, the security provider is left with a 
contractual claim for the transfer of equivalent assets. In practice, this 
scenario will not occur that often, as the secured party's insolvency will 
usually trigger contractual close-out netting provisions.57 
2.4.5 No interest in the proceeds 
The securities lending and derivatives documentation does not envisage 
any interest for the collateral provider in the proceeds of a disposal by a 
collateral taker (a kind of proprietary substitution). If sales occur, rights 
in the proceeds are not determined by the pre-sale rights in the collateral, 
but the collateral taker is exclusively entitled to them. For example, the 
ISDA Margin Provisions (New York law) do not envisage any right of a 
proprietary nature for the collateral provider whatsoever. Section 2.2(c) 
of these provisions gives a secured party the right to dispose of collateral 
'free from any claim or right of any nature whatsoever of the Provider, 
including any equity or right of redemption by the Provider [...]'. The 
collateral provider has a contractual claim for the transfer of equivalent 
assets only. 
57 On close-out netting see secKon 4.7 of chapter II and section 3 of chapter V. 
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Of course, the parties can agree to a trust on the proceeds, for instance, in 
order to protect the position of the original owner. However, this is not 
the approach of the standard documentation, which does not envisage a 
trust on the proceeds or any other proprietary interest in the proceeds for 
the collateral provider. There is also a practical reason why establishing 
a trust on proceeds may prove difficult. As was already noted in section 
1.3.3 ('A right of use in Europe - Why?') above, in practice, tracing invest­
ment securities and their proceeds is often impracticable as there is 
typically a chain of intermediaries, whereas clearing systems and netting 
arrangements preclude an identification of a particular transfer at one end 
to a particular receipt of assets at the other.58 
2.5 The characterisation issue 
Eventually, the question arises as to whether a security interest combined 
with a secured party's general right of disposal can still be characterised 
as a security interest, or if it is actually an outright transfer. 
In 1965 Grant Gilmore argued that a transfer of collateral by a pledgee to 
a third party should be characterised as a conversion, even if the pledgee 
had been given the power to do so in the pledge agreement. He stated: 
Needless to say, the common law has always stigmatized such a transfer of a 
pledgor's property as a conversion It may safely be assumed that the conversion 
would be a conversion still even if the pledge agreement authorized the pledgee to 
sell the property (without assigning the debt) whenever he felt like it The Code 
says nothing about such unauthonzed sales by secured parties in §9-207 or in any 
other section Such a sale would seem clearly to be a violation of the secured party's 
inescapable duty to use reasonable care m custody and preservation of the 
collateral so that we may conclude that the Code secured party has no more right 
to sell the collateral without assigning the debt than a common law pledge did 5 9 
Like Gilmore, Kettering wonders whether a security interest combined 
with a general right of disposal as an outright transfer can still be charac­
terised as a security interest. Kettering argues that 'the most natural char­
acterisation of the relationship after the pledged securities are sold is not 
as a secured transaction, but rather that the two parties are mutual 
creditors'.60 In his view, the statement in Official Comment to Article 9-314 
58 See sechon 3 4.5 and section 4 7 below for rules of 'proprietary substitution' under 
English and Dutch law respectively 
59 See Gilmore 1965, § 42 10, ρ 1156 This passage is discussed in Kettering 1999 I, ρ 
1127 et seq and Kettering 1999 II, ρ 195 et seq 
60 See Kettering 1999 II, ρ 197 
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of the UCC (quoted in section 2.3 above), that a secured party may sell 
collateral to a third party, which presumes that the relationship between 
the parties should still be characterised as a secured transaction, leads to 
'conceptual acrobatics' and 'irreducible anomalies'.61 
In my view, a secured party's general right of disposal as envisaged in the 
TBMA Master Securities Loan Agreement and the ISDA Margin Provi­
sions is essentially an outright transfer. Until the moment of disposal, the 
collateral provider arguably still has a number of rights, notably the 
ownership right and the right to redeem. But these rights are weaker than 
the rights that a provider of security normally has. Not only are they 
subject to the collateral provider's default, but also to the collateral taker's 
general right of disposal, which may be exercised at any moment in time. 
After the moment of such a disposal, the original owner's proprietary 
interest is replaced by a contractual claim for the transfer of equivalent 
assets. He cannot exercise his right of redemption, and the collateral taker 
cannot fulfil his duty of due care. Moreover, the collateral provider has no 
interest in the proceeds from such disposals. The collateral taker has so 
many rights and the collateral provider so few, that, with regard to 
content, the collateral taker should be treated as the owner of the collat­
eral. This approach coincides with that taken in the American repo mar­
kets (see section 2.1 above), in which financial collateral is customarily 
provided on the basis of the outright transfer method. 
2.6 Conclusion 
The belief that a security interest can be combined with an unlimited right 
of disposal under American law has been a factor that has contributed to 
the envisaging of such a construction in the Collateral Directive (see in 
particular section 3 below). For nearly two decades this construction has 
indeed been applied in the American securities lending and derivatives 
markets. However, this construction has dubious theoretical under­
pinnings. It is closely related to and has probably been inspired by the 
(impairing) right of repledge, which was originally applied in the Ameri­
can margin lending business and was later codified in the UCC. A secured 
party's general right of disposal, however, goes one step further than an 
impairing repledge. Until the right of disposal is exercised, the ownership 
and redemption rights of the provider of security are only a weak reflec-
61 Quotahons Kettering 1999 II, ρ 221 and ρ 235 For an in-depth analysis, see 
Kettering 19991, in particular section II, Kettering 1999II, in particular section IV Β 
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tion of the rights that a provider of security ordinarily has. Not only are 
they subject to the security provider's own default, but also to the collat­
eral taker's right of disposal. After exercise of the right of disposal by the 
collateral taker, the rights of the original owner are impaired definitely. 
The original owner can no longer redeem the encumbered assets, to which 
a third party acquirer is now fully entitled. Neither can the secured party 
fulfil his duty of due care any longer. Moreover, the original owner has no 
interest in the proceeds from the disposal by the secured party, as he is 
left with a contractual claim only. Whereas the construction of a repledge 
could, with some effort, still be reconciled with the characteristics of a 
security interest, this does not hold true for a secured party's general right 
of disposal. With regard to content, this structure has so much in common 
with an outright transfer, that the correct approach seems to suggest that 
it be treated as such, for tax, capital adequacy and accounting purposes, 
for example. 
3. RIGHT OF USE UNDER ENGLISH LAW 
3.1 Introduction 
This section demonstrates that it is not necessarily the case in common 
law jurisdictions that a collateral taker can be granted a general right of 
disposal (i.e. the right to vest a security interest in respect of a collateral 
asset or to transfer it outright) on the basis of a security interest. In the 
American securities lending and derivatives markets, a secured party is 
regularly granted a general right of disposal.62 However, granting a 
general right of disposal to a secured party is traditionally alien to English 
law. It is the author's impression that the right of use in the Collateral 
Directive has been inspired by American law and stems to a large extent 
from pressure by participants in the London financial market.63 The fol­
lowing quotation is illustrative: 
62 Note, however, that it is likely that a security interest combined with a general right 
of disposal should, under American law and with regard to content, be charac-
tensed as an outright transfer See section 2 above 
63 See e g Benjamin 2000, p i l l (footnote 74), McCormack 2003, section on 'EC Finan­
cial Collateral Directive' and Conclusion, and the discussion papers by Morton and 
Potok in the Commission Working Document, Annex A (in particular section 
A 2 (c)), and Annex Β (in particular section 3) See also section 13 3 above ('A right 
of use in Europe - Why7') 
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The documentahon for prime brokerage is not standardised In many cases, the 
transachon between hedge fund client and broker is structured as a security interest 
with a right of use, notwithstanding the legal complexities associated with this I 
believe this is largely because prime brokers have modelled their documentation 
on US documentation, where Article 9 of the UCC permits a right of use 
This section provides an overview of the main issues relating to a secured 
party's general right of disposal under English law. Section 3.2 is of a prac-
tical nature, and focuses on segments of the financial markets in which 
parties who establish a security interest are inclined to give the collateral 
taker an unlimited right of disposal, such as in the context of prime 
brokerage, or in the case of the client - custodian relationship. Section 3.3 
examines whether the standard documentation governed by English law 
for repurchase, securities lending and derivatives arrangements, en-
visages a secured party's general right of disposal. Section 3.4 examines 
whether a security interest is compatible with a general right of disposal 
under English law from a theoretical point of view. Section 3.5 investi-
gates the validity of a number of arguments that have been put forward 
in favour of the introduction of a security interest combined with a 
general right of disposal. Section 3.6 considers the Financial Collateral 
Arrangements (No. 2) Regulations 2003, which implement the Collateral 
Directive in the United Kingdom. Section 3.7 contains a conclusion.65 66 
3.2 Prime brokerage and custody 
3.2.1 Introduction 
Benjamin has pointed out the main sectors of the economy in which a 
secured party's general right of disposal is sometimes considered. Like in 
the US, this construction is applied in the securities industry, in particular 
because of the 'tremendous' commercial pressure on financial institu-
64 Source an e-mail to the author from Dr J Benjamin, London School of Economics 
(12 August 2003) See also sechon 3 2 2 on prime brokerage below 
65 Because a secured party traditionally is not granted a general right of disposal 
under English law, the literature on this subject is scarce The most comprehensive 
review of the issue can be found in Benjamin 2000, chapter 5 C For further, but 
more fragmentary treatments of the subject, see the references in the footnotes 
below 
66 Benjamm 2000, chapter 5 C, uses the term 'rehypothecation' to indicate a secured 
party's general right of disposal Because 'rehypothecation' or 'repledge' may be 
understood to relate to a right to vest a security interest only, these terms are not 
used in this section to refer to a general right of disposal 
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tions.67 In the United Kingdom, the issue plays a particularly important 
role in the context of prime brokerage arrangements, and on a more 
general level in the client - custodian relationship. This section investi-
gates under what circumstances a prime broker and a custodian can 
dispose of their clients' assets.68 
3.2.2 Prime brokerage 
Prime brokerage is a bundle of services offered by financial institutions 
to their hedge fund clients. Often a prime broker provides the hedge fund 
client with considerable amounts of funding. In exchange, the prime 
broker usually has a security interest in the hedge fund's security port-
folio. The prime broker customarily stipulates the right to transfer the 
encumbered securities out of its client's securities account into its own 
account, subject to an obligation to deliver equivalent assets to the client. 
This enables the prime broker to dispose of its client's assets. Essentially, 
this arrangement is an application of the construction of a security interest 
combined with the secured party's general right of disposal. It is believed 
that this structure has come into being because prime brokers have 
modelled their documentation on US documentation.69 
Under English law, however, this construction raises concerns. The right 
of disposal not only runs the risk of being declared invalid by a judge, but 
the construction as a whole also risks being characterised as an outright 
transfer. This is mainly because of the circumstance that a conversion at 
the mere discretion of the secured party is equivalent to an option to 
purchase, which the courts traditionally consider an offence against the 
principle that there can be no clog on the secured party's right to redeem 
the encumbered property.70 By the same token, even if the prime broker-
age documentation itself envisages a conversion of the security interest 
into an outright transfer arrangement at the moment of actual use (which 
happens regularly in practice) the construction itself is vulnerable. The 
above shows that a security interest cannot be combined that easily with 
67 See Benjamin 2000, section 5.46. See also Benjamin / Yates / Montagu 2002, section 
4.22. 
68 See in particular Benjamin 2000, chapter 5.C and chapter 10.B. 
69 See the quotation in section 3.1 above. 
70 For further information on the equity of redemption, see section 3.4.2 below. 
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a general right of disposal. Such a right can be declared invalid, or the 
structure as a whole can be recharacterised as an outright transfer.71 
3.2.3 The client - custodian relationship 
The issue of a secured party's general right of disposal also plays a role on 
a more general level in the relationship between a custodian and his 
clients. Can a custodian dispose of his clients' assets on the basis of a 
security interest? 
a. Starting point: the beneficiary's interest 
In current practice, there is often no direct link between an issuer of 
securities and investors. Securities are commonly held through a chain of 
custodians who act as intermediaries.72 Benjamin and Austen-Peters have 
asserted that in this indirect holding system the relationship between a 
custodian and his client should, under English law, be characterised as a 
trust. A trust can relate to intangible goods, such as indirectly held 
securities. In such a trust, the custodian is the trustee and therefore the 
legal owner of the assets. The client is the beneficiary of the trust, and has 
a beneficial interest in the trust property.73 
In principle, the custodian does not have the power to dispose of his 
clients' assets in the course of his own business because he acts in the 
capacity of a trustee. It would be incompatible with his fiduciary duty 
towards the client/beneficiary for a custodian to dispose of his clients' 
assets and to pocket the profits. Any dispositions should be for the benefit 
of the clients.74 
71 See Benjamin 2000, sections 10.49-10 59, and p. 117 (footnote 101 ), Benjamin / Yates / 
Montagu 2002, sections 4.8, 4 33-34 
72 Because the so-called indirect holding system is predominant in practice, direct 
holdings are not discussed here On this issue, see Austen-Peters 2000, sections 2.20-
24. 
73 See Benjamin 2000, chapter 2, Austen-Peters 2000, in particular sections 2 25-2 32 
74 Of course, the custodian-trustee may ask for a reasonable fee for his services See 
Martin 2001, pp. 601-606 
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b. Basis for a right of disposal: outright transfer, not a security interest 
Of course, a client is free to transfer his beneficial interest in book-entry 
securities to his custodian outright.75 In this case all rights (i.e. legal in-
terest and beneficial interest) lie with the custodian who can then dispose 
of them freely. Under English law, however, a client cannot grant a custo-
dian a general right of disposal on the basis of a security interest. For 
reasons to be discussed in section 3.4 below, such a contractual right may 
well be declared invalid, or alternatively, the structure runs the risk of 
being characterised as an outright transfer. For this reason, custodians 
who stipulate a right of disposal as a matter of course, often do so on the 
basis of securities lending agreements. Securities lending agreements are, 
under English law, customarily structured as an outright transfer.76 An 
outright transfer, as a matter of fact, entails a general right of disposal. 
3.3 The approach of the standard documentation 
Under standard agreements used by English market participants, the 
provision of financial collateral in repo and securities lending transactions 
takes place on the basis of an outright transfer. This is true for the GMRA 
and the GMSLA, but also for the earlier 1995 Overseas Securities Lender's 
Agreement.77 Moreover, the 2001ISDA Margin Provisions only envisage 
an outright transfer of collateral under English law. The 1995 Deed subject 
to English law (one of the Credit Support Documents preceding the 2001 
Margin Provisions) did make it possible to vest a security interest. How-
ever, no right of use could be established in connection with such a 
security interest.79 The structure of the standard documentation applied 
in the English financial markets therefore confirms the impression that a 
security interest and a right of use are mutually exclusive concepts. 
3.4 Theoretical considerations 
3.4.2 Introduction 
Turing and Lester have noted that: 
75 As the trustee is the legal owner, the only thing a beneficiary/investor can dispose 
of is his equitable interest. 
76 See also section 3.3 below. 
77 See also section 2 of chapter III. 
78 See Paragraph 6(d) of the 1995 English Deed. 
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Re-use has been a particular problem in the United Kingdom, since there have been 
legal bars which arguably preclude re-use, even where expressly agreed to by the 
customer. 
What exactly are the legal bars that preclude a secured party's general 
right of disposal? Benjamin and McCormack mention three equitable rules 
that are possibly not compatible with a secured party's general right of 
disposal. These are: the rule 'once a mortgage, always a mortgage', the 
related rule on clogs on the equity of redemption, and the rule against 
collateral benefits.80 The relationship between these three rules and a 
secured party's general right of disposal is outlined below. Whether the 
collateral provider has any proprietary rights left in the event the secured 
party has a general right of disposal is also considered. Moreover, atten-
tion is paid to the question of whether a collateral provider has an interest 
in the proceeds upon the sale of collateral assets, or in equivalent assets 
to which the collateral taker is or will be entitled. 
3.4.2 'Once a mortgage, always a mortgage', and the equity of redemption 
Benjamin shows that the rule 'once a mortgage, always a mortgage' and 
the collateral provider's equity of redemption are closely interrelated rules 
that have long since been firmly upheld under English law. The equity of 
redemption means that a collateral provider has the right to the return of 
the encumbered asset upon discharge of the secured obligation. As a 
general rule, the collateral provider cannot waive the equity of redemp-
tion by contract. The equity of redemption is considered a characteristic 
feature of a security interest. Waiving the equity of redemption would 
therefore also be incompatible with the rule 'once a mortgage, always a 
mortgage'. Granting a secured party a general right of disposal cannot be 
reconciled with these two rules.81 
Goode takes a more liberal view. According to Goode 'it is open to the 
parties to agree that the mortgagee is to have a power of sale even without 
default, and such an agreement is not void as impairing the equity of re-
demption'.82 Essentially, Goode makes a distinction between default and 
non-default situations. He proposes that the equity of redemption does 
79 See Turing / Lester 2005, p. 70. 
80 See Benjamin 2000, in particular sections 5.50-53; McCormack 2003, section on 'EC 
Financial Collateral Directive'. 
81 See Benjamin 2000, sections 5.53-54. See also Benjamin / Yates / Montagu 2002, 
section 4.22; McCormack 2003, section on 'EC Financial Collateral Directive'. 
82 See Goode 2003, section 6-30. 
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have a value in default situations, but may not be that much of an issue in 
non-default situations in which a collateral taker wishes to dispose of the 
encumbered property involved. 
In support of his view Goode mentions two cases. The first case (The 
Maule, [1997] 1 W.L.R. 528) relates to a mortgagee's power to dispose of an 
encumbered ship upon a non-monetary event of default. Contrary to 
judges' decisions earlier in the procedure, it was held on appeal that such 
a disposal is possible. The case, however, does not support the view that 
the equity of redemption is not applicable in a non-default situation. First, 
the security provider did default in this case, and second, it was held that 
the secured party's right to dispose is subject to the equity of redemption. 
The Maule only shows that the option to redeem encumbered assets need 
not be given in the security agreement itself. It is sufficient that the credi-
tor, in fact, gives the debtor reasonable notice of an intended sale and an 
opportunity to redeem. In the second case mentioned by Goode (Langton 
v. Waite, (1868) LR 6 Eq 165) a stockbroker was held to have no implied 
right to dispose of collateral securities, and was obliged to account for the 
profits of an unlawful disposal to the collateral giver. In an aside, the 
judge remarked that in his view, a collateral taker's right of disposal can 
be agreed upon in a contract, but in this case there was no such agree-
ment, so this consideration has limited value.83 The cases mentioned are 
not compatible with the majority of the cases mentioned in Benjamin 2000, 
and with regard to content, hardly support Goode's argument that the 
equity of redemption is not applicable in a non-default situation. 
There are two more substantial arguments that can be advanced against 
Goode's proposition that a distinction should be made between default 
and non-default situations. The first is that customarily, security interests 
have a function in default situations only. A security interest gives the 
collateral taker the option to have recourse if the collateral provider does 
not fulfil his obligations. Typically, a security interest does not serve a 
function in non-default situations. Goode's approach, however, implicitly 
extends the scope of the functions that a security interest may fulfil. In his 
view, a security interest not only serves its traditional recovery function 
in default, but can also be applied to make collateral assets tradable. In 
this respect, he signals a new approach to the issue. A second objection to 
Goode's proposition is that a disposal by the collateral taker usually 
results in a loss of proprietary interest on the side of the collateral 
83 See also Benjamin 2000, chapter 5, footnote 100. 
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provider. He is left with a contractual claim, unless a form of proprietary 
substitution takes place (on this issue see subsection 3.4.5 below). As 
opposed to an ownership interest, a collateral provider's mere contractual 
claim is hardly compatible with the concept of a security interest. In light 
of the above, the relaxation of the equity of redemption as proposed by 
Goode does not seem tenable. 
3.4.3 No collateral benefits 
Another equitable rule mentioned by Benjamin as a possible obstacle to 
a secured party's general right of disposal, prohibits collateral benefits. It 
basically means that a collateral taker should not reserve to himself any 
collateral advantage outside the collateral agreement, in addition to pay-
ment of interest, cost and principle. Currently, this rule is only applied in 
the case of unfair and unconscionable provisions in an agreement. Benja-
min therefore argues that the rule has little meaning in the case of trans-
actions involving financial collateral, particularly if the collateral giver 
and taker are both financial institutions. In the event of a lopsided power 
relationship, however, as might exist between a custodian and his non-
financial client, the rule on collateral benefits could, arguably, be invoked 
as an argument against the construction of a secured party's general right 
of disposal.84 
3.4.4 Residual rights? 
Arguably, the original owner still has some rights until the moment that 
the secured party makes use of his general right of disposal. He is still the 
formal owner of the collateral assets, and can redeem them by paying off 
the secured debt. These rights are nevertheless weaker than those of an 
'ordinary' provider of security. Normally, an ownership interest that is 
encumbered with a security interest is lost only in the case of a default by 
the security provider. When the secured party has a general right of dis-
posal, however, the ownership and redemption rights of the security 
provider are also subject to this right of disposal, which may be exercised 
at any moment in time, and which wipes out the security provider's 
proprietary rights entirely.85 
84 See Benjamin 2000, sections 5.55-56. See also McCormack 2003, section on 'EC 
Financial Collateral Directive'. 
85 On the issue of residual rights, see also sections 2.4.4 and 4.6.4. 
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3.4.5 An interest in proceeds or equivalent assets? 
In favour of a secured party's general right of disposal. Goode has argued 
that the equity of redemption 'simply attaches to the proceeds of the 
sale'.86 One could question whether it is compatible with the nature of a 
security interest that a collateral provider may, upon a disposal by the 
collateral taker, be faced with entirely different assets upon payment of 
the secured debt. In any case. Goodes rule provides comfort to the collat-
eral provider who, albeit not in the original assets, has an interest in the 
proceeds of the sale of those assets. 
Benjamin is somewhat more reserved. Like Goode, she envisages an 
interest of the collateral provider after a disposal by the collateral taker, 
but not in the proceeds of the sale. She proposes an interest in equivalent 
assets to which the collateral taker is or will be entitled. This rule is more 
in line with what a security interest actually is, because upon redemption 
the collateral provider will be the owner, if not of exactly the same assets, 
than, in any case, of assets equivalent to the ones he originally transferred. 
Benjamin's rule, however, is also less advantageous to the collateral 
provider than that of Goode, because it is not necessarily the case that the 
collateral taker is actually entitled to equivalent assets. According to Ben-
jamin, if there are no equivalent assets in place, the collateral provider is 
left with a contractual claim.87 
The Collateral Directive goes even further. Article 5(3) of the directive 
does not envisage an immediate interest for the collateral provider in the 
proceeds of a sale, or in equivalent assets to which the collateral taker 
becomes entitled. It only provides for an interest of the collateral provider 
in equivalent assets after these have been transferred to him by the collat-
eral taker. This means that he merely has a contractual claim against the 
collateral taker for the delivery of equivalent assets from the moment the 
collateral taker exercises his right of disposal, and until the moment the 
collateral taker actually transfers equivalent assets. This is not an enviable 
position, because it implies that during this time frame the collateral 
provider runs an insolvency risk in respect of the collateral taker. In any 
case, it is clear that the Collateral Directive leaves hardly any of the 
protection envisaged by Goode. 
86 See Goode 2003, section 6-30. 
87 See Benjamin 2000, section 5.64. 
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Under English law, the parties could agree to a trust on the proceeds of an 
authorised disposition by the collateral taker in order to overcome the 
negative consequences of the Collateral Directive. Such a trust does not 
arise automatically, but would depend on the agreement of the parties. 
However, as in the American markets, it is not likely that the parties to a 
collateral arrangement will, in practice, envisage a trust on proceeds. This 
is because a trust on proceeds is not in the interest of the collateral taker. 
Furthermore, as was already indicated in section 1.3.3, tracing the 
proceeds of investment securities is usually difficult, if not impossible in 
practice, because typically there is a chain of intermediaries. Moreover, 
clearing systems and netting arrangements preclude an identification of 
a particular transfer at one end to a particular receipt at the other.88 
3.4.6 Concluding remarks 
McCormack and Benjamin mention a few cases in which a secured party's 
general right of disposal in respect of securities was sanctioned.89 
McCormack, however, notes that it is not that easy to fit the concept of a 
secured party's general right of disposal into English law, and pleads for 
a clarification of the underpinnings of the concept by the legislator in the 
course of the implementation of the Collateral Directive in the United 
Kingdom.90 Benjamin's general conclusion is that a secured party's general 
right of disposal is not compatible with the equitable rules outlined 
above.91 In my view, this is the correct approach. Wood states: 
It seems to be the case in most developed legal systems that the beneficiary loses his 
propnetary m rem interest if the custodian can use the securities as his own, e g by 
borrowing them or selling them, even if the custodian must substitute equivalent 
securities or replace them with cash The right of the custodian to treat the securities 
as his own is inconsistent with the investor's ownership92 
From a practical pomt of view, it is understandable that a secured party's 
general right of disposal is considered in the securities markets. In this 
market in particular, there is strong commercial pressure to make optimal 
88 See section 2 4 5 above and section 4 7 below for substitution rules under American 
and Dutch law respectively 
89 See Benjamin 2000, section 5 63 See also McCormack 2003, section on 'EC Financial 
Collateral Directive' 
90 See McCormack 2003, section on 'EC Financial Collateral Directive' and Conclusion 
A clarification by the legislator has not, however, been provided, see section 3 6 
below 
91 See Benjamin 2000, section 5 66 
92 Quotation Wood 1995 I, sechon 6 41 See also sections 6 42-43 
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use of assets. Moreover, tradable securities can, by their nature, easily be 
replaced by equivalent assets.93 A secured party's general right of dis-
posal, however, is not compatible with the rule 'once a mortgage, always 
a mortgage', the equity of redemption or the rule prohibiting collateral 
benefits. This is particularly true in the case of a lopsided power relation-
ship.94 Until the moment of the actual disposition, the collateral provider 
arguably still has his ownership interest and the right to redeem, but these 
rights have a weak character, because they are not only subject to the 
collateral provider's own default, but also to the collateral taker's general 
right of disposal. Moreover, the possibility that, upon disposal, the collat-
eral taker is left with a contractual claim only is not compatible with the 
essence of a security interest. The collateral provider loses all his proprie-
tary rights and, under the Collateral Directive, does not have a right to the 
proceeds of a disposal by the collateral taker. In my view, the construction 
of a security interest combined with a general right of disposal has so 
much in common with an outright transfer, that it should be characterised 
as such. 
3.5 Additional arguments for change? 
A number of factors that have contributed to the introduction of a secured 
party's general right of disposal have already been mentioned in section 
1.3.3 ('A right of use in Europe - Why?'). Benjamin advances two addi-
tional arguments in favour of this construction. Neither of these argu-
ments seems convincing and they are refuted below. 
1. First, Benjamin argues that, whereas the outright transfer method 
and insolvency set-off are generally enforceable under English law, this 
may not be the case in foreign jurisdictions. In the case of cross-border 
transactions, the outright transfer method may therefore not be an 
attractive option. The alternative proposed by Benjamin to reach the same 
economic result is a security interest combined with a right of use.95 
The argument concerning outright transfer and set-off is, however, no 
longer valid for transactions covered by the law of a Member State of the 
European Union after the implementation of the Collateral Directive. The 
93 For comparable considerations under American law, see the last paragraph of 
section 2.3 above. See also section 1.3.3 ('A right of use in Europe - Why?'). 
94 See also Benjamin 2000, section 5.62. 
95 See Benjamin 2000, section 5.67. See also Benjamin / Yates / Montagu 2002, section 
4.22. 
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Collateral Directive recognises the outright transfer method and con­
tractual close-out netting arrangements in the case of collateralised trans­
actions.96 In the United States, an outright transfer is a perfectly viable 
way to provide collateral, whereas a secured party's general right of 
disposal has shaky foundations from a theoretical point of view.97 More­
over, it seems unlikely that the construction of a secured party's general 
right of disposal is currently applied in many other jurisdictions, and can 
offer the legal comfort for which Benjamin argues. 
2. Benjamin's second argument in favour of a right of use is based on 
the legal characterisation of different types of securities. A distinction 
should be made between non-dematerialised securities and dematerial-
ised securities that are registered by intermediaries. As far as non-demate­
rialised securities are concerned, a legal interest can be delivered. If a third 
party C obtains a legal interest in these securities from a collateral taker 
B, this interest is protected against the original collateral provider A's 
equity of redemption, if C is acting in good faith. C's legal interest prevails 
over A's equitable interest. However, if C acquires from collateral taker 
Β an interest in securities that are held by an intermediary, this interest is 
not legal but equitable, and may not prevail over A's equity of redemption 
(as would be the case if a non-dematerialised security were concerned). 
Because securities are more and more frequently held by intermediaries 
(which effectively means that legal interests are replaced by equitable 
ones) the position of third parties acquiring securities tends to worsen. 
They can no longer fend off A's equity of redemption that easily. 
According to Benjamin, the recognition of a secured party's general right 
of disposal would offer collateral takers the legal protection needed.98 
If Benjamin were to have reasoned in accordance with market practice, 
however, there would be no problem whatsoever, either in the case of 
non-dematerialised securities, or in the case of book-entry securities held 
by intermediaries. Benjamin presupposes that A establishes a security 
interest in favour of B, on the basis of which Β disposes of the encumbered 
assets in favour of C. In this case A's equity of redemption may indeed 
pose a problem. By contrast, in the case of an outright transfer by A to Β 
in line with standard market practice, A has no equity of redemption 
whatsoever. In this case Β is fully entitled to dispose of the assets received 
96 See, in particular. Articles 6 and 7 of the CD. 
97 See section 3.3.3.d ('Extra illustration: the approach under English and American 
law') of chapter III and section 2 of this chapter. 
98 See Benjamin 2000, sections 5.68-69. 
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from A and to transfer full title to C. C's interest, in this case, is never 
subject to A's equity of redemption and is fully enforceable. 
Moreover, it would be too simple to argue that the equitable rules set out 
in section 3.4 above can simply be set aside, as would be the result if a 
right of use on the basis of a security interest were introduced. These rules 
set out the fundamental characteristics of a security interest, which guar-
antee that the interests of a collateral provider and a collateral taker are 
balanced. A security interest without these characteristics, such as a 
security interest combined with a right of use as envisaged in the Col-
lateral Directive, is essentially an outright transfer. It is submitted that, 
just as the economic purpose of the outright transfer and the right of use 
structures is identical, so also should their legal characterisation (and their 
treatment for tax, accounting and capital adequacy purposes, for example) 
be the same. 
3.6 The Financial Collateral Arrangements (No. 2) Regulations 2003 
In the United Kingdom, the Collateral Directive has been implemented by 
way of the Financial Collateral Arrangements (No. 2) Regulations 2003 
(hereafter: 'Regulations'). Section 16 of the Regulations deals with the right 
of use under a security financial collateral arrangement. It follows fairly 
closely the text of Article 5 of the Collateral Directive" and reads as 
follows: 
(1) If a security financial collateral arrangement provides for the collateral-taker to 
use and dispose of any financial collateral provided under the arrangement, as if 
it were the owner of it, the collateral-taker may do so in accordance with the terms 
of the arrangement. 
(2) If a collateral-taker exercises such a right of use, it is obliged to replace the 
original financial collateral by transferring equivalent financial collateral on or 
before the due date for the performance of the relevant financial obligations 
covered by the arrangement or, if the arrangement so provides, it may set off the 
value of the equivalent financial collateral against or apply it in discharge of the 
relevant financial obligations in accordance with the terms of the arrangement. 
(3) The equivalent financial collateral which is transferred in discharge of an 
obligation as described in paragraph (2), shall be subject to the same terms of the 
security financial collateral arrangement as the original financial collateral was 
subject to and shall be treated as having been provided under the security financial 
99 Note, however, that the somewhat obscure provision of Article 5(4) of the CD has 
been omitted. 
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collateral arrangement at the same time as the originai financial collateral was first 
provided. 
(4) If a collateral-taker has an outstanding obligation to replace the original 
financial collateral with equivalent financial collateral when an enforcement event 
occurs, that obligation may be the subject of a close-out netting provision. 
The Explanatory Note to Section 16 of the Regulations only states that: 
Regulation 16 provides that where a security financial collateral arrangement 
provides a right of use for the collateral-taker over the collateral, that term is to be 
enforceable. Where a right of use is exercised the collateral-taker is obliged to 
replace the collateral with equivalent financial collateral, unless he sets off the value 
of the collateral in discharge of the relevant financial obligations in accordance with 
the terms of the arrangement. The equivalent financial collateral is to be subject to 
the same terms as the original financial collateral. Obligations arising under right 
of use provisions in the arrangement may be the subject of a close-out netting 
provision. 
This compact note sheds no light on the conceptual difficulties associated 
with a secured party's general right of disposal as set out in Benjamin 2000 
and in section 3.4 above.100 
3.7 Conclusion 
Article 5 of the Collateral Directive, implemented in the United Kingdom 
by way of Article 16 of the Financial Collateral Arrangements (No. 2) 
Regulations 2003, provides for the construction of a secured party's gener-
al right of disposal. Is this construction compatible with traditional rules 
of English law? 
It is difficult to reconcile a secured party's right of disposal with the 
equitable rule 'once a mortgage, always a mortgage', with the equity of 
redemption and, particularly in the case of an unequal power relationship, 
with the prohibition of collateral benefits. For this reason, the only way a 
collateral provider can traditionally grant a 'right of use' to a collateral 
taker under English law is by way of an outright transfer of title. 
Market practice confirms that a security interest is not compatible with the 
collateral taker's general right of disposal. The standard documentation 
100 For a more general treatment of the implementation of the Collateral Directive in 
the United Kingdom, see Fawcett 2005; Turing 2005; Turing / Lester 2005; Hughes 
2006. 
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applied in repo, securities lending and derivatives markets is based on the 
outright transfer method and does not envisage secured party's general 
right of disposal under English law. In line with their fiduciary obliga-
tions, custodians cannot dispose of their clients' assets unless clients have 
transferred their assets outright to the custodian. Customarily, such trans-
fers take place on the basis of securities lending arrangements. The doubts 
in the English prime brokerage markets in relation to a prime broker's 
right to dispose of collateral assets of its hedge fund clients confirms that 
there is a tension between the concepts of a security interest and a secured 
party's general right of disposal. 
It is understandable that the financial industry is interested in an alter-
native to the outright transfer method. The construction of a security 
interest combined with a general right of disposal is an extra way to make 
optimal use of assets. One of the main drawbacks of this construction, 
however, is that it not only blurs the distinction between an outright 
transfer and a security interest, but also defies the expectations that 
people in general have in relation to these legal concepts. In the case of an 
outright transfer, they know they lose all title and interest, whereas they 
expect to retain ownership if they vest a security interest. The new con-
struction of the Collateral Directive is not in line with these expectations. 
It enforces the position of the secured party in an unprecedented way. 
With regard to content, the construction of a security interest combined 
with a general right of disposal has most in common with an outright 
transfer. Until the moment that a collateral taker exercises his right of use, 
the collateral provider arguably still has his ownership and redemption 
rights, but these rights are not very strong, because they are not only 
subject to the collateral provider's own default, but also to the collateral 
taker's general right of use, which may be exercised at any time. If it is 
exercised, the collateral provider's proprietary interest is wiped out 
altogether. The assets to which his right of redemption relates have dis-
appeared for good. Moreover, the Collateral Directive envisages no inter-
est in the proceeds of the sale. Materially, the construction of a security 
interest combined with a general right of disposal can be equated with an 
outright transfer of the kind that takes place in repurchase, securities 
lending and derivatives transactions. 
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4. RIGHT OF USE UNDER DUTCH (AND GERMAN) LAW 
4.1 Introduction 
4.2.1 Market practice before the Collateral Directive 
Before the implementation of the Collateral Directive, the market standard 
in the Netherlands was that market participants provided collateral by 
way of an outright transfer of title. Collateral in repurchase agreements 
was usually transferred on the basis of a sale/re-sale, whereas collateral 
in securities lending was usually transferred on the basis of a loan of fun-
gibles (verbruiklening, Darlehen). This practice is now sanctioned in Article 
6 of the Collateral Directive concerning the recognition of title transfer 
arrangements.101 
4.1.2 A new construction: a security interest combined with a general right of 
disposal 
Article 5 of the Collateral Directive makes it possible to provide collateral 
in another way. According to Article 5, a collateral provider can give a 
collateral taker a security interest (e.g. a right of pledge) combined with 
a right of use. This right of use means that the pledgee has the right to 
dispose of the pledged assets in his own name. He can encumber them 
with a security interest or sell the assets to a third party. Such a disposal 
will often leave the pledgor with a contractual claim for the transfer of 
equivalent assets only, which may be netted with a counterclaim, and 
which, to the extent that this is not possible (e.g. because of price fluctua-
tions), ranks on a pari passu basis in insolvency. A pledge under Dutch and 
German law is a security right. In principle, a pledgee only has a right to 
dispose of pledged assets if an event takes place that justifies enforcement 
of his security right. The right of use implies a pledgee's general right of 
disposal and is therefore a remarkable development in security law. 
4.2.3 Contents of section 4 
This section explores whether a right of use based on a security interest 
fits in the Dutch system of property law. It investigates whether this con-
struction gives rise to tensions in this system, and whether it is compatible 
with what a security interest actually is, or whether it should with regard 
101 See also section 2 of chapter III. 
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to content be qualified as an outright transfer. Throughout this section a 
number of comparisons are made with German law. This section ap-
proaches the issue by opposing the Collateral Directive's approach of a 
secured party's general right of disposal to the circumstances under which 
a party with a limited right (a right of pledge or a right of usufruct) cus-
tomarily has a right to dispose of the encumbered assets. Sections 4.2-5 on 
'enforcement', 'repledge', 'perishable goods' and 'a non-owner's right of 
disposal granted on a contractual basis' respectively, discuss under which 
circumstances a pledgee is - or is not - entitled to dispose of the pledged 
assets under general principles of Dutch law. Section 4.6 on 'irregular 
structures' examines the theory of irregular pledge, usufruct and custody. 
This section investigates to what extent these irregular structures coincide 
with the Collateral Directive's right of use, and pays particular attention 
not only to the moment at which ownership passes, but also to the ques-
tion of whether ownership passes through the patrimony of the collateral 
taker or falls to the third party acquirer directly. An additional topic that 
arises in connection with the right of use on the basis of a security interest 
is the rule of proprietary substitution envisaged in the Collateral Direc-
tive. This issue is explored in section 4.7. Section 4.8 pays some additional 
attention to the way the right of use has been implemented into national 
Dutch and German law. Section 4.9 contains concluding remarks.102 
4.2 Enforcement 
The most important example of a pledgee being entitled to dispose of 
pledged assets in his own name is enforcement. The pledgee is entitled to 
realise his security interest only if the obligation in relation to which the 
right of pledge is vested is not fulfilled.103 Note that the right of use under 
the Collateral Directive goes further, as it entails a right to dispose of en-
cumbered assets under 'normal circumstances'. Because enforcement is 
not that wide in scope, it cannot serve as a basis for placing the right of 
use in the system of property law.104 
102 On the right of use under Dutch law, see the Right of Use Report; Keijser 2003 II; 
Keijser 2004, section 5; Lieverse / Wiggers-Rust 2005, 'Inleiding Van Hees'; Verstij-
len 2005, section 4. For German law see for example Löber 2001, in particular 
section IV.5; Keller 2002, in particular p. 353; Lóber 2002; Keller 2003; the Right of 
Use Report; Löber 2005, pp. 75-76. 
103 See Articles 3:227 and 248 of the NCC and § 1204 of the GCC. 
104 Cf. Groefsema 1993, section 6.2. For a discussion on the basis of a mortgagee's (hypo-
theekhouder) right of disposal upon default under former and current Dutch law. 
215 
Chapter IV 
4.3 Repledge 
4.3.2 Dutch law 
On the basis of Article 3:242 of the NCC, a pledgor can give a pledgee the 
right to establish a further right of pledge over the pledged asset for the 
benefit of a third party. This further right of pledge is established later, 
but ranks above the initially established right of pledge. The Dutch statu­
tory right to repledge is generally accepted and applied in practice. In 
order to protect the interests of the original collateral provider, the right 
to establish a further right of pledge is, in practice, often subject to limita­
tions. These may relate to the height of the debt secured by the further 
right of pledge, which may not be higher than the original secured debt, 
or to the term of the debt secured by the further right of pledge, which 
may not exceed the term of the original secured debt. In legal literature 
the construction of repledge has raised a number of interpretation issues, 
including that of the level of protection of the original collateral provider, 
which are not discussed further in this context. Here, the focus is on the 
views of Zwalve, who alone has fundamentally criticised the construc­
tion.105 
Zwalve has argued that this construction stems from a false interpretation 
of Roman law. In his view, the proper approach is that under normal 
circumstances a pledgee has no right of disposal in respect of assets that 
are not his own106, and therefore should not be able to establish a further 
right of pledge in respect of the pledged asset for the benefit of a third 
party. This view is in line with the nature of a right of pledge, which is a 
security interest. A pledgee has the right to dispose of the pledged assets 
only to enforce the security interest, or to guarantee its continued exis­
tence (see section 4.4 on perishable goods below). A right to repledge, let 
alone a general right of disposal, is not compatible with the nature of a 
right of pledge.107 
see the Asser Series 3-III, no. 298-299, which, for a more elaborate historical treatise, 
refers to the earlier Asser Series 3-ΠΙ (11th edition), nos. 318 et seq. 
105 On the repledge generally, see Asser Series 3-III, nos. 38-39; Groefsema 1993, p. 157 
(footnote 12); Koopal 1995, with the reaction of Stokkermans 1996; Fikkers 1998, 
with the reaction of Faber 1998; Van Hees 2001; Breken 2002. For a reference of a 
critical nature, see Zwalve 1994. 
106 See also Ulpianus D. 50,17, 54: 'Nemo plus tuns ad ahum transferre potest, quam ipse 
haberet'. 
107 Zwalve's approach is exactly that of the German Pandectists and of the drafters of 
the German Civil Code (see below). 
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4.3.2 German law 
Prior to 1900, when the German Civil Code came into force, the right of 
repledge was controversial in the German territories, which all had their 
own jurisdictions. It was not always clear whether a pledgee could only 
dispose of his claim against the pledgor (and of the accessory right of 
pledge), or if he could also dispose of the pledged asset itself (with or 
without the consent of the pledgor) by establishing a right of pledge in 
respect of that asset for the benefit of a third party. The relevant provi-
sions of the Prussian legislation can be interpreted in both ways.108 This 
also holds true for the pledge laws in the Kingdom Sachsen and in 
Austria.109 On the other hand, the laws of Bayern clearly only allowed the 
pledgee to dispose of his own claim and not of the pledged assets.110 This 
was also true for Swiss law.111 
Before the introduction of the German Civil Code, the interpretation of 
Roman law by the so-called Pandectists (Pandektisten) played an important 
unifying role in addition to the laws of the distinct German territories. The 
Pandectists interpreted Roman law in light of the German society of the 
nineteenth century. They held that the nature of a right of pledge pro-
hibited a general right of disposal for the pledgee, but did allow a right of 
disposal that was in line with the security function of the right of pledge 
(i.e. notably the enforcement of the right of pledge).112 
The approach of the Pandectists was adopted by the drafters of the Ger-
man Civil Code. The drafters did not approve a disposal of pledged assets 
that was not in line with the security function of the right of pledge. In 
their view, such a disposal was not compatible with a pledgee's duty of 
due care and constituted a penal offence, i.e. illegal appropriation.113 
Under current principles of German law, a pledgee can therefore not 
establish a right of pledge over the pledged asset for the benefit of a third 
108 See §§ 127-138 in Prussia 1794, p. 296-297. See also, with commentaries, Prussia 
1840, pp. 375-378; Prussia 1844, p. 501; Prussia 1879, pp. 683-685. 
109 See § 475 and §§ 482-483 of the Civil Code of the Kingdom of Sachsen in Sachsen 
1863/1865. On Austrian law, see Austria 1872, § 454 and § 455 (in particular footnote 
1 on p. 240); Zwalve 1994, pp. 446-447. 
110 See Bayern 1821, chapter 6, § XII(l); Bayern 1872, p. 493 (number 2); Bayern 1894, 
pp. 96-97 (§ 12). 
111 See Switzerland 1893, pp. 321-322 (Article 218). 
112 See Demburg 1860, § 61, p. 475-484; Windscheid / Kipp 1906, § 227, p. 1145 et seq. 
See also Zwalve 1994. 
113 See the Drafters of the GCC, pp. 803-809 (in particular p. 804). 
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party. He only has the right to pledge his claim against the pledgor for 
whom the original, accessory right of pledge was established. Conse-
quently, a right of repledge as envisaged in the Dutch Civil Code is pro-
hibited under German law. 
4.3.3 Conclusion 
The right of repledge is envisaged in the Dutch Civil Code and is gener-
ally accepted and applied in the Netherlands, although subject to certain 
limitations protecting the original collateral provider. However, as 
Zwalve and the German Pandectists have convincingly shown, this con-
struction is subject to criticism. It gives the pledgee a right that goes 
beyond the security function of a right of pledge. For this reason, a right 
of repledge does not exist under German law. In addition, a right of re-
pledge never entails a pledgee's right to transfer pledged assets outright, 
as this would disrupt the careful balance that is customarily struck 
between pledgor and pledgee. The right of use under the Collateral Direc-
tive, on the contrary, does entail a right to pledge and to transfer. The 
right of repledge cannot therefore be a satisfactory explanation for the 
right of use. 
4.4 Perishable goods 
Another doctrine that deserves consideration is that of perishable goods. 
In the case of goods that run the risk of perishing (drohender Verderb), 
§ 1219 of the GCC provides for a pledgee's right to sell these goods, if 
necessary. After the sale, proprietary substitution takes place, i.e. the 
pledgor has an ownership right in respect of the replacement goods and 
the pledgee a security interest. Like the Collateral Directive's right of use, 
the doctrine of perishable goods therefore shows a pledgee's right of 
disposal combined with a rule of proprietary substitution. The text of 
§ 1219 of the GCC is as follows: 
1. If the security of the pledgee is jeopardised by imminent destruction of the 
pledge or by an apprehended substantial decrease of its value, he may have the 
pledge sold by public auction. 
2. The proceeds take the place of the pledge. The proceeds shall be deposited on the 
demand of the pledgor. 
114 Translation: Goren 1994. Original German text: '1. Wird durch den drohenden Ver-
derb des Pfandes oder durch eine zu besorgende wesentliche Minderung desWer-
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Dutch law shows a lacuna in this respect. The title of the NCC on the 
rights of pledge and hypothec (mortgage) of the Dutch Civil Code 
contains no provision that explicitly allows a pledgee to sell perishable 
goods. The only provision of the NCC that bears resemblance to the 
German provision on perishable goods is Article 3:229. This provision sets 
out a rule on proprietary substitution in relation to pledged assets. Article 
3:229 of the NCC reads as follows: 
The right of pledge or hypothec (mortgage) entails, by law, a right of pledge over all 
claims for compensation which take the place of the secured property, including 
claims resulting from its reduction in value [ ] 
However, the parliamentary history of the NCC makes clear that the 
substitution rule of Article 3:229 of the NCC primarily applies to damages 
or insurance money due or paid. Perishable goods are neither mentioned 
in the parliamentary history nor in the literature on the rule of proprietary 
substitution of Article 3:229 of the NCC.116 For this reason, it is proposed 
that Article 3:229 of the NCC should be read in combination with Article 
6:90 of the NCC. The text of this latter provision is: 
1 Where delivery is impeded of a thing which is perishable or subject to rapid 
deterioration, or, for some other reason, is so difficult to preserve that, in the given 
circumstances, it cannot be required of the obligor to preserve the same, the latter 
is entitled to procure the sale of the thing in a proper manner The obligor is bound 
to the obligee to make such a sale where the letter's interests clearly require it, or 
where the obligee indicates that he demands the sale 
2 The net proceeds take the place of the thing, without prejudice to the nghts of the 
obligee for any failure in the performance of the obligation 
tes die Sicherheit des Pfandglaubigers gefährdet, so kann dieser das Pfand öffent-
lich versteigern lassen 2 Der Erlös tritt an die Stelle des Pfandes Auf Verlangen 
des Verpfanders ist der Erlös zu hinterlegen ' 
115 Translation Netherlands Business Legislation Original Dutch text 'Het recht van 
pand of hypotheek brengt van rechtswege mee een recht van pand op alle vordenn-
gen tot vergoeding die in de plaats van het verbonden goed treden, waaronder 
begrepen vorderingen ter zake van waardevermindering van het goed. [ ]' 
116 See Parliamentary History of the NCC, Boek 3, Vermogensrecht in het algemeen, pp 
734-736, Asser Series 3-III, m particular nos. 25, 63, 179, Nieuwenhuis 1998, com-
mentary to Article 3 229 of the Dutch Civil Code, Pitlo / Reehuis, Heisterkamp 2001, 
section 756 
117 Translation Netherlands Busmess Legislation Original Dutch text '1 Bijeen ver-
hindering tot aflevering van een zaak die aan snel tenietgaan of achteruitgaan 
onderhevig is of waarvan om een andere reden de verdere bewaring zo bezwaarlijk 
is dat zij m de gegeven omstandigheden met van de schuldenaar kan worden ge-
vergd, is deze bevoegd de zaak op een geschikte wijze te doen verkopen De schul-
denaar is jegens de schuldeiser tot een zodanige verkoop gehouden, wanneer diens 
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Article 6:90 of the NCC relates to situations in which the delivery of goods 
that are perishable, subject to rapid deterioration, or that otherwise cannot 
reasonably be preserved is impeded. It does not matter if the impediment 
can be attributed to the creditor or the debtor. A debtor who is under an 
obligation to deliver the goods described, but cannot, may dispose of the 
goods concerned. Section 2 of Article 6:90 of the NCC contains a rule on 
proprietary substitution. The proceeds of the sale of the goods concerned 
take the place of the goods transferred.118 
There are two reasons, though, why Article 6:90 of the NCC may not 
apply to a pledgee. First, section 1 of Article 6:90 of the NCC requires an 
'impediment to delivery'. In the case of a right of pledge one may wonder 
if there is indeed an impediment for the pledgee to deliver the pledged 
assets. On the one hand, one can argue that there is no real impediment, 
because the pledgee simply does not want to give the pledged assets back 
to the pledgor, as this would mean his claim against the pledgor would 
become unsecured. On the other hand, and this makes application of 
Article 6:90 in connection with article 3:229 easier, one could argue that 
there is an impediment in the form of the secured debt that has not yet 
been paid. Second, Article 6:90 of the NCC has been positioned in Book 6 
on the law of obligations, and not in the Title of Book 3 of the NCC on the 
rights of pledge and hypothec (mortgage). Still, it can be argued that a 
pledgee is also under an obligation to deliver the goods concerned in the 
sense of Article 6:90 of the NCC, even if this obligation follows from the 
fact that he has a limited right only, and is not the owner of the goods. In 
any case, the desired result, which is reached under German law by an 
explicit statutory provision, is of a pledgee who may dispose of perishable 
goods. In order to resolve this problem, one solution would be to read 
Article 3:229 of the NCC in conjunction with Article 6:90 of the NCC, 
interpreted liberally. 
However that may be, the German regulation on perishable goods (and 
its possible Dutch counterpart as described above) cannot serve as a basis 
for implementation of Article 5 of the Collateral Directive. There are, of 
belangen deze verkoop onmiskenbaar eisen of de schuldeiser te kermen geeft de 
verkoop te verlangen 2 De netto-opbrengst treedt voor de zaak m de plaats, onver-
mmderd de rechten van de schuldeiser wegens tekortkommgen in de nakommg 
van de verbintenis ' 
118 See the Parliamentary History of the NCC, Boek 6, Algemeen gedeelte van het verbinte­
nissenrecht, pp. 317-319. See also Groefsema 1993, ρ 158 Cf Articles 7 30 and 8 491 
of the NCC 
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course, certain similarities. Both the provision on perishable goods and 
Article 5 of the Collateral Directive envisage a pledgee with a right of dis-
posal and a rule of proprietary substitution in order to preserve the pre-
sale proprietary structure. Still, there are also important differences. First, 
securities are not necessarily 'perishable goods'. They can only be con-
sidered to be so in the case of extreme price fluctuations in the market. 
The second argument relates to the different objectives of the German law 
provision and the Collateral Directive. The German arrangement in 
respect of perishable goods has only the limited goal of protecting the 
pledgor's security interest, and therefore serves only the recovery function 
of collateral. The right of use under the Collateral Directive, on the other 
hand, has a considerably wider scope. It not only allows dispositions in 
the event of deterioration, but aims at a general right of disposal in respect 
of collateral assets under all circumstances. It aims at tradeability, rather 
than at maintaining the recovery function of financial collateral provided. 
For these reasons, the regulation on perishable goods cannot serve as a 
satisfactory basis for integrating the right of use in the Dutch and German 
systems of property law.119 
4.5 A non-owner's right of disposal granted on a contractual basis 
4.5.2 Introduction 
a. A non-owner's right of disposal 
Normally, the owner of an asset is entitled to dispose of that asset. There 
are, however, instances in which someone who is not the owner of an 
asset can have the right to dispose of that asset in his own name (hereafter 
indicated as a 'non-owner's right of disposal'). A few examples of a non-
owner's right of disposal have already been discussed above. When a 
pledgee enforces his security interest, he disposes of the assets of the 
pledgor in his own name (see section 4.2 above). When a pledgee exer-
cises a right of repledge under Dutch law, he disposes of the asset of the 
pledgor in his own name (see section 4.3 above). Dispositions by a 
pledgee in his own name in relation to perishable goods were discussed 
in section 4.4 above. Dispositions by a usufructuary in his own name are 
dealt with below in section 4.6.3. In all these cases, dispositions by a non-
owner are based on an explicit legal provision, while consent of the 
119 For a further discussion of the Collateral Directive's rule on proprietary sub-
stitution, see section 4.7 below. 
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original owner is not - with the exception of the Dutch repledge -
required. 
This section focuses on a number of legal constructions that show that a 
non-owner's power to dispose of someone else's assets in his own name 
can also be based on a contract.120 The most important of these to be dis-
cussed are the sale on commission, reservation of title arrangements and 
the fiduciary transfer of title. The concept of a non-owner's right of dis-
posal on a contractual basis is often referred to as machtiging in the 
Netherlands, and Ermächtigung in Germany.121 
It should be stressed from the outset that the concept of a non-owner's 
right of disposal cannot be classified as one that belongs purely to the law 
of obligations. Although such a right is granted on the basis of a contract, 
it also has marked proprietary features because it gives a non-owner the 
right to dispose of assets that are not his own. Whereas a right of pledge 
can easily be combined with rights and obligations of a purely obligatory 
nature, such as a pledgee's obligation to insure encumbered assets, it is 
exactly this proprietary feature of the concept of a non-owner's right of 
disposal that leads to tensions when it is applied in connection with the 
proprietary right of pledge. 
b. Dutch law 
Under current Dutch law, there are two important applications of the con-
cept of a non-owner's right of disposal on a contractual basis. These are: 
the contract of mandate (lastgevingsovereenkomst), which is, among other 
things, used to structure a sale on commission, and reservation of title 
arrangements. 
It follows from Articles 7:414-424 of the NCC, that in a sale on commission 
an intermediary can be given the right to sell the principal's assets in the 
name of the principal (an example of direct representation), or in his own 
name (indirect representation). In the case of indirect representation, the 
120 A general right of disposal can also be granted on the basis of a unilateral legal act, 
but hereafter the focus is on such a right granted on the basis of a bilateral agree-
ment. 
121 For Dutch law, see, for example, Groefsema 1993; Asser Series 2-1, chapter III, § 6; 
Asser Series 5-III, p. 139. For German law, see the literature mentioned in footnote 
125. 
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intermediary (a non-owner) disposes in his own name of the assets of 
another entity on the basis of a contract.122 
Likewise, in a reservation of title, the buyer (not yet a full owner, but the 
owner under the condition that the sale price will be paid) can, if this 
follows from the contractual relationship with the original owner, dispose 
in his own name of the original owner's goods in the normal course of 
business, even before paying the sale price. In the absence of a statutory 
provision comparable to Articles 7:414-424, several theories have been 
developed in to explain the basis of this right of disposal.123 The reser­
vation of title arrangement can, in line with Article 3:92 of the NCC, be 
seen as a transfer under the condition of payment of the sale price or of a 
subsequent transfer in the normal course of business of the buyer. If one 
of these conditions is fulfilled, the buyer can dispose of the assets in­
volved in his capacity of a full owner. Because of this, however, this first 
theory is not an application of a non-owner's right of disposal. Another 
way to explain the buyer's right to dispose in his own name of the original 
owner's assets in the normal course of business is through accepting that 
the original owner can extend this right to the buyer on the basis of a con­
tract. Hereafter, the focus will be on the latter theory, because it is in this 
case that, like the Collateral Directive's disposing pledgee, a non-owner 
disposes in his own name of another entity's assets. 
Both the sale on commission and reservation of title arrangements there­
fore show that under Dutch law an owner can contractually grant a non-
owner the right to dispose in his own name of the owner's assets.124 
c. German law 
Under German law, the concept of a non-owner's right of disposal on a 
contractual basis has an explicit legal basis. §§ 182-185 of the GCC 
122 For more on 'direct' and 'indirect' representation, see chapter 3 ('Authority of 
Agents') of the Principles of European Contract Law. 
123 On these theories, see Asser Series 2-1, chapter ΠΙ, in particular sections 135-136; 
Asser Series 3-III, in particular sections 428-428a; Reehuis 1998, chapter 8, in par­
ticular section 38. See also the Supreme Court's verdict of 8 June 1973 (Nationaal 
Grondbezit Ν. V. I Kamphuis), published in Ars Aequi 1973, pp. 565-571, with an anno­
tation by Van der Grinten and in Nederlandse jurisprudentie 1974, no. 346, with an 
annotation by Kleijn. 
124 For Dutch law see, for example, Asser Series 2-1, chapter III; Asser Series 5-III, 
chapter III, in particular §§ 4 and 5; Van der Grinten 1993 I; Van der Grinten 1993 
II; Groefsema 1993; Meijer 1999, in particular chapter 5; Pitlo / Reehuis, Heister­
kamp 2001, no. 141; Reehuis 1998, chapter 8. 
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constitute title 6 on Einwilligung and Genehmigung. Whereas Einwilligung 
is a form of consent that is given beforehand, the Genehmigung relates to 
consent that is given after a legal act has already been carried out. Both 
forms of consent fall within the general category of Zustimmung (see § 182 
of the GCC). In this section, the focus is on § 185 of the GCC, which relates 
to acts of disposal by a non-owner {Verfugung eines Nichtberechtigten). On 
the basis of this provision, someone who is not an owner can dispose of 
the assets of someone else, if (1) the person entitled has given his consent 
in advance {Einwilligung), (2) that person has consented afterwards {Ge-
nehmigung), (3) the non-owner becomes entitled to the assets because he 
acquires or inherits them. Because the Collateral Directive presumes 
consent in advance in respect of a right of use, it is § 185(1) of the GCC, 
relating to the Einwilligung, that is most interesting here. As in Dutch law, 
the most important applications of the doctrine of a non-owner's right of 
disposal under German law are (1) the disposal by an intermediary in the 
case of a sale on commission, and (2) the disposal by the first buyer in the 
case of a reservation of title arrangement. Another important application 
of the concept of a non-owner's right of disposal is (3) a fiduciary transfer 
of title, which is not allowed under current Dutch law but is commonly 
applied under German law. In the case of a fiduciary transfer of title, even 
though title has passed to the fiduciary, the original owner is allowed to 
dispose of the goods transferred under certain circumstances.125 
d. The objective of section 4.5 
The sections below investigate whether the concept of a non-owner's right 
of disposal granted on a contractual basis can be used to explain the 
pledgee's right to dispose of pledged assets as envisaged in Article 5 of the 
Collateral Directive. Under both Dutch and German law, the concept of 
a non-owner's right of disposal is applied in a sale on commission and 
reservation of title arrangements, topics discussed in sections 4.5.2 and 
4.5.3 below. Section 4.5.4 focuses on the concept of a non-owner's right of 
disposal in fiduciary transfers of title under German law. Section 4.5.5 
subsequently examines the principal question of whether it is possible to 
grant a pledgee an unlimited right of disposal, and considers this question 
in light of core principles of pledge law. 
125 For the scope of § 185(1) of the GCC see the Munich Commentary, Volume 1, 4th 
edition, § 185, no 35-37, Palandt Commentary, 64th edition, § 185, section 9, Soergel 
Commentary, 13th edition, § 185, no. 23, Staudinger Commentary, 2001, § 185, no 
32-45 See also Serick 1990 and Groefsema 1993, section 4 5 
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4.5.2 Sale on commission 
This section discusses the sale on commission, in which an intermediary 
sells a principal's assets to a third party in his own name. Under Dutch 
law, a sale on commission is structured as an agreement of mandate (last-
gevingsovereenkomst). The NCC contains a special section on agreements 
of mandate (see Articles 7:414-424 of the NCC), which is part of the 
general title 7.7 on services (opdracht).™6 Under German law, the concept 
of a sale by an intermediary to a third party in his own name can be 
explained with the help of § 185 of the GCC. A detailed regulation on the 
sale of commission is set out in §§ 383-406 of the German Commercial 
Code (Handelsgesetzbuch). 
A sale on commission and the Collateral Directive's right of use have this 
in common: they both feature a non-owner's right of disposal. In a sale on 
commission, an intermediary disposes in his own name of the assets of a 
principal. In cases involving the right of use, a pledgee disposes in his 
own name of the assets of a pledgor. 
There are, however, also principal differences between the sale on com­
mission and the right of use. These become apparent when one compares 
the structure of these two legal constructions. A sale on commission is 
structured as follows: 
Sale on commission 
T=l; T=2; 
agreement of mandate transfer of asset(s) 
A ^ Β ^ C 
-« -* 
T=3; € T=2; € 
At moment 7=1, a principal A and an intermediary Β conclude an agreement of 
mandate, on the basis of which the intermediary sells and delivers the principal's 
assets to a third party C in his own name at moment 7=2. The price paid by C to Β 
at moment T=2 must subsequently be transferred by Β to A at moment T=3. 
The structure of the right of use envisaged in the Collateral Directive is 
entirely different: 
126 Before the current NCC came into force, the Dutch Commercial Code contained an 
explicit regulation on the sale on commission. See the old Articles 76-85a of the 
Dutch Commercial Code in Fruin 1990. See also Asser Series 5-III, section 136. 
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Security interest combined with a right of use 
T=l; € 7=2; € 
A *- Β 
T=l; security interest T=2; exercise of right of use 
plus right of use 
T=4; return of € T=3; € 
»- »-
-« -* D 
T=4; equivalent assets T=3; acquiring equivalent 
assets in the market 
At 7=1, A receives euros from Β and vests a security interest combined with a right 
of use in return. At 7=2, Β exercises his right of use and transfers A's assets to C in 
exchange for a sum of money. Because of his obligation to transfer equivalent assets 
to A at 7=4, Β acquires equivalent assets in the market from D at 7=3. 
A number of important differences between a sale on commission and a 
right of use are summarized as follows: 
1. In a sale on commission, A usually receives payment only at T=3. In 
the right of use scenario, A has already received a counter-performance 
atT=l. 
2. In a sale on commission, A is the owner until Β has lawfully dis­
posed of the assets in the ordinary course of business. After that moment, 
A has an unsecured exposure towards B. In the right of use structure, both 
A and Β are secured throughout the transaction in the sense that their 
risks are covered by a counter-performance that is available for netting if 
anything should go wrong.127 
3. In a sale on commission, there is no obligation to deliver equivalent 
assets at the end of a transaction for any of the parties, but only an obliga­
tion for Β to pass on the sale price (minus a commission fee). If a right of 
use has been granted, A and Β must transfer equivalent assets. 
4. In a sale on commission, the intermediary acts for the account of the 
principal and in one way or another always represents the principal's 
interests, for which he is usually awarded with a fee. In the case of the 
127 Under the Collateral Directive, such netting is intended tobe enforceable. For more 
information on this issue, see section 3 of chapter V. 
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right of use, the 'pledgee' does not act for the account of the original 
owner or represent the original owner's interests. Rather, the pledgee dis-
poses of the assets concerned in the course of his own business in order 
to make profit for his own benefit. 
A sale on commission and the right of use have in common that they both 
feature a disposing non-owner. Still, the sale on commission cannot serve 
as a sufficient basis for implementation of the right of use. A comparison 
of the two legal constructions shows that they have different objectives 
and that they are structured in different ways. 
4.5.3 Reservation of title arrangements 
The principal goal of a reservation of title arrangement, such as the Dutch 
eigendotnsvoorbehoud or the German Eigentumsvorbehalt, is security for the 
seller. From an economic point of view, the seller is the collateral taker, 
whereas the buyer agrees to the reservation of title and can thus be con-
sidered to be the collateral provider. This section focuses on the circum-
stance that the buyer can, in the case of a reservation of title arrangement 
under both Dutch and German law, be granted the right to dispose of the 
original owner's assets in his own name, in the course of his own business 
and for his own benefit. This right guarantees the continuation of business 
activities. Whether the buyer has this right must be determined on the 
basis of the contractual relationship between the parties.128 
At first sight, the right of use seems similar to reservation of title arrange-
ments. Both allow a non-owner to dispose of another entity's assets in his 
own name and - unlike in the case of the sale on commission - for his own 
account and in the course of his own business. 
Still, there are a number of differences between a reservation of title 
arrangement and a right of use, which become apparent when one com-
pares the structure of these two legal constructions. The structure of a 
reservation of title arrangement is as follows: 
128 For the arcumstances under which a buyer has a right of disposal under Dutch law, 
see the Supreme Court's decision of 14 February 1992 (Hmck I Van der VJerff), pub-
lished in Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1993, no 623 For German law, see the literature 
mentioned in footnote 125 
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Reservation of title 
T=l; sale with T=2; sale in normal 
reservation of title course of business 
A »- Β •- C 
-« -< 
T=3; € T=2; € 
At 7=1, A transfers assets to B, but reserves title in respect of the assets until Β pays 
the sale price or disposes of the assets in the normal course of his business. At 7=2, 
Β sells and delivers the assets to C and receives euros in return. At T=3, Β pays A 
for the assets. 
This structure is essentially different from that of a security interest com­
bined with a right of use (as depicted in section 4.5.2 above). Without 
being exhaustive, a number of important differences are: 
1. If title is reserved, A receives payment only at T=3. In the right of 
use scenario, A has already received a counter-performance at T=l. 
2. In a reservation of title arrangement, A is the secured party wishing 
to reserve his ownership interest, in any case, until Β has paid the sale 
price or has disposed of the assets in the normal course of business. After 
the moment of such a disposal by B, A has an unsecured exposure to­
wards B. In the right of use structure, both A and Β are secured through­
out the transaction in the sense that their risks are covered by a counter-
performance that is available for netting if anything should go wrong.129 
3. If title to assets is reserved, there is no obligation to deliver equiva­
lent assets at the end of a transaction for any of the parties, but only an 
obligation for Β to pay for the originally transferred assets. If a right of use 
has been granted, A and Β must transfer equivalent assets. 
4. Another difference is that in a reservation of title arrangement, it is 
not the secured party (i.e. the original owner) who has an unlimited right 
of disposal, but his counterparty (the first buyer), who has consented to 
the reservation of title and can thus be considered as the collateral provid­
er. In the case of a 'right of use', however, it is the collateral taker who has 
a general right of disposal. 
129 Under the Collateral Directive, such netting is intended to be enforceable. For more 
information on this issue, see section 3 of chapter V. 
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As in the case of the Collateral Directive's right of use, a reservation of 
title arrangement can feature a non-owner who is entitled to dispose in his 
own name of assets that belong to another entity, in the course of his own 
business and for his own benefit. Nonetheless, the structure of a reserva­
tion of title arrangement deviates so much from that of the right of use 
(e.g. it features a collateral provider's right of disposal and not that of the 
collateral taker), that it cannot be used as a theoretical explanation for the 
right of use. 
4.5.4 Fiduciary transfer of title 
The commentaries to § 185(1) of the GCC make clear that in a fiduciary 
transfer of title, the original owner can be given a right of disposal.130 
There are several reasons why parties may opt for the establishment of a 
non-possessory security interest, such as the fiduciary transfer of title. The 
original owner may need the goods given in security (e.g. machinery) for 
the continuation of his enterprise. He may want to process them, or he 
may want to dispose of the assets in the normal course of his business, 
which is one reason why he can be granted a right of disposal. Whether 
the original owner has this right must be determined on the basis of the 
contractual relationship between the parties.13' 
The structure of a fiduciary transfer of title is as follows: 
Fiduciary transfer of title 
T=l; fiduciary transfer 
of title 
A ^ Β 
*-
T=l; loan 
T=3; repayment of loan 
At moment T=l, owner Β transfers assets on a fiduciary basis to A in order to secure 
a loan from A to B. From that moment, A is the fiduciary owner of those assets and 
Β the beneficiary. At moment 7=2, Β transfers the assets in the normal course of 
130 See the Munich Commentary, Volume 1, 4th edition, § 185, no. 35-37; Palandt 
Commentary, 64th edition, § 185, section 9; Soergel Commentary, 13th edition, 
§ 185, no. 23; Staudinger Commentary, 2001, § 185, no. 32-45. 
131 See Serick 1990, in particular pp. 55-56. On fiduciary transfers of title, see also 
section 3.2 of chapter III. 
T=2; transfer in normal 
course of business 
»• C 
T=2;€ 
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business to C in exchange for a sum of money. At moment T=3, Β repays the loan 
to A. 
Both in the case of a fiduciary transfer of title and the Collateral Direc­
tive's right of use it can be agreed that a non-owner (the original owner or 
the pledgee respectively) has a right to dispose of assets in his own name 
and for his own benefit. Still, the structures of these two constructions are 
essentially different.132 The main differences between a fiduciary transfer 
of title and the right of use are the following: 
1. In the structure described above, which involves a fiduciary transfer 
of title, Β repays the loan to A only at T=3. In the right of use scenario, A 
has already received a counter-performance at T=l. 
2. In a fiduciary transfer of title, A is the secured party until Β has re­
paid the loan or has lawfully disposed of the assets in the ordinary course 
of business. After such a disposal at moment T=2, A merely has - in the 
absence of an additional agreement - an unsecured exposure towards B. 
In the right of use structure, both A and Β are secured throughout the 
transaction in that their risk is covered by a counter-performance that is 
available for netting if anything should go wrong.133 
3. In a fiduciary transfer of title, there is no obligation to deliver equiv­
alent assets at the end of a transaction for the parties, but only an obliga­
tion for Β to pay off the loan. If a right of use has been granted, A and Β 
must transfer equivalent assets. 
4. In a fiduciary transfer of title, it is not the secured party (i.e. the 
fiduciary A), but the collateral provider (i.e. the original owner B) who can 
be granted a right to dispose of the goods transferred. In the case of the 
right of use of the Collateral Directive, it is the collateral taker who has an 
unlimited right of disposal. 
The structures of a fiduciary transfer of title and the Collateral Directive's 
right of use differ in many respects. One of the principal differences is that 
under a fiduciary transfer of title, it is the collateral provider who may 
have a general right of disposal and not the collateral taker. Therefore, the 
132 Cf. the structure of the Collateral Directive's right of use set out in section 4.5.2 
above. 
133 Under the Collateral Directive, such netting is intended tobe enforceable. For more 
information on this issue, see section 3 of chapter V. 
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original owner's right of disposal in the case of a fiduciary transfer of title 
cannot serve as a basis for the right of use. 
4.5.5 A pledgee's contractually granted general right of disposal? 
a. A theoretical possibility 
Even if a collateral taker does not customarily have a general right of dis-
posal in, for example, reservation of title arrangements or fiduciary trans-
fers of title (see sections 4.5.3 and 4.5.4 above), it is theoretically possible 
that a secured party is granted such a right on the basis of a contract. 
Additional inspiration for this approach can be drawn from German law, 
which seems to defend the application of a contractually granted general 
right of disposal in connection with a loan agreement or a right of usu-
fruct. A borrower or a usufructuary can, in this view, be given a general 
right of disposal on the basis of a contract. This allows the contracting 
parties a level of flexibility.134 A drawback of this view though, is that it 
leads to a fading of the distinction between a loan and a loan of fungibles, 
and between a right of usufruct and an irregular right of usufruct. Both a 
loan of fungibles and an irregular right of usufruct entail a passing of 
ownership. It is probably because of this drawback that Dutch law cus-
tomarily takes a different approach in this respect than German law. A 
loan agreement combined with a general right of disposal and an obliga-
tion to transfer equivalent assets at a later date is customarily charac-
terised as a loan of fungibles and entails a passing of ownership. A right 
of usufruct combined with a usufructuary's general right of disposal and 
an obligation to transfer equivalent assets was, under old Dutch law, 
designated as an irregular right of usufruct and, likewise, led to a passing 
of ownership. Under the current Dutch Civil Code, however, it is possible 
to grant a usufructuary a general right of disposal.135 
Explaining the collateral taker's right of use as envisaged in the Collateral 
Directive by referring to the concept of a contractually granted general 
right of disposal has a number of advantages. This approach is compatible 
134 See e.g. Palandt Commentary, 64th edition, § 607, section 6; Palandt Commentary, 
64th edition, § 1067. 
135 On the loan of fungibles see also section 2.4.2 of chapter III and section 4.6.2 of this 
chapter. On the irregular right of usufruct under German and old Dutch law and 
on the advantages and disadvantages of the new approach in this respect in the 
current Dutch Civil Code, see in particular section 4.6.3 below. 
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with the approach of the Collateral Directive, according to which the 
collateral provider loses ownership only at the moment that the collateral 
taker exercises his right of use, and not at the moment that the right of dis-
posal is granted. The Collateral Directive suggests that until that moment 
the collateral provider has an unimpaired ownership interest.136 Further-
more, it can help in determining whether ownership passes through the 
patrimony of the collateral taker or passes directly from the collateral 
provider to the third party acquirer.137 
Still, one wonders why the construction of a secured party's general right 
of disposal has never developed under either Dutch or German law. 
Whereas a loan agreement and a right of usufruct may leave some room 
for a contractually granted general right of disposal, the same is not true 
for the right of pledge. To my knowledge, the view that a secured party 
can be granted an unlimited right to dispose of encumbered assets on the 
basis of a contract has never been defended in Dutch or German legal 
literature. The next subsection investigates why this is the case, and why 
the Collateral Directive's right of use puts pressure on systems of Dutch 
and German property law. 
b. Pressure on the system of property law: no compatibility with core prin-
ciples of pledge law 
This section investigates the relationship between the proprietary right of 
pledge and the proprietary construction of a non-owner's right of dis-
posal. Whether these two legal constructions are compatible can best be 
investigated by considering the consequences of combining the two. 
One of the first problems to arise relates to the prohibition of repledge 
under German law (see section 4.3). Essentially, this prohibition makes it 
impossible to grant a pledgee more rights than a right to have recourse to 
the encumbered assets. He is not allowed a right of disposal enabling him 
to repledge the encumbered assets in order to secure his own debt. In this 
light, an even more comprehensive, general right of disposal is quite 
unacceptable. 
More importantly, a pledgee's general right of disposal is not compatible 
with essential characteristics of security interests under both Dutch and 
136 For a further elaboration on this issue, see section 4.6.4 below. 
137 For a further elaboration on this issue, see section 4.6.5 below. 
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German law. A security interest, such as a right of pledge, is by its nature 
a limited right that only gives the pledgee the right to dispose of encum-
bered assets if the secured debt is not fulfilled. A pledgee's contractually 
granted, unlimited right of disposal is diametrically opposed to such a 
limited right of disposal. The right of pledge combined with a right of use 
is no longer a security interest, which serves recourse purposes, but 
acquires a much wider scope. Furthermore, a pledgee's general right of 
disposal cannot be reconciled with the pledge principles outlined in sec-
tion 1.3 of chapter III. When a pledgee disposes of the encumbered assets, 
he essentially appropriates them. This is contrary to the prohibition of 
appropriation under Dutch and German law. After a disposal by the 
pledgee, the pledgor is no longer able to redeem his assets by fulfilling the 
secured obligation, because the assets are now owned by a third party. 
Moreover, a general right of disposal cannot be reconciled with a 
pledgee's duty of due care.138 
The core argument against combining a right of pledge with a pledgee's 
general right of disposal is that this combination disturbs the careful 
balance that legislators and courts have customarily struck between the 
interests of collateral providers, their creditors and collateral takers. The 
principles mentioned above all reflect that the parties involved in a 
security arrangement are engaged in a special, fiduciary relationship in 
which their respective interests are balanced. One of the main objectives 
of the pledge principles is to protect the interests of a weaker collateral 
provider, who is often in a dependent position because he is in need of 
funding, and to protect his other creditors against what is usually a 
stronger collateral taker. A general right of disposal essentially gives the 
collateral taker the power to decide whether the fiduciary relationship 
between the parties continues to exist. This is at odds with the notion of 
protecting the collateral provider and his creditors, which lies behind the 
characteristics of security interests. 
As was already indicated in section 4.5.1.a, a non-owner's general right of 
disposal is a construction which, though granted on the basis of a contract, 
has distinct proprietary features. The above clearly shows that there is 
friction between this proprietary construction and the proprietary right 
of pledge. In my view, the scope of a non-owner's right of disposal is 
subject to limitations. It has value in the sale on commission. It also 
138 Comparable principles apply in the case of a fiduciary transfer of title. See section 
3.2 of chapter III. 
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explains why a collateral provider can dispose of assets in a reservation 
of title arrangement, and, under current German law, in a fiduciary trans-
fer of title. Moreover, under German law its application in connection 
with a loan agreement or with a right of usufruct is sometimes also 
defended. In my view, however, it cannot be applied in connection with 
a right of pledge, as it distorts what a right of pledge essentially is. 
The question remains: what to do if a provision in a pledge agreement 
nevertheless envisages the pledgee's general right of disposal? One initial 
option would be to declare the respective provision void or voidable.139 
Under Dutch law, this could be based on Article 3:40 of the NCC, which 
prohibits legal acts which violate a mandatory statutory provision, for 
example, those of pledge law. Under German law, this could be based on 
§ 138 of the GCC, which prohibits extortion, e.g. in the relationship 
between a stronger collateral taker and a weaker collateral provider. 
Whereas this solution may be available under principles of general law, 
it is very unlikely that it can be applied in the context of the Collateral 
Directive, which explicitly envisages a secured party's right of disposal. 
Another solution, which seems the most appropriate in the case of the 
Collateral Directive, and which can also be applied in other cases, is to do 
justice to the intentions of the parties and to convert their arrangement 
accordingly. See, for example, § 140 of the GCC: 
If an invalid legal act corresponds to the requirements of another legal act, the latter 
will apply, if it is plausible that its application would have been desired if the 
parties had known of the invalidity. 
As is shown in section 4.6 below, it is the 'irregular right of pledge' that 
can best be used in order to interpret the Collateral Directive's right of 
use. An irregular pledge has essentially the same structure as a security 
interest combined with a right of use. In an irregular pledge a 'pledgor' 
grants a 'pledgee' a general right of disposal, whereas the 'pledgee' is 
under the obligation to transfer equivalent assets at the end of the trans-
action. Because a pledgee's general right of disposal is not compatible 
139 See, for example, Benjamin 2000, sections 10.57-10.59, and p. 117 (footnote 101); 
Benjamin / Yates / Montagu 2002, section 4.34. See also section 3 above. 
140 Translation: TK. Original German text: 'Entspricht ein nichtiges Rechtsgeschäft den 
Erfordernissen eines anderen Rechtsgeschäfts, so gilt das letztere, wenn anzu-
nehmen ist, dass dessen Geltung bei Kenntnis der Nichtigkeit gewollt sein würde.' 
141 On recharacterisation under English law, see also the sources mentioned in footnote 
139. 
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with the fiduciary protection mechanisms that are characteristic of a right 
of pledge, such an irregular right of pledge entails a transfer of owner-
ship. 
4.6 Irregular structures 
4.6.2 Introduction 
In addition to the theory of a non-owner's contractually granted right of 
disposal, a more traditional theory relating to 'irregular' structures is 
available to explain a pledgee's, usufructuary's or custodian's general right 
of disposal. This theory is discussed in this section. Section 4.6.2 below 
focuses on the irregular right of pledge under Dutch and German law, in 
light of other irregular structures, such as the irregular right of usufruct 
and irregular custody. Because of changes to the Dutch Civil Code in 1992, 
it is necessary to consider the new Dutch regulation on the (irregular) 
right of usufruct in section 4.6.3. Particular attention is also paid to the 
moment at which ownership passes under the irregular structures, and to 
whom. These issues are dealt with in sections 4.6.4 and 4.6.5 respectively. 
4.6.2 Irregular right of pledge 
Consumable goods (verbruikbare goederen, Verbrauchbare Sachen) are goods 
that can be used up or disposed of. Securities are consumable goods in 
that they are often traded. It is exactly this feature of securities that plays 
a key role in the Collateral Directive.142 
How should a right of pledge, a right of usufruct or custody in respect of 
such consumable goods be characterised? In Dutch and German literature, 
it has been argued that in all these cases ownership passes if the assets are 
made 'replaceable'. Replaceable means that the pledgee, usufructuary or 
custodian is allowed to dispose of the assets while being under an obliga-
tion to transfer back equivalent assets. In this case, the doctrine speaks of 
'irregular pledge', 'irregular usufruct' and 'irregular custody' respective-
142 According to Meijer 1974, pp. 4-6, securities are consumable goods. Under German 
law securities are also considered consumable goods. See § 92 of the GCC (ver-
brauchbare Sachen) and the comments thereto in the Munich Commentary, Volume 
1, 4th edition, pp. 919-920; Palandt Commentary, 64th edition, § 92. 
143 On Dutch law, see Hammerstein 1977, chapter 4; Houwing in Van Hall / Hou wing 
1952, pp. 165-228; Van Gaaien 2001, nos. 022 and 153; Meijer 1974, pp. 3-27. On the 
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In Dutch literature, Meijer has argued that a custody arrangement implies 
a passing of ownership if the custodian is allowed to dispose of the assets 
given in custody while being under an obligation to pay equivalent assets 
at a later date. She states: "This is no longer custody, but a loan of fungible 
assets. The client loses the ownership of the assets at the moment he 
places them in custody [...].'144 
Houwing and Van Ardenne-Stachiw argue that a client loses his pro-
prietary interest when he gives securities in custody or pledges them to 
a custodian, who has a right to replace the securities provided with 
securities of the same kind but with different numbers (recht van nummer-
verwisseling). Such a right means that a custodian can dispose of the 
securities of his clients, but must replace those securities by equivalent 
securities of which the number may be different. Van der Grinten has also 
discussed the right to replace securities with securities with different 
numbers. He describes the situation in which a custodian has the right to 
replace securities in which he has a right of pledge. In the view of Van der 
Grinten, such an arrangement is incompatible with the pledgor's owner-
ship right because this right no longer attaches to specified assets. He 
argues that, in this case, fiduciary ownership passes to the custodian. The 
relationship arising between the client and the custodian is indeed of a 
fiduciary nature if the custodian cannot dispose freely of the assets given 
in custody, but must take the interests of his client into account. It can, 
however, be argued that an unconditioned passing of ownership to the 
custodian takes place if the custodian has an unconditioned right of 
disposal, and can dispose of the assets for his own business purposes.145 
Following Houwing, Hammerstein has developed a more generally 
applicable theory in respect of consumables that are made replaceable. 
Both authors argue that a pledgee, usufructuary or custodian who is 
allowed to dispose of consumables in exchange for equivalent assets 
German irregular pledge, see the Staudinger Commentary, (Neubearbeitung 2002), 
§ 1204, no. 52-60. The irregular usufruct has been codified in § 1067 of the German 
Civil Code. 
144 See Meijer 1974, pp. 3-27. Quotation: p. 27. Translation: TK. Original Dutch text: 'Dit 
is geen bewaargeving meer, maar verbruiklening. De 'bewaargever' verliest de 
eigendom van de ingeleverde stukken op het moment van de overgifte [...].' 
145 See Houwing in Van Hall / Houwing 1952, p. 170; Van Ardenne-Stachiw 1985, 
section 2.6.5; and Van der Heijden / Van der Grinten 1989, pp. 327-328. Note that 
the topic of a right to change the numbers of securities is not discussed in the 12th 
edition of the Van der Heijden / Van der Grinten manual. 
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becomes the owner of the consumables. Hammerstein states that making 
a consumable asset replaceable means that: 
the ownership passes to the entity to whom the asset has been handed over. As a 
result, the proprietary claim of the owner is transformed into a contractual claim 
for the delivery of equivalent assets. [...] It could be argued that the cause is, in this 
case, the right to use up the asset or to use it (which use would, in this instance, 
include a right to dispose of the asset), while the transferee is under an obligation 
to transfer equivalent assets or the value thereof at the end of the relationship 
between the parties.146 
In such cases there is an irregular pledge, an irregular right of usufruct or 
an irregular custody relationship.147 
Van Setten has argued that the right of use of the Collateral Directive is 
essentially a loan of fungibles.148 In the case of a loan of fungibles assets 
are also made replaceable. Therefore, as under the irregular structures, a 
loan of fungibles entails a transfer of ownership.149 
The doctrine of replaceability also plays a role in German law when con-
sidering consumable assets. When a pledgee has the right to dispose of 
such assets in exchange for an obligation to deliver equivalent assets, this 
is qualified as an irregular pledge, and ownership passes.150 Likewise, an 
irregular right of usufruct (further discussed in section 4.6.3 below) and 
a loan of fungibles (Sachdarlehen; see §§ 607-609 GCC) under German law 
as a standard entail a passing of ownership.151 
146 See Hammerstein 1977, pp. 135-136. Translation: TK. Original Dutch text: '[...] het 
vervangbaar stellen van een zaak betekent dat de eigendom overgaat op degene 
aan wie men de zaak ter hand stelt. De zakenrechtelijke aanspraak van de eigenaar 
verandert daardoor in een obligatoire vordering tot teruggave van een soortgelijke 
zaak. [...] Als titel van eigendomsverkrijging zal kunnen worden aangevoerd dat 
de zaak verbruikt mag worden of in de meest ruime zin gebruikt (hetgeen in dit 
verband dan ook een bevoegdheid tot vervreemding zou impliceren) onder de 
verplichting aan het einde van de rechtsverhouding een soortgelijke zaak of de 
waarde daarvan terug te geven.' 
147 See Hammerstein 1977, chapter IV. In the same sense Houwing in Van Hall / 
Houwing 1952, pp. 165-228. 
148 See Dalhuisen / Van Setten 2003, pp. 140-141. 
149 See section 2.4.2 of chapter III. 
150 On the 'unregelmässiges Pfandrecht' or 'pignus irreguläre' see the Staudinger Com-
mentary, (Neubearbeitung 2002), § 1204, no. 52-60. 
151 See Palandt Commentary, 64th edition, § 607; Palandt Commentary, 64th edition, 
§ 1067. See also section 2.4.2 of chapter ΙΠ. 
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Both under Dutch and German law, therefore, the general rule is that 
ownership passes if consumable assets are made replaceable (which 
means that the receiver of the assets has the right to dispose of them, 
while being under an obligation to deliver equivalent assets).152 
Taking into account that Article 5 of the Collateral Directive relates to 
security interests, it is most feasible to consider the right of use as an ir-
regular pledge. The structure of an irregular pledge is essentially as 
follows: 
Irregular pledge 
T=l;€ T=2;€ 
T=l; irregular pledge 
T=4; return of € 
» 
-* 
T=4; equivalent assets 
T=2; exercise of right 
of disposal 
-*- C 
T=3;€ 
T=3; buying equivalent 
assets in the market 
D 
This structure is exactly the same as the structure of a security interest 
combined with a right of use as envisaged in the Collateral Directive.153 
Such a security interest combined with a right of use is therefore essen-
tially an irregular pledge. In line with the Dutch and German doctrine on 
irregular pledge, usufruct and custody, the conclusion must therefore be 
drawn that the right of use under the Collateral Directive entails a passing 
of ownership.154 
152 The exact moment at which the original owner loses his proprietary interest, and 
to whom, is discussed in more detail in sections 4.6.4 and 4.6.5 below. 
153 See the diagram in section 4.5.2 above. 
154 The irregular pledge has been suggested in German literature as a way of 
implementing Article 5 of the CD. See Löber 2001; Keller 2002; Löber 2002; Keller 
2003. See also section 4.8 below. 
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4.6.3 Irregular right of usufruct 
a. Introduction 
A separate section is devoted to the (irregular) right of usufruct. The 
reason being that under the current Dutch Civil Code, a usufructuary has 
a general right of disposal if the right of usufruct is vested in respect of 
consumable goods. This is remarkable because a right of usufruct, like a 
right of pledge, is, after all, a limited proprietary right. A right of usufruct 
is normally confined to making use of assets or to enjoying their fruits, 
and does not entail a general right of disposal. Moreover, as in the Col-
lateral Directive, the Dutch legislator has envisaged a rule of proprietary 
substitution in connection with the general right of disposal of the usu-
fructuary. This section investigates whether the new right of usufruct, 
combined with a right of disposal and a rule of proprietary substitution, 
can serve as a basis for implementing the Collateral Directive's right of 
use. 
b. German law 
The German approach in respect of the irregular right of usufruct (Niess-
brauch) is a clear example of the theory discussed in section 4.6.2 above on 
consumable goods. On the basis of § 1067 of the GCC, the person who has 
a right of usufruct in respect of consumable goods (verbrauchbare Sachen) 
is the owner of these goods. The text of § 1067 of the GCC is as follows:1" 
1 If a right of usufruct relates to consumable assets, the usufructuary becomes the 
owner of these assets, upon the termination of the right of usufruct he should 
compensate the original owner for the value which the assets had at the moment 
the right of usufruct was vested Both the original owner and the usufructuary can 
at their own cost have the value determined by a specialist 
2 The original owner can request security when the claim for the compensation of 
the value is endangered 
155 See also §§ 1075(2) and 1084 of the GCC 
156 Translation TK Original German text '1 Sind verbrauchbare Sachen Gegenstand 
des Nießbrauchs, so wird der Nießbraucher Eigentumer der Sachen, nach der Be-
endigung des Nießbrauchs hat er dem Besteller den Wert zu ersetzen, den die 
Sachen zur Zeit der Bestellung hatten Sowohl der Besteller als der Nießbraucher 
kann den Wert auf seine Kosten durch Sachverstandige feststellen lassen 2 Der 
Besteller kann Sicherheitsleistung verlangen, wenn der Anspruch auf Ersatz des 
Wertes gefährdet ist ' 
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The draughtsmen of the GCC have extensively elaborated upon the theo-
retical background of the irregular right of usufruct. The German legis-
lator makes a distinction between assets that are fit for use or that produce 
fruits, and other assets. In respect of the first category of assets, a regular 
right of usufruct can be established. The second category, in any case, 
comprises assets that derive their value from the fact that they can be 
consumed or can be disposed of (consumable assets). In principle, such 
assets cannot be subject to a regular right of usufruct, but only to an ir-
regular right of usufruct. An irregular right of usufruct entails a passing 
of ownership. In this case, the usufructuary is under an obligation to 
compensate the original owner for the value of the assets upon termi-
nation of the right of usufruct. The original owner can request a security 
to ensure that this obligation will be fulfilled.157 
c. Old Dutch law 
Under old Dutch law, the right of usufruct in respect of consumable assets 
was regulated in Article 804 of the Civil Code. The text of this provision 
is as follows: 
If, however, the right of usufruct relates to consumable assets, the usufructuary can, 
upon the termination of the right of usufruct, confine itself to returning an 
equivalent quantity, quality and value, or to paying the price at which the assets 
have been estimated at the start of the right of usufruct, or shall be estimated 
according to the value at that moment. 
Under old Dutch law, as in German law, ownership passed in the case of 
the establishment of an irregular right of usufruct. In the case an irregular 
right of usufruct was vested, the original owner lost his title and was left 
with a contractual right against the new owner. In order to enhance the 
enforceability of this contractual right, a security interest was sometimes 
established.159 
157 See the Drafters of the GCC, p. 253 et seq. See, in the same sense, the definitions of 
'usufruct' and 'quasi-usufruct' in Black's Law Dictionary (including references to 
Roman law). On the moment at which ownership passes, and to whom, see sections 
4.6.4 and 4.6.5 below. 
158 See Fruin 1990. Translation: TK. Original Dutch text: 'Indien echter onder het 
vruchtgebruik verbruikbare zaken zijn begrepen, kan de vruchtgebruiker volstaan 
met, bij het eindigen van het vruchtgebruik, eene gelijke hoeveelheid, hoedanigheid 
en waarde terug te geven, of den prijs te betalen, op welken de zaken bij aanvang 
des vruchtgebruiks mogten geschat zijn, of volgens de waarde van dat tijdstip 
mogten geschat worden.' 
159 See Van Gaaien 2001, no. 022. 
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d. Current Dutch law 
Widening of the rights of the usufructuary 
In the course of the revision of the Dutch Civil Code, the legislator has 
widened the rights of the usufructuary considerably. Under current Dutch 
law, the rights of a usufructuary are not necessarily confined to using an 
asset or to enjoying the fruits thereof. In Articles 3:207,212-213 and 215 of 
the NCC, which are discussed in further detail below, the legislator has 
conferred a number of extra rights upon the usufructuary, such as the 
rights to consume, dispose of or spend encumbered assets. The intention 
of the legislator has probably been to make the right of usufruct a flexible 
instrument, which makes it possible to make maximum use of the eco-
nomic value of assets.160 
One example of the widening of the rights of the usufructuary can be 
found in section 1 of Article 3:207 of the NCC. This provision not only 
makes it possible that the usufructuary uses, but also that he consumes 
assets. The text of this provision is: 
The usufructuary may use or consume property subject to the usufruct according 
to the rules made at the time of establishment of the usufruct or, in their absence, 
with due regard to the nature of the property and local usage governing use or 
consumption. 
Consumption here means that the assets are used up and are no longer 
available. If and how the usufructuary compensates the original owner 
must be established on the basis of the contract between the parties or, in 
its absence, in line with the nature of the property involved and local 
usage.162 
The rights of the usufructuary are also extended in relation to property 
that is intended to be alienated, such as securities. On the basis of section 
1 of Article 3:212 of the NCC, the usufructuary has the right to dispose of 
such property in his own name in conformity with its destination. This 
160 See Meijers' Explanatory Notes to Title 3.8 of the NCC, in particular the intro-
ductory remarks. See also Groefsema, 1993, pp. 156-157. 
161 Translation: Netherlands Business Legislation. Original Dutch text: 'Een vruchtge-
bruiker mag de aan het vruchtgebruik onderworpen goederen gebruiken of ver-
bruiken overeenkomstig de bij de vestiging van het vruchtgebruik gestelde regels 
of, bij gebreke van zodanige regels, met inachtneming van de aard van de goederen 
en de ten aanzien van het gebruik of verbruik bestaande plaatselijke gewoonten.' 
162 See Meijers' Explanatory Notes to Title 3.8 of the NCC, Article 3.8.1 and Article 
3:8.6. 
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right follows directly from the law. According to sections two and three 
of Article 3:212, the right to dispose can also be granted to the usu-
fructuary by the original owner or by the subdistrict court (kantongerecht) 
in respect of other assets. The text of Article 3:212 of the NCC is as follows: 
1. To the extent that property subject to a usufruct is intended to be alienated, the 
usufructuary is entitled to alienate it in conformity with its destination. 
2. At the time of establishment of the usufruct, the usufructuary may also be given 
the power to dispose of property other than that mentioned in the preceding 
paragraph. [...] 
3. In other cases the usufructuary may not alienate or encumber property without 
the consent of the holder of the principal right or the authorisation of the subdistrict 
court. [...]163 
If the usufructuary indeed disposes of the encumbered assets in line with 
Article 3:212 of the NCC, proprietary substitution takes place. This means 
that the original owner becomes the owner of the replacement goods, 
while the usufructuary obtains a right of usufruct in respect of those 
replacement goods. The rule of proprietary substitution is set out in 
Article 3:213 of the NCC. Section 1 of this provision reads as follows: 
Property taking the place of property subject to the usufruct and duly disposed of, 
belongs to the holder of the principal right and is also subject to the usufruct. The 
same applies to receipts from the collection of claims subject to the usufruct and to 
claims for compensation which take the place of property subject to the usufruct, 
including claims resulting from a reduction in value of that property. 
163 Translation: Netherlands Business Legislation. Original Dutch text: '1. Voor zover 
de aan een vruchtgebruik onderworpen goederen bestemd zijn om vervreemd te 
worden, is de vruchtgebruiker tot vervreemding overeenkomstig hun bestemming 
bevoegd. 2. Bij de vestiging van het vruchtgebruik kan aan de vruchtgebruiker de 
bevoegdheid worden gegeven ook over andere dan de in het vorige lid genoemde 
goederen te beschikken. [...] 3. In andere gevallen mag een vruchtgebruiker slechts 
vervreemden of bezwaren met toestemming van de hoofdgerechtigde of machtiging 
van de kantonrechter. [...]'. 
164 Translation: Netherlands Business Legislation. Original Dutch text: 'Hetgeen in de 
plaats van aan vruchtgebruik onderworpen goederen treedt doordat daarover be-
voegdelijk wordt beschikt, behoort aan de hoofdgerechtigde toe en is eveneens aan 
het vruchtgebruik onderworpen. Hetzelfde is het geval met hetgeen door inning 
van aan vruchtgebruik onderworpen vorderingen wordt ontvangen, en met vorde-
ringen tot vergoeding die in de plaats van aan vruchtgebruik onderworpen goede-
ren treden, waaronder begrepen vorderingen ter zake van waardevermindering 
van die goederen.' 
165 In relation to Articles 3:212 and 213 of the NCC see Meijers' Explanatory Notes to 
Title 3.8 of the NCC, in particular to Articles 3.8.1, 3.8.10 and 3.8.11. 
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A third example of the widened rights of the usufructuary under the 
current Dutch Civil Code can be found in Article 3:215 of the NCC. On the 
basis of this provision, a usufructuary can be granted the right to 'alienate 
or spend' the property subject to the right of usufruct. The text of section 
1 of Article 3:215 of the NCC is as follows: 
Where the usufructuary is entitled to alienate or spend , wholly or partially, the 
property subject to the usufruct, the holder of the principal right can, upon the 
termination of the usufruct, claim the surrender of the property granted m usufruct 
or that which has taken its place, to the extent that the usufructuary or his assignees 
do not establish that the property has been spent or has perished by fortuitous 
. 167 
event 
This provision can best be understood from the point of view of the law 
of inheritance. The Dutch legislator originally considered the right of 
usufruct one of several possible ways to regulate the relationship between 
the longest living spouse and the family of the deceased person (in the 
absence of a last will). With Article 3:215 of the NCC, the legislator 
pursued two goals. On the one hand, the legislator wanted to take the 
maintenance needs of the longest living spouse into account. On the other, 
he wanted to honour the ownership claims of the family of the deceased 
person. The legislator was convinced that the right of usufruct would only 
be suitable for these goals if it were possible for the longest living spouse 
to dispose of the assets subject to the right of usufruct and to use them up, 
without incurring an obligation to replace them or their value at a later 
date. In order to honour the ownership claims of the family of the de-
ceased as well, the theory relating to the irregular right of usufruct (which 
would have implied a passing of ownership to the longest living spouse) 
had to be set aside.168 
166 Note of the translators This institution resembles thefidetcommissum de residuo The 
term "to spend" ('verteren") must be distinguished from the term "to consume" 
("verbruiken") in article 207 of Book 3 "To spend" here means that the usufructuary 
may touch capital without incurring the obligation to replace it at a later time 
167 Translation Netherlands Busmess Legislation Original Dutch text 'Is bij de vesti-
ging van een vruchtgebruik of daarna aan de vruchtgebruiker de bevoegdheid ge-
geven tot gehele of gedeeltelijke vervreemding en vertering van aan het vruchtge-
bruik onderworpen goederen, dan kan de hoofdgerechtigde bij het emde van het 
vruchtgebruik afgifte vorderen van de m vruchtgebruik gegeven goederen of het-
geen daarvoor in de plaats getreden is, voor zover de vruchtgebruiker of zijn recht-
verknjgenden niet bewijzen dat die goederen verteerd of door toeval temetgegaan 
zijn ' 
168 See Meijers' Explanatory Notes, Article 3 813, Van Gaaien 2001, chapters 1 and 2, 
Florijn 1994, chapter 6 
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However, in the new law of inheritance in Book 4 of the NCC, which 
came into force in 2003 (a number of years after the introduction of the 
NCC's general provisions on the right of usufruct in 1992), the right of 
usufruct plays a limited role only. In Book 4, the relationship between the 
longest living spouse and the family of the deceased has been regulated 
in a different manner. In principle, the longest living spouse inherits 
everything, whereas the children are given a contractual claim against the 
longest living spouse that is enforceable only upon the latter person's in-
solvency or death.169 The adapted rules on usufruct have only been 
applied in Articles 4:19, 4:21, 4:29 and 4:30 of the NCC.170 ^ 
Drawbacks 
It appears from the above that under current Dutch law, the scope of the 
original right of usufruct, i.e. the right to enjoy the fruits and/or the use of 
an asset, has been widened considerably. Under the current Dutch Civil 
Code, a usufructuary can have the right to consume, dispose of or spend 
the assets encumbered with a right of usufruct. In principle, the right of 
ownership does not pass to the usufructuary if a right of usufruct is com-
bined with a general right of disposal. As such, the Dutch legislator has 
deviated from the rule on the irregular right of usufruct that had, until 
then, been in force, and thus from the theory on consumable goods as out-
lined in section 4.6.2 above. The adapted rules, however, have led to com-
plications from the perspective of general property law. 
In legal literature, particularly the rule on proprietary substitution of Ar-
ticle 3:213 of the NCC is subject to critique. Van Gaaien notes friction 
when a usufructuary obtains registered claims (vorderingen op naam) or 
registered (immovable) property (registergoederen). It is not clear how the 
circumstance that these assets are registered to the name of the usu-
169 See Title 4.3 of the NCC. 
170 See Van Mourik 2002. 
171 Likewise, under German law the relationship between the longest living spouse 
and the family of the deceased has not been addressed by envisaging a right of 
disposal for a usufructuary. It follows from §§ 1085-1089 of the GCC (Niessbrauch 
an einem Vermögen) that a right of usufruct in respect of consumable assets that form 
part of a patrimony (Vermögen) or of the estate of a deceased person, leads to a 
passing of ownership. In Germany the theory on the irregular right of usufruct has 
been maintained unimpaired (see also subsection b on German law above). In order 
to solve the issue arising under the law of inheritance, German law envisages 
special rules concerning the Vorerbschaft and the Nacherbschaft (see §§ 2100-2146 of 
the GCC). These rules make it possible to leave an inheritance to the longest living 
spouse until his or her death, after which it falls to the family of the deceased 
person. 
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fructuary should be matched with an ownership claim of someone else 
that is based on the rule of proprietary substitution.172 In addition, Meijers 
and Hammerstein remark that the rule of proprietary substitution does 
not always offer real certainty, because it may be difficult for the original 
owner to prove to which assets exactly he is entitled. This may be difficult, 
for example, when the usufructuary has become the owner on the basis 
of (unauthorized) commingling. Particularly in the case of consumable 
assets, which often are not easily identifiable, it may, in practice, be diffi-
cult for the original owner to prove to which assets his proprietary 
interest attaches.173 Both on a theoretical and a practical level, a usu-
fructuary's general right of disposal therefore leads to complications. Van 
Gaaien concludes that the old system that recognised an irregular right of 
usufruct (a transfer of ownership, if necessary combined with a security 
interest) functions best.174 
No validity for right of pledge 
Even if one is in favour of a usufructuary's general right of disposal, 
despite the theoretical and practical problems arising from it, this does not 
necessarily mean that the same concept should also be applied in the case 
of the right of pledge. The relationship between an owner and a usufruc-
tuary is essentially different from that between an owner and a pledgee. 
In the latter relationship, the credit provider/pledgee is often in a more 
powerful position than the pledgor/owner. It is precisely this imbalance 
that makes it undesirable to give the party who is in the stronger position, 
i.e. the pledgee, a general right of disposal in respect of assets provided 
as security, and, in doing so, the possibility of ending the fiduciary 
relationship between the parties altogether. 
e. Conclusion 
Under the old Dutch Civil Code, the rights of a usufructuary were limited 
to using and enjoying the fruits of an asset. A right of usufruct in respect 
of consumable assets was characterised as irregular, and led to a passing 
of ownership. Under the current Dutch Civil Code, this approach is 
abandoned. The rights of a usufructuary are widened, as he may under 
certain circumstances consume, dispose of or spend the encumbered 
goods. Under current Dutch law, a usufructuary's right of disposal in 
172 See Van Gaaien 2001, sections 5.4 and 5.5 and, on the same issue, Asser Series 2-1, 
nos. 128-134; Asser Series 3-1, nos. 216-217 and no. 253. 
173 See Meijers' Explanatory Notes, Article 3.8.9; and Hammerstein 1977, p. 161. 
174 See Van Gaaien 2001, section 5.8 and chapter 7 (in particular number 175). 
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principle does not lead to a passing of ownership. In taking this new 
approach, the Dutch legislator wanted to enhance a flexible use of encum-
bered assets. In addition, the amended right of usufruct was originally 
intended as a way to regulate the position of the longest living spouse and 
the family of the deceased under the law of inheritance. This latter 
problem has, however, in the meantime been addressed by envisaging a 
solution specific to the law of inheritance. Moreover, the construction of 
a right of usufruct combined with a general right to use up or dispose is 
unfortunate from a theoretical point of view. It is not compatible with the 
general principle of civil law - that making assets replaceable leads to a 
passing of ownership. It also leads to practical problems in relation to 
registered claims and registered immovable property, and because of 
possible commingling, for example. 
German law maintains a traditional approach, which certainly has its 
merits. The right of usufruct entails a right to enjoy the use or the fruits of 
an asset. Dispositions in respect of such an asset are not compatible with 
the limited nature of a right of usufruct. In this case, one should speak of 
an irregular right of usufruct, which entails a transfer of ownership. In 
order to regulate the relationship between the longest living spouse and 
the family of the deceased, the law of inheritance envisages the special 
rules of Vorerbschaft and Nacherbschaft. 
In any case, the Dutch regulation on the right of usufruct cannot be used 
as a blueprint for the introduction of the right of use of the Collateral Di-
rective in Dutch or German law. The right of pledge, unlike the right of 
usufruct, often goes hand in hand with a level of inequality between the 
owner and the party with the limited right. It is undesirable to give the 
usually more powerful party, the pledgee, a general right of disposal, and 
thus the right to end the fiduciary relationship between the parties. 
4.6.4 The moment that ownership passes: residual rights for the original owner? 
a. Introduction 
This section attempts to determine the moment at which a collateral pro-
vider loses his ownership interest. Does this happen at the moment that 
the security interest combined with a general right of disposal is vested, 
or at the moment that the right of disposal is exercised by the collateral 
taker? It also examines the rights of the original owner in the time frame 
between granting a secured party a general right of disposal and the 
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exercise of that right. This section shows that the Collateral Directive's 
right of use, if one interprets it by applying the theory on irregular 
structures, leads to pressure on the Dutch and German systems of pro-
perty law and entails a worsening of the position of collateral providers.175 
b. Theoretical considerations 
It is usually argued by Dutch legal scholars that ownership passes at the 
moment the parties establish an irregular right of pledge or usufruct, or 
an irregular custody arrangement.176 This is also the starting point in 
respect of the irregular pledge under German law177, and in respect of ir-
regular custody and right of usufruct arrangements (codified in § 700 and 
§ 1067 of the German Civil Code respectively)178. Likewise, a loan of 
fungibles entails a passing of ownership at the moment the loan is entered 
into.179 If there is no other agreement between the parties on this issue, the 
fact that one makes assets replaceable automatically makes ownership 
pass.180 
However, it has also been argued that it is possible to deviate from this 
principal rule. In the context of an irregular right of pledge, for example, 
Houwing stresses the importance of the relationship between the par-
ties.181 The Staudinger Commentary, too, takes the moment an irregular 
right of pledge is entered into as a starting point, but stresses the will of 
the parties as an important factor.182 Additionally, in the case of a loan of 
fungibles, an irregular custody arrangement and an irregular right of 
usufruct, the parties can, under German, law deviate from the principal 
rule and agree upon a passing of ownership at the moment the assets 
concerned are actually disposed of by the original owner's counterparty.183 
175 See, in particular, section 4.5.5 above on comparable consequences that arise when 
one applies the theory relating to a non-owner's general right of disposal. 
176 In this sense, see Meijer 1974, p. 27 (section 4); Hammerstein 1977, chapter IV, § 2. 
177 See the Staudinger Commentary, (Neubearbeitung 2002), § 1204, no. 54, which takes 
the moment the irregular arrangement is entered into as a starting point. 
178 See the Palandt Commentary, 64th edition, § 700 and § 1067. 
179 See section 2.4.2 of chapter III. 
180 Under Danish and Italian law ownership also passes at the moment an irregular 
structure is agreed upon. See chapters 1 and 4 of the Right of Use Report. 
181 See Houwing 1952, pp. 170-171. 
182 See the Staudinger Commentary, Neubearbeitung 2002), § 1204, no. 54. 
183 See Palandt Commentary, 64* edition, § 607, sections 2 and 6 (loan of fungibles); 
Palandt Commentary, 64'h edition, § 700 (irregular custody); Palandt Commentary, 
64'h edition, § 1067; Munich Commentary, Volume 6 Sachenrecht (§§ 854-1296), third 
edition, § 1067, in particular section 9 (irregular right of usufruct). 
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c. The Collateral Directive 
Article 5 of the Collateral Directive does not follow the principal rule that 
ownership passes at the moment that consumable assets are made 
replaceable. It presumes that the collateral provider is the owner and that 
the collateral taker only has a security interest until the moment that the 
collateral taker disposes of the encumbered assets, at which time a third 
party acquires ownership.184 Thus, the Collateral Directive is in keeping 
with the approach that the parties who establish an irregular right of 
pledge can agree that ownership passes at the moment of actual disposal. 
It should, however, be noted that this approach has a number of draw-
backs, which are outlined below. 
d. 'Weak' ownership and redemption rights 
A first peculiarity has already been indicated in the sections on American 
and English law and relates to the 'weak' character of the residual rights 
of the collateral provider in the period until the collateral taker exercises 
his right. Not only are his ownership and redemption rights subject to his 
own default, but they can also be cancelled out the moment the collateral 
taker decides to exercise his right of disposal. In fact, this leads to a 
security interest of a special kind, in which the collateral taker - in prac-
tice often the stronger party - has the power to end the fiduciary relation-
ship between the parties.185 
e. A continued right of disposal? 
A further complication not yet investigated, relates to the original owner's 
right of disposal. The approach that stresses the autonomy of the parties 
and that allows a passing of ownership at the moment of actual disposal 
gives rise to further questions in this respect. Does the original owner, in 
the period between the establishment of the right of use and the actual 
exercise thereof, have the power to establish more security interests 
(either combined with a general right of disposal or not), or to transfer the 
encumbered property to a third party? Or, does his right to dispose of the 
encumbered property terminate at the moment the first security interest 
combined with a right of disposal is established? 
184 See, in the same sense. Article 7:53(2) of the NCC. 
185 On American and English law see sections 2.4.4 ('Residual rights?') and 3.4.4 
('Residual rights?') above. 
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Arguably, the power of the original owner to establish further security 
interests (either combined with a right of disposal or not), or to transfer 
the assets concerned to a third party, is still in place. An owner has the 
right to dispose of his assets. The presumption of the original owner's 
continued right of disposal, however, again shows how weak the original 
owner's remaining interest is. What has the original owner left to dispose 
of? His ownership interest is seriously impaired. If the first secured party 
exercises his right of use, the original owner's interest is wiped out entire­
ly. The original owner can therefore only dispose of a right that is subject 
to the condition that the first secured party does not invoke his right of 
use. In addition, the original owner can dispose of the contractual claim 
for the transfer of equivalent assets, which may arise in future after the 
first secured party has indeed exercised his right of use. Arguably, a sub­
sequent secured party or transferee can therefore obtain nothing more 
from the original owner than an interest in assets that is subject to the first 
secured party's right of disposal, or a contractual claim relating to 
equivalent assets that may arise in future. 
An alternative solution would be to prohibit the original owner from 
disposing of assets any further once he has encumbered them with a 
security interest combined with a right of use. Such a complete termi­
nation of the owner's right of disposal, however, is hardly compatible 
with the unlimited nature of an ownership right.186 Still, the attractive side 
of this solution is that it provides clarity. It also illustrates how little has 
remained of the original owner's proprietary interest.187 
ƒ. Concluding remark 
The above shows that the approach whereby ownership can pass at a later 
moment than that at which the irregular right of pledge is vested, i.e. at 
the moment that the right of disposal is exercised, leads to tensions in the 
system of property law. Already during the interim period between 
vesting the right of pledge and actual disposal, the proprietary interest of 
the original owner is seriously impaired. His ownership and redemption 
rights are not strong because they can be terminated by the collateral taker 
at any moment in time. As a result, the original owner has hardly 
186 Comparable objections can be made in respect of the exclusive mandate (exclusieve 
last) in Dutch law, which is set out in Article 7:423 of the NCC. On this latter issue 
see Asser Series 5-ΠΙ, in particular section 169. 
187 Suggested as a possible solution by Van Hees in Lieverse / Wiggers-Rust 2005, pp. 
61-62. 
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anything left to dispose of for the benefit of a subsequent third party 
pledgee or transferee. He can merely dispose of an ownership right that 
is subject to the first pledgee's general right of disposal, and of a con-
tractual claim for the delivery of equivalent assets that may arise in future. 
The suggestion that full ownership continues until the actual moment of 
disposal is therefore deceptive. Only a vague reflection thereof is actually 
still in place. The position of the collateral taker is the mirror image of that 
of the collateral provider. The collateral taker does not merely have a 
security interest. His right to dispose of the encumbered assets makes his 
position very much akin to that of an owner. A similar blurring of the 
ownership concept does not occur in connection with the principal rule 
that ownership passes at the moment that assets are made replaceable. 
4.6.5 To whom does ownership pass? 
A related question that deserves at least a few words, is whether owner-
ship passes through the patrimony (vermogen, Vermogen) of the collateral 
taker who exercises a general right of disposal before falling to the third 
party acquirer, or whether it falls directly to the third party. 
In irregular structures, ownership in principle passes from the original 
owner to the 'pledgee', 'usufructuary' or 'custodian' at the moment the 
irregular structure is entered into. Only after a subsequent disposal by the 
original owner's counterparty to a third party acquirer, do the assets 
concerned fall to that third party. 
However, if the original owner and his counterparty have agreed that 
ownership does not pass at the outset of the transaction, but at the later 
moment of disposal by the counterparty, two approaches are available. 
The first is an indirect approach, in which ownership passes through the 
patrimony of the original owner's counterparty for a split second and 
subsequently falls to the third party. In the second, or direct approach, 
ownership does not pass through the patrimony of the original owner's 
counterparty, but falls directly to the third party acquirer.188 
A parallel can be drawn with a reservation of title arrangement. As was 
indicated in section 4.5.1, Dutch legal theory has broadly developed two 
legal theories to explain the passing of ownership to a third party acquirer 
188 On these two principal approaches and the variations thereof in Dutch legal theory, 
see Asser Series 2-1, sections 135-136. 
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upon disposal by a buyer under a reservation of title arrangement. These 
theories broadly coincide with the direct and the indirect approaches 
indicated above. If the buyer's power of disposal is based on the occur-
rence of a condition precedent (that of a disposal in the normal course of 
business), the buyer disposes as a full owner, and the assets pass through 
him. If, however, the buyer's power of disposal is based on a contractually 
granted non-owner's right of disposal (machtiging), ownership passes 
directly to the third party acquirer. Likewise, under a German reservation 
of title arrangement, a buyer's right of disposal can be based on a con-
dition precedent, in which case ownership passes through the buyer 
before it falls to the third party acquirer. Under German law, a reservation 
of title arrangement is, however, commonly combined with the buyer's 
right of disposal on the basis of § 185 of the GCC. In this case, ownership 
passes directly from the original owner to the third party acquirer, with-
out assets passing through the first buyer.189 
The Collateral Directive is silent on the issue. It is therefore possible to 
argue that the Collateral Directive should, in this respect, be interpreted 
in accordance with the theory on the irregular structures, which means 
that ownership passes through the collateral taker. It is, however, also 
possible to deviate from the principal rule of the irregular structures (as 
with the timing issue; see section 4.6.4 above), and to follow the approach 
that title passes directly from the collateral provider to the third party and 
does not pass through the collateral taker. 
4.7 Proprietary substitution 
4.7.2 Introduction 
This section discusses the rule of proprietary substitution set out in Article 
5(3) of the Collateral Directive. It examines the practical effects of the Col-
lateral Directive's rule of proprietary substitution on the positions of col-
lateral provider and collateral taker. This section also explores whether 
the rule set out in the Collateral Directive is compatible with Dutch 
property law. In addition, it investigates whether there are alternatives to 
the Collateral Directive's rule of substitution. 
189 See also sections 4.5.1, including references to literature, and 4.5.3 above. 
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4.7.2 Article 5 of the Collateral Directive 
Apart from the introduction of a general right of disposal for a secured 
party (which can only be accommodated in a satisfactory way by referring 
to the irregular right of pledge), the Collateral Directive also sets out a 
rule of proprietary substitution in Article 5(3). The directive deviates at 
this point from the irregular right of pledge, which contains no rule of 
proprietary substitution. The Collateral Directive's rule of proprietary sub-
stitution is structured as follows. If the collateral taker exercises his right 
of use, the collateral provider is left with a contractual claim until the 
moment that the collateral taker transfers equivalent assets to the collat-
eral provider. These assets must be transferred at the end of the trans-
action at the latest. As soon as these equivalent assets are transferred, the 
Collateral Directive's rule of proprietary substitution takes effect. This 
means that the original proprietary structure now relates to the equivalent 
assets. Consequently, the collateral provider has an ownership interest in 
the equivalent assets and the collateral taker a security interest therein. 
These interests are backdated. The substitute financial collateral is treated 
as if it had been provided the moment the original collateral was first 
provided. 
4.7.3 Practical effects? 
As was argued in the sections above, the Collateral Directive's right of use 
means that for a collateral provider, proprietary interest in respect of 
collateral is replaced by a contractual claim against the collateral taker, in 
any case from the moment the collateral taker transfers the collateral 
assets to a third party. At first sight, a rule of proprietary substitution may 
seem to mitigate this negative consequence of the right of use for the 
collateral provider. It should, however, be noted that the Collateral Di-
rective's rule does not relate to all kinds of replacement assets (i.e. notably 
the proceeds from a transfer of the original collateral to a third party), and 
also does not relate to equivalent assets that form or will form part of the 
patrimony of the collateral taker. The substitution rule of the directive 
relates to equivalent assets only after they have been transferred by the 
collateral taker, usually at the end of the transaction. The same is true for 
Article 7:53(4) of the NCC. In the course of parliamentary history, the 
Dutch Minister of Justice has remarked that proprietary substitution takes 
place only upon a transfer of the equivalent assets by the collateral 
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taker.190 The collateral provider is therefore still faced with a contractual 
claim from the moment that the collateral taker exercises his right of use 
to the moment that the collateral taker decides to transfer equivalent 
collateral. The Collateral Directive's rule of proprietary substitution is of 
little use to the collateral provider in this respect. 
Arguably, the Collateral Directive's rule of proprietary substitution has 
advantages only for the collateral taker. The directive envisages a con-
tinued security interest for his benefit even after the transfer of equivalent 
assets. This interest is backdated to the start of the transaction, and can 
therefore not be surpassed by, for example, an attachment or a right of 
pledge relating to the assets of the collateral provider that has been vested 
after that moment. 
From a practical point of view, however, the Collateral Directive's rule of 
proprietary substitution may not have any value at all. In practice, it is 
usually agreed by the parties that a collateral taker is not obliged to trans-
fer equivalent assets unless the collateral provider fulfils the secured debt 
at the same time. In order to minimize risk, the collateral taker will there-
fore only transfer equivalent collateral at the end of a transaction, when 
the collateral provider fulfils the secured debt. What is the use of pro-
prietary substitution at this moment? With the fulfilment of the secured 
debt, the collateral taker's security interest is customarily no longer 
available in line with its accessory nature, which renders proprietary 
substitution at this moment useless. 
4.7.4 Compatibility with Dutch property law? 
The rule of proprietary substitution set out in the Collateral Directive, 
which envisages substitution by equivalent assets upon a transfer by the 
collateral taker, deviates from traditional rules of proprietary substitution 
under Dutch law. Under Dutch law, substitution customarily takes place 
immediately and relates to all kinds of replacement assets. In parliamen-
tary history of implementing the Collateral Directive in Dutch law, the 
Minister of Justice has noted that the Collateral Directive's rule of sub-
stitution has much in common with four already available rules of 
proprietary substitution. While this may be true, the minister has ignored 
the fundamental difference between immediate substitution by all kinds 
190 See sections 9 and 18 of the Additional Explanatory Memorandum (Nadere Memorie 
van Antwoord), Eerste Kamer, 2004-2005, 28 874, E. 
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of replacement assets and substitution at a later moment in time by 
equivalent assets only. The four rules mentioned by the Dutch Minister 
of Justice will be examined in greater detail below.191 
The first rule of proprietary substitution to which the minister compares 
the Collateral Directive's rule of substitution is that of Article 3:213 of the 
NCC. This rule was already discussed in section 4.6.3 above and relates 
to substitution upon disposal by a usufructuary. One of the fundamental 
characteristics of this rule of proprietary substitution is that it takes place 
immediately and applies to all kinds of replacement assets. This is not the 
case under Article 5(3) of the Collateral Directive, in which substitution 
is limited to equivalent assets, which are usually made available at a later 
date only. 
The second rule of proprietary substitution to which the rule of the 
Collateral Directive is compared is that found in Article 3:229 of the NCC. 
This rule was already discussed in section 4.4 above. The rule of 
proprietary substitution in Article 3:229 of the NCC primarily relates to 
damages or insurance money due if a pledged asset is damaged or 
destroyed. According to this rule proprietary substitution takes place right 
away and relates to any substitute assets.192 
The minister also mentions two other rules of proprietary substitution, 
which are set out in Articles 3:167 and 3:246(5) of the NCC respectively. 
Article 3:167 of the NCC relates to goods of a community (gemeenschap) 
that are replaced by other goods. Article 3:246(5) concerns the collection 
of a pledged claim, in which the right of pledge attaches to the proceeds. 
Again, proprietary substitution in these instances takes place immedi-
ately, and relates to any goods replacing the original ones.193 
The above considerations make clear that the rule of proprietary sub-
stitution set out in the Collateral Directive differs fundamentally from 
proprietary substitution as it is traditionally known under Dutch law. 
Under the traditional rules, proprietary substitution takes place tmme-
191 See séchons 9 and 18 of the Additional Explanatory Memorandum (Nadere Memorie 
van Antwoord), Eerste Kamer, 2004-2005, 28 874, E 
192 The German doctrine on perishable goods was also discussed m section 4 4 If a 
pledgee disposes of such goods, these goods are substituted by the proceeds of this 
disposal This rule of proprietary substitution also takes effect immediately 
193 On Article 3 167 of the NCC, see the Parliamentary History of the NCC, Boek 3, 
Vermogensrecht m het algemeen, ρ 580 On Article 3 246 of the NCC, see the Parlia­
mentary History of the NCC, Boek 3, Vermogensrecht in het algemeen, pp 771-774 
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diately and automatically in relation to all kinds of replacement assets, whereas 
under the Collateral Directive, substitution takes place only upon a transfer 
by the collateral taker, usually at the end of a transaction and only in 
relation to equivalent assets. This means - and this is crucial - that under 
the the Collateral Directive a collateral provider is left with a mere con-
tractual claim from the moment the collateral taker disposes of the origi-
nal assets until the moment that the collateral taker decides to transfer 
equivalent assets. During this time frame, the collateral provider runs an 
insolvency risk in respect of the collateral taker. 
It is perhaps worthwhile to note that under Dutch law, proprietary sub-
stitution is allowed only in a limited number of cases. The main reason for 
this is probably that after substitution the security provider is faced with 
the possibility that he may now have an interest in assets entirely different 
from the ones he originally owned. Ideally, the original assets are 
returned to the security provider upon termination of the relationship 
between the parties. Only in exceptional circumstances that are beyond 
the control of the parties (such as a fire or a thunderstorm that gives rise 
to an insurance claim), is a deviation from this rule considered acceptable. 
Reehuis therefore argues that in Dutch law there is no room for proprie-
tary substitution if a collateral taker transfers assets to a third party with 
the consent of the collateral provider. The Collateral Directive clearly 
deviates from this position.194 
4.7.5 Alternatives? 
One final consideration is whether there are alternatives for the Collateral 
Directive's rule of proprietary substitution, which relates to equivalent 
assets upon a transfer by the collateral taker. Could proprietary substitu-
tion, for example, relate to equivalent assets as soon as the collateral taker 
becomes entitled to them, or to all kinds of replacement assets, such as 
sale proceeds, etc.? What are the advantages of such alternatives? 
By accepting that proprietary substitution takes place at the moment that 
equivalent assets become part of the patrimony of the collateral taker, the 
interests of the collateral provider are better taken into account because, 
in effect, this approach entails a possible limitation of the period in which 
the collateral provider is left with a contractual claim. Another advantage 
of this approach is that these equivalent assets cannot, for example, be 
194 See Pitlo / Reehuis, Heisterkamp 2001, section 756. 
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encumbered with a right of pledge that prevails over the interests of the 
original collateral provider for the benefit of a third party, and cannot be 
subject to an attachment (beslag) by third parties to the detriment of the 
collateral provider. 
The same a fortiori holds true for a rule of substitution based on the re-
placement of original assets by other assets. In this case, there is no time 
period at all in which the collateral provider has a contractual claim only. 
Moreover, there is no risk that third parties establish rights (e.g. a right of 
pledge or an attachment) that prevail over those of the collateral provider. 
Apart from that, this latter rule relating to replacement assets would be 
most compatible with the rules of Dutch law in relation to proprietary 
substitution outlined above. However, when substitution relates to all 
kinds of replacement assets, there may be a complicating factor - one that 
does not arise when substitution relates to equivalent assets as soon as 
they become part of the collateral taker's patrimony. It becomes com-
plicated, when assets are transferred through chains of intermediaries, 
including clearing houses, in which netting arrangements are in place, as 
it may in such cases prove impossible to determine exactly which assets 
can be identified as replacement. Because identification is crucial, proprie-
tary substitution arguably cannot take place in such cases.195 
All in all, the current Collateral Directive's rule of proprietary substitution 
is an empty shell, which, in practice, offers the collateral provider no pro-
tection whatsoever. Therefore it is submitted that, contrary to the 
approach taken in the Collateral Directive, it is desirable that proprietary 
substitution should take place at the moment equivalent assets become 
part of the patrimony of the collateral taker, while an even more desirable 
improvement would be if substitution, in as far as is practically possible, 
could relate to all kinds of replacement assets. 
4.8 Implementation in Germany and the Netherlands 
The German legislator has taken the correct approach in implementing a 
security interest combined with a right of use, by referring to the doctrine 
on the irregular right of pledge. Because the irregular right of pledge is 
recognised under German law, the German legislator has not introduced 
195 On the issue of the identification of proceeds, see also sections 1.3.3 ('A right of use 
in Europe - Why?'); 2.4.5 ('No interest in the proceeds'); and 3.4.5 ('An interest in 
proceeds or equivalent assets?'). 
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an explicit legal provision in order to implement the Collateral Directive's 
right of use. There is, however, at least one thing missing: the German 
legislator has not considered the Collateral Directive's remarkable rule of 
proprietary substitution.196 
It would, in my view, have been logical if the Dutch legislator would have 
implemented the right of use by referring to the doctrine on the irregular 
right of pledge also. The Dutch legislator, however, has paid hardly any 
attention to the way a pledgee's general right of disposal should be 
interpreted from a theoretical point of view. Article 7:53 of the NCC 
simply gives the collateral taker a right to 'use or sell'197 without further 
explanation, and, in line with the Collateral Directive, sets out a rule of 
proprietary substitution, which should take place before the end of a 
transaction. According to the Dutch legislator, a security interest com-
bined with a general right of disposal is 'something in between' an out-
right transfer and a right of pledge.198 No attention has been paid to the 
theoretical foundation of the pledgee's general right of disposal.199 
The unprecedented way in which a security interest combined with a 
general right of disposal harms the position of providers of security and 
favours that of security takers, and the fact that the Collateral Directive's 
196 See the Diskussionsentwurf des Bundesmimstertums der Justitz, Entwurf eines Gesetzes 
zur Änderung der Insolvenzverordnung, des Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuches und anderer 
Gesetze, pp 18-19, Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung, Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Um-
setzung der Richtlinie 2002/47/EG vom 6 Juni 2002 über Finanzsicherheiten und zur 
Änderung des Hypothekenbankgesetzes und anderer Gesetze, Bundesrat, Drucksache 
563/03,15 August 2003, ρ 13, Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung, Entwurf eines Ge-
setzeszur Umsetzung der Richtlinie 2002/47/EG vom 6 Juni 2002 über Finanzsicherheiten 
und zur Änderung des Hypothekenbankgesetzes und anderer Gesetze, Deutscher Bundes-
tag, Drucksache 15/1853, 29 October 2003, pp 27-28 (m particular section 6a) and 
ρ 32 (in particular section 6a) See, on the same issue, Lober 2005, pp 75-76, and the 
Auslegung des Bundesministeriums der Finanzen zur Thematik Primebroker nach dem 
Investmentgesetz (Stand 26 Mai 2004), mentioned in footnote 23 of Lober 2005 and 
available on www bahn de (through the links Fur Anbieter, Inländische Investment-
fonds) 
197 This terminology is not correct The Dutch legislator should have used the term 
'dispose' 
198 See the Dutch Additional Explanatory Memorandum (Nadere Memorie van Ant-
woord), Eerste Kamer, 2004-2005, 28 874, E, section 22, pp 21-22 
199 See, m particular, the Explanatory Comments (Memorie van Toelichting) in respect 
of Article 7 53 of the NCC m Tweede Kamer, 2002-2003,28 874, no 3, pp 6-7 and pp 
15-16, and in Tweede Kamer, 2004-2005, 30 138, no 3, pp 7-8 and pp 16-17 For a 
more detailed discussion of the problematic approach of the Dutch legislator m res-
pect of the Collateral Directive's rule of proprietary substitution, see section 4 7 
above. 
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rule of proprietary substitution is, in reality, usually an empty shell that 
provides no protection to collateral providers whatsoever, have not been 
given sufficient attention. Nor has the scope of application of the right of 
use been sufficiently considered, which can also be applied in bank/ 
customer and in custodian/client relationships (excluding private per-
sons), possibly even on the basis of generally applicable conditions. The 
possible negative consequences of the Collateral Directive's right of use 
have, therefore, not been taken into consideration. Dutch and German 
legislators have only stressed the positive effects of a right of use for the 
liquidity of the cash and securities markets. 
A key issue of interpretation in the Collateral Directive (and the national 
implementing legislation) is the scope of the term 'financial collateral 
arrangement'. Should these arrangements, under all circumstances, fulfil 
the two functions of recovery and tradeability, or does the Collateral Di-
rective also relate to arrangements that serve a recovery function only? 
Specifically in the case of a security interest (such as a right of pledge), the 
question is whether the scope of the Collateral Directive should be limited 
to security interests combined with a right of use, or expanded to include 
also traditional security interests without a general right of disposal. This 
issue is further discussed in chapter VI. 
4.9 Concluding remarks 
On the basis of the 'right of use' envisaged in the Collateral Directive, it is 
possible to give a secured party the right to dispose of encumbered assets 
under all circumstances. A security interest, such as a right of pledge, is, 
however, not compatible with a secured party's general right of disposal. 
A security interest is intended as a safeguard in the event of a default. 
While this means that dispositions can take place when there is an event 
of default, it does not mean that the secured party has a general right of 
disposal. Moreover, the parties who agree on a security interest are in a 
fiduciary relationship, in which their interests are balanced. The interests 
of collateral providers, who are in need of credit and are therefore in a 
dependent position, are safeguarded by a number of protective mecha-
nisms. In a right of pledge, this fiduciary relationship and the limited 
character of the right of pledge are, for example, apparent from the 
general principle that a pledgor can redeem his assets by fulfilling his 
obligations. By the same token, a pledgee is customarily not allowed to 
appropriate pledged assets and has a duty of due care in respect of the 
assets, which, in any case, means that he has no power to dispose of them 
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for the benefit of a third party. The right of use renders these principles, 
and thus the fiduciary relationship between the parties, void. It is a con-
ceptual oddity that the generally more powerful collateral taker has the 
right to revoke the mechanisms protecting the collateral provider at any 
moment he pleases.200 
The theories relating to enforcement and repledge cannot serve as a basis 
for incorporating the right of use into the Dutch and German systems of 
property law. Likewise, the German theory on perishable goods, which 
envisages both a right of disposal and a rule of proprietary substitution, 
cannot serve as a basis for the right of use. Securities are not perishable, 
but are consumable goods. Neither can the concept of a non-owner's right 
of disposal granted on a contractual basis, which is commonly applied in 
relation to the sale on commission, and - as an explanation for the collat-
eral provider's, but not the collateral taker's right of disposal - in relation 
to reservation of title arrangements and fiduciary transfers of title, be 
applied to explain a collateral taker's general right of disposal. When 
applied in connection with a right of pledge, this concept leads to irre-
concilable tensions with core principles of pledge law, particularly with 
the mechanisms protecting the collateral provider. 
The theory of irregular pledge, irregular usufruct and irregular custody 
best illustrates what the right of use is all about. Ownership passes if con-
sumable assets are made replaceable, i.e. if the beneficiary has the right to 
dispose of them in exchange for a contractual obligation to transfer equiv-
alent assets at a later moment. The same principle applies in the case of a 
loan of fungibles. In this case, assets are also made replaceable, which 
customarily leads to a passing of ownership. Because the structure of the 
right of use as envisaged in Article 5 of the Collateral Directive is exactly 
the same as that of an irregular pledge, the right of use can be equated to 
a transfer of title. 
Contrary to this doctrine, the Dutch legislator has recently introduced a 
right of usufruct combined with a general right of disposal and a rule of 
proprietary substitution. This choice, however, leads to theoretical and 
practical problems, particularly if substitute registered claims (vorderingen 
op naam) or immovable property are registered in the name of the 
usufructuary. It has therefore been argued that the doctrine of irregular 
200 See the outline of the principle characteristics of security interests in section 1.3 of 
chapter III. 
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usufruct, which entails a transfer of title, should be re-established. 
Another reason not to take the Dutch law of usufruct as a model upon 
which to implement the Collateral Directive's right of use, is that a 
security interest, unlike the right of usufruct, often features an unequal 
balance of power between the parties, which benefits the collateral taker. 
From this perspective, it is not desirable to widen the collateral taker's 
powers with a general right of disposal. 
In principle, the theory on the irregular structures mentioned above 
envisages a passing of ownership at the moment the irregular structure 
is entered into. It is, however, possible to deviate from this principle and 
to agree on a passing of ownership at the moment that the general right 
of disposal is exercised. The Collateral Directive follows this latter 
approach. Under the Collateral Directive, a transfer of title takes place at 
the moment that the secured party exercises his right of use. The approach 
under which ownership passes at a later moment, however, causes 
tension from a property law point of view as it leads to a diluted concept 
of ownership. What is the status of the ownership and redemption rights 
of the collateral provider in the period between the establishment of the 
security interest combined with a right of use, and the exercise of that 
right? These rights cannot be equated to the rights that a provider of secu-
rity normally has. In this case, the security provider's rights are subject 
only to his own default. If the secured party has a general right of dis-
posal, the security provider's ownership and redemption rights have a far 
weaker status because they are also subject to the secured party's general 
right of disposal, which may be executed at any moment in time. Con-
sequently, the collateral provider has hardly anything left to dispose of for 
the benefit of third parties. It has even been argued that his right of 
disposal terminates entirely after the establishment of a first security 
interest combined with a general right of disposal. 
As soon as the collateral taker exercises his right of disposal, the collateral 
provider definitely loses title and is left with nothing but a contractual 
claim against the collateral taker for the delivery of equivalent assets. He 
has no proprietary action of revendication. In effect, the only remedy he 
has, provided the collateral taker cannot fulfil his obligations, is a right of 
netting. Contractual arrangements regarding netting are generally en-
forceable under the Collateral Directive.201 Nonetheless, if the price of the 
collateral assets goes up, and in the absence of proper margin mecha-
201 See section 3 of chapter V. 
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nisms, the collateral provider is left with an unsecured contractual claim. 
He will, in this case, have to compete with other ordinary creditors on a 
pari passu basis. 
The proprietary substitution arrangement proposed in Article 5 of the 
Collateral Directive is of no use to the collateral provider. The arrange-
ment deviates from traditional rules of proprietary substitution in, for 
example, Dutch law, under which substitution takes place immediately 
and automatically in respect of all kinds of replacement assets. The Col-
lateral Directive's rule of proprietary substitution, on the other hand, is 
limited to equivalent assets after these have been transferred by the collat-
eral taker, usually at the end of a transaction. 
The right of use on the basis of a security interest is a deviation from 
standard practice in the Dutch and German repo, securities lending and 
derivatives markets, where collateral is customarily provided by way of 
an outright transfer of title. A general right of disposal is a concept that is 
at odds with core principles of pledge law. Essentially, this construction 
can be equated to an outright transfer. 
5. CONCLUSION 
5.1 Introductory remarks 
A secured party's general right of disposal is a new construction that has 
come into fashion in the American securities markets over the past few 
decades and has recently been set out in the European Collateral Di-
rective. Some factors that have contributed to its appearance are the wish 
for liquid financial markets, the economic pressure on financial market 
participants to make optimal use of assets (including assets pledged to 
them) and the fungible nature of securities held through intermediaries. 
This chapter has investigated the theoretical underpinnings and the 
practical consequences of a security interest combined with a general right 
of disposal, which gives a secured party an owner's customary right of 
disposal (i.e. a right to encumber financial collateral with a limited right, 
or to transfer it outright). Special attention has been paid to the different 
interests that are involved when a security interest is combined with a 
secured party's right of disposal. Generally, a right of use enhances the 
liquidity of the financial markets, which is to the benefit of all players. A 
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closely related, but distinct interest is that of the major financial market 
participants. The interests of the markets in general and of its major 
players are benefited by easy access to assets. Another interest, one 
opposed to that of major market participants, considered in this chapter 
is that of collateral providers. 
Section 5.2 summarizes the arguments made in the sections on American, 
English, Dutch and German law. It shows that a security interest and a 
general right of disposal are conflicting concepts. With regard to content, 
a security interest combined with a general right of disposal can be 
equated to an outright transfer. Section 5.3 briefly recalls the alternative 
outright transfer method for the provision of financial collateral, which 
was the topic of chapter III. Section 5.4 argues that the characterisation of 
a security interest combined with a general right of disposal as an outright 
transfer can have a value for capital adequacy, accounting and tax pur-
poses. The concluding section 5.5 briefly summarizes the findings of this 
chapter. 
5.2 The security interest approach 
5.2.2 General considerations 
Generally, if a collateral provider vests a security interest for the benefit 
of a collateral taker, he vests a limited right in order to secure an out-
standing obligation. He expects to retain his ownership interest, unless he 
defaults on the secured obligation. Different jurisdictions tend to have 
slightly different approaches with regard to the protection of the position 
of the provider of a security interest. The focus may, for example, be on 
the collateral provider's equity of redemption, on the collateral taker's 
duty of due care, or on the prohibition of appropriation of collateral assets 
by the collateral taker. Of course, this is merely a question of emphasis, as 
these different features of security interests are essentially compatible. 
They give shape to the fiduciary relationship between the parties. They 
safeguard the ownership interest of the collateral provider and exclude 
dispositions by the secured party under normal circumstances. A general 
right of disposal on the basis of a security interest, as set out in Article 5 
of the Collateral Directive, does not do justice to these considerations, 
which balance the interests of the different parties involved. 
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5.2.2 United States 
At the end of the nineteenth century and in the first decades of the 
twentieth century, a right of repledge was commonly applied in the 
course of margin lending arrangements. This practice was sanctioned in 
court cases and ultimately led to the recognition of the right to repledge 
in the UCC. Under American law, an impairing repledge is possible. 
Relatively recently, the American standard documentation for securities 
lending and derivatives transactions has taken an even more radical 
approach, by envisaging a security interest combined with a collateral 
taker's unlimited right to dispose of assets in the course of his own 
business. The documentation excludes the collateral provider's equity of 
redemption and envisages no interest of the collateral provider in the 
proceeds from a disposal. Moreover, the structure hardly seems com-
patible with a collateral taker's duty of reasonable care. The structure 
envisaged in the documentation excludes key characteristics of security 
interests, and is therefore, arguably, essentially that of an outright trans-
fer. Note that the American repo market shows that the outright transfer 
method is a perfectly viable way to provide collateral under American 
law. 
5.2.3 Europe 
The right of use on the basis of a security interest as set out in the Col-
lateral Directive is incompatible with the concept of a security interest 
under English, Dutch and German law.202 
a. English law 
According to English legal principles, the only way a collateral provider 
can grant a 'right of use' to a collateral taker is by way of an unambiguous 
outright transfer of all legal and/or beneficial interests. A general right of 
disposal cannot be granted on the basis of a security interest. The main 
reason for this is that a right of disposal for a collateral taker is in-
compatible with equitable principles in relation to security interests, such 
as the rule 'once a mortgage, always a mortgage', the equity of redemption 
and the prohibition on collateral benefits. 
202 For the approach taken in Danish and Italian law, which coinades on all major 
issues with that taken in German and Dutch law in particular, see the Right of Use 
Report 
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b. Dutch and German law 
In the section on Dutch and German law it was investigated whether a 
secured party's general right of disposal could be explained in a satis-
factory way by looking at the circumstances under which a party with a 
limited right (a pledgee or a usufructuary) can dispose of encumbered 
assets. The following cases provide no solution for explaining the Collat-
eral Directive's right of use: (1) The theory in relation to the enforcement 
of a security interest, as it is limited to default situations. (2) The Dutch 
repledge cannot provide an explanation, as the Collateral Directive's right 
of use not only allows the establishment of a security interest, but also an 
outright sale. (3) The doctrine on perishable goods cannot be applied, 
because the Collateral Directive's right of use relates to securities and 
cash, which are consumable but not perishable goods. (4) The theory of a 
non-owner's right of disposal granted on a contractual basis (applied, 
most importantly, in the case of a sale on commission, and in giving a 
collateral provider - but not a collateral taker - a right of disposal in reser-
vation of title arrangements and fiduciary transfers of title) also cannot be 
used as an explanation for the concept of a collateral taker's general right 
of disposal. This concept is not compatible with the mechanisms pro-
tecting the interests of collateral providers and their other creditors, which 
are characteristic of a security interest. 
In my view, the best way to interpret the Collateral Directive's con-
struction is by referring to the irregular structures, i.e. the irregular right 
of pledge, right of usufruct and custody. The irregular pledge comes 
closest to what the right of use is all about. In both cases, a general right 
of disposal is granted to the secured party. The section on Dutch and 
German law shows that it is the irregular pledge that matches the struc-
ture of the right of use envisaged by the Collateral Directive:203 
Security interest combined with a right of use I irregular pledge 
T=l; € T=2; € 
-* -« 
A *• Β »• C 
T=l; (irregular) pledge T=2; exercise of right 
plus right of disposal of disposal 
203 See also the diagrams and related explanatory comments in sections 4.5.2 and 4.6.2 
above. 
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1=4, return of € 1=3, € 
** »-
» • - « D 
7=4, equivalent assets 7=3, buying equivalent 
assets in the market 
The irregular pledge and the right of use envisaged in the Collateral 
Directive coincide on the following points: (1) the security interest is 
vested to secure a claim of the 'pledgee' against the 'pledgor'; (2) both con-
cepts entail a passing of ownership; (3) the collateral taker can enter into 
further trading with the 'pledged' assets in the course of his own business; 
and (4) the parties are under an obligation to transfer equivalent assets at 
the end of the transaction. A security interest combined with a right of use 
is therefore essentially an irregular pledge. 
The concept of 'replaceability' explains why ownership passes in the case 
of irregular pledge, usufruct or custody. Replaceability means that (1) the 
pledgee, usufructuary or custodian can dispose of the asset, and (2) is 
under a contractual obligation to transfer equivalent assets at a later 
moment. The result of consenting to such replaceability is that title passes 
and that the provider of the right of pledge or usufruct, or the client of the 
custodian, is left with a contractual claim. This claim ranks on a pan passu 
basis in the case of the collateral taker's insolvency.204 
Still, also if explained on the basis of the theory on irregular structures, the 
Collateral Directive's right of use exerts pressure on the system of 
property law. This is due to the fact that the Collateral Directive deviates 
from the irregular structures in respect of the ever crucial timing issue. In 
the irregular pledge, usufruct and custody, it is generally argued that 
ownership passes at the moment the irregular structure is entered into. 
The transferor loses his proprietary interest at the moment he consents to 
replaceability. From that moment on he is left with a contractual claim. It 
has also been argued, however, that it is possible to deviate from this prin-
cipal rule on the basis of a contract. The parties can agree that ownership 
passes at the moment of actual disposal. Article 5 of the Collateral Direc-
tive, which envisages that the ownership right of the collateral provider 
is maintained until the moment the collateral taker chooses to dispose of 
the pledged assets, follows this latter approach. 
204 In a loan of fungibles (verbruiklenmg under Dutch law, Darlehen under German law) 
assets are also essentially made replaceable. That is why under Dutch and German 
law a loan of fungibles, m principle, also leads to a transfer of ownership 
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In the period prior to the actual disposal by the collateral taker, the collat-
eral provider still seems to have his ownership and redemption rights. In 
fact though, his rights are not as solid as they would be in the case of an 
ordinary security interest without a general right of disposal. Not only are 
the rights mentioned subject to his own default, they also stop existing 
when the secured party exercises his right of disposal, which may be at 
any moment in time. Moreover, once the security provider has granted a 
right of use to a first secured party, his power to further dispose of the 
encumbered assets is considerably limited. He can only dispose of rights 
that are subject to the first secured party's general right of disposal and of 
a possible future claim for the delivery of equivalent assets. It has some-
times even been argued that his power of disposal ceases to exist at all. In 
my view, therefore, the original owner does not have a fully fledged pro-
prietary interest in the period until the right of disposal is exercised. In 
addition, the careful balance between the parties is disturbed. The collat-
eral provider's weak ownership and redemption rights, and the possibility 
that the secured party can end the fiduciary relationship between the 
parties at any moment he pleases (one meant precisely to protect the inter-
ests of the usually weaker collateral provider), are arguments against 
treating the structure as a security interest and in favour of treatment as 
an outright transfer. 
Upon a disposal of encumbered assets by the collateral taker, the collateral 
provider loses his proprietary interest in the encumbered assets definitely 
as well as his right to redeem the assets concerned. From the moment of 
actual disposal, he has a contractual claim for the transfer of equivalent 
assets only. In the event of the collateral taker's insolvency, his only 
remedy is to set this claim off against the value of the cash or securities 
received from the collateral taker. If, however, the prices of the financial 
collateral provided to the collateral taker have gone up (and this in the 
absence of proper margin arrangements), the collateral provider runs an 
unsecured credit risk in respect of the collateral taker. In this case his 
claim will have to compete with the claims of other unsecured creditors 
on the basis of the pari passu principle. 
The Collateral Directive says nothing about the question of whether 
ownership passes through the patrimony of the collateral taker upon a 
disposal, or falls directly into that of the third party acquirer. Two 
approaches can be taken. In line with the theory on the irregular struc-
tures, one could defend the position that ownership passes through the 
patrimony of the collateral taker. Alternatively, it is possible to follow the 
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approach that is often taken in the case of reservation of title arrange-
ments, which means that ownership flows directly from the original 
owner to the third party acquirer. 
The Collateral Directive poses the additional problem of proprietary 
substitution. Under Dutch law, proprietary substitution is only applied in 
a limited number of situations, such as in relation to insurance payments 
or damages due when pledged assets are damaged or destroyed, or in 
relation to the proceeds from a sale when pledged perishable assets have 
to be sold. In these instances, proprietary substitution takes place imme-
diately and automatically, and relates to all kinds of replacement assets. 
The Collateral Directive's rule of proprietary substitution is not com-
patible with this traditional approach. The Collateral Directive envisages 
proprietary substitution only in relation to equivalent assets after these 
have been transferred by the collateral taker, usually at the end of the 
transaction. This means that the collateral provider has an unsecured 
exposure towards the collateral taker during the entire course of a trans-
action. In practice, the Collateral Directive's rule is usually an empty shell, 
because a collateral taker will only transfer equivalent assets when the 
secured debt is fulfilled. At this moment, the security interest ceases to 
exist and proprietary substitution can no longer take place. 
5.2.4 Vertical relationships 
The Collateral Directive gives rise to an important additional policy issue. 
The directive's right of use does only not apply to transactions between 
commercial market participants in, for example, the over-the-counter 
market, but also to the relationship between a financial institution (e.g. a 
bank or a custodian) and its clients. A financial institution, with which a 
client has a securities account, for example, is under a fiduciary duty to 
take the interests of its clients into account. Compliance with this fiduciary 
duty is particularly important because a client is often in a weaker 
position than a financial institution. The right of use is a legal construction 
with far-reaching legal consequences. The client may not fully realise the 
consequences of a right of use, because when he grants the financial insti-
tution a right to 'use' he may not perceive this as a general right of dis-
posal. The client may nevertheless lose his proprietary interest in secu-
rities and be left with a contractual claim. 
In line with their fiduciary duties, it is submitted that financial institutions 
should explain the legal implications of a right of use to their clients. In 
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my view, financial institutions should explain that a pledge with a right 
of use is something essentially different from a traditional right of pledge, 
that there is no prohibition of appropriation, no duty of due care and no 
right of redemption to protect the client's ownership interest. It is, how-
ever, somewhat naive to rely fully on the ability and willingness of com-
mercial banks and custodians to explain to their clients what the implica-
tions of a right of use actually are (i.e. that the client loses his ownership 
right and is left with a contractual claim). Financial institutions are under 
strong economic pressure to use the assets of their clients. Because their 
interests are diametrically opposed to those of their clients, it seems ad-
visable not only to oblige financial institutions to inform their clients 
properly, but also to monitor their behaviour in practice. One may also 
wonder whether the stipulation of a right of use on the basis of generally 
applicable conditions is compatible with the financial institution's fidu-
ciary duties. 
If the outright transfer method is used, no complicated explanations about 
the deformed right of pledge are necessary; every investor should under-
stand that he loses his ownership right in this case. It is submitted that an 
unambiguous transfer of title by the client to the financial institution 
serves the interests of both parties. The client realises he loses his pro-
prietary interest, and the financial institution is free to dispose of the 
transferred assets as it wishes. From the point of view of investor pro-
tection, the outright transfer method is therefore preferable over a right 
of use on the basis of a security interest. These considerations are particu-
larly important if the client is not a major financial institution, but a small 
or medium-sized enterprise. 
5.2.5 Theory and its meaning in practice 
Has this chapter focused too much on theory and too little on what the 
law is seeking to achieve? Should theory be set aside for the sake of liquid 
markets? Promoting liquid markets is, of course, a very important, com-
mendable objective that deserves full support. As was shown in chapter 
III, liquid markets can easily be achieved by applying the outright transfer 
method, which is the market standard for the provision of collateral under 
repo, securities lending and derivatives transactions throughout Europe. 
The 'cost' of the additional construction of a security interest combined 
with a right of use is that the distinction between security interests and 
outright transfers fades. Of course, this has a theoretical side, but theory 
also serves practical purposes. People have different expectations when 
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establishing a security interest (they know they retain ownership unless 
they default on the secured debt), than when transferring title outright 
(they know they lose their proprietary status irrevocably and will often 
only have a contractual claim instead). Because the title transfer method 
is a suitable alternative for the construction found within the Collateral 
Directive, and has indeed been sanctioned by the Collateral Directive, 
there is no need to interfere with expectations that have been long estab-
lished in practice.205 
5.2.6 Future developments? 
Currently, the construction of a secured party's general right of disposal 
can be applied in the American and European securities markets. It 
should, however, be noted that the drafters of a UNIDROIT Preliminary 
Draft Convention on Substantive Rules regarding Intermediated Secu-
rities (who were partly also involved in drafting the Collateral Directive) 
currently consider an extended application of the construction in the 
securities markets on a world-wide basis. Moreover, the drafters of the 
UNIDROIT Convention go further than the Collateral Directive in two 
respects. They envisage a right of use that, in principle, (1) arises auto-
matically in respect of intermediated securities that are credited to a secu-
rities account of the collateral taker on the basis of a collateral agreement; 
and (2) may also be exercised in respect of collateral securities provided 
by natural persons. It may be clear that, in my view, these are regrettable 
developments.206 
They prompt the question of whether a further dissemination of the 
construction to other market segments is to be expected. Westrik has 
cautioned against a further erosion of the pledge concept. He points out 
that it is conceivable that collateral takers will also argue for the applica-
tion of the concept of a secured party's general right of disposal in other 
parts of the economy.207 
205 See, in the same sense, Fesevur 2005. 
206 See UNIDROIT 2006, Study LXXVIII - Doc. 42, March 2006, Appendix 2, chapter 
V, Article 25 (in connection with Article 5) and Article 27 (in connection with Article 
l(r)-(s)). 
207 See Westrik 2004 I. 
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5.2.7 Conclusion 
In my view, a security interest and a general right of disposal are two 
incompatible concepts. A general right of disposal cannot be reconciled 
with the fiduciary relationship that arises in the case of a security interest. 
A general right of disposal is at odds with the security provider's right of 
redemption, the security taker's duty of due care, the prohibition of 
appropriation (applicable under Dutch and German law), the English rule 
'once a mortgage, always a mortgage' and the English rule prohibiting 
collateral benefits. These different principles of pledge law basically 
protect the often weaker position of the collateral provider against the 
stronger position of the collateral taker. It is conceptually inconsistent to 
give the party against whom the collateral provider is protected (i.e. the 
collateral taker) the right to end the fiduciary relationship between the 
parties. My basic argument is, therefore, that when one focuses on content 
rather than form, the construction has more in common with an outright 
transfer than with a security interest. Under Dutch and German law, this 
construction should be characterised as an irregular pledge (i.e. an out-
right transfer). This would be in keeping with American and English law, 
in which a security interest combined with a right of use is materially the 
same as an outright transfer. 
5.3 The title transfer approach 
It was not necessary to introduce the construction of a security interest 
combined with a general right of disposal in the Collateral Directive. A 
right of use can also be granted on the basis of an outright transfer of title. 
The title transfer method promotes the liquidity of the financial markets 
equally well and has the additional advantage that its consequences are 
evident to all parties involved. 
The analyses in this chapter clearly show that market participants use the 
outright transfer method when entering into collateralised transactions. 
This is the approach of internationally used standard agreements, such as 
the Global Master Repurchase Agreement (repos) and the Global Master 
Securities Lending Agreement (securities lending). The European Master 
Agreement also applies the outright transfer method (repo, securities 
lending, provision of margin in derivatives transactions). Present practice 
in Germany and the Netherlands is that repos and securities lending are 
indeed structured as outright transfers. In the United Kingdom too, 
collateral is commonly provided on the basis of a transfer of title. This is 
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illustrated by the ISDA Margin Provisions (English law). The outright 
transfer method is also a perfectly viable way to provide collateral in the 
US, and is the standard in the American repo market. As market practice 
shows, it is certainly possible to reach the goal of liquid markets on the 
basis of the outright transfer approach.208 
5.4 Other issues 
This chapter has examined the right of use from a civil law point of view. 
Section 1.4 of the general introduction mentions a number of additional 
issues that should be considered, such as the treatment of this construc-
tion by custodians, where income and voting rights are concerned, and 
from the points of view of capital adequacy, accounting and tax regula-
tions. These issues have not been dealt with in this chapter, but a few 
tentative lines of thought can be suggested in line with the civil law 
analysis. It is, for example, important that a custodian registers a security 
interest combined with a general right of disposal as something essential-
ly different from a traditional security interest. If the collateral provider's 
right to dispose of the encumbered assets any further is terminated upon 
the establishment of a first security interest combined with a right of dis-
posal, as is sometimes proposed, this should also be registered. Other 
questions emerge as to who is allowed to receive income payments and, 
in the case of equity securities, who is allowed to execute voting rights, 
and from what moment? From a formal legal point of view, ownership 
only passes upon disposal of the encumbered assets by the collateral 
taker, even if up to that moment the collateral provider's ownership right 
is already seriously impaired. Arguably, the rights to receive income pay-
ments and to exercise voting rights therefore belong to the original owner 
until the moment of disposal, whereas after the moment of disposal they 
belong to the third party transferee. As far as capital adequacy, accounting 
and tax treatments of the construction are concerned, there seems room 
for a less formalistic approach that focuses more on content. A secured 
party's general right of disposal seriously impairs the ownership rights of 
the original owner and, in fact, renders the mechanisms protecting the 
interests of collateral providers inoperable. This is, in effect, no security 
interest. For this reason, it seems appropriate that for capital adequacy, 
accounting and tax purposes, the construction of a security interest com-
bined with a general right of disposal should be treated as an outright 
transfer from the moment it has been established. 
208 See also chapter III, in particular section 2. 
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5.5 Concluding remarks 
The objective of promoting liquid European cash and securities markets 
deserves full support. In my view, the construction of a security interest 
combined with a general right of disposal that has been designed to this 
end, however, does more harm than good. 
A 'right of use' on the basis of a security interest as envisaged in the Col-
lateral Directive gives a collateral taker the right to dispose of his counter-
party's assets under all circumstances. This is advantageous for collateral 
takers, who can now use pledged assets to earn money in the course of 
their own business. A collateral provider will usually, if in a position to 
do so, only grant a right of disposal in exchange for lower prices for finan-
cial services. The downside of this construction for collateral providers, 
however, is that the fiduciary protection mechanisms that are customarily 
in place in the case of a security interest to protect their interests are 
rendered inoperable because the collateral taker can at any moment in 
time dispose of the collateral assets. Until a disposal of the encumbered 
assets by the collateral taker, the collateral provider's ownership and re-
demption rights therefore have a particularly weak status, whereas the 
collateral provider loses all proprietary interest at the moment of actual 
disposal and is left with a contractual claim. A general right of disposal is 
not compatible with the nature of a security interest and essentially 
implies an outright transfer. In effect, this construction leads to an un-
necessary collapse of the distinction between the concepts of security 
interest and outright transfer. Unnecessary, because as market practice 
shows, the achievement of liquid markets could have been reached by 
sanctioning the outright transfer method only. 
In my view, it is not that objectionable to somewhat relax a collateral 
taker's fiduciary duties if the collateral provider and the collateral taker 
are equally powerful parties. The Collateral Directive, however, relaxes 
them substantially, if not fully, and moreover, is not limited to trans-
actions between financial institutions. The directive may also apply to 
transactions between major financial institutions and small and medium-
sized enterprises, or between a custodian and his clients. In such cases in 
particular, the erosion of the fiduciary relationship between security 
provider and taker is unacceptable. 
The new construction of a security interest combined with a general right 
of disposal has a shaky theoretical basis, blurs the useful distinction 
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between outright transfers and security interests, and seeks to enforce the 
position of collateral takers, who usually occupy a stronger position than 
collateral providers, in an unprecedented way. With regard to content, 
this construction can best be characterised and treated as an outright 
transfer for capital adequacy, accounting and tax purposes, for example. 
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ENFORCEMENT 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introductory remark 
This chapter examines the enforcement regime set out in the Collateral 
Directive. The Collateral Directive takes a liberal approach to the manner 
in which rights concerning financial collateral are enforced, such as the 
enforcement of a security interest or of contractual close-out netting 
provisions. In addition, the Collateral Directive, in line with the approach 
taken earlier in the Settlement Finality Directive, requires that certain 
rules of insolvency law are not applied to financial collateral arrange-
ments. 
1.2 The manner of enforcement 
The central issue in sections 2 and 3 below is the manner in which rights 
in respect of financial collateral are enforced under the Collateral Direc-
tive. Section 2 relates to the enforcement of financial collateral that has 
been provided on the basis of a security interest, section 3 deals with the 
enforcement of financial collateral provided by way of a title transfer. 
Because the enforcement of financial collateral can take place both in and 
outside of insolvency, the contents of sections 2 and 3 precede sections 4 
and 5, which relate to insolvency law only. 
The central issue in section 2 is the enforcement of a security interest. 
Attention is paid to the procedural requirements that are usually set out 
in national laws in respect of the enforcement of a security interest, and 
to the related issue of appropriation. The traditional approach under 
Dutch (and German) national law is compared to that of the Collateral 
Directive. The Collateral Directive has a number of far-reaching conse-
quences in this respect, because the directive essentially abolishes the core 
characteristics of security interests (outlined in section 1.3 of chapter III) 
of a specified manner of enforcement and the prohibition of appropria-
tion. The issue of the collateral provider's right to surplus value upon 
enforcement, one of the other core characteristics, is not dealt with in the 
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Collateral Directive and is also not discussed in this chapter. It must be 
determined under the national applicable law whether such a right exists.1 
In the case of a title transfer of financial collateral, enforcement upon 
default usually takes place by way of close-out netting. Contractual close-
out netting provisions are the topic of section 3. The Collateral Directive 
generally sanctions the enforceability of contractual close-out netting 
provisions. There are, however, important issues that the Collateral Direc-
tive leaves undetermined and that must still be decided under national 
law. Section 3 focuses on four of these topics. These are the issues of 
reciprocity and commensurability, voidable preference and the moment 
at which mutual obligations should be valued. 
1.3 Insolvency law 
The Collateral Directive and the Dutch implementing law are at variance 
with a number of general principles of Dutch insolvency law. The ap-
proach of the Collateral Directive was inspired by the Settlement Finality 
Directive, under which the retroactive effect of the declaration of insol-
vency was already abolished and certain legal acts were enforceable even 
after the declaration of insolvency. This approach has been followed in the 
Collateral Directive. Moreover, the Settlement Finality Directive deter-
mined that the rights of a collateral taker should not be affected by the 
insolvency of a collateral provider, which means, arguably, that a freeze 
period, for example, should have no effect on the enforcement of rights 
that are covered by this directive. Likewise, the Collateral Directive deter-
mines that a freeze period should not apply to financial collateral arrange-
ments. 
1 For Outch law, the Minister of Justice has indicated that after the implementation 
of the Collateral Directive any surplus value upon the enforcement of a right of 
pledge should also be paid to the collateral provider and his other creditors in line 
with Article 3:253 of the NCC. Arguably, the same is true for transfers of a fiduciary 
nature. As a matter of course, no such obligation exists in the event of an outright 
transfer. See sections 6 and 15 of the Additional Explanatory Memorandum (Nadere 
Memorie van Antwoord), Eerste Kamer, 2004-2005, 28 874, E; the Explanatory Com-
ments (Memorie van Toelichting), Tweede Kamer, 2004-2005, 30 138, no. 3, pp. 18-19; 
and the Report on a Written Consultation (Verslag van een schriftelijk overleg), Tweede 
Kamer, 2005-2006, 30 138, no. 6. See also Van Vliet 2005; and the Dutch Supreme 
Court's BTL Lease case of 18 November 2005, www.rechtspraak.nl, LJN AT8241, 
which case is also discussed in section 3.4.4 of chapter III. 
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Section 4 of this chapter deals with the abolition of the retroactive effect 
of the declaration of insolvency as envisaged in both the Settlement 
Finality Directive and the Collateral Directive. It also considers the protec-
tion of creditors under a financial collateral arrangement against the 
effects of insolvency after that declaration. As such, it becomes possible 
to determine by which legal acts the insolvent estate is bound. It is also 
important to establish whether the insolvent party's counterparty under 
a financial collateral agreement can enforce his rights immediately or 
whether he is bound by a freeze period. This issue is addressed in section 
5. 
1.4 Who benefits from the enforcement regime of the Collateral Di-
rective? 
A central issue in this chapter is the question of who benefits from the 
new enforcement regime of the Collateral Directive and the changes to in-
solvency law that the directive requires. Is there a special group of credi-
tors that benefits from the new regime? Who has to face the disadvantages 
of the new regime? 
The approach of the Collateral Directive in respect of enforcement has 
drawn the attention of a number of advisory and legislative bodies. The 
favouring of one particular group of creditors on the basis of a financial 
collateral arrangement, in this case, collateral takers, is necessarily detri-
mental to the position of all other creditors. In response to this the Euro-
pean Economic and Social Committee has noted that: 
It is vital to take account of this precedent, which may be extended to other types 
of creditors and thus pervert the principles of bankruptcy law and the corre-
sponding protection of creditors. 
Likewise, according to the Common Position: 
In order to strike the right balance between the need not to enlarge the scope of the 
Directive unduly to the detriment of the other creditors in an insolvency situation 
on the one hand and, on the other hand, the need to ensure that the aims of the 
Directive can be achieved, the Council has found it necessary to introduce in Article 
1(3) an option for Member States to limit the scope of the special regime laid down 
by the Directive to financial collateral arrangements where both parties belong to 
the institutions of a financial nature set out in Article l(2)(a) to (d). 
2 See section 3.4 of the Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee. 
3 See p. 21 of the Common Position. 
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In the course of Dutch and German parliamentary history, the dis-
criminatory effects of the Collateral Directive's enforcement regime have 
also attracted attention. As was mentioned in chapter I, for example, the 
Dutch Council of State has pointed out that the changes contained in the 
Collateral Directive in relation to pledge law have negative consequences 
for collateral providers (and their other creditors), and that the changes 
required in insolvency law have negative consequences for the position 
of those creditors who have not concluded a financial collateral agree-
ment.4 
This chapter investigates the basis of these concerns. 
This chapter considers the effects of the Settlement Finality Directive and 
the Collateral Directive on Dutch bankruptcy proceedings (faillissement) 
regulated in the Netherlands Bankruptcy Act.5 Throughout this chapter, 
the analysis of Dutch law is the central focus of attention.6 Sections 2 and 
3 contain some comparisons with German law. 
See the advice of the Dutch Council of State (Raad van State), quoted in section 3 of 
chapter I See also the debate throughout Dutch and German parliamentary history 
For Dutch law see also e g Keijser 2004, Westrik 20041, Van Erp 20041, in particular 
pp 540-542, Van Erp 2004 II, Westrik 2004 II, Meulman 2005, Van Erp 2005, 
Lieverse / Wiggers-Rust 2005; Verstijlen 2005; Snijders 2005, Van Vliet 2005 
No attention will be paid to comparable changes in relation to the suspension of 
payment proceedings (surseance van betaling) regulated in the NBC, chapter X 
('Emergency regulation') of the Credit System Supervision Act 1992 (Wet toezicht kre-
dietwezen 1992), chapter IX ('Emergency regulation') of the Insurance Undertakings 
Supervision Act 1993 (Wet toezicht verzekeringsbedrijf 1993); chapter 8 ('Emergency 
regulation and insolvency') of the Insurance Undertakings (Benefits in Kind for 
Funerals) Supervision Act (Wet toezicht natura-uitvaartverzekeringsbednjf) For the 
changes to these regulations as required by the two directives see Articles I and IIB 
of the Dutch law implementing the Settlement Finality Directive (Staatsblad 1998, 
714) and Articles II, V, VI and VII of the Dutch law implementing the Collateral 
Directive (Staatsblad 2006,15) 
Note that the Dutch Minister of Justice has appointed an advisory committee on 
insolvency law (Commissie Insolventierecht), which at present is working on a pro-
posal for a thorough revision of the Dutch Bankruptcy Code For more information 
see www justitie ni The text below only considers current Dutch insolvency law 
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2. THE LIBERAL ENFORCEMENT OF A SECURITY INTEREST 
AND THE ABOLITION OF THE PROHIBITION OF APPROPRI-
ATION 
2.1 Introduction 
This section focuses on the approach of the Collateral Directive in respect 
of the enforcement of a security interest in financial collateral. Article 4 of 
the Collateral Directive distinguishes two different methods of deter-
mining the value of securities that are subject to a security interest. Secu-
rities can be sold or appropriated. The value of the securities is deter-
mined on the basis of the sale price or, in the case of appropriation, on the 
basis of the agreement between the parties in this respect. This value, or, 
if the financial collateral consists of cash, the value of that cash, is sub-
sequently set off against, or applied in discharge of the outstanding 
obligations of the counterparty. 
This section discusses the interrelated issues concerning the manner in 
which a security interest is enforced (section 2.2) and the prohibition of 
appropriation (section 2.3). According to the Collateral Directive, it should 
be possible to enforce a security interest in relation to financial collateral 
without formal requirements. It also suggests that the prohibition of 
appropriation, as it is applied under Dutch and German law, for example, 
should be abolished.7 
2.2 The enforcement of a security interest without formal require-
ments 
2.2.2 The traditional approach 
The enforcement of security interests under Dutch and German law has 
traditionally been subject to strict rules that are, to a large extent, manda-
tory. The main goal of strict enforcement procedures is to protect the 
security provider (and his creditors) by preventing abuse and optimising 
proceeds. As such, enforcement procedures give shape to the fiduciary 
relationship between the collateral provider and collateral taker. For 
pledge law, these strict rules of enforcement have been codified in the 
7 See also section 8.7 of chapter II and section 1.3 of chapter III above. 
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Dutch and German civil codes.8 In the case of a fiduciary transfer of title, 
these rules of pledge law were (under old Dutch law) customarily applied 
by way of analogy. German law is somewhat more liberal in this respect 
and leaves room for the original owner and the fiduciary to agree on the 
manner of enforcement themselves.910 
a. General rules 
Under Dutch law, the most important procedural requirements for the 
enforcement of a right of pledge are the following. Before enforcing a 
right of pledge, a pledgee must give prior notification of his intention to 
do so to the debtor, to the pledgor (if this is not the same person as the 
debtor) and to any other parties involved. The parties can agree, however, 
that there is no such obligation to notify.11 There are different ways in 
which the actual enforcement of a right of pledge can take place. One 
method of enforcement is a sale of the pledged assets in an auction with 
a public character. By conducting a public sale, the maximisation of the 
proceeds is guaranteed.12 Dutch law allows other ways of enforcement, 
provided permission has been granted by the interim provisions judge 
(voorzieningemechter). In this instance, the role of the judge guarantees an 
objective manner of establishing the value of the pledged assets.13 A third 
option, which is often applied in practice, is that the pledgor (or the insol-
vency administrator in his place) and the pledgee conclude an agreement 
on a different manner of enforcement. Such an agreement, though, can 
only be concluded after the moment the pledgee has become entitled to 
realise his right of pledge. Only from that moment onwards is the pledg-
or/credit taker no longer in a dependent position. He can now properly 
represent his interests and the value of the pledged assets can be deter-
mined in a fair way.14 Enforcement must take place in line with one of 
these three different options. It is not possible to agree on another method 
of enforcement. After the completion of the enforcement, the debtor must 
8 For Dutch law, see Articles 3:248 et seq. of the NCC. For German law, see in par-
ticular §§ 1221,1234-1241 and 1245-1246 of the GCC. For the text of a number of key 
provisions in English, see section 3.3.2 of chapter III. 
9 On fiduciary transfers of title see sections 1.3 and 3.2 of chapter III above. 
10 On the enforcement of a security interest, see the Principles of European Insolvency 
Law, in particular § 9 ('Security rights and set-off), pp. 57-59. On the importance of 
realising maximum proceeds for the benefit of the joint creditors, see the Principles 
of European Insolvency Law, § 12, pp. 79-82. 
11 See Article 3:249 of the NCC. 
12 See Article 3:250 of the NCC. 
13 See Article 3:251(1) of the NCC. 
14 See Article 3:251 (2) of the NCC. 
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again be notified, unless this obligation has been excluded on the basis of 
a contract.15 
German law also envisages a notification duty for the pledgee before and 
after the sale of pledged assets.16 A public sale is one of the ways in which 
the actual enforcement can take place.17 Other methods of enforcement 
have been envisaged in §§ 1245 and 1246 of the GCC. § 1245 of the GCC 
allows an agreement between the pledgor and the pledgee for a means of 
enforcement other than public sale. Essential parts of this agreement, 
however, can only be concluded after the moment of default, when the 
pledgor/credit taker is no longer in a dependent position. In addition, 
§ 1246 of the GCC allows other reasonable ways of enforcement, sanc-
tioned by a judge if necessary. In all cases, as in Dutch law, there are 
mechanisms in place (a public sale, an agreement after the moment of 
default, or intervention by a judge) that guarantee an objective valuation 
of the pledged assets. 
The rationale of the different methods of enforcement available under 
Dutch and German law is to generate a fair value so that the rights of the 
collateral provider and his other creditors will not be prejudiced. In all 
cases, there is a mechanism in place that guarantees a more or less ob-
jective price, such as a public auction, the permission of a judge or an 
agreement after the moment of default. These mechanisms guarantee a 
level of objectivity, and prevent abuse by the security taker. 
b. Cash 
If a right of pledge has been established in relation to cash, there is no 
need for special procedures to establish the value of that cash. On the 
basis of Article 3:255 of the NCC a pledgee is therefore, under Dutch law, 
allowed to have recourse to it without delay and without formal require-
ments, as soon as he can demand the fulfilment of his claim. 
c. Securities 
For securities that are traded on an exchange or a market, a special 
enforcement procedure is also laid down by Dutch and German law. In 
this case, it is crucial to determine a fair price for the securities involved. 
15 See Article 3:252 of the NCC. 
16 See §§ 1234 and 1241 of the GCC. 
17 See §§ 1235-1240 of the GCC. 
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In order to guarantee a level of objectivity in this respect, both Dutch and 
German law envisage a role for one or more professional intermediaries 
in the sale of the securities. The function of this intermediary is the 
realisation of a fair market price in an unbiased, objective manner. For 
example. Article 250(2) of the current NCC allows a sale on a market or 
exchange, but demands that such a sale takes place through a professional 
intermediary.18 In order to guarantee an objective price. Article 1201(2) of 
the old NCC even required the intervention of two professional inter­
mediaries.19 Likewise, German law envisages a role for an independent 
intermediary in § 1221 of the GCC.20 The German legislator has explicitly 
rejected a sale by the pledgee himself, without the intervention of an 
intermediary: 
In Hannover (§ 48) and Oldenburg (Art 21), however, the legislator has gone one 
step further First, the execution of the sale of securities with a market price has 
been left to the pledgee himself The draft [of the GCC, TK] does not follow this 
example, because it does not result in insubstantial harm to the security of the 
pledgor2 1 
In the First Chamber of Parliament, the Dutch Minister of Justice has 
expressed the view that an intermediary in the sense of Article 250(2) of 
the NCC does not necessarily have to be independent. The minister is of 
the view that, if the collateral taker can be qualified as an 'intermediary', 
the collateral taker can enforce his security himself. This view, though, 
does not do justice to the function of the intermediary, i.e. obtaining a fair 
and objective price. The views of the minister have probably been politi­
cally motivated by his wish to convince the First Chamber of Parliament 
of the quality of the first draft Dutch law implementing the Collateral 
Directive, which was nonetheless rejected. Historically, an intermediary 
18 See the Parliamentary History of the NCC, Boek 3, Vermogensrecht m het algemeen. 
Article 3.9 2 11 
19 See Article 1201(2) of the old NCC in Fruin 1990 See also the older and somewhat 
more elaborate text of Article 1202 of the Netherlands Civil Code of 1838 
20 See the Drafters of the GCC, pp 859-861 ('£ Befriedigung aus Papieren, welche 
Borsenkurs haben') 
21 See the Drafters of the GCC, ρ 860 Translation TK Original German text 'Man ist 
aber in Hannover (§ 48) und in Oldenburg (Art 21) noch einen Schritt weiter gegan­
gen Erstens hat man die Ausfuhrung des Verkaufs bei kurshabenden Inhaber-
papieren dem Glaubiger selbst überlassen Diesem Vorgange folgt der Entwurf 
nicht, weil derselbe der Sicherheit des Verpfanders nicht unwesentlichen Abbruch 
thut' 
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in the sense of Article 250(2) of the NCC has always been truly independ-
ent.22 
The importance of an independent intermediary becomes apparent when 
one considers the concepts of 'market' and 'exchange'. The valuation by 
intermediaries may not be strictly needed in the case of securities that are 
listed on a firmly established market or exchange with transparent prices, 
such as the AEX. In this case, it is relatively easy to establish market prices 
in an objective manner. This, however, is not true for securities that are 
not quoted and traded on such a market or exchange. It is much more 
difficult to determine objective prices in the case of less established mar-
kets, such as an alternative trading platform, a market in which only a 
limited number of market participants take part, or the over-the-counter 
market. Prices on such markets are not necessarily transparent and it may 
not instantly be clear whether a higher price can be obtained elsewhere. 
In such cases, the services of an intermediary are indispensable. Only the 
intervention of an objective intermediary can, in this case, guarantee opti-
mal proceeds for the collateral provider and his other creditors. 
2.2.2 The liberal approach of the Collateral Directive 
The approach of the Collateral Directive in respect of enforcement differs 
fundamentally from the traditional approach under Dutch and German 
law. Under Article 4 of the Collateral Directive a pledgee is able to choose 
between a sale and, if this has been agreed upon, appropriation.23 In the 
case of a sale of securities, the Collateral Directive envisages a liberal 
enforcement regime. Basically, the Collateral Directive allows every 
method of sale upon which collateral provider and collateral taker agree. 
Formal requirements are prohibited.24 This means, for example, that prior 
notification is no longer needed (such as required under Article 3:249 of 
the NCC) and that the formal requirements, such as a public sale or the 
permission of a judge, are also dispensed with (see Articles 3:250 and 251 
of the NCC). Even though a prohibition of these formal requirements also 
means that the protection they offer to the collateral provider and his 
creditors is relinquished, a number of arguments can be put forward in 
favour of this approach. 
22 See the report of the debate in the First Chamber of the Dutch Parliament on 1 
March 2005, EK 17, p. 764. 
23 See Articles 4(l)and4(2)of the CD. The issue of appropriation will be discussed in 
section 2.3 below. 
24 See Article 4(4) of the CD. 
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The most important reason for the liberal enforcement regime of the Col-
lateral Directive is that formal requirements usually prevent immediate 
enforcement. By ensuring rapid enforcement, the Collateral Directive 
intends to promote the continued liquidity of the financial markets. By 
allowing direct enforcement, contagion effects on the counterparties of a 
defaulting market participant are limited. This means a reduction of 
systemic risk. In addition to a limitation of systemic risk, the following 
arguments can be put forward to justify a deviation from strict rules 
relating to the enforcement of a security interest. First, the transactions 
that fall within the scope of the Collateral Directive are usually entered 
into by large, professional market participants. Because these parties are 
approximately in an equal power position, they will, as a rule, agree on a 
reasonable mechanism for valuation. Secondly, the Collateral Directive 
leaves room for the national legislator to determine that enforcement 
should take place in a commercially reasonable manner. This test can, 
however, only take place a posteriori, i.e. only after the enforcement has 
been completed.25 All in all, this means that there are sound arguments in 
favour of the liberal regime of the Collateral Directive where major mar-
ket participants are concerned. 
However, in the case of small and medium-sized enterprises the argu-
ments that justify a deviation from the traditional enforcement regime are 
not valid. The volume of the transactions entered into by such enterprises 
is so much smaller that they can hardly be deemed to pose a risk to the 
continued liquidity of the markets for cash and securities. In addition, 
such enterprises are not as powerful as major financial institutions. They 
are not in a position to stipulate reasonable contractual mechanisms for 
valuation, which makes it even more important to apply the fiduciary 
principles that protect their interests. Moreover, because of their limited 
size, they may not be equipped with the expertise necessary to determine 
a posteriori if securities have been valued in line with commercially 
reasonable market prices, and thus whether it is feasible to start legal 
proceedings against their counterparty. Arguably, small and medium-
sized enterprises should therefore fall outside the scope of the Collateral 
Directive, as is allowed by Article 1(3) of the Collateral Directive. 
Note that, unfortunately. Article 24 of the March 2006 UNIDROIT Prelim-
inary Draft Convention on Substantive Rules regarding Intermediated 
Securities, which relates to the enforcement of security interests over 
25 On this latter issue, see recital 17 and Article 4(6) of the CD. 
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intermediated securities, takes a comparable approach. Like the Collateral 
Directive, this provision sets out a liberal enforcement regime for security 
interests which can be determined in an agreement between the parties 
and is not subject to national mandatory rules relating to enforcement.26 
The only requirement allowed is that enforcement takes place in a com-
mercially reasonable manner.27 This requirement may indeed prove useful 
in transactions between major market participants, but, as in the case of 
the Collateral Directive, it does not necessarily lead to fair results in the 
case of small entities (or even natural persons)28 that have little if any im-
pact on liquidity and only limited access to relevant information about 
market prices. 
2.2.3 Implementation in the Netherlands 
As far as the manner of enforcement is concerned, the Dutch law im-
plementing the Collateral Directive does not pay sufficient attention to the 
position of collateral providers. The Dutch Minister of Justice has in-
dicated in the course of the parliamentary proceedings that under the new 
Article 7:54(2) of the NCC a collateral taker who is a professional inter-
mediary (tussenpersoon in het vak) is himself allowed to sell the collateral 
assets on the market to the counterparty of his choice.29 Most financial 
institutions are indeed professional intermediaries, which means that they 
can enforce a security interest in respect of financial collateral themselves. 
This also means that there is no mechanism in place to guarantee that 
optimum proceeds will be realised for the collateral provider and his 
creditors. It is clear that this is a deviation from the Dutch law that was in 
force before the implementation of the Collateral Directive. The most 
relevant provision in this respect is Article 3:250(2) of the NCC, which in 
all circumstances requires at least one objective and independent inter-
mediary when a right of pledge in respect of securities is enforced. This 
provision excludes the enforcement of a security interest by a collateral 
taker himself. Article 7:54 of the NCC deviates from this traditional ap-
26 See UNIDROIT 2006, Study LXXVin - Doc. 42, March 2006, Appendix 2, Article 24. 
27 See UNIDROIT 2006, Study LXXVIII - Doc. 42, March 2006, Appendix 2, Article 
24(4). 
28 See UNIDROIT 2006, Study LXXVIII - Doc. 42, March 2006, Appendix 2, Article 27. 
29 See the Explanatory Comments (Memorie van Toelichting) to Article 7:54 NCC in 
Tweede Kamer, 2002-2003, 28 874, no. 3, p. 17; Tweede Kamer, 2004-2005, 30 138, no. 
3, p. 18. 
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proach and under this new provision objective prices are therefore not 
guaranteed.30 
In addition, the Dutch Minister of Justice has failed to appreciate that the 
terms 'market' and 'market price' are not unequivocal concepts. The 
minister has argued, on the contrary, that the prices of the securities that 
fall within the scope of the Collateral Directive and the Dutch imple­
menting law can always be established easily and objectively, without the 
interference of any third party. This view is not necessarily in line with 
reality. In respect of securities that are traded on the AEX it may be 
possible to objectively determine their value. But this is different for other 
securities, which are traded on other markets, such as alternative trading 
platforms or the over-the-counter market. The prices on these markets can 
differ. Taking the big transaction volumes on the collateral markets into 
account, even a small price difference may have considerable financial 
consequences.31 
These issues may not be that important in the relationship between two 
professional participants in the financial markets, both of which are in an 
equal power position, and have easy access to information about price 
levels in different trading platforms. The Dutch regulation, however, 
makes small and medium-sized enterprises, to a large extent, dependent 
on the credit taker to whom they have provided collateral, usually a major 
financial institution. The financial institution has easy access to infor­
mation, whereas the enterprise usually does not, in any case not to the 
extent that the collateral taker does. The financial institution therefore has 
the power to determine how a valuation is to take place. The small or 
medium-sized enterprise pays for the absence of an independent third 
party. 
30 On the issue of enforcement see also sections 15,17, 19 and 22 (p 21) of the Ad­
ditional Explanatory Memorandum (Nadere Memorie van Antwoord), Eerste Kamer, 
2004-2005,28 874, E This memorandum does not recognise that there is a substan­
tial difference to the law m force before the Collateral Directive was implemented 
31 On this issue, see Eerste Kamer, 2003-2004, Β, ρ 4, Eerste Kamer, 2003-2004, 28 874, 
C, ρ 6, Eerste Kamer, 2004-2005, 28 874, E, sections 15, 17, 19 and 22 (p 21), the 
report of the debate m the First Chamber of Parliament on 1 March 2005, EK 17, ρ 
753 and ρ 764, Tweede Kamer, 2004-2005, 30 138, no 3, ρ 13 and pp 17-18 For the 
approach of the German legislator see Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung, Entwurf 
eines Gesetzes zur Umsetzung der Richtlinie 2002/47/EG vom 6 ]uni 2002 über Finanz-
stcherheiten und zur Änderung des Hypothekenbankgesetzes und anderer Gesetze, Bundes-
rat, Drucksache 563/03, 15 August 2003, ρ 21. 
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The Dutch legislator has tried to mitigate this negative effect in two ways. 
The first attempt was set out in a Ministerial Amendment (Noia van Wijzi-
ging), which envisaged that the parties could agree upon a role for the 
interim provisions judge (voorzieningenrechter) in the enforcement pro-
ceedings.32 The resulting provision of Article 7:54(4) of the NCC provides 
no relief, however. If a stronger credit provider is not in favour of a 
contractual provision on the basis of which a judge has the power to act 
as an independent third party in the enforcement proceedings, the judge 
is then 'out of the game'. 
The second attempt is the remark by the Minister of Justice that a judge 
can examine a posteriori if enforcement has taken place in a commercially 
reasonable manner. This approach is in line with Article 4(6) of the Collat-
eral Directive. This latter provision has not led to an explicit imple-
menting provision in Dutch law. In this respect, the Minister of Justice has 
referred, however, to possible actions by the collateral provider on the 
basis of contractual default (wanprestatie) or tort (onrechtmatige daad). 
Essentially, Articles 3:250 and 251 of the NCC and Article 4(6) of the Col-
lateral Directive are elaborations of the more general principle that parties 
should behave reasonably and fairly towards one another. For this reason, 
it is indeed arguable that the party who did not enforce in a commercially 
reasonable manner can be sued on the basis of either contractual default 
or tort. Still, this approach fails to touch upon the core of the problem. On 
what basis should a small or medium-sized enterprise, in the absence of 
a professional third party, decide if a legal action against the collateral 
taker has any chance of success? All in all, the lack of specialized, objec-
tive information works to the disadvantage of small or medium-sized 
enterprises.33 
An additional issue of a more technical nature, which has received quite 
a lot of attention in the course of the implementation of the provisions of 
the Collateral Directive relating to the enforcement of a right of pledge 
over financial collateral, concerns the relationship between the provisions 
of the NCC concerning the right of pledge and set-off. Under traditional 
Dutch pledge law, a pledgee sells pledged assets upon default and has 
recourse to the proceeds. Because he has no obligation to hand over the 
sale proceeds to the pledgor before he has had recourse (afdrachtverplich-
32 See Tweede Kamer, 2003-2004, 28 874, no. 7. 
33 For the view of the Dutch Minister of Justice see sections 15,17,19 and 22 (p. 21) of 
the Additional Explanatory Memorandum (Nadere Memorie van Antwoord), Eerste 
Kamer, 2004-2005, 28 874, E. 
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ting) - he is only obliged to pay the pledgor any surplus value upon 
recourse - there is no possibility of invoking the set-off of such an obliga-
tion to hand over the sale proceeds and the secured claim. Nevertheless, 
in Article 7:54(1) of the NCC the Dutch legislator follows Article 4 of the 
Collateral Directive, which primarily seems to use set-off terminology in 
an economic sense, in applying set-off (verrekening) terminology in 
relation to the enforcement of a right of pledge over financial collateral.34 
This is remarkable because under Dutch law, the right of pledge and set-
off are two distinct legal constructions, each subject to separate legal 
provisions notably in Book 3 and Book 6 of the NCC. The approach of the 
Dutch legislator therefore leads to some confusion. Should the general 
pledge or set-off provisions be applied in addition to Article 7:54 of the 
NCC when a right of pledge in respect of financial collateral is enforced? 
Pursuant to parliamentary questions in this respect, the government has 
put forward that, in principle, the provisions of pledge law prevail, 
whereas set-off provisions can only be applied when they do not conflict 
with provisions of pledge law. An easier, somewhat less confusing 
approach would have been to implement Article 4 of the Collateral Direc-
tive by referring exclusively to the Dutch provisions of pledge law.35 
2.3 No prohibition of appropriation? 
The issue of appropriation is closely related to the mandatory enforce-
ment regime discussed in section 2.2 above. Under general rules of both 
Dutch and German law, a contractual provision that gives a pledgee the 
power to appropriate pledged assets is void.36 This is self-evident, because 
if such a provision were valid, it would be possible to avoid the man-
datory rules of enforcement. If the parties could simply agree on appro-
priation by the collateral taker, there would be no mechanism that would 
guarantee an objective valuation of the pledged assets. In practice, a 
collateral taker can appropriate but only if the formal requirements 
concerning the manner of enforcement, which were discussed above, have 
been met. The rationale of this combination of different provisions is the 
prevention of misuse by a dominant collateral taker, and the optimisation 
34 See also Article 7:53(3) of the NCC. 
35 On this issue, see Eerste Kamer, 2004-2005, 28 874, D, p. 3; Eerste Kamer, 2004-2005, 
28 874, E, section 6; the report of the debate in the First Chamber of Parliament on 
1 March 2005, EK17, p. 752 and p. 761; Tweede Kamer, 2004-2005,30 138, no. 3, p. 14 
and p. 17. See also the debate on this issue in Lieverse / Wiggers-Rust 2005; Ver-
stijlen 2005, section 4.2; Faber 2005, no. 111. 
36 See Article 3:235 of the NCC and § 1229 of the GCC. 
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of proceeds for the benefit of the collateral provider and his other credi-
tors. After all, a prescribed method of enforcement offers more guarantees 
that maximum proceeds will be realised, than appropriation and valua-
tion on the basis of a contract that has possibly been dictated by the collat-
eral taker. 
The Collateral Directive deviates from the traditional approach under 
Dutch and German law, in that it allows parties to agree that pledged 
securities are appropriated and that their valuation takes place in accord-
ance with contractual provisions.37 Generally, this new approach is fa-
vourable to collateral takers and detrimental to collateral providers and 
their creditors. 
On the basis of Article 4(3) of the Collateral Directive, those Member 
States of the European Union that do not recognise the appropriation 
method are allowed to ignore this method when implementing the direc-
tive. However, the prohibition of appropriation has little added value if 
the requirements for the enforcement of a security interest are abolished. 
A collateral taker who would wish to appropriate the assets could simply 
sell them to an affiliated entity - without being hindered by tedious re-
quirements - and subsequently, buy them back from that entity. In addi-
tion, it has been argued in section 2.2 on the enforcement of security inter-
ests above that there are good reasons for a liberal enforcement regime in 
the case of major market participants. For the same reasons, contractual 
arrangements in respect of appropriation are acceptable in the case of 
transactions between market participants who are equally powerful. That 
the prohibition of appropriation can be removed when major financial 
market participants are concerned is therefore a position easy to defend. 
It is, however, quite unacceptable that the interests of weaker market 
participants, such as small and medium-sized enterprises, are simply cast 
aside. The strict enforcement procedures and the prohibition of appro-
priation are features of the fiduciary relationship between collateral 
provider and taker, the application of which is particularly important in 
the case of weaker economic players. The combination of the Collateral 
Directive's liberal enforcement regime and the possibility of appropriation 
is at odds with this objective of protection. Where small and medium-
37 See Article 4(1-2) of the CD. For a comparable approach see the UNIDROIT Prelimi-
nary Draft Convention on Substantive Rules regarding Intermediated Securities, 
UNIDROIT 2006, Study LXXVIII - Doc. 42, March 2006, Appendix 2, Article 
24(l)(b). 
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sized enterprises are concerned, the directive benefits collateral takers to 
a disproportionate extent. This is a good reason to exclude these enter-
prises from the scope of the Collateral Directive. 
3. CLOSE-OUT NETTING 
3.1 Introduction 
This section investigates whether national rules relating to netting or set-
off8 continue to play a role in light of the Collateral Directive's rule that 
contractual close-out netting provisions should be enforceable. 
3.1.1 What is netting? 
When a party invokes netting or a set-off against a counterparty, he essen-
tially fulfils an obligation towards that counterparty even if no actual, 
physical payments take place. At the same time, he receives payment in 
respect of a claim which he has against that counterparty (up to the 
amount of the lesser obligation). The result of netting is that two recipro-
cal debts are (at least in part) fulfilled. In insolvency, this means that if 
netting can be enforced by a creditor, then that creditor fulfils an obliga-
tion towards the insolvent estate and at the same time receives payment 
from the estate. A creditor who is in a position to invoke netting is there-
fore in a better position than creditors who do not have this option. 
Netting is an exception to the pari passu or paritas creditorum principle in 
insolvency, which means that all creditors are treated on an equal 
footing.39 A right to invoke netting in fact gives a creditor a preferential 
position, which can be compared to that of a pledgee, for example.40 It is 
for this reason that national systems of law usually impose limitations on 
set-off, in particular in cases of insolvency.41 
38 No sharp distinction is made between the terms 'netting' and 'set-off. 
39 Under Dutch law, the pari passu principle appears in Article 3:277(1) of the NCC. 
See also the Principles of European Insolvency Law, § 12.2 ('Ranking of claims -
paritas creditorum'), pp. 81-82. 
40 Annex D of the Commission Working Document, pp. 2-3, phrases this as follows: 
'close-out netting, to the extent that it applies in the context of insolvency pro-
ceedings, may be analysed as involving the appropriation or destruction of an asset 
of the insolvent party and, therefore, as inconsistent with the principle of pari passu 
distribution of assets among creditors.' 
41 On set-off in insolvency see the Principles of European Insolvency Law, § 9.3, pp. 
60-61. 
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3.1.2 Close-out netting under GMRA and GMSLA 
As was already outlined above, the standard documentation for repo and 
securities lending transactions usually contains contractual close-out 
netting provisions that are applicable in the event of default, including 
insolvency. The close-out netting process set out in, for example, the 
GMRA and GMSLA consists of three stages. These stages are (1) early ter­
mination and the acceleration of all rights and obligations (automatically 
or upon notice), (2) valuation of all rights and obligations and, if neces­
sary, conversion into a single currency, and (3) set-off, resulting in a single 
monetary obligation by one party to the other.42 
3.2.3 The approach of the Collateral Directive and the role of national law 
The Collateral Directive generally sanctions comparable contractual ar­
rangements that aim at the netting of cash and securities upon the occur­
rence of an event of default, such as insolvency.43 Article 7 of the directive 
relates to the 'Recognition of close-out netting provisions' and states: 
1. Member States shall ensure that a close-out netting provision can take effect in 
accordance with its terms: 
(a) notwithstanding the commencement or continuation of winding-up proceedings 
or reorganisation measures in respect of the collateral provider and/or the collateral 
taker; and/or 
(b) notwithstanding any purported assignment, judicial or other attachment or 
other disposition of or in respect of such rights. 
2. Member States shall ensure that the operation of a close-out netting provision 
may not be subject to any of the requirements that are mentioned in Article 4(4), 
unless otherwise agreed by the parties. 
Pursuant to subsection 2 of this provision, close-out netting should not be 
subject to formal requirements in the sense of Article 4(4) of the Collateral 
Directive, which determine that: 
(a) prior notice of the intention to realise must have been given; 
(b) the terms of the realisation be approved by any court, public officer or other 
person; 
(c) the realisation be conducted by public auction or in any other prescribed 
manner; or 
(d) any additional time period must have elapsed. 
42 On this issue, see also section 4.7 of chapter II and section 3.3.3.b ('Recovery 
function') of chapter ΙΠ. 
43 See recitals 5,14 and 15, and Articles 2(1 )(n) and 7 of the CD. 
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Recital 14 explains the objectives behind the liberal close-out netting 
regime of Article 7 of the Collateral Directive. It makes clear that close-out 
netting enables market participants to express the risk in respect of a 
counterparty on a net basis.44 Recital 14 of the Collateral Directive states: 
The enforceability of bilateral close-out netting should be protected, not only as an 
enforcement mechanism for title transfer financial collateral arrangements in-
cluding repurchase agreements but more widely, where close-out netting forms 
part of a financial collateral arrangement. Sound risk management practices com-
monly used in the financial market should be protected by enabling participants to 
manage and reduce their credit exposures arising from all kinds of financial 
transactions on a net basis, where the credit exposure is calculated by combining 
the estimated current exposures under all outstanding transactions with a counter-
party, setting off reciprocal items to produce a single aggregated amount that is 
compared with the current value of the collateral. 
On the whole, the Collateral Directive is therefore favourable to the credi-
tor who can invoke netting under a financial collateral arrangement. 
However, the Collateral Directive does not offer certainty in all respects. 
As was already mentioned in section 8.7.3 of chapter II, national law still 
plays an important role when determining if and under what conditions 
close-out netting can take effect. This continuing role of national law 
follows from recital 15 of the Collateral Directive. This recital states in 
general terms that restrictions or requirements under national law relating 
to set-off (or netting) should be taken into account. By way of an example 
this recital makes clear that it should be determined under national law 
whether claims are reciprocal and are thus eligible for set-off. Another 
issue that should, according to the recital, be considered under national 
law is whether set-off can take place in light of the knowledge (actual or 
construed) about his counterparty's insolvency possessed by the party 
invoking the set-off. This brings to mind rules of voidable preference. The 
text of recital 15 reads as follows: 
This Directive should be without prejudice to any restrictions or requirements 
under national law on bringing into account claims, on obligations to set-off, or on 
netting, for example relating to their reciprocity or the fact that they have been 
concluded prior to when the collateral taker knew or ought to have known of the 
commencement (or of any mandatory legal act leading to the commencement) of 
winding-up proceedings or reorganisation measures in respect of the collateral 
provider. 
44 See also section 15 of the Opinion of the European Central Bank. 
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The approach of recital 15 is remarkable because it thwarts much of what 
recital 14 and Article 7 of the Collateral Directive aim to achieve. It should 
be noted that it was introduced at a late stage in the legislative process. 
Recital 15 first appeared in the text agreed upon by the ECOFIN Council 
on 13th December 2001.45 The ECOFIN text gives no explanation for the 
sudden appearance of this recital. Its background may be the following. 
As was indicated above, close-out netting is favourable to the creditor 
who can invoke netting, but also results in the disappearance of assets to 
which this creditor's counterparty is entitled, which is disadvantageous 
to all other creditors of that counterparty. Possibly one or more delega-
tions at the ECOFIN meeting wished to establish some limitations on the 
liberal netting regime proposed by the Collateral Directive and therefore 
proposed the text of recital 15. By referring to national law, the national 
law restrictions on netting again come into play, and they, in turn, deter-
mine how the interests of different groups of creditors are taken into 
account. 
In addition to the issues mentioned explicitly in recital 15 of the Collateral 
Directive, there are also other topics in relation to close-out netting that 
should be determined under national law, simply because the Collateral 
Directive is silent on those issues. An important example is the moment 
in time at which the claims of the parties who are subject to close-out 
netting should be valued. This issue is not dealt with in the Collateral 
Directive and should therefore be determined under the national law 
concerned. 
3.2.4 The approach of the Dutch legislator 
Dutch law contains a liberal set-off regime. The general rules relating to 
set-off are set out in Articles 6:127 et seq. of the NCC, whereas Articles 53 
and 54 of the NBC relate to set-off in cases of insolvency.46 Article 6:127 of 
the NCC sets out five requirements for set-off: (1) the claims involved in 
set-off should be 'reciprocal' or 'mutual', which means that only the claims 
that two parties have against one another are eligible for set-off (this issue 
is the topic of section 3.2 below); (2) claims should be 'similar' or 'com-
mensurable'. This means that they should be expressed in the same unit 
45 See p. 6 of the ECOFIN text. 
46 On Articles 6:127 et seq. of the NCC see, for example, the Asser Series 4-1, chapter 
12. On Articles 53 and 54 of the NBC see e.g. the History of the NBC (2-1), pp. 461-
465, and Van Setten in Vereecken / Nijenhuis 2003, pp. 259-261. See also Faber 2005 
for an analysis of general civil law and insolvency law aspects of set-off. 
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of account, e.g. cash or apples, or, to put it in the words of Article 6:127(2), 
that the claims should 'correspond' to one another (this requirement is 
discussed in section 3.3). Requirements that will not be considered further 
are (3) that the party invoking set-off should have the right to settle his 
obligation, and (4) that he should be entitled to enforce the satisfaction of 
his claim. The final requirement for set-off, which is closely connected to 
the requirement of reciprocity or mutuality, is (5) that the claim and the 
obligation involved in set-off should not form part of separate patrimo-
nies.47 The text of Article 6:127 of the NCC states: 
1. Where an obligor, who has a right of compensation (set-off), notifies his obligee 
that he is compensating (setting-off) the obligation agamst a claim, both obligations 
shall be extinguished up to their common amount 
2 An obligor has a right of compensation (set-off) where he has a claim for a 
prestation (performance of an obligation) which corresponds to his obligation to the 
other party, and where he may settle the obligation and enforce satisfaction of the 
claim 
3 There is no right of compensation (set-off) between a claim and an obligation 
which form part of separate patrimonies (estates) 
While Articles 6:127 et seq. of the NCC concerning set-off apply in prin-
ciple, they are not provisions of mandatory law. This means that parties 
can enter into differing agreements in respect of set-off.49 
In insolvency. Articles 53 and 54 of the NBC apply. These provisions 
prevail over the general set-off provisions of the Dutch Civil Code. In 
addition, unlike the provisions of the Civil Code, they are mandatory, 
because they apply in insolvency and safeguard the interests of the other 
creditors of the insolvent estate. The Dutch set-off regime in insolvency 
is, nevertheless, liberal. Article 53 sets out the requirements under which 
a set-off can take place in insolvency. Article 54 contains some exceptions 
47 On these five requirements see also Faber 2005, no 15 
48 Translation Netherlands Busmess Legislation Original Dutch text '1 Wanneer een 
schuldenaar die de bevoegdheid tot verrekening heeft, aan zijn schuldeiser ver-
klaart dat hij zijn schuld met een vordering verrekent, gaan beide verbintenissen 
tot hun gemeenschappelijk beloop teniet 2 Een schuldenaar heeft de bevoegdheid 
tot verrekening, wanneer hij een prestatie te vorderen heeft die beantwoordt aan 
zijn schuld jegens dezelfde wederpartij en hij bevoegd is zowel tot betaling van de 
schuld als tot het afdwingen van de betaling van de vordering 3 De bevoegdheid 
tot verrekening bestaat niet ten aanzien van een vordering en een schuld die in van 
elkaar gescheiden vermogens vallen ' 
49 See Faber 2005, nos 118-125 
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that will not be discussed here. The main rule of Article 53(1) of the NBC 
is: 
A person who is both a debtor and a creditor of the bankrupt may set-off his debt 
against his claim against the bankrupt provided each arose before the declaration 
of bankruptcy, or if they resulted from legal acts entered into with the bankrupt 
before the declaration of bankruptcy. 
Under Article 53 of the NBC, obligations can in principle therefore be set 
off if they have 'pre-insolvency roots'. This means that both obligations 
must have arisen before the declaration of insolvency, or must result from 
legal acts entered into with the insolvent entity before the moment insol-
vency was declared. If these requirements are met, contractual netting 
arrangements are also generally enforceable in insolvency.51 
When implementing Article 7 of the Collateral Directive, the Dutch legis-
lator had the Dutch liberal set-off regime both in and outside of insol-
vency in mind, and argued that no explicit provision was needed in Dutch 
law to guarantee the enforceability of contractual close-out netting pro-
visions. The Collateral Directive has, therefore, not led to a change in 
Dutch law. This means that it must still be determined under the liberal 
regime of Articles 6:127 et seq. of the NCC and Articles 53 and 54 of the 
NBC whether close-out netting provisions in financial collateral arrange-
ments are enforceable.52 
50 Translation: Netherlands Business Legislation. Original Dutch text: 'Hij die zowel 
schuldenaar als schuldeiser van de gefailleerde is, kan zijn schuld met zijn vorde-
ring op de gefailleerde verrekenen, indien beide zijn ontstaan vóór de faillietverkla-
ring of voortvloeien uit handelingen, vóór de faillietverklaring met de gefailleerde 
verricht.' 
51 Under Dutch law which was in force before the implementation of the Collateral 
Directive, contractual close-out netting provisions were - except for a few minor 
impediments - generally considered to be enforceable. This issue is addressed in 
legal opinions of major law firms commissioned by trade organisations, such as 
those relating to the enforceability of the GMRA under Dutch law. On this issue, see 
also the Netherlands Annex to the GMRA and the Guidance Notes thereto. In 
addiHon, see Graaf 1998/1999, section 5; Nijenhuis / Verhagen 1994; Nijenhuis 1998; 
Rank 1998 II, pp. 399^02; Wessels 1997 II. On set-off in insolvency generally, see 
Faber 2005, in particular chapter 8. 
52 See Tweede Kamer, 2002-2003, 28 874, no. 3, p. 9 ('Verrekenbeding'); Tweede Kamer, 
2004-2005, 30 138, no. 3, pp. 10-11 ÇVerrekenbeding'). 
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3.1.5 The contents of this section 
This section focuses on the continuing importance of national law for 
close-out netting after the implementation of the Collateral Directive. Sec-
tion 3.2 deals with the issue of reciprocity or mutuality that, according to 
recital 15 of the directive, should be considered under national law. 
Section 3.3 deals with the requirement of similarity or commensurability. 
Another issue that, according to recital 15 of the Collateral Directive, 
should be examined under national law is that of voidable preference, 
which is the topic of section 3.4. An issue that the Collateral Directive does 
not address, and that must for this reason be determined under national 
law, is the moment at which claims that are subject to close-out netting 
should be valued (see section 3.5). 
3.2 Reciprocity or mutuality 
3.2.1 Introduction 
As was mentioned in section 3.1.3, the Collateral Directive generally 
sanctions contractual close-out netting arrangements in the event of 
default. Recital 15 of the Collateral Directive, however, makes clear that 
it must be determined under the applicable national law whether claims 
are reciprocal and are thus eligible for set-off. In this context, reciprocity 
means that there should be a correspondence between the parties who are 
involved in set-off. The requirement that there is such a correspondence 
is also referred to as mutuality. 
After a note on terminology, this section examines how the requirement 
of mutuality appears in the absence of a netting agreement. In this respect, 
the traditional approach under Dutch law and, by way of a comparison, 
the approaches of the Principles of European Contract Law and the 
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts will be 
explored. Whether it is possible under Dutch law to deviate from the 
mutuality requirement in a netting contract, and whether such a contract 
is enforceable in insolvency will then be examined. 
3.2.2 A note on terminology 
The term 'reciprocity' is applied in recitals 14 ('reciprocal items') and 15 
('reciprocity' of claims) of the Collateral Directive. The Dutch translation 
of the Collateral Directive in this respect applies the term wederkerigheid, 
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whereas the German translation, for example, features the term Gegen-
seitigkeit. That reciprocity should indeed be interpreted as a correspon-
dence between the creditors involved in netting, as 'mutuality', is con-
firmed by the Dutch legislator, who interprets the term as such.53 Fawcett, 
too, relates the reference to reciprocity in the Collateral Directive to the 
requirement of the mutuality of the creditors.54 Another issue of corres-
pondence, i.e. that of the claims that are subject to set-off, is dealt with in 
section 3.3 on 'similarity' or 'commensurability' below. 
3.2.3 Dutch law 
Under Dutch law, the mutuality requirement is set out in Article 6:127 of 
the NCC. Section 2 of this provision, which was quoted above in section 
3.1.4, requires that the same two parties owe the fulfilment of an obliga-
tion towards each other. Moreover, section 3 of Article 6:127 of the NCC 
requires that the obligations concerned should form part of the same 
patrimonies. This latter aspect of mutuality means, for example, that a 
party who has an obligation towards his counterparty in a personal 
capacity cannot set off this obligation and a claim against that counter-
party in his capacity as a trustee.55 
3.2.4 European Principles of Contract Law 
Like Dutch law, the European Principles of Contract Law ('European Prin-
ciples') also require mutuality in principle. Article 13:101 of the European 
Principles sets out the 'Requirements for Set-Off', and requires that 'two 
parties owe each other obligations'. The text of this provision reads as 
follows: 
If two parties owe each other obligations of the same kind, either party may set off 
that party's right to performance ("claim") against the other party's claim, if and to 
the extent that, at the time of set-off, the first party: 
(a) is entitled to effect performance; and 
(b) may demand the other party's performance. 
53 See Tweede Kamer, 2002-2003, 28 874, no. 3, p. 9 (Verrekenbeding'); Tweede Kamer, 
2004-2005, 30 138, no. 3, pp. 10-11 (Verrekenbeding'). 
54 See Fawcett 2005, pp. 296-297 ('Mutuality'). 
55 On the mutuality requirement under Dutch law, see the Asser Series 4-1, section 
533; Faber 2005, nos. 24-42 and 86-92. For English law, see Derham 2003, chapters 
11,12,13; Wood 1994, chapter 13; Wood 1995 II, sections 8-1 - 8-4 and 12-10. 
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The European Principles do not explicitly mention the requirement that 
the obligations subject to set-off should fall within the same patrimonies. 
3.2.5 UNIDROIT Principles 
Like the European Principles, the UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts ('UNIDROIT Principles') also require mutuality. 
Article 8.1 of the UNIDROIT Principles is a general provision, which 
relates to the 'Conditions of set-off', and which requires that 'two parties 
owe each other money or other performances'. The full text of subsection 
1 of Article 8.1 reads as follows: 
Where two parties owe each other money or performances of the same kind, either 
of them ("the first party") may set off its obligation against that of its obligee ("the 
other party") if at the time of set-off, 
(a) the first party is entitled to perform its obligation; 
(b) the other party's obligation is ascertained as to its existence and amount and 
performance is due. 
The Comments to this provision make clear that each party should be the 
obligor and the obligee of the other. Moreover, the parties should act in 
the same capacity.56 
3.2.6 Contractual arrangements and insolvency 
The mutuality requirement of Article 6:127 of the NCC applies in the 
absence of a contract between the parties. However, as was indicated in 
section 3.1.4 above, it is permitted to deviate from the set-off provisions 
of the NCC, in respect of mutuality also, and to agree to different terms 
in a contract.57 For example, it is possible to agree on a netting arrange-
ment involving more than two parties. Whereas under the GMRA and the 
GMSLA, repo and securities lending transactions typically involve two 
parties, it is therefore also possible to agree on netting in a structure that 
involves more parties.58 
Are contractual provisions that deviate from the mutuality requirement 
enforceable in insolvency? As was indicated in section 3.1.4 above, the 
main test in this respect is Article 53(1) of the NBC. This provision is 
56 See the UNIDROIT Principles 2004, p. 255, section 2. 
57 See also Faber 2005, nos. 118-125, in particular no. 120. 
58 On the possibility of deviating from e.g. the mutuality requirement on the basis of 
a contract see Comment 8 to Article 8.1 of the UNIDROIT Principles 2004, p. 260. 
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favourable to set-off as long as the claims involved have pre-insolvency 
roots. This means that a contractual set-off arrangement that deviates 
from the mutuality requirement is enforceable if the claims involved have 
arisen before the declaration of insolvency, or result from legal acts 
entered into with the insolvent entity before the moment of that decla-
ration.59 
3.2.7 The Collateral Directive and the role of national law 
This section has shown that the issue of reciprocity, or mutuality, falls 
outside the scope of the liberal close-out netting regime of the Collateral 
Directive. Whether mutuality poses restrictions on close-out netting 
should be determined under national law. 
3.3 Similarity or commensurability 
3.3.2 Introduction 
Whereas section 3.2 dealt with the requirement of a correspondence 
between the parties involved in set-off, this section deals with the require-
ment of a correspondence between the goods that are subject to set-off. 
Traditionally, set-off can only take place when assets are 'similar' or 'com-
mensurable'. This issue is given special attention because the Collateral 
Directive relates to close-out netting arrangements that concern different 
types of assets, such as cash and different types of securities. What is the 
relation between the liberal close-out netting regime of the Collateral 
Directive and the similarity or commensurability requirement? Is there 
still a role for applicable national law when determining whether the re-
quirement of similarity is an impediment to set-off? 
This section considers how the requirement of similarity appears in the 
absence of a netting agreement. In this respect, the traditional approach 
under Dutch law, and, by way of a comparison, the approaches of the 
Principles of European Contract Law and the UNIDROIT Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts will be explored. Whether it is pos-
sible under Dutch law to deviate from the requirement of similarity in a 
netting contract, and whether such a contract is enforceable in insolvency, 
will then be examined. The focus will then shift to the question of whether 
59 See Faber 2005, nos. 397 and 479. 
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national law still plays a role in this respect after the implementation of 
the Collateral Directive. 
3.3.2 Dutch law 
In principle, under Dutch law claims should be similar {gelijksoortig) in 
order to be eligible for set-off. Article 6:127(2) of the NCC, which was 
quoted in section 3.1.4 above, requires that obligations correspond to one 
another for set-off. Similar obligations are, for example, obligations in the 
same currency. Some jurisdictions allow some degree of flexibility as far 
as the similarity requirement is concerned. A widening of this require-
ment sometimes occurs in the case of claims that are denominated in 
different currencies.60 It seems unlikely, however, that it is possible to set 
off obligations expressed in cash and different kinds of securities. The 
traditional view is that such obligations are not similar.61 
3.3.3 European Principles of Contract Law 
The European Principles of Contract Law also require similarity in prin-
ciple. Article 13:101 of the European Principles, quoted above in section 
3.2.4, requires that obligations are 'of the same kind'. 
Obligations expressed in different currencies are not of the same kind in 
the sense of this provision. In order to facilitate the set-off of foreign cur-
rencies also, the European Principles contain a special provision relating 
to the set-off of obligations expressed in different currencies. Article 
13:103 of the European Principles relates to 'Foreign Currency Set-Off' and 
states: 
Where parties owe each other money in different currencies, each party may set off 
that party's claim against the other party's claim, unless the parties have agreed that 
the party declaring set-off is to pay exclusively in a specified currency. 
If the parties have not agreed upon payment in a specified currency, 
obligations in different currencies can therefore be set off. The European 
60 See e.g. Articles 6:121 et seq. of the NCC. 
61 On the similarity or commensurability requirement under Dutch law see the Asser 
Series 4-1, no. 534; Faber 2005, nos. 43-57. For English law see Derham 1993, chapter 
9; Wood 1994, chapter 19; Wood 1995 II, sections 6-20, 6-33, 6^6 et seq., 12-19. See 
also Haudek 1936, p. 60 (several jurisdictions); and Eujen 1975, p. 26 (German law), 
pp. 36-37 (French law), p. 52 (English law). 
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Principles thereby essentially loosen the similarity requirement some-
what.62 
3.3.4 UNIDROIT Principles 
Like the European Principles, the UNIDROIT Principles also contain a 
provision that allows foreign currency set-off in spite of the similarity 
requirement that applies in principle. Article 8.1, section 1 of the UNI-
DROIT Principles, which was quoted in section 3.2.5 above, requires that 
performances are 'of the same kind'.63 Article 8.2 of the UNIDROIT Prin-
ciples concerns 'Foreign currency set-off' and contains a special rule on the 
set-off of obligations expressed in different currencies. This provision 
states: 
Where the obligations are to pay money in different currencies, the right of set-off 
may be exercised, provided that both currencies are freely convertible and the 
parties have not agreed that the first party shall pay only in a specified currency. 
Under the UNIDROIT Principles, the set-off of foreign currencies is 
therefore allowed under certain conditions. The UNIDROIT Principles 
deviate from the European Principles in that they impose the requirement 
that the currencies are easily convertible, in addition to the requirement 
that there is no contractual agreement about payment in a specified 
currency.64 
However, the UNIDROIT Principles do not only allow the set-off of 
different currencies. They contain an even further loosening of the simi-
larity requirement. They also allow the set-off of obligations expressed in 
cash and securities, if - again - these are easily convertible, and if no 
agreement has been made on payment in specified cash and/or securities. 
Comment 3 (Obligations of the same kind') to Article 8.1 of the Chapter 
on Set-Off states the following: 
Cash and securities are not performances of the same kind in the sense of this 
article. Nevertheless, as is the case with different foreign currencies, set off may be 
exerased if the securities are easily convertible and if there is no agreement to the 
effect that only the payment of specified cash or securities is possible. 
62 For a critical approach, see Faber 2005, no. 57. 
63 See also Comment 3 to Article 8.1 in the UNIDROIT Principles 2004, p. 256. 
64 See also the comments to Article 8.2 in the UNIDROIT Principles 2004, pp. 260-261. 
65 See the UNIDROIT Principles 2004, p. 256. For a critical approach, see Faber 2005, 
no. 57. 
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3.3.5 Contractual arrangements and insolvency 
The similarity requirement of Article 6:127(2) of the NCC applies in the 
absence of a contract between the parties. This provision does leave room, 
however, for a contractual departure. It is, for example, possible to agree 
that non-similar obligations can be expressed in a single unit in order to 
facilitate netting. This is exactly what occurs in the case of the GMRA and 
GMSLA. The parties express obligations in one currency, which up to that 
moment have been expressed in cash and different types of securities. 
This essentially makes these obligations similar, and makes it possible to 
set them off.66 
The requirement that obligations must be similar for set-off can therefore 
be altered on the basis of contractual provisions. As in the case of the 
requirement of reciprocity, such contractual provisions are enforceable in 
insolvency within the boundaries set by Article 53 of the NBC.67 Nor is 
Article 133 of the NBC, which states that claims against the insolvent 
estate having a value that is not expressed in Dutch currency are to be 
admitted for their estimated value in Dutch currency, an obstacle to con-
tractual close-out netting. Arguably, this provision relates only to claims 
that are lodged with the insolvency administrator for the purposes of the 
verification procedure, and not to claims that are subject to close-out 
netting provisions.68 Transactions involving cash and different types of 
securities (like those under the GMRA and GMSLA), which have been 
concluded before insolvency and to which the standard close-out netting 
provisions of these agreements apply, can therefore successfully be sub-
jected to netting under Article 53 of the NBC. 
3.3.6 The Collateral Directive and the role of national law 
Recital 15 of the Collateral Directive determines in general terms that the 
directive 'should be without prejudice to any restrictions or requirements 
under national law on bringing into account claims, on obligations to set-
off, or on netting'. As examples, recital 15 mentions national rules on reci-
procity (see section 3.2 above) and voidable preference (see section 3.4 
below). In addition, the similarity requirement arguably falls within the 
scope of the generally stated first sentence of recital 15, even if it has not 
66 See Faber 2005, nos. 118-125, in particular no. 120. 
67 See Faber 2005, no. 479. 
68 On Article 133 of the NBC see the History of the NBC (2-II), pp. 132-133; Rank 
1998 II, pp. 400-401; Graaf 1998/1999, section 5; Faber 2005, no. 397. 
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been explicitly mentioned as an example. Strictly speaking, this means 
that it must be determined under national law whether the issue of simi-
larity poses an obstacle to the close-out netting envisaged in, for example, 
repo and securities lending contracts. This interpretation, however, is 
opposed to the general aim of recital 14 and Article 7 of the Collateral Di-
rective, which are intended to guarantee the enforceability of close-out 
netting provisions in comparable contracts that relate to cash and different 
kinds of securities. It is not clear which of these conflicting approaches 
will prevail. 
In the Netherlands, in any case, the issue must arguably be determined 
under national law, because the Dutch legislator has not implemented 
Article 7 of the Collateral Directive (see section 3.1.4 above). This, how-
ever, poses no problem, because as was shown above, under Dutch law, 
contractual arrangements relating to the netting of obligations expressed 
in different units, such as cash and/or different types of securities, are 
generally enforceable, in insolvency also. 
3.4 Voidable preference 
Another issue that recital 15 of the Collateral Directive - in somewhat 
woolly language - mentions as being subject to national law, relates to the 
question of whether claims can be taken into account for the purpose of 
close-out netting in connection with the moment they came into existence. 
It is particularly important to establish whether claims have come into 
existence prior to the moment that the insolvent party's counterparty 
came to know or ought to have known of the insolvency, or after that 
moment. If such claims came into existence after that moment, national 
rules concerning voidable preference (actio pauliana) may come into play. 
This is because close-out netting in relation to such claims could, in fact, 
give the insolvent party's counterparty a preferential position to the detri-
ment of all other creditors. Whether or not such a preferential position is 
acceptable should be determined under national rules of law, notably 
under those relating to voidable preference.69 The reference in recital 15 
to rules of national law in this respect coincides with the approach of 
recital 16 and Article 8(4) of the Collateral Directive, which also refer to 
general rules of national insolvency law relating to the voidance of 
69 For Dutch law, see Articles 42 et seq. and Articles 54 and 55 of the NBC. For a Dutch 
legal analysis of set-off on the eve of insolvency, see Faber 2005, in particular 
chapter 7. See also the Principles of European Insolvency Law, § 8 ('Reversal of 
juridical acts'), pp. 53-57. 
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transactions which were entered into during a prescribed period before 
insolvency and are to the detriment of the other creditors.70 
3.5 Moment of valuation 
3.5.1 Introduction 
Another issue in which national law comes into play relates to the 
moment at which the obligations that are subject to contractual close-out 
netting should be valued. This moment has not been established in the 
Collateral Directive and must therefore be determined on the basis of 
national law. 
This section focuses on the moment of valuation in the event of an insol-
vency. It investigates when the valuation should take place under Dutch 
law. Should the valuation take place the moment a judge declares that the 
state of insolvency commences, or can the parties also agree upon another 
moment for the purpose of valuation? This section considers the approach 
of standard agreements such as the GMRA and the GMSLA, before 
determining what the moment of valuation should be under Dutch law. 
Particular attention is paid to the Dutch fixation principle and to Article 
38 of the Dutch NBC. Comparisons will also be made with § 104 of the 
German Insolvency Statute (Insolvenzordnung), and with the moment at 
which pledged assets are valued. 
3.5.2 GMRA and GMSLA 
In line with the close-out netting provisions of the GMRA and GMSLA, 
the moment when the valuation of obligations takes place is usually after 
the declaration of insolvency. This is so because the GMRA and GMSLA 
envisage valuation procedures that, as a rule, should be completed within 
a time frame of five business days.71 
The agreements envisage several ways to determine the value of obliga-
tions. One of these is to sell the assets that should otherwise have been 
transferred to the counterparty in the transaction, or in case that counter-
party was under an obligation to transfer assets, to buy replacement assets 
70 See also Tweede Kamer, 2002-2003,28 874, no. 3, p. 9 ('Verrekenbeding'); Tweede Kamer, 
2004-2005, 30 138, no. 3, pp. 10-11 ^Verrekenbeding). 
71 See Paragraphs 10(d)(ii) and 10(e) of the GMRA and Paragraphs 10.3-5 of the 
GMSLA. 
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in the market. The sale or purchase price can, in this case, be used to 
establish the actual business value of the obligations that are subject to 
close-out netting.72 Another way to determine the value of a claim or obli-
gation in respect of securities is to obtain price quotations from a number 
of market makers or regular dealers.73 If such methods cannot be applied, 
it is basically the non-defaulting party who establishes a fair market 
value.74 
Corrigan, Georgiou and Gollow have explained why a 'dealing window' 
of several business days may be needed in order to complete such valua-
tion procedures. They use the Barings case as an illustration. Barings went 
into administration in London on a Sunday. News about the adminis-
tration only reached the Asian markets, which are a considerable number 
of time zones ahead, after the close of business on Monday. This meant 
that market participants could only enter into replacement transactions, 
and thereby determine the actual value of the mutual obligations, on 
Tuesday. A 'dealing window' for entering into replacement transactions 
can therefore be justified on the basis of the argument that markets 
operate in different time zones. A dealing window of five days, however, 
seems generous from this perspective.75 
3.5.3 Fixation principle 
The approach set out in the standard documentation, which envisages a 
valuation period of up to five days, does not seem to be compatible with 
the fixation principle under Dutch law. At the moment the insolvency is 
declared, the insolvent estate is fixated. At this moment, it is determined 
which assets fall within or outside of the insolvent estate. This fixation 
guarantees the position of the creditors of the insolvent entity. It could be 
argued that the moment of the declaration of insolvency should also be 
decisive for the valuation of assets that fall within the insolvent estate and 
that are subject to a close-out netting arrangement. If the moment of 
72 This method of valuation is set out in, for example. Paragraph 10(e)(i)(A) of the 
GMRA and Paragraph 10.5 of the GMSLA. 
73 Paragraph 10(e)(i)(B) of the GMRA requires quotes from two or more market 
makers or regular dealers. Compare the role of the intermediary in establishing the 
value of pledged securities, discussed in section 2.2.l.c above. 
74 See Paragraph 10(e)(i)(C) of the GMRA, and Paragraph 10(e)(ii) in conjunction with 
Paragraph 10(d)(iv) of the GMRA. See Paragraph 10.4 of the GMSLA in conjunction 
with the definitions of 'Bid Value' and 'Offer Value' in Paragraph 10.1 of the 
GMSLA. 
75 See Corrigan / Georgiou / Gollow 1999, p. 116. 
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valuation occurs after that of the declaration of insolvency, the other 
creditors of the insolvent estate are exposed to price fluctuations. If prices 
go down, any possible surplus value will be reduced and they will receive 
less money. But if prices go up, they will receive more if any surplus is 
available. There is clearly an area of tension between this speculation at 
the risk of all other creditors and the fixation principle.76 
3.5.4 Netherlands Annex to GMRA 2000 
Because of the fixation principle under Dutch insolvency law, it is un­
certain whether the default market value can be calculated in line with the 
provisions of the GMRA or GMSLA on a date possibly falling after the 
declaration of insolvency. For repos. Paragraph 6(c) of the Netherlands 
Annex to GMRA 2000 addresses this issue by moving the moment of 
valuation, if necessary, to the day of the declaration of insolvency, or, if 
this is not a dealing day, to an earlier day.77 There is no comparable official 
annex to the GMSLA for securities lending agreements. 
3.5.5 Article 38 of the NBC 
In addition to the fixation principle. Article 38 of the NBC also points in 
the direction of a valuation at the moment of insolvency. This provision 
reads as follows: 
If, in the case of article 37 [relating to not or not fully performed mutual contracts 
generally; TK], delivery of goods traded in the commodity market is stipulated at 
a fixed time or within a certain period and if such time arises or such period expires 
after the bankruptcy order, the agreement will be cancelled by the bankruptcy 
order and the counterparty of the bankrupt, may, without more, lodge a claim for 
damages as an unsecured creditor If the estate suffers a loss because of such 
cancellation, the counterparty must compensate such loss 
76 On close-out netting and the fixation principle see Graaf 1998/1999, ρ 194, Rank 
1998 II, ρ 400 On the fixation principle generally see Van Hees 2000 See also the 
Principles of European Insolvency Law, § 3 4, ρ 40 
77 See also the Guidance Notes to the Netherlands Annex, section 5 3 
78 Translation Netherlands Business Legislation Original Dutch text 'Indien in het 
geval van artikel 37 de levering van waren, die ter beurze op termijn worden ver­
handeld, bedongen is tegen een vastgesteld tijdstip of binnen een bepaalden 
termijn, en dit tijdstip invalt of die termijn verstrijkt na de faillietverklaring, wordt 
de overeenkomst door de faillietverklaring ontbonden en kan de wederpartij van 
den gefailleerde zonder meer voor schadevergoeding als concurrent schuldeischer 
opkomen Lijdt de boedel door de ontbinding schade, dan is de wederpartij ver­
plicht deze te vergoeden ' 
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Article 38 of the NBC sets out a special rule in relation to mutual agree­
ments which relate to goods that are traded on a market, and which give 
rise to obligations that should be fulfilled at a moment that falls after the 
declaration of insolvency. It envisages the cancellation (ontbinding) of such 
agreements when insolvency is declared.79 
One question that arises in connection with this provision is whether it 
only applies to contracts relating to commodities (waren), such as grain, 
sugar or coffee, or also to agreements involving financial collateral. Nijen-
huis has investigated whether Article 38 of the NBC applies to certain 
derivatives contracts, such as swaps, and futures and forwards. He argues 
that such derivatives transactions do not concern commodity goods 
(waren) in the sense of Article 38 of the NBC, but rather obligations to pay 
money. This, however, is a rather formalistic approach. As Wood points 
out, the financial markets as they exist today simply did not yet exist at 
the end of the nineteenth century, when Article 38 of the NBC was 
enacted.80 In my view, the possibility that courts will follow the alternative 
approach suggested by Nijenhuis, i.e. that they will apply Article 38 of the 
NBC by way of analogy to derivatives transactions, certainly cannot be 
excluded. This is because the rationale of this provision (i.e. a cancellation 
creates immediate clarity for all the parties involved) can be applied to 
commodity, but equally as well to derivatives transactions.81 That Article 
38 of the NBC applies to repo and securities lending transactions seems 
even more likely, because these transactions do not only involve obliga­
tions to pay money, but also to transfer securities. The legislator has 
explicitly indicated that this provision applies to transactions involving 
securities.82 
A second question that arises in connection with Article 38 of the NBC 
(and one that is more relevant in the context of this section), is the 
moment at which assets should be valued after cancellation. In relation to 
the moment of valuation, Nijenhuis states that valuation should probably 
take place at the moment of the declaration of insolvency. He points out 
79 This provision, relating to goods traded on a commodity market, is an exception to 
the principle that no automatic termination takes place when insolvency is declared 
See the Principles of European Insolvency Law, § 6 1 ('No automatic termination'), 
ρ 46 
80 See Wood 1994, ρ 25 
81 See in particular Nijenhuis 1998 See also Nijenhuis / Verhagen 1994, ρ 100 
82 See the History of the NBC (2-1), ρ 416 On Article 38 of the NBC and on compa­
rable provisions m other countries, see also Wood 1994, chapter 9 
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that this approach follows from the fixation principle.83 The view that the 
moment of valuation should, under Article 38 of the NBC, indeed take 
place at the moment of the declaration of insolvency also follows explicitly 
from the parliamentary history of this provision.84 For this reason. Article 
38 of the NBC could be presented as an argument against a valuation 
procedure of up to five days after the declaration of insolvency (as set out 
in, for example, the GMRA and the GMSLA), and in favour of the valua-
tion of financial collateral at the moment of the declaration of insolvency. 
3.5.6 § 104 of the German Insolvenq/ Statute 
German law contains a provision that is comparable to Article 38 of the 
NBC. § 104 of the German Insolvency Statute (Insolvenzordnung) relating 
to 'Fixed-date transactions. Financial performance' reads as follows: 
(1) If the delivery of goods with a market or stock exchange price was agreed to 
take place exactly on a definite fixed date or within a definite fixed period, and if 
such date or expiry of the period occurs after the insolvency proceedings were com-
menced, performance may not be claimed, but only claims for non-performance. 
(2) If financial performance with a market or stock exchange price was agreed to 
take place at a fixed date or within a fixed period, and if such date or expiry of the 
period occurs after the insolvency proceedings were commenced, performance may 
not be claimed, but only claims for non-performance. In particular the following 
shall be regarded as financial performance 
1. the delivery of precious metals, 
2. the delivery of securities or comparable rights if it is not intended to obtain a 
participation in a company in order to establish a long-term association, 
3. performances in specie which have to be effected in foreign currency or in a 
mathematical unit, 
4. performances in specie, the amount of which is indirectly or directly deter-
mined by the exchange rate of a foreign currency or mathematical unit, by the 
interest rate prevailing for claims or by the price of other goods or services, 
5. options and other rights to deliveries or performances in specie in the meaning 
of Nos. 1 to 4, 
6. financial collateral in the sense of § 1(17) of the German Banking Act (Kredit-
wesengesetz). 
If transactions concerning financial performances are combined in a framework 
contract for which agreement has been reached that in the case of violations of the 
contract it may only be terminated uniformly, the totality of these transactions shall 
be regarded as a mutual contract within the meaning of §§ 103,104. 
(3) The claim for non-performance shall cover the balance between the agreed price 
and the market or stock exchange price prevailing at the place of performance for 
83 See Nijenhuis 1998, p. 615. 
84 See the History of the NBC (2-1), p. 417. 
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a contract with a comparable term at a moment agreed upon by the parties, but at 
the latest on the fifth working day after the insolvency proceedings were com-
menced. If the parties have not come to an agreement, the second working day after 
the insolvency proceedings were commenced is the norm. The other party may 
bring such a claim only as a creditor of the insolvency proceedings.8 
§ 104 of the German Insolvency Statute relates to goods (Waren) and finan-
cial performances (Finanzleistungen) with a market or stock exchange 
price. Like Article 38 of the Dutch NBC, § 104 of the German Insolvency 
Statute also envisages the termination of transactions which provide for 
85 The translation is based on the translation of the text of the Insolvency Statute as it 
stood on 1 January 2004, found on the website of the German Ministry of Justice 
(www.bmj.bund.de), and has been adapted by the author to take into account 
amendments to § 104 of the Insolvency Statute resulting from the implementation 
of the Collateral Directive. Original German text: 
'§ 104 Fixgeschäfte. Finanzleistungen 
(1) War die Lieferung von Waren, die einen Markt- oder Börsenpreis haben, genau 
zu einer festbestimmten Zeit oder innerhalb einer festbestimmten Frist vereinbart 
und tritt die Zeit oder der Ablauf der Frist erst nach der Eröffnung des Insolvenz-
verfahrens ein, so kann nicht die Erfüllung verlangt, sondern nur eine Forderung 
wegen der Nichterfüllung geltend gemacht werden. 
(2) War für Finanzleistungen, die einen Markt- oder Börsenpreis haben, eine be-
stimmte Zeit oder eine bestimmte Frist vereinbart und tritt die Zeit oder der Ablauf 
der Frist erst nach der Eröffnung des Verfahrens ein, so kann nicht die Erfüllung 
verlangt, sondern nur eine Forderung wegen der Nichterfüllung geltend gemacht 
werden. Als Finanzleistungen gelten insbesondere 
1. die Lieferung von Edelmetallen, 
2. die Lieferung von Wertpapieren oder vergleichbaren Rechten, soweit nicht der 
Erwerb einer Beteiligung an einem Unternehmen zur Herstellung einer dauern-
den Verbindung zu diesem Unternehmen beabsichtigt ist, 
3. Geldleistungen, die in ausländischer Währung oder in einer Rechnungseinheit 
zu erbringen sind, 
4. Geldleistungen, deren Höhe unmittelbar oder mittelbar durch den Kurs einer 
ausländischen Währung oder einer Rechnungseinheit, durch den Zinssatz von 
Forderungen oder durch den Preis anderer Güter oder Leistungen bestimmt 
wird, 
5. Optionen und andere Rechte auf Lieferungen oder Geldleistungen im Sinne der 
Nummern 1 bis 4, 
6. Finanzsicherheiten im Sinne des § 1 Abs. 17 des Kreditwesengesetzes. 
Sind Geschäfte über Finanzleistungen in einem Rahmenvertrag zusammengefaßt, 
für den vereinbart ist, daß er bei Vorliegen eines Insolvenzgrundes nur einheitlich 
beendet werden kann, so gilt die Gesamtheit dieser Geschäfte als ein gegenseitiger 
Vertrag im Sinne der §§ 103,104. 
(3) Die Forderung wegen der Nichterfüllung richtet sich auf den Unterschied 
zwischen dem vereinbarten Preis und dem Markt- oder Börsenpreis, der zu einem 
von den Parteien vereinbarten Zeitpunkt, spätestens jedoch am fünften Werktag 
nach der Eröffnung des Verfahrens am Erfüllungsort für einen Vertrag mit der ver-
einbarten Erfüllungszeit maßgeblich ist. Treffen die Parteien keine Vereinbarung, 
ist der zweite Werktag nach der Eröffnung des Verfahrens maßgebend. Der andere 
Teil kann eine solche Forderung nur als Insolvenzgläubiger geltend machen.' 
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a performance date that falls after the declaration of insolvency. The per-
formance of such transactions can, on the basis of § 104, no longer be 
claimed. This provision leaves room only for claims for non-performance. 
§ 104 of the Insolvency Statute has been amended in the course of the 
implementation of the Collateral Directive. Section 2(6) of § 104 of the In-
solvency Statute now makes clear that the provision also applies to trans-
actions with financial collateral. 
At what moment should obligations under financial collateral arrange-
ments be valued? In this respect, the approach under German law differs 
from that in the Netherlands. The starting point is the same. Upon default 
German law also aims at immediate clarity in establishing the value of 
concluded transactions, and is intended to prevent speculation after the 
moment of insolvency. However, unlike in the Netherlands, German law 
traditionally allowed a maximum two-day period for valuation. The goal 
of this two-day period was to give the solvent counterparty an oppor-
tunity to conclude a replacement transaction (Deckungsgeschäft). The price 
of this replacement transaction could then be used for calculating the 
actual value of the claim for non-performance.86 In the course of the imple-
mentation of the Collateral Directive, the German legislator has revised 
this two-day rule, arguing that the two-day period is not in line with 
modem practice, in which replacement transactions can often be con-
cluded on the same day. One would have expected that this observation 
would have led to a limitation of the time frame for the conclusion of 
replacement transactions. The contrary, however, has occurred. The law 
implementing the Collateral Directive revised § 104(3) of the Insolvency 
Statute and allows the parties to agree upon valuation within a time frame 
of five days after the declaration of insolvency. This widening of the time 
frame coincides with the time frame laid down in the GMRA and the 
GMSLA (see above), and - as Löber rightly notes - with a similar five-day 
valuation period envisaged in the EMA87. But the arguments for the 
extension of the two-day period to a period of five days have not been 
made clear. The only statement by the German legislator in this respect is 
that 'the parties may have an interest in valuation at a later moment'. 
What this 'interest' may be has not been explained. One drawback to a 
time period of five days is that it leaves room for speculation, or even 
manipulation at the risk of the other creditors of the insolvent estate. In 
line with the new text of § 104(3) of the Insolvency Statute, if the parties 
86 See the January 2004 version of § 104(3) of the Insolvency Statute. 
87 See Löber 2005, p. 77 and footnote 28. See also the definition of 'Quotation Date' in 
Section 7(l)(a) of the EMA. 
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have not agreed upon a moment of valuation, the old two-day term 
applies.88 
3.5.7 Comparison with pledge law 
In the case of a right of pledge, enforcement and valuation customarily 
take place at a moment later than that of the declaration of insolvency. 
This is not objectionable because in this case there are objective mecha-
nisms in place that guarantee that no improper speculation at the cost of 
the insolvent estate occurs, such as a public sale, or the intervention of a 
judge or - in the case of securities - of a professional intermediary. The 
enforcement in line with these mechanisms requires a certain period of 
time. In the case of set-off, objective mechanisms that guarantee a fair 
value are absent. Valuation is, in this case, typically a matter for the par-
ties. It is probably for this reason that the fixation principle plays a more 
important role in the case of set-off than in the case of the realisation of a 
right of pledge. The less the difference in time between the declaration of 
insolvency and the moment at which the obligations subject to set-off are 
valued, the less the risk that other creditors are prejudiced. This also limits 
the risk of actions on the basis of, for example, voidable preference (cf. 
section 3.4 above).89 
3.5.8 Concluding remark 
It is submitted that the moment at which the obligations that are subject 
to close-out netting are valued should be as close to the declaration of 
insolvency as possible. Deviations from this point in time are not com-
patible with the fixation principle, which applies in insolvency and 
protects the interests of the different creditors involved. This, of course, 
is particularly true for agreements that are clearly to the detriment of the 
other creditors of the insolvent estate. Nevertheless, a good reason for 
88 See Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung; Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Umsetzung der Richt-
alinie 2002/47/EG vom 6. Juni 2002 über Finanzsicherheiten und zur Änderung des Hypo-
thekenbankgesetzes und anderer Gesetze, Bundesrat, Drucksache 563/03, 15 August 
2003, pp. 17-19 ('Zu Nummer 4'). Idem: Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung; Entwurf 
eines Gesetzes zur Umsetzung der Richtlinie 2002/47/EG vom 6. juni 2002 über Finanz-
sicherheiten und zur Änderung des Hypothekenbankgesetzes und anderer Gesetze, Deut-
scher Bundestag, Drucksache 15/1853,29 October 2003, pp. 14-15 ('Zu Nummer 4'). 
89 See also Faber 2005, nos. 423-424, who is of the more liberal view that, as in the case 
of the execution of a right of pledge, the fixation principle plays no role when deter-
mining the moment when the determination of the value of the claims that are 
subject to set-off will take place. 
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allowing a time frame for valuation is that replacement transactions 
entered into immediately after insolvency can demonstrate the actual 
value of the claims involved. In the market as it functions today, it ap-
pears that such transactions can usually be concluded within a limited 
period of time, even within a day. When different time zones are in-
volved, a longer period of e.g. two business days for valuation may be 
appropriate. The five-day period envisaged in the GMRA and the GMSLA 
and in § 104 of the German Insolvency Statute, however, seems to be too 
long, whereas the Dutch approach of valuation at the moment of the 
declaration of insolvency could be loosened somewhat in order to give the 
solvent party some time to enter into a replacement transaction. 
3.6 Conclusion 
The key point made in this section on close-out netting is that, even if 
Article 7 of the Collateral Directive may seem to set out a liberal and uni-
form regime in respect of close-out netting, national law still plays a 
crucial role in this field. This is partly because recital 15 of the directive, 
which became a part thereof at a late stage of the legislative process, refers 
to national law. It does so explicitly in relation to the reciprocity or mutu-
ality requirement (see section 3.2) and national rules of voidable prefer-
ence (section 3.4). But recital 15 is formulated in general terms, which 
arguably also bring issues such as the requirement of similarity or com-
mensurability once again within the scope of national law (see section 
3.3). Another factor that contributes to a continuing role of national law 
where close-out netting is concerned is that the Collateral Directive has 
simply not regulated certain issues. An example of this category is the mo-
ment at which mutual claims should be valued (see section 3.5). Therefore, 
if further convergence in respect of the treatment of close-out netting 
arrangements is desired on a European level, the issue should be read-
dressed.90 
90 Note that the European Financial Market Lawyers Group has proposed a number 
of further liberalisations in the field of insolvency set-off and netting agreements in 
the EFMLG Report (2004). It has done so in light of the importance of set-off and 
netting arrangements for financial market participants. The EFMLG Report (2004), 
however, pays no attention to the issue of the continuing role of national law in this 
field, and neglects the fact that set-off or netting by one creditor also has a detri-
mental effect on the position of other creditors. 
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4. THE DECLARATION OF INSOLVENCY: NO RETROACTIVE 
EFFECT, ENFORCEABILITY OF LEGAL ACTS 
4.1 Starting point: retroactive effect, no enforceability of legal acts 
Under the Dutch Bankruptcy Code, a declaration of insolvency is, as a 
rule, applied retroactively. An insolvency takes effect at the beginning of 
the day of such a declaration. This rule is sometimes referred to as the 
'zero hour rule'.91 A related principle is that from that moment onwards, 
the insolvent party himself can no longer bind the insolvent estate by dis-
posing of the assets that fall within the insolvent estate, while also other 
legal acts carried out after that moment without the consent of the insol-
vency administrator are, as a rule, not enforceable against the insolvent 
estate." Like the earlier Settlement Finality Directive, the Collateral Di-
rective thwarts these two principles. Article 8(l)(a) of the Collateral Direc-
tive determines that the declaration of insolvency may not have retro-
active effect where transactions with financial collateral are concerned. 
Article 8(2) of the Collateral Directive, under certain circumstances, does 
leave room for creditors under a financial collateral arrangement to 
invoke the enforceability of legal acts entered into after the declaration of 
insolvency.93 
4.2 The declaration of insolvency has no retroactive effect 
Article 8(l)(a) of the Collateral Directive requires the abolition of the 
retroactive effect of the declaration of insolvency.94 This provision has 
been implemented in the Netherlands by adding Article 63e, first para-
graph, to the NBC.95 This provision reads as follows: 
As a deviation from Articles 23 and 35 the declaration of the insolvency of a debtor 
under a financial collateral arrangement in the sense of Article 51 of Book 7 of the 
Civil Code does not have retroactive effect extending to the beginning of the day 
on which that declaration is issued, in relation to a financial collateral agreement 
91 See Articles 23 and 35 of the NBC. 
92 This follows from Articles 23, 24, 35, 53(1) and 54(2) of the NBC and from the 
fixation principle that applies in insolvency. Article 24 of the NBC contains an 
exception: legal acts are enforceable if they are beneficial to the insolvent estate. 
93 On the different provisions of the NBC that may conflict with the arrangements 
covered by the Settlement Finality Directive and the Collateral Directive see Van 
Setten in Vereecken / Nijenhuis 2003, pp. 258-261. 
94 For the text of this provision see section 8.8.2 of chapter II or Appendix 2. 
95 In the original, but rejected, draft proposal with number 28 874 Article 63e of the 
NBC was numbered as 63c. 
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concluded before the moment of the declaration of insolvency, or a transfer, the 
establishment of a right of pledge or a netting order on the basis thereof96 
This digression from the principle that the declaration of insolvency has 
retroactive effect has the following consequence. Suppose an insolvent 
party fulfils an obligation under a financial collateral agreement to trans-
fer money or securities to his counterparty on the day of the declaration 
of insolvency, but before the moment when the insolvency is actually 
declared. Before the implementation of the Collateral Directive the ad-
ministrator of the insolvent estate could reclaim the money or securities 
transferred on the basis of Article 23 NBC. Under the Collateral Directive 
this is different. The financial collateral cannot be reclaimed for the benefit 
of the insolvent estate. 
Earlier, Articles 3, 6(1) and 7 of the Settlement Finality Directive set out a 
comparable exception for systems in which orders for the transfer of 
money or securities are settled ('settlement systems').97 Transfer orders 
and netting in settlement systems are enforceable until the actual moment 
of the commencement of insolvency proceedings. Whereas the Settlement 
Finality Directive is intended to guarantee the uninterrupted functioning 
of these settlement systems, the Collateral Directive is intended to safe-
guard the continuity of a larger system, i.e. that of the money and 
securities markets. It should not be possible to reverse legal acts that have 
been carried out before the declaration of insolvency, as this would mean 
a disruption. If legal acts do not have to be reversed, money and securities 
continue to be available on the markets and can be used to fulfil any 
obligations due, even if one market participant is in trouble. A possible 
snowball effect in respect of the positions of other market participants is 
prevented. This means a limitation of the so-called systemic risk. 
The approach of Article 8(l)(a) of the Collateral Directive is not advan-
tageous to the insolvent estate. Still, there are good arguments in favour 
of this approach m addition to the argument of a limitation of systemic 
96 Translation TK Original Dutch text 'In afwijking van de artikelen 23 en 35 werkt 
de faillietverklaring van een schuldenaar uit hoofde van een financielezekerheids-
overeenkomst als bedoeld in artikel 51 van Boek 7 van het Burgerlijk Wetboek niet 
terug tot aan het begin van de dag waarop zij wordt uitgesproken, ten aanzien van 
een door de schuldenaar voor het tijdstip van faillietverklaring gesloten financiele-
zekerheidsovereenkomst of een overdracht, vestiging van een pandrecht of een 
opdracht tot verrekening op grond daarvan ' 
97 This provision has been implemented in Dutch law by Article 212b(l) of the NBC 
in relation to bankruptcy proceedings 
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risk. It must be kept in mind that the retroactive effect of Article 23 of the 
NBC has mainly been introduced for reasons of evidence. At the end of 
the nineteenth century, the legislator reasoned that it was generally not 
a problem to determine the day on which transactions take place and on 
which the judge issues a declaration of insolvency. This was not true, 
however, for the exact moment (the hour and the minute) thereof. Ac­
cording to the legislator, it would have been difficult to determine exactly 
which of the transactions concluded on the day of the declaration of 
insolvency fell before or after the moment of the declaration of insolvency. 
For this reason, this declaration had retroactive effect.98 In today's finan­
cial markets, however, it is generally easy to determine the moment at 
which transactions actually take place. In these markets, there is therefore 
no longer any sufficient reason to apply the declaration of insolvency 
retroactively. It is not sufficient, however, to abolish the retroactive effect 
of the declaration of insolvency, as is done in Article 63e, first paragraph, 
of the NBC. Judges should also be obligated to state in the declaration of 
insolvency the exact time at which it is issued, to which end Article 14 of 
the NBC has been revised by the Dutch law implementing the Collateral 
Directive Article 14 of the NBC now obliges a judge in all cases to indicate 
the exact moment (the hour and the minute) of the declaration of insol-
99 
vency. 
In principle, it is sound practice that the consequences of an insolvency 
become effective and that fixation takes place at the moment when the 
declaration of insolvency is issued. Van Hees has argued that, in principle, 
parties should be able to rely on the enforceability of legal acts carried out 
before the declaration of insolvency. In the current economy, it is possible 
to determine exactly when a growing number of transactions are actually 
entered into. Van Hees has therefore proposed the abolition of the retro­
active effect of the declaration of insolvency altogether.100 Likewise, Ver-
stijlen has argued for the abolition of the retroactive effect of the decla­
ration of insolvency in all cases. In his view the insolvent's counterparty, 
who invokes the enforceability of legal acts, has the burden of proving 
98 See the History of the NBC (2-1), ρ 360 
99 On the revision of Article 14 of the NBC see the Explanatory Comments (Memorie 
van Toelichting), Tweede Kamer, 2002-2003, 28 874, no 3, pp 19-20, Tweede Kamer, 
2004-2005,30138, no 3, ρ 21 As a result of the implementation of the earlier Settle­
ment Finality Directive, Article 212b(5) of the NBC already set out an obligation for 
the judge to indica te exactly when an enti ty falling within the scope of this directive 
is declared bankrupt This provision has been rescinded with the implementation 
of the Collateral Directive and the revision of Article 14 of the NBC 
100 See Van Hees 2000, pp 132-135 
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that these legal acts were carried out before the declaration of insol-
vency.101 
4.3 Enforceability of legal acts after the declaration of insolvency 
4.3.2 Introduction 
Are legal acts that have an effect on the insolvent estate enforceable if they 
have been concluded after the declaration of insolvency and without the 
consent of the insolvency administrator? As a principle of Dutch law this 
is not the case. This means that a financial collateral agreement or a trans-
action concluded after the declaration of insolvency, or payments to or by 
the insolvent party without the consent of the insolvency administrator, 
cannot be invoked against the insolvent estate. The Collateral Directive 
and the Dutch implementing law, however, make an exception to this 
principle. Under certain conditions. Article 8(2) of the Collateral Directive 
makes it possible for the counterparty of an insolvent party in a financial 
collateral arrangement to invoke protection even after the declaration of 
insolvency.102 The Dutch implementing provision is Article 63e, second 
paragraph, of the NBC, which reads as follows: 
Articles 23, 24, 35, 53(1), 54(2) of this code [i e the Bankruptcy Code, TK], as well 
as Article 72, opening words and subsection a, of Book 3 of the Civil Code cannot 
be invoked against third parties in relation to a financial collateral agreement in the 
sense of Article 51 of Book 7 of the Civil Code that is concluded after the declaration 
of insolvency, in relation to the transfer or establishment of a right of pledge on the 
basis of a financial collateral agreement, as well as in relation to all legal acts based 
on a financial collateral agreement m connection with obligations of the debtor that 
have come into existence after the declaration of insolvency, if the legal act con-
cerned takes place on the day of the declaration of insolvency and if the counter-
party can prove that he did not know and should not have known of the 
declaration of insolvency at the time of the legal act 
101 See Vershjlen 2005, section 6 
102 For the text of this provision see section 8 8 3 of chapter II or Appendix 2 
103 Translation TK Original Dutch text 'De artikelen 23, 24, 35, 53, eerste lid, 54, 
tweede lid, van deze wet, alsmede artikel 72, aanhef en onder a, van Boek 3 van het 
Burgerlijk Wetboek, kunnen met aan derden worden tegengeworpen ten aanzien 
van een door een schuldenaar na het tijdstip van faillietverklaring gesloten finan-
cielezekerheidsovereenkomst als bedoeld in artikel 51 van Boek 7 van het Burgerlijk 
Wetboek, een overdracht of vestiging van een pandrecht op grond van een finan-
cielezekerheidsovereenkomst, alsmede elke rechtshandeling op grond van een 
f manaelezekerheidsovereenkomst vanwege verbintenissen van de schuldenaar die 
na het tijdstip van faillietverklaring zijn ontstaan, mits de betreffende rechtshande-
ling plaatsvindt op de dag van faillietverklaring en de wederpartij kan aantonen 
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In accordance with this provision, legal acts entered into after the declara-
tion of insolvency are enforceable if the legal act concerned takes place on 
the day of, but after the moment of, the declaration of insolvency, and if 
the insolvent party's counterparty was not aware, nor should have been 
aware of the insolvency. This means that the insolvent party can success-
fully effectuate, for example, margin or income payments after the 
moment of the declaration of insolvency, but on that same day, to a third 
party in 'good faith'. The money or securities transferred disappear out of 
the insolvent estate and are no longer available to the joint creditors of the 
estate. 
4.3.2 General principle and four exceptions 
Under Dutch law, in principle, legal acts conducted by the insolvent party 
after the declaration of insolvency cannot be enforced against the insol-
vent estate. This means, for example, that a creditor of the insolvent estate 
cannot receive payments or other rights from the insolvent entity at the 
cost of the insolvent estate without the co-operation of the insolvency 
administrator. It also means that a debtor of the insolvent entity can, in 
principle, only make liberating payments to the insolvent estate, and not 
to the insolvent entity in private. As a rule, the counterparties of the insol-
vent entity cannot invoke protective provisions from the moment when 
the insolvency is actually declared by a judge. This approach is intended 
to protect the interests of all other creditors of the estate. Over time, 
however, four exceptions to the principle that individual counterparties 
of the insolvent entity are not protected have become part of the NBC.104 
1. The first exception is laid down in Article 52 of the NBC. Essentially, 
Article 52 of the NBC determines that a liberating payment can be made 
to the insolvent party in person, if the party who made the payment did 
not know about the declaration of insolvency. This provision has been in 
force since 1896. The content of this provision is as follows: 
dat deze ten tijde van de rechtshandeling de faillietverklaring niet kende of behoor-
de te kennen.' 
104 See Verschoof 1992, chapters 7 and 8; Polak-Wessels II, no. 2245-2247; Van Hees 
1996. In addition to the exceptions discussed below. Van Hees 1996 points out that 
the protection of parties who obtain immovable assets from an insolvent party is 
extended under the current Dutch Civil Code. On this issue, see also Verschoof 
1992, p. 14. This exception concerning immovable assets is not discussed further in 
this study. 
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1. Payment to the bankrupt after the declaration of bankruptcy but before its publi-
cation in the performance of obligations owed to the bankrupt and arising before 
the declaration of bankruptcy will discharge the payor as against the estate pro-
vided it is not proved that he knew of the declaration of bankruptcy. 
2. A payment referred to in the preceding paragraph made to the bankrupt after 
publication of the declaration of bankruptcy will only discharge the payor as 
against the estate if he proves that the declaration of bankruptcy could not have 
been known at the time by legal publication in his place of residence, subject to the 
right of the curator to prove that it was known to him nevertheless. 
3. Payment to the bankrupt will in any case discharge the debtor from liability to 
the estate insofar as his payment accrues to the estate.1 
2. A second exception to the principle that legal acts conducted after 
the declaration of insolvency are not enforceable is laid down in Article 
35(3) of the NBC, which came into force in 1992, together with Books 3,5 
and 6 of the NCC. The text of this provision reads as follows: 
For the application of articles 86 and 238 of Book 3 of the Civil Code a person 
acquiring from the debtor is deemed to have been aware of the debtor's lack of legal 
capacity after the publication of the bankruptcy order referred to in the third para-
graph of article 14.106 
This new provision envisages a role for Articles 3:86 and 3:238 of the NCC 
in insolvency. On the basis of these provisions, the party who obtains a 
movable asset or a right to bearer or order (recht aan toonder of order), or a 
possessory right of pledge in respect of such assets from a party without 
legal capacity (such as an insolvent party), can under certain circum-
105 Translation: Netherlands Business Legislation. Original Dutch text: 
'1. Voldoening na de faillietverklaring doch vóór de bekendmaking daarvan, aan 
den gefailleerde gedaan, tot nakoming van verbintenissen jegens dezen vóór de fail-
lietverklaring ontstaan, bevrijdt hem, die haar deed, tegenover den boedel, zoolang 
zijne bekendheid met de faillietverklaring niet bewezen wordt. 
2. Voldoening, als in het vorig lid bedoeld, na de bekendmaking der faillietverkla-
ring aan den gefailleerde gedaan, bevrijdt tegenover den boedel alleen dan, wan-
neer hij, die haar deed, bewijst dat de faillietverklaring te zijner woonplaatse langs 
den weg der wettelijke aankondiging nog niet bekend kon zijn, behoudens het recht 
van den curator om aan te toonen, dat zij hem toch bekend was. 
3. In elk geval bevrijdt voldoening aan den gefailleerde den schuldenaar tegenover 
den boedel, voor zooverre hetgeen door hem voldaan werd ten bate van den boedel 
is gekomen.' 
106 Translation: Netherlands Business Legislation. Original Dutch text: 'Voorde toepas-
sing van de artikelen 86 en 238 van Boek 3 van het Burgerlijk Wetboek word t dege-
ne die van de schuldenaar heeft verkregen, geacht na de bekendmaking van de fail-
lietverklaring, bedoeld in artikel 14, derde lid, diens onbevoegdheid te hebben ge-
kend.' 
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stances, invoke the enforceability of these legal acts. An important 
criterion to determine the success or failure of this appeal is knowledge 
of the declaration of insolvency. Article 35(3) of the NBC determines that 
the insolvent party's counterparty is deemed not to have known about the 
declaration of insolvency until the moment it is published in the Neder-
landsche Staatscourant in accordance with Article 14(3) of the NBC.107 In the 
period between the declaration of insolvency and the publication thereof 
in the Nederlandsche Staatscourant, the insolvent party's counterparty is 
therefore deemed to be acting in 'good faith'.108 
The Dutch legislator has introduced this provision on the basis of the Van 
der Hoeven q.qJ Gemeente Amsterdam decision of the Supreme Court109. The 
legislator has perceived this decision of the Supreme Court as a general 
rule on the protection of individual creditors. This rule determines that a 
transferee or a pledgee who has obtained a right from his insolvent 
counterparty is deemed to be acting in good faith (i.e. he did not know 
and should not have known about the insolvency) and can invoke pro-
tective provisions from the moment of the declaration of insolvency until 
the publication thereof in the Nederlandsche Staatscourant or a newspaper 
in line with the version of Article 14(3) of the NBC in force at that time.110 
To a large extent, this interpretation seems to have been derived from the 
following passage from the Van der Hoeven decision: 
In line with the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and the Civil Code, an insol-
vency administrator can always reclaim an asset from a pledgee, to whom this asset 
was pledged by the insolvent party without notification to the insolvency adminis-
trator, and who has taken possession of the pledged asset after the publication of 
the insolvency decision, without being under an obligation to pay any compen-
sation to the pledgee 
107 Until a revision of the NBC that took effect on 15 January 2005 (see Staatsblad 2004, 
615, Staatsblad 2005,10), Article 14(3) of the NBC also required the publication of the 
declaration of insolvency m one or more newspapers designated by the insolvency 
judge (rechter-commissans) 
108 On the practical meaning of Article 35(3) of the NBC for the establishment of a valid 
right of pledge see Pitlo, Reehuis / Heisterkamp 2001, séchons 773 and 800 
109 See Supreme Court, 18 April 1947, Nederlandsche Jurisprudentie 1948, no 447 
110 See footnote 107 above 
111 Translation TK Original Dutch text 'dat, volgens de bepalingen van de F W en 
van het Β W, de curator een tot den faillieten boedel behoorenden zaak, welke de 
gefailleerde buiten zijn voorkennis heeft verpand, van den pandhouder, die deze 
zaak na de openbaarmaking van het vonnis van faillietverklaring in pand heeft ge­
nomen, steeds kan terugvorderen, zonder tot eenige vergoeding gehouden te zijn' 
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It is, however, disputed whether the Supreme Court actually intended to 
formulate such a rule. The Van der Hoeven decision did not relate to the 
twilight zone between the declaration of insolvency and the publication 
thereof in the Nederlandsche Staatscourant or a newspaper, but concerned 
a right of pledge that was vested approximately three weeks after the 
pledgor was declared insolvent by the court. The Supreme Court simply 
did not have to decide on the specific issue of exactly what moment of 
'publication' is decisive for the protection of individual creditors: the 
issuance of the insolvency order by the judge in public (Article 1 of the 
NBC), the publication thereof in the Nederlandsche Staatscourant or a news-
paper (Article 14(3) of the NBC), or in the insolvency register (Article 19 
of the NBC)112. That the decision does not deviate from the general prin-
ciple of Dutch insolvency law, i.e. no protection of individual creditors as 
of the moment of the issuance of the court order in public by a judge, is a 
position easily defended. This latter interpretation would be in line with 
the Supreme Court's 1980 ABC decision.113 This decision rejected a plea 
invoking a general principle of protection for individual creditors (Article 
35(3) of the NBC was at that time not in force and could not be invoked), 
which would apply until the publication of the declaration of insolvency 
in a periodical, i.e. also after the declaration of insolvency by the judge. 
In any case. Article 35(3) of the NBC is not in accordance with the general 
principle of Dutch insolvency law that the interests of the joint creditors 
prevail over the interests of individual creditors.114 
3. A third exception to the principle of insolvency law, which states 
that the joint interests of the creditors of the insolvent estate prevail over 
the interests of individual creditors, derives from Article 3 of the Settle-
ment Finality Directive. This provision has been implemented into Dutch 
law by Article 212b(3) of the NBC115 in relation to bankruptcy proceedings. 
Article 212b(3) of the NBC basically states that an order given to a 
112 In 2005 an online register has been established, which contains information on in-
solvencies as of 1 January 2005. See http://insolventies.rechtspraak.nl. 
113 See the ABC I Emmeng q.q. case. Supreme Court, 11 January 1980, Nederlandse ]uris-
prudentie 1980, no. 563. 
114 See the excellent conclusion of Advocate-General Franx in the ABC I Emmerig q.q. 
case, as well as the authors mentioned in that conclusion. See also the History of the 
NBC (2-III), pp. 83-85, and the literature both for and against the legislator's inter-
pretation of the Van der Hoeven decision mentioned therein. See also Verschoof 1992, 
pp. 13-14. 
115 This provision was numbered 212b(2) until a revision of the NBC that took effect 
on the 15 January 2005 (see Staatsblad 2004, 615; Staatsblad 2005, 10). 
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settlement system by a participant to such a system can be carried out that 
same day, even if it is given after that participant has been declared insol-
vent. The party who settles such an order must act in good faith. This pro-
vision implementing the Settlement Finality Directive became part of 
Dutch law on 1 January 1999. 
4. As was mentioned in the above introduction, the fourth exception 
to the rule that counterparties of an insolvent entity cannot invoke protec-
tion after the declaration of insolvency has been laid down in Article 63e, 
second paragraph, of the NBC as a result of the implementation of the 
Collateral Directive in 2006. This provision is relevant for legal acts in 
relation to financial collateral after the declaration of insolvency, such as 
a transfer or the establishment of a security interest in respect thereof. It 
entails a further erosion of the principle that no protection can be invoked 
after the declaration of insolvency. Verstijlen has noted that Article 63e, 
second paragraph, of the NBC leads to an inconsistent system of insol-
vency law and that there are no good arguments why a creditor under a 
financial collateral arrangement should be put in a better position than 
other creditors.'16 This is also my opinion.117 Verstijlen's suggestion to 
eliminate these inconsistencies by extending the protection for creditors 
under a financial collateral arrangement to other creditors as well, should, 
however, not be followed.118 This would be to the detriment of all the 
creditors who do not happen to receive payments from the insolvent 
entity and would further undermine the pari passu principle. It would be 
better to reconsider Article 8(2) of the Collateral Directive and to deter-
mine under what circumstances a deviation from the pari passu principle 
can indeed be justified.119 
If none of these exceptions applies, the general rule of Dutch insolvency 
law must be followed, which means that no protection can be invoked 
after the declaration of insolvency. 
116 See Verstijlen 2005, section 6. 
117 See Keijser 2003 I, sections 3 and 7; Keijser 2004, section 6. 
118 See Verstijlen 2005, section 7. 
119 On this issue, see also section 4.5 of chapter VI. 
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4.3.3 Pros and cons 
a. Systemic risk 
The key argument used to justify the rule that legal acts are under certain 
circumstances enforceable even after the declaration of insolvency is the 
need to eliminate systemic risk. The counterparty of an insolvent entity in 
a system or under a collateral arrangement must be sure that payments of 
cash or transfers of securities cannot be reversed, even if they have been 
carried out after this moment in time. Otherwise, this may result in a de-
fault by that insolvent entity's counterparty, possible contagion effects on 
other market participants, and thus systemic risk. 
How convincing is this argument? The rule seems to be relevant in only 
a limited number of cases. Vereecken presents two examples of a financial 
institution that transfers assets after a declaration of insolvency. He men-
tions a foreign branch of a financial institution, which transfers assets not 
knowing that the institution has been declared insolvent according to the 
laws of another jurisdiction. He also shows that a financial institution may 
carry out transactions both in the name of and for the account of another 
institution that has, in the meantime, been declared insolvent.120 These are 
exceptional cases, which may, of course, cause inconvenience, but which 
can hardly be deemed to pose a systemic risk to the entire financial sector. 
It should be taken into account that in the financial markets, information 
about a (forthcoming) declaration of insolvency is generally made avail-
able immediately, for instance by supervisors or rating agencies. This cir-
cumstance not only makes legal acts by a (foreign) branch or on the basis 
of a power of attorney unlikely, but also makes it difficult for the insolvent 
entity's counterparty to invoke 'good faith'. 
In the case of transactions involving small and medium-sized enterprises, 
such information is less readily available. But even here legal acts entered 
into after the declaration of insolvency can hardly be considered a trigger 
to systemic risk. As a result of the size of transactions entered into by 
small and medium-sized enterprises, their non-enforceability is unlikely 
to cause contagion effects and pose a danger to the entire financial sector. 
Like in the case of the Collateral Directive's right of use or its liberal en-
forcement regime, in the case of legal acts entered into after the declara-
tion of insolvency there is no need to harm the position of small and 
120 See Vereecken / Nijenhuis 2003, pp. 46-47. 
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medium-sized enterprises (and their joint creditors) generally, in order to 
dispel the risk of a strain on liquidity that might occur only in exceptional 
cases. 
b. Misuse and proof of good faith 
Another circumstance that should be taken into account is that the rules 
of the directives can be misused by an insolvent entity wishing to favour 
a counterparty who is not yet aware, or claims not to be aware, of the 
declaration of insolvency. But also if, for example, an employee makes an 
unauthorized payment, the counterparty acting in good faith may invoke 
protective provisions. This is to the detriment of all other creditors. Is 
there a risk of such misuse in practice? Several scenarios should be con-
sidered. If an insolvent financial institution transfers assets to another 
financial institution after the declaration of insolvency, it is unlikely that 
this latter institution can invoke good faith, because, as was indicated 
above, information about the (forthcoming) insolvency will usually have 
been distributed immediately and on a wide scale by, for example, regu-
lators and rating agencies. Only in a cross-border context may such 
information, in exceptional cases, not be readily available. If an insolvent 
financial institution favours a corporate counterparty, it is more likely that 
such information is less readily available, in particular where small or 
medium-sized enterprises are concerned. In this case it is therefore easier 
for such a counterparty to invoke good faith. In the event of the insol-
vency of an enterprise, this enterprise may make a payment in favour of 
its own bank. Invoking good faith will, however, prove a difficult task for 
that bank, because a bank is usually well informed about its client's finan-
cial position. If, however, the insolvent enterprise favours another enter-
prise (note that some countries in the European Union have given the 
Collateral Directive a scope that also includes such relationships), it will 
again be easier for the corporate counterparty to prove that it was acting 
in good faith. In particular, when an insolvent entity transfers assets to a 
corporate counterparty, the possibility that good faith may be successfully 
invoked cannot, therefore, be excluded. The consequence thereof would 
be that assets, which may represent a considerable value, are withdrawn 
from the joint creditors of the insolvent estate. 
Who bears the burden of proof? In principle, the counterparty of the insol-
vent party must prove that he did not know and should not have known 
about the insolvency. This is a difficult task from the moment that infor-
mation about the insolvency becomes publicly available, because in this 
323 
Chapter V 
case, the counterparty should have known about it. In practice, however, 
the declaration of insolvency by a judge is hardly ever published the very 
same day in the automated online insolvency register121 or in the Neder-
landsche Staatscourant in line with Article 14(3) of the NBC. This means 
that there is a time frame between the declaration of insolvency and the 
official publication thereof, in which case a lack of knowledge can be 
demonstrated fairly easily. During this interval of time, it should therefore 
as a rule be presumed that an enterprise that receives payments is acting 
in good faith. There is simply no way that it could have known of the 
insolvency in the absence of an official publication. Of course, this is 
different if it is plausible that the enterprise knew or should have known 
about the (forthcoming) insolvency by other means. But this, it seems, 
should be proved by the insolvency administrator. In the case of financial 
institutions, there are special circumstances that play a role in determining 
whether good faith can be invoked in respect of the time frame between 
the declaration of insolvency and the official publication thereof. In this 
case, as was mentioned above, information on a (forthcoming) declaration 
of insolvency is generally distributed swiftly and on a wide scale by 
supervisors and rating agencies, etc. When the insolvency administrator 
can show that such information has indeed been made available to market 
participants, a financial institution will struggle to successfully invoke 
good faith.122 
c. The position of other creditors 
The Collateral Directive makes it possible for an insolvent party's counter-
party in a financial collateral arrangement to successfully invoke pro-
tective provisions even after the declaration of insolvency. This means 
that cash and/or securities are no longer available to the other creditors of 
the insolvent estate. This is the same approach that was taken earlier in 
the Settlement Finality Directive. The rule set out in the directives, how-
ever, fails to conform to the general principle of insolvency law that legal 
acts conducted after the declaration of insolvency are not enforceable (i.e. 
the principle of fixation of the insolvent estate).123 Neither is the rule of the 
121 See footnote 112 above. 
122 The issues of possible misuse and good faith were discussed in the course of Dutch 
parliamentary history. See Eerste Kamer, 2004-2005, 28 874, D, p. 6 and p. 9; Eerste 
Kamer, 2004-2005, 28 874, E, section 10 and section 21; and in particular also the 
debate in the First Chamber of Parliament on 1 March 2005, EK 17, p. 752 and pp. 
761-762. 
123 See e.g. the Principles of European Insolvency Law, § 3.4 ('"Fixation" of position of 
creditors'), p. 40. 
324 
Enforcement 
directives in line with the related pari passu or paritas creditorum rule, 
which is intended to protect the interests of the joint creditors of the insol-
vent estate against the single interest of an individual creditor.124 This is 
a remarkable development. Under the Settlement Finality Directive and 
the Collateral Directive the interests of the joint creditors should, under 
certain circumstances, give way to the interest of a single creditor in a 
system or a financial collateral arrangement. The interests of the joint 
creditors can be seriously infringed by this approach. The insolvent party 
can now - deliberately or not - make effective payments to individual 
creditors of his choice even after the declaration of insolvency. These 
individual creditors will be protected if they (or, under the Settlement 
Finality Directive, the party settling the payment) have acted in good 
faith. This can lead to an arbitrary treatment of creditors that is detri-
mental to the joint creditors. 
d. Concluding remark 
All in all, the argument of systemic risk hardly seems to be a sufficient 
ground upon which to deviate from the fixation and pari passu principles 
that apply in insolvency, also if the possible misuse of the rule that 
envisages the enforceability of legal acts even after the declaration of 
insolvency is taken into account. 
5. FREEZE PERIOD 
5.1 Introduction 
This section examines in how far a so-called freeze period is an impedi-
ment to the enforcement of a security interest in respect of financial collat-
eral, or of close-out netting provisions in financial collateral agreements. 
The approach of Dutch law and that of the Collateral Directive and the 
Settlement Finality Directive are considered.125 
124 See e.g. the Principles of European Insolvency Law, § 12.2 ('Ranking of claims -
paritas creditorum'), pp. 81-82. 
125 On the freeze period see Verschoof 1992, chapter 3; Kortmann 1994 I; Van der Aa 
1995; Verdaas 2003; Keijser 20031, section 4; Keijser 2004, section 6; Verstijlen 2005, 
section 6.1. 
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5.2 The Dutch freeze period 
Articles 63a-c of the NBC regulate the freeze period, which can be put into 
effect from the moment of the declaration of insolvency. The core pro-
vision is Article 63a of the NBC, which states: 
1 On the application of each interested party or on his own motion, the rechter-
commissaris may proclaim a freeze penod of two months at the most, during which 
each right of third parties, with the exception of the creditors of the estate Roedel-
schuldeisers), to have recourse to property belonging to the estate or to claim 
property under the control of the bankrupt or the curator may only be exerased 
with his authorisation The rechter-commissans may extend this penod once for no 
more than two months 
2 The rechter-commissans may restrict his order to certain third parties and attach 
conditions both to his order and to the authorisation of a third party to exerase a 
right to which that third party is entitled 
3 If a third party sets a reasonable time penod in respect of the exerase of his 
powers to the curator, this time period is suspended during the freeze penod 
4 The freeze penod may also be proclaimed by the court issuing the bankruptcy 
order on the application of the party who applied for the bankruptcy or of the 
debtor The freeze penod that is proclaimed at the time of the insolvency order has 
effect from the day of the declaration of insolvency, including that day ' 6 
126 The translation is based on that of the Netherlands Business Legislation, which has 
been amended by the author of this book in order to take into account changes to 
Article 63a of the NBC which are effective since 15 January 2005 Onginal Dutch 
text 
1 De rechter-commissans kan op verzoek van elke belanghebbende of ambtshalve 
bi] schriftelijke beschikking een afkoelingsperiode afkondigen, waann elke be-
voegdheid van derden, met uitzondering van boedelschuldeisers, tot verhaal op tot 
de boedel behorende goederen of tot de opeising van goederen die zich in de macht 
van de gefailleerde of de curator bevinden, voor een periode van ten hoogste twee 
maanden niet dan met zijn machtiging kan worden uitgeoefend De rechter-com-
missans kan deze periode eenmaal verlengen met een periode van ten hoogste twee 
maanden 
2 De rechter-commissans kan zijn beschikking beperken tot bepaalde derden en 
voorwaarden verbinden zowel aan zijn beschikking als aan de machtiging van een 
derde tot uitoefening van een aan deze toekomende bevoegdheid 
3 Indien een derde ter zake van zijn bevoegdheid een redelijke termijn aan de cura-
tor stelt, wordt deze termijn geschorst tijdens de afkoelingspenode 
4 De afkoelingsperiode kan ook op verlangen van de aanvrager van het faillisse-
ment of van de schuldenaar worden afgekondigd door de rechter die de faillietver-
klaring uitspreekt De afkoelingsperiode die tegelijkertijd wordt afgekondigd met 
de faillietverklaring heeft gevolgen vanaf de dag waarop de faillietverklaring wordt 
uitgesproken, die dag daaronder begrepen ' 
326 
Enforcement 
The objective of the freeze period that is envisaged in Article 63a of the 
NBC is to give the administrator of an insolvent entity time to determine 
the actual situation of the insolvent estate and whether there are any pos-
sibilities for a (partial) continuation of the enterprise, and, if this is not 
possible, how it should best be liquidated.127 To this end, the freeze period 
prevents third parties, with the exception of the creditors of the insolvent 
estate (boedelschuldeisers)12*, from having recourse to the property belong-
ing to the estate or to claim property under the control of the insolvent 
party or the insolvency judge (rechter-commissaris). Such recourse can only 
be had and claims can only be enforced with the consent of the insolvency 
administrator. This temporary measure is intended to serve the interests 
of the insolvent party, his creditors, employees and other parties involved. 
Under Dutch law, a freeze period may last for a period of two months 
with a possible extension of, at most, two additional months. 
Article 63a has been in force since 1992. On 15 January 2005, this provision 
was amended in some technical respects (e.g. instead of a freeze period of 
two times one month, the maximum freeze period now lasts two times 
two months). In addition. Articles 63b and 63c were added to the regu-
lation of the freeze period in January 2005. These provisions contain two 
clarifications of the powers of third parties during the freeze period. Ar-
ticle 63b of the NBC gives a pledgee of a claim the power to notify the 
debtor of that claim of the right of pledge during the freeze period. This 
means that, from the moment of notification, the pledgee is entitled to 
receive payments in respect of the claim.129 These payments must, how-
ever, be kept apart with a trustee. During the freeze period, the pledgee 
is not allowed to have actual recourse. In addition. Article 63c of the NBC 
determines that the tax authorities may attach the assets of third parties 
that are located on the premises of the insolvent entity. This attachment 
cannot, however, be enforced during the freeze period. Moreover, it 
cannot be invoked against the real owners of the assets, if these real 
owners have claimed the assets from the insolvency administrator before 
the attachment by the tax authorities took place. 
127 In its verdict of 19 December 2003 in the Mobell I Interplan case. Rechtspraak van de 
Week 2004/8, the Dutch Supreme Court stated that a freeze period becomes senseless 
after an insolvency administrator has deaded to liquidate the insolvent entity See 
section 3 4 4 of the verdict This interpretation of the scope of the freeze period is 
unnecessarily restrictive as the administrator may, for example, need time to deter-
mine in what manner the liquidation should best take place 
128 I e creditors with a preferential claim that has come into existence after the decla-
ration of insolvency 
129 See Article 3 246 of the NCC 
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5.3 The Settlement Finality Directive and the Collateral Directive 
Under the Collateral Directive, a freeze period may not be an obstacle for 
the enforcement of financial collateral. It follows from Articles 4(4)(d) and 
4(5) of the Collateral Directive that it should be possible to enforce a right 
of pledge in respect of financial collateral immediately. These provisions 
state that a security financial collateral arrangement can take effect 'not-
withstanding the commencement or continuation of winding-up proceed-
ings or reorganisation measures' and that the realisation of a financial col-
lateral arrangement may not be subject to 'any additional time period' 
elapsing. Likewise, Articles 7(l)(a) and 7(2) in conjunction with Article 
4(4)(d) of the Collateral Directive make clear that close-out netting 
arrangements can also take effect without delay.130 The enforcement of a 
right of pledge and close-out netting should not be hindered by a freeze 
period. 
Earlier, Article 9 of the Settlement Finality Directive already determined 
that the rights of a collateral taker in the sense of that directive should not 
be affected by insolvency proceedings against the collateral provider. 
Recital 9 of the Settlement Finality Directive also underlines the impor-
tance of the enforceability of collateral. Even if formulated in somewhat 
general terms, the directive seems to exclude the applicability of a freeze 
period, which (albeit temporarily) does affect the rights of a collateral 
taker and does hamper the enforceability of collateral. In any case, the 
Dutch legislator has interpreted Article 9 of the Settlement Finality Direc-
tive in this way and has introduced Article 212b(2) of the NBC, which 
explicitly excludes the applicability of the freeze period to the enforce-
ment of collateral in a 'system' in the sense of the Settlement Finality Di-
rective.131 
The reason why this approach has been taken in the Settlement Finality 
Directive and the Collateral Directive is that a freeze period can be 
considered as an obstacle to liquidity. The insolvency of one market 
130 For the text of Articles 4 and 7 of the CD, see section 8 7 of chapter II or Appendix 
2 
131 The law implementing the Settlement Finality Directive took effect on 1 January 
1999 See Staatsblad 1998, nos 714 and 715 The provision prohibiting the appli-
cability of a freeze period to collateral provided in a 'system, only took effect only 
on 15 January 2005, together with a general revision of the freeze period, which was 
described in section 5 2 above See Staatsblad 2004, 615 and Staatsblad 2005,10 See 
also the Explanatory Comments (Memorie van Toelichting) to the new Article 212b(2) 
of the NBC in Tweede Kamer, 1999-2000, 27 244, no 3, pp 20-21 
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participant should not pose a danger to the liquidity of the cash and 
securities markets generally. A contagion effect upon other market par-
ticipants (i.e. systemic risk) should be prevented. This approach implies 
that the liquidity of the financial markets prevails over the interests of an 
insolvent entity. In the case of major market participants who have an 
important impact on the liquidity of the cash and securities markets, these 
arguments are indeed convincing. However, in the case of small and 
medium-sized enterprises, these arguments seem to have little meaning. 
In this case a freeze period has little or no impact on systemic risk. 
5.4 The scope of the Dutch freeze period 
Does the Collateral Directive necessitate a change to Articles 63a-c of the 
NBC? In order to answer this question, the exact scope of the freeze 
period under Dutch law should be examined. This section investigates in 
what cases the Dutch freeze period applies and, in particular, whether it 
applies to transactions involving financial collateral. Where transactions 
with financial collateral are concerned, it is important to determine 
whether the freeze period affects the enforcement of a security interest in 
respect of such collateral and of close-out netting provisions. 
It should be noted from the outset that there is a considerable degree of 
uncertainty about the exact scope of the freeze period under Dutch law. 
As is shown below, this is, to a large extent, because the Dutch legislator 
is inconsistent in his approach to the freeze period. 
The text of Article 63a suggests that the freeze period has a wide scope of 
applicability. It relates to 'property' {goederen) generally belonging to the 
insolvent estate or under the control of the insolvent entity or the insol-
vency administrator. 'Property' is a very broad notion that includes things 
(tangible assets) and patrimonial rights (including intangible assets, e.g. 
claims).132 
The 1992 Explanatory Comments {Memorie van Toelichting) to Article 63a 
of the NBC, however, seem to contain a limitation. By way of an example, 
the Explanatory Comments mention the following creditors to whom the 
freeze period applies: pledgees and mortgagees; creditors who have 
reserved title {eigendomsvoorbehoud), who have a right to reclaim unpaid 
goods {redamerecht), or a right accruing from a lease; creditors who have 
132 See in particular Articles 3:1-3 and 3:6 of the NCC. 
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otherwise given a right to make use of assets; and tax authorities in rela-
tion to their right of seizure (bodembeslag).133 Even though this enumera-
tion is not exhaustive, it relates in all cases to tangible assets. For this 
reason, Kortmann is also inclined to interpret the freeze period restric-
tively and to apply it to tangible assets only.134 Van der Aa has argued that 
the freeze period was introduced in particular to bring to an end the 
practice of creditors who have reserved title collecting assets with large 
vehicles immediately after the commencement of insolvency.135 This is an 
additional argument for a limitation of the freeze period to tangible 
things. It is therefore undisputed that the freeze period relates to tangible 
assets that are necessary for conducting an enterprise, such as machinery. 
But goods that are liquid and more easily replaceable, such as all kinds of 
goods in stock, also fall within the scope of the freeze period. 
It is, nonetheless, less certain whether the freeze period also extends to 
intangible assets. Examples of such assets are registered claims (vorderin-
gen op naam), such as rights in respect of cash, and rights relating to 
securities (i.e. financial collateral). After the revision of the freeze period 
that took effect in 2005, it is nonetheless likely that intangible assets also 
fall within the scope of the freeze period. The Explanatory Comments 
relating to the 2005 revision make it clear that the scope of the freeze 
period is not limited to tangible assets.136 Section 21 of the Explanatory 
Comments indicates that the freeze period applies to the enforcement of 
all rights that influence the size and the contents of the insolvent estate. 
Section 44 of the comments mentions explicitly that the freeze period does 
not only apply to 'things', but to all property, including patrimonial rights 
(e.g. registered claims). Moreover, Article 63b of the NBC regulates the 
powers of a pledgee with a right in respect of a claim. This regulation 
would have been superfluous if claims fell outside the scope of the freeze 
period altogether.137 The same is true for Article 212b(2) of the NBC, a pro-
vision which excludes the applicability of the freeze period to financial 
collateral provided in a 'system' in the sense of the Settlement Finality 
Directive.138 
133 See Tweede Kamer, 1980-1981, 16 593, no 3, pp 153-154 
134 See Kortmann 1994 I, in particular section 2 
135 See Van der Aa 1995, section 2 
136 See Tweede Kamer, 1999-2000, 27 244, no 3 
137 See, m this sense, also Verstijlen 2005, sechon 6 1 
138 See sechon 5 3 above 
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If claims do indeed fall within the scope of the freeze period, this means 
that a right of pledge in respect of a claim cannot be immediately 
enforced. Indeed, as was mentioned above. Article 63b of the NBC allows 
the pledgee to receive payments on the pledged claim, but prohibits 
enforcement. Does the inclusion of claims in the scope of the freeze period 
also have a consequence for netting arrangements? Netting also has an 
effect on the insolvent estate, and could, as such, fall within the scope of 
Article 63a of the NBC. Before the revision of the freeze period that took 
effect in 2005, Kortmann argued that netting should not be hampered by 
a freeze period.139 Faber, too, is not in favour of application of the freeze 
period to set-off.140 In his view, there is no good reason to prevent the set-
off of claims in insolvency. Both authors also show, however, that the 
scope of the freeze period is not entirely clear and that it could also be 
argued that netting does fall within its scope and cannot be carried out 
during the freeze period. The following arguments, for example, can be 
presented both for and against the application of a freeze period to 
netting: 
1. One argument in favour of a broad scope of applicability of the 
freeze period, including claims, is that a pledgee with a right in respect of 
a claim or a party who can invoke netting, may decide not to exercise his 
right if the insolvency administrator comes up with a feasible plan for the 
successful continuation of the enterprise. The freeze period gives the 
insolvency administrator the necessary time to make such a plan, which 
may please the pledgee or the party who had intended to invoke netting. 
On the basis of the rescue plan, secured creditors can decide whether to 
withdraw financial resources, or whether to support the rescue plan and 
not invoke their right of pledge or netting. In this scenario, financial 
resources, which would otherwise have disappeared from the insolvent 
estate, are now available for the continuation of the enterprise. 
2. On the other hand, one may wonder whether the powers of finan-
ciers should be curtailed this way. In particular, the fact that cash and 
securities (unlike machinery, for example) are easily replaceable supports 
the view that such assets should not be covered by the freeze period. In 
the case of assets that are liquid and can easily be replaced, a financier 
should, in this view, have the right to net immediately, which guarantees 
continued liquidity during the freeze period. Upon the presentation of a 
139 See Kortmann 1994 I, section 8. 
140 See Faber 2005, nos. 437-438. 
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rescue plan by the insolvency administrator, the financier can determine 
whether it is feasible and whether he is willing to finance it.141 
3. The application of the criterion, set out in the Explanatory Com-
ments relating to the 2005 revision of the freeze period, i.e. effects on the 
size and the contents of the insolvent estate, heighten the likeliness that 
close-out netting cannot be enforced during a freeze period. 
4. The exclusion of close-out netting from a freeze period would lead 
to a certain discrepancy with pledge law. Why should a set-off of claims 
be possible during a freeze period, but not the enforcement of a right of 
pledge in respect of a claim? 
Another reason why the scope of the freeze period is not undisputed is 
that the legislator himself has caused further confusion in the law imple-
menting the Collateral Directive. In the Explanatory Comments to this 
law, the legislator has deviated from his statements in the Explanatory 
Comments relating to the 2005 changes to the freeze period. The Explana-
tory Comments to the Dutch law implementing the Collateral Directive 
contain some passages on the freeze period. In these texts, the legislator 
explains that the freeze period is intended to apply to capital equipment, 
such as machinery and goods in stock, which may be necessary for the 
continuation of the enterprise. Other rights, such as rights in respect of 
financial collateral, cannot be compared with rights in respect of such 
capital equipment, and can therefore, in the view of the legislator, be 
enforced irrespective of a freeze period.142 
Verdaas has pointed out that the approach of the legislator is inconsistent 
and confusing.143 Verstijlen has nonetheless concluded that, all in all, the 
freeze period also applies to claims.144 In light of the above, it must indeed 
be presumed that, under Articles 63a-c of the NBC, a freeze period pre-
vents the enforcement of a security interest in respect of financial collat-
eral. It also cannot be entirely excluded that close-out netting provisions, 
like those envisaged in the GMRA or the GMSLA, are not enforceable in 
141 Note that the criterion of liquidity or replacability prompts the question of whether, 
for example, different kinds of goods in stock fall within the scope of the freeze 
period. 
142 See Tweede Kamer, 2002-2003,28 874, no. 3, p. 14 and p. 20; Tweede Kamer, 2004-2005, 
30 138, no. 3, p. 22. 
143 See Verdaas 2003. 
144 See Verstijlen 2005, section 6.1. 
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the event that the general Dutch legal rules relating to a freeze period 
apply. 
5.5 Implementation into Dutch law 
Article 63d of the NBC gives shape to the Collateral Directive by explicitly 
abolishing the freeze period where financial collateral is concerned. This 
provision states: 
The property that is pledged on the basis of a financial collateral agreement as 
defined in Article 51 of Book 7 of the Civil Code, is excluded from the property 
mentioned in Article 63a, first paragraph. 
On the basis of this provision, the freeze period is not applicable to a secu-
rity interest in respect of financial collateral. Such interests can therefore 
be realised in the course of the freeze period. 
Article 63d of the NBC relates to a security interest in respect of financial 
collateral only. This provision, however, is silent about the issue of close-
out netting. Still, in accordance with the Collateral Directive, a freeze 
period may also not be an impediment to close-out netting under a title 
transfer financial collateral arrangement. In light of the insufficiently 
defined scope of the freeze period under Dutch law, one could question 
whether it is a good thing that the Dutch legislator has limited himself to 
enacting a special provision that states that security interests in respect of 
financial collateral are enforceable during a freeze period, but has not 
explicitly stated that close-out netting is enforceable notwithstanding a 
freeze period. 
In the course of parliamentary discussion, the Dutch Minister of Justice 
stated that an article in the NBC, which makes it clear that close-out net-
ting provisions in a financial collateral agreement are enforceable during 
a freeze period, is superfluous. The minister argued that netting does not 
result in the disappearance of property from the insolvent estate. It may 
be true that the initial transfer of financial collateral has taken place at an 
earlier moment in time. This financial collateral has, however, been 
replaced by a contractual claim for the provision of equivalent assets. This 
145 Translation: TK. Original Dutch text: 'Van de goederen als bedoeld in artikel 63a, 
eerste lid, zijn uitgezonderd de goederen die uit hoofde van een financiëlezeker-
heidsovereenkomst als bedoeld in artikel 51 van Boek 7 van het Burgerlijk Wetboek 
zijn verpand.' 
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contractual claim falls within the insolvent estate and is extinguished (at 
least in part) as a result of close-out netting. Netting therefore does indeed 
have the consequence that property disappears out of the insolvent estate 
and that the size of the estate diminishes. The position of the minister m 
this respect is not tenable.146 
Close-out netting provisions of financial collateral arrangements should, 
in any case, be enforceable under Dutch law if a freeze period is pro-
claimed. Even if this cannot be based on an explicit provision in the NBC, 
it follows directly from the provisions of the Collateral Directive. 
The effect of the non-applicability of a freeze period to security interests 
and netting arrangements in respect of financial collateral is that the 
insolvency administrator will have to allow recourse to take place imme-
diately in respect of cash and securities that, until that moment, have 
formed part of the insolvent estate. 
6. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has examined the consequences of the Collateral Directive on 
the manner of the enforcement of rights in respect of financial collateral 
and on insolvency law. Sections 2 and 3 have examined the way in which 
the enforcement of a security interest in respect of financial collateral 
should take place under the Collateral Directive, and a number of issues 
in relation to close-out netting provisions in financial collateral arrange-
ments. Generally, the Collateral Directive seeks to eliminate obstacles to 
enforcement and is therefore in favour of secured parties. Sections 4 and 
5 of this chapter have paid attention to the following issues of insolvency 
law: the abolition of the retroactive effect of the declaration of insolvency, 
the enforceability of legal acts after the declaration of insolvency, and the 
non-applicability of the freeze period. Generally, the approach of the Col-
lateral Directive (and of the earlier Settlement Finality Directive) favours 
the counterparty of the insolvent party under a financial collateral ar-
rangement, and is detrimental to all other creditors. 
146 See séchons 14 and 20 of the Additional Explanatory Memorandum (Nadere Memorie 
van Antwoord), Eerste Kamer, 2004-2005, 28 874, E See also Eerste Kamer, 2003-2004, 
28 874, Β, ρ 5, Eerste Kamer, 2003-2004, 28 874, C, ρ 11, Eerste Kamer, 2004-2005, 
28 874, D, ρ 7 and ρ 9 
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6.1 Enforcement 
6.2.2 Enforcement of a security interest 
On the basis of the Collateral Directive, formal requirements that are set 
out in pledge law (such as the public sale of pledged assets, or the inter-
vention of a judge or, in the case of securities, of an objective interme-
diary) may not be applied when enforcing a security interest in financial 
collateral. In addition, the directive opens the possibility of abolishing the 
prohibition of appropriation. The drafters of a UNIDROIT Preliminary 
Draft Convention on Substantive Rules regarding Intermediated Secu-
rities are currently considering a comparable approach. Together, the 
formal requirements for enforcement and the prohibition of appropriation 
are intended to strike a balance between the interests of all parties in-
volved, in particular the collateral provider, his creditors and the collat-
eral taker. In particular, they are intended to prevent abuse and to safe-
guard optimum proceeds. The approach of the Collateral Directive and 
the UNIDROIT Draft Convention can lead to situations in which the pro-
ceeds of the enforcement are not optimal, and that are disadvantageous 
to the collateral provider and his creditors. 
Major participants in the financial markets generally know how to look 
after their interests. When they contract with one another, a reasonable 
valuation mechanism will usually be agreed upon, because these partici-
pants are equally powerful. It is arguable that in this case the interest of 
the insolvent estate must give way to the interest of liquid markets for 
cash and securities. This is different in the case of small and medium-
sized enterprises, which are far less important for the liquidity of the 
markets, and that may, in many cases, not be able to accurately represent 
their interests (and those of their creditors) when entering into trans-
actions with a more powerful, major market participant. The Collateral 
Directive and the UNIDROIT Draft Convention offer only one mechanism 
to guarantee a fair balance between the parties, which is the possibility of 
giving a judge the power to determine a posteriori if enforcement has taken 
place in a commercially reasonable manner. In this respect, small and 
medium-sized enterprises and (in case of the UNIDROIT Draft Conven-
tion) natural persons are, however, again in a disadvantageous position, 
because they lack the expertise to determine whether a fair value has been 
realised by their counterparty and whether it is opportune to resort to the 
court. For these reasons, it is indeed argued that these enterprises and 
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natural persons should be protected and fall outside the scope of the 
Collateral Directive and the UNIDROIT Draft Convention. 
6.2.2 Close-ou t netting 
If collateral has been transferred outright, enforcement in the event of 
default typically takes place by way of close-out netting. If a party invokes 
netting against his counterparty, this means that (1) the counterparty's 
claim is fulfilled, and that (2) the counterclaim of the party invoking 
netting is extinguished (up to the amount of the lesser claim). The Collat-
eral Directive generally favours the enforceability of contractual close-out 
netting provisions upon default. National law, however, still plays an im-
portant role in respect of a number of issues, such as the mutuality and 
similarity requirements, voidable preference and the moment of valua-
tion. 
As far as the requirement of mutuality is concerned, the Collateral Di-
rective states explicitly that it must be determined under national law 
whether this requirement is an obstacle to set-off. In the Netherlands, the 
same is true for the requirement of similarity, because the Dutch legislator 
has not implemented Article 7 of the Collateral Directive. Under Dutch 
law, the requirements of mutuality and similarity apply in principle, but 
can be altered on the basis of a contract. Such contracts are enforceable in 
insolvency if they have 'pre-insolvency' roots. The contractual close-out 
netting provisions of the GMRA and GMSLA are therefore enforceable 
under Dutch law when the master agreement and transactions thereunder 
have been entered into before insolvency. 
Likewise, the issue of voidable preference should, according to the Collat-
eral Directive, be determined under the rules of national law. The same 
is true for the question of the moment in time at which obligations that are 
subject to close-out netting should be valued, because this issue has not 
been dealt with in the directive. As far as the moment of valuation is con-
cerned, the fixation principle should not be applied too rigidly. Some 
flexibility can be useful in order to determine the actual value of mutual 
obligations by entering into replacement transactions, for example. But 
the allowed time frame for valuation should be reduced to a minimum in 
order to prevent speculation and fraud at the cost of the insolvent estate. 
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6.2 Insolvency law 
The Collateral Directive has three major consequences for insolvency law: 
the declaration of insolvency does not have retroactive effect, under cer-
tain circumstances legal acts that have been conducted after the declara-
tion of insolvency are enforceable, and the freeze period does not apply 
in the case of transactions involving financial collateral. A comparable 
approach in relation to these issues was already present in the Settlement 
Finality Directive. 
Generally, the Settlement Finality Directive and the Collateral Directive 
favour the interests of the financial markets (that have an interest in liq-
uidity) over the opposed interests of the insolvent estate (that, on the 
contrary, has fixation as a starting point in order to protect the interests of 
the creditors of the insolvent estate in particular). 
6.2.2 The declaration of insolvency has no retroactive effect 
Under Dutch law, the declaration of insolvency generally has retroactive 
effect. Under the Collateral Directive, however, the insolvency becomes 
effective as of the exact moment when the insolvency has been declared. 
Even though this change is not to the advantage of the insolvent estate, it 
is a sound measure that an insolvency has consequences only from the 
moment it is declared by a judge. The reason why the declaration of insol-
vency normally has retroactive effect is that at the end of the nineteenth 
century the Dutch legislator found that it was often difficult to prove at 
exactly what moment in time transactions occurred and at what time the 
declaration of insolvency was issued. In today's financial markets, though, 
it is often easily possible to determine precisely at what time a transaction 
has taken place. In addition, as a result of the law implementing the Col-
lateral Directive, a judge is now obliged to mention in the declaration of 
insolvency at what time exactly it has been issued. Some authors have 
argued for the abolition of the retroactive effect of the declaration of insol-
vency altogether. 
6.2.2 Enforceability of legal acts after the declaration of insolvency 
Under certain circumstances, the Collateral Directive leaves room for in-
voking provisions that protect individual creditors who have been doing 
business with the insolvent party after the declaration of insolvency. Legal 
acts are enforceable if they have been concluded after the declaration of 
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insolvency but on the same day, and if the insolvent entity's counterparty 
can prove that he did not know and should not have known of the insol-
vency. This means that financial collateral may disappear from the insol-
vent estate even after the declaration of insolvency and without the con-
sent of the insolvency administrator. The rule that gives individual credi-
tors under a financial collateral arrangement the right to invoke the 
enforceability of legal acts even after the declaration of insolvency contra-
dicts the pari passu principle. It leaves room for questionable transactions 
that are to the detriment of the insolvent estate. 
6.2.3 No freeze period 
Transactions that fall within the scope of the Collateral Directive are not 
affected by a freeze period. This means that enforcement can take place 
without delay, which has a negative impact on the insolvent estate. This 
deviation from the general rules of insolvency law is justified by the argu-
ment that a temporary freeze period hampers the liquidity of cash and 
securities on the financial markets, which increases systemic risk. 
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CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introductory remarks 
This study relates to financial collateral arrangements. While particular 
attention has been paid to repurchase and securities lending agreements, 
derivatives have also been discussed. These financial instruments are 
applied by commercial market participants and by central banks on a very 
large scale. 
The focus of this study has been on the legal issues arising in relation to 
financial collateral arrangements. Particular attention has, in this respect, 
been paid to the Settlement Finality Directive and the Collateral Directive, 
both of which have a number of important consequences for national 
rules of property and insolvency law. Whereas both directives are meant 
to realise such commendable objectives as the elimination of systemic risk, 
the achievement of legal certainty and the promotion of a liquid European 
market for cash and securities, they have also led to an altered balance in 
the interests of collateral providers, their creditors and collateral takers, 
and, in insolvency, the different creditors of the insolvent estate. 
This chapter contains conclusions and recommendations. Section 2 of this 
chapter outlines the most important conclusions of this study. It describes 
the consequences of the Settlement Finality Directive and the Collateral 
Directive in the fields of property and insolvency law. On the basis of 
these conclusions, sections 3 and 4 set out a number of recommendations 
as to how these directives should be interpreted and changed. 
1.2 Overview of consequences for property and insolvency law 
Section 2 provides an outline of the consequences of the Settlement Finali-
ty Directive and the Collateral Directive for national rules of property and 
insolvency law. It summarizes the conclusions of chapters III (on transfers 
of title), rV (on security interests combined with a general right of dispo-
sal) and V (on enforcement). 
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1.3 Restrictive or extensive interpretation? 
In this book, the question of the preferred interpretation of the Collateral 
Directive (and of national implementing laws) has been raised a number 
of times.1 Having investigated the consequences of the Collateral Direc-
tive in chapters III, IV and V, it is possible to determine whether the direc-
tive in its current form should be given a restrictive or an extensive scope 
of application. Section 3 examines two possible ways to limit the scope of 
the Collateral Directive and weighs the arguments between a restrictive 
and an extensive scope of application. 
1.4 Recommendations for change 
Section 4 questions whether the rules set out in the Settlement Finality 
Directive and Collateral Directive are fair to all parties involved, and 
whether the harmonised regime should not have been slightly different. 
It suggests a number of changes resulting in a slightly different regime, 
which meets the objectives relating to systemic risk, legal certainty and 
liquidity, but which, at the same time, does more justice to the divergent 
interests of the different participants in the financial markets. 
2. THE CONSEQUENCES FOR PROPERTY AND INSOLVENCY 
LAW 
2.1 Introduction 
This section begins with an outline of the key consequences of the Collat-
eral Directive and the Settlement Finality Directive for property and insol-
vency law. In order to improve liquidity, the Collateral Directive sanctions 
title transfers of financial collateral, introduces a security interest com-
bined with a so-called 'right of use' (i.e. a collateral taker's general right of 
disposal), and contains provisions relating to the manner of enforcement 
of interests in financial collateral (whether provided by way of an outright 
transfer or on the basis of a security interest). These topics are discussed 
in section 2.2 below. In addition, both the Collateral Directive and the 
Settlement Finality Directive set out a number of provisions of insolvency 
law, which are discussed in section 2.3. Section 2.4 assesses whether the 
1 See, for example, section 3 of chapter I; sections 8.2.5, 8.3 and 8.4 of chapter II; 
section 3.7 of chapter III; section 4.8 of chapter IV; and section 2 of chapter V. 
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directives in their current form strike a fair balance between the interests 
of collateral providers, their creditors and collateral takers, and, in the 
case of insolvency, between the different creditors of the insolvent estate. 
2.2 Property law 
2.2.2 Introduction 
In Europe, financial collateral is customarily provided on the basis of an 
outright transfer of title.2 An outright transfer, i.e. an unlimited transfer 
of all right, title and interest in respect of such collateral, enables the 
collateral taker to dispose of the collateral in the course of his own busi-
ness. If the collateral taker requires only an object by which to secure an 
outstanding debt, the collateral provider can provide one by establishing 
a security interest in respect of financial collateral. Depending on the 
national legal system, this security interest can, for example, be a right of 
pledge or a fiduciary transfer of title. 
Section 2.2.2 below begins with an overview of a number of essential 
features of security interests, which guarantee a balance of the interests 
of the different parties involved. Whether or not the Collateral Directive 
is in line with these features will be examined in subsections 2.2.3 ('Trans-
fer of title') and 2.2.4 ('Security interests'). 
2.2.2 Core characteristics of security interests 
Under Dutch and German law, security interests such as a right of pledge 
or a fiduciary transfer of title, commonly have the following characteristic 
features (many of which also occur in security interests under American 
and English law). 
1. A secured party has a duty of due care in respect of the assets in 
which he has a security interest. 
2 This occurs on the basis of market documentation for repurchase, securities lending 
and derivatives transactions applied in Europe, such as the Global Master Repur-
chase Agreement, the Global Master Securities Lending Agreement, the Margin 
Provisions (Part 3; English law) issued by the International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association, and the European Master Agreement for Financial Transactions. 
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2. The collateral provider generally has a right of redemption, which 
means that he regains full title to exactly the same encumbered 
assets if he pays the secured debt. 
3. A secured party has the right to sell encumbered assets upon default 
by the security provider, but not under normal circumstances. 
4. If a secured party sells the encumbered assets upon default, he must 
do so in a prescribed manner. 
5. The secured party is not allowed to appropriate the assets upon 
default. 
6. Should there be any surplus value upon enforcement and fulfilment 
of the secured obligation, the secured party must pay this amount 
to the collateral provider. 
There are also other characteristics of a right of pledge, such as its abso-
lute and accessory character, droit de suite, and the special rights of a 
pledgee upon default. The focus of this book, however, has been on the 
principles listed above, which shape the fiduciary relationship between 
a collateral provider, his creditors, and the collateral taker. These prin-
ciples guarantee a balance between the interests of the different parties 
involved. They are essentially an elaboration of the core principle that 
parties should act in a reasonable manner towards each other. The appli-
cation of the pledge principles is particularly important in a situation in 
which there is no equal balance of power between the provider of credit 
and the debtor who provides collateral. Normally, the application of these 
principles is mandatory, but the Collateral Directive renders them 
inapplicable in many ways.3 
2.2.3 Transfer of title 
a. Enforceability of title transfer arrangements in accordance with their terms 
Article 6 of the Collateral Directive states that title transfer arrangements 
can take effect in accordance with their terms. This provision sanctions 
outright transfers of financial collateral, which enable the collateral taker 
to dispose of the collateral in the course of his own business. If interpreted 
3 On the essential features of security interests, see also section 1.3 of chapter III. 
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broadly, this provision also sanctions fiduciary transfers of title, which 
aim to provide security and do not give the collateral taker the right to 
freely dispose of the collateral. Such an interpretation would, however, 
have negative consequences for collateral providers. 
A fiduciary transfer of title is essentially a security interest. For this 
reason, provisions and principles of pledge law are traditionally applied 
by way of analogy to fiduciary transfers.4 Applying the rules of pledge 
law, such as those relating to a prescribed manner of enforcement (e.g. a 
public sale, or a sale involving intervention by a judge or some other ob-
jective, third party intermediary) and prohibiting appropriation, guaran-
tees a balance between the interests of the collateral provider, his creditors 
and the collateral taker. The principle that, upon enforcement by the col-
lateral taker, any surplus value should be paid to the collateral provider 
has the same effect. The application of these rules shapes the fiduciary 
relationship between the parties. These rules guarantee maximum pro-
ceeds and protect the collateral provider and his creditors agamst a more 
powerful collateral taker. The application of these principles of pledge law 
is particularly important when there is an unequal balance of power 
between the credit provider and the debtor who provides the collateral. 
Normally, therefore, the application of these principles is mandatory. 
If Article 6 of the Collateral Directive is interpreted broadly, the parties 
can, however, render these principles inoperable through a contract. Ac-
cording to Article 6, it would be possible, for example, to agree that the 
collateral taker / fiduciary has the right to appropriate the encumbered 
assets upon default. It could also be agreed that, were he to sell these 
assets, he would not be obliged to do so in a predetermined manner (e.g. 
in public, with the consent of a judge or with the intervention of an in-
dependent professional intermediary), but rather as he deemed fit. He 
may also not be obliged to pay any surplus value to the collateral pro-
vider. Maximum proceeds for the benefit of the collateral provider and his 
other creditors are clearly not guaranteed in this scenario. In short, the 
4 This is the case under (old) Dutch law, for example To a certain extent, the same 
is true for current German law Note that, from 1992, fiduciary transfers of title 
were prohibited under Dutch law by Article 3 84(3) of the Dutch Civil Code This 
provision was interpreted by the Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) in the Sogelease 
case of 19 May 1995, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1996, no 119, and m the BTL Lease 
case of 18 November 2005, www rechtspraak ni, LJN AT8241 Within the limits of 
these decisions, transfers with fiduciary features are possible Under current Dutch 
law, a security interest can, in any case, be established by vesting a (public or non-
public) nght of pledge 
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consequence of a broad interpretation of Article 6 of the Collateral Direc-
tive is that the parties can, through a contract, avoid the protective mecha-
nisms of pledge law, which are traditionally applied by way of analogy 
to fiduciary transfers. 
b. Close-out netting 
Generally, Article 7 of the Collateral Directive sanctions the enforceability 
of close-out netting provisions that are commonly envisaged in title trans-
fer financial collateral arrangements. Section 1 of this provision requires 
Member States to ensure 'that a close-out netting provision can take effect 
in accordance with its terms'. Nevertheless, some crucial issues (such as 
the mutuality and similarity requirements, the issue of voidable prefer-
ence and the moment of valuation) still need to be determined by national 
law. In order to achieve convergence in the field of close-out netting on a 
European level, the issue should be readdressed. 
2.2.4 Security interests 
a. A secured party's general right of disposal 
One of the most remarkable changes brought about by the Collateral 
Directive is set forth in Article 5. In order to enhance liquidity, this pro-
vision envisages the possibility of combining a security interest with a 
'right of use', i.e. a general right of disposal for the collateral taker. To a 
large extent, this new approach seems to have been inspired by American 
law. Over the past twenty years or so, a security interest combined with 
an unlimited right of disposal has become common in the American 
securities lending and derivatives markets. 
If the collateral taker exercises this right of disposal by transferring the 
collateral assets to a third party, for example, the collateral provider loses 
his (proprietary) interest in the collateral5, and is left with a contractual 
claim against the collateral taker. By exercising the right of use, the collat-
eral taker incurs a contractual obligation to transfer equivalent assets to 
the collateral provider no later than at the end of the transaction. On the 
basis of Article 5(3) of the Collateral Directive, these equivalent assets take 
5 In the European Union, interests in securities are often of a proprietary nature. See 
the EFMLG Report (2003). The Dutch SGTA system may also be considered. 
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the place of the assets originally provided (i.e. a rule of proprietary 
substitution). 
The Collateral Directive's right of use is not compatible with key charac-
teristics of security interests. Security interests, such as a right of pledge, 
customarily relate to assets that can be used for purposes of recourse if a 
secured debt is not satisfied. Under 'normal', i.e. non-default circum-
stances, the encumbered assets cannot generally be used for other pur-
poses, such as in the case of a right of usufruct, let alone be disposed of. 
A secured party's general right of disposal is also not in line with his duty 
of due care in relation to the assets in which he has a security interest. The 
construction conflicts with the ban on appropriating encumbered assets, 
which is applied in a number of Member States. Moreover, it frustrates 
the collateral provider's right of redemption, which means that he regains 
full title to exactly the same encumbered assets if he pays the secured 
debt. These traditional principles guarantee a balance between the in-
terests of the collateral provider and collateral taker, which is disturbed 
by the Collateral Directive. The fiduciary character of a security interest, 
which protects the interests of collateral providers and their creditors 
against those of collateral takers (who are often in a stronger position), is 
therefore not in line with a collateral taker's general right of disposal, 
which is, in fact, a right to end the fiduciary relationship between the 
parties. 
Based on an analysis of American, English, Dutch and German law, it has 
been submitted in chapter IV that a security interest combined with a 
right of use is essentially an outright transfer. Under English law, for 
example, a collateral taker's general right of disposal is not compatible 
with equitable rules, such as, in particular, the collateral provider's equity 
of redemption. According to the general principles of English law, a secu-
rity interest combined with a 'right of use' should be characterised as an 
outright transfer. Under Dutch and German law, a security interest com-
bined with a general right of disposal can best be understood by referring 
to the irregular right of pledge or pignus irreguläre. The irregular right of 
pledge is based on the principle that ownership passes from one party to 
another when assets are rendered replaceable. This occurs when a non-
owner (e.g. a pledgee, a usufructuary or a borrower of fungible assets) is 
given the right to dispose of the assets involved, and is under an obli-
gation to return equivalent assets to the original owner. According to the 
right of use envisaged in the Collateral Directive, assets are essentially 
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made replaceable. Under general principles of law, this would result in an 
outright passing of title.6 
Under the Collateral Directive, ownership arguably passes only at the 
moment that the right of use is exercised. It should, however, be noted 
that the rights of the collateral provider are already impaired in the period 
between the establishment of the general right of disposal and the exercise 
thereof. In the case of a traditional security interest, the collateral provider 
retains his ownership interest and redemption right, which are lost only 
in the event of the collateral provider's own default. If the collateral taker 
is granted a general right of disposal, the ownership and redemption 
rights are not only subject to the collateral provider's default, but also to 
the collateral taker's right of disposal, which can be exercised at any time, 
leaving the collateral provider with a contractual claim. 
Friction also arises in connection with the Collateral Directive's rule of 
proprietary substitution, which is, to a large extent, an empty shell. Con-
trary to traditional rules of proprietary substitution under Dutch law, for 
example, the Collateral Directive's rule only relates to equivalent assets 
and not to other assets that might replace the original collateral assets (e.g. 
the sale proceeds). Moreover, it takes effect only when the collateral taker 
decides to transfer the equivalent assets, and not at the point at which the 
collateral taker becomes entitled to them. If the equivalent assets are 
transferred at the same time that the secured debt is paid off, as is usually 
the case, no proprietary substitution takes place at all. This is because, in 
line with the accessory character of security interests, the collateral taker's 
security interest ceases to exist once the secured debt is satisfied. As a 
result, the collateral provider is left with a contractual claim from the 
moment that the right of use is exercised to the moment that the collateral 
taker transfers equivalent assets, usually at the end of a transaction. 
During this period, the collateral provider runs the risk that the collateral 
taker will become insolvent.7 
Combining a security interest with a right of use enhances the liquidity of 
the markets. However, it puts a collateral provider in an undesirable 
6 For a comparable analysis in relation to Danish and Italian law, see the relevant 
chapters of the Right of Use Report 
7 This risk is mitigated if the collateral provider can offset his right to receive equiva-
lent assets with his obligation towards the collateral taker to fulfil the secured debt 
However, when price fluctuations of the cash and/or secunhes concerned occur, a 
residual risk may remain 
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position, leaving him with a contractual claim against the collateral taker. 
Moreover, the right of use infringes upon a number of core principles of 
pledge law, such as the duty of due care, the prohibition of appropriation, 
and the right of redemption. It is not in line with the fiduciary nature of 
security interests. It could, therefore, be argued that for e.g. tax, account-
ing and capital adequacy purposes, the construction should be treated as 
what it essentially is, i.e. an outright transfer. In addition, it should be 
noted that the goal of liquidity could have been reached without blurring 
the distinction between outright transfers and security interests. It would 
have been better if the Collateral Directive had been limited to sanctioning 
the market standard for the provision of financial collateral, i.e. by way of 
an outright transfer thereof.8 
b. Liberal enforcement regime 
Article 4 of the Collateral Directive envisages a liberal regime for the 
enforcement of security interests, such as a right of pledge. In the event a 
collateral provider defaults, the collateral taker can enforce his security 
interest without abiding by formal requirements such as a public sale or 
the intervention of an impartial intermediary. Moreover, the Collateral 
Directive takes the non-applicability of the prohibition of appropriation 
as a starting point. This means that the collateral taker can, if this has been 
agreed to by the parties, appropriate assets upon default and value them 
on the basis of a contractual arrangement. The combination of mandatory 
enforcement procedures with the prohibition of appropriation prevented 
abuse and ensured maximum proceeds. As such, the interests of collateral 
providers and their creditors were taken into account. Under the Collat-
eral Directive, these protective mechanisms can be rendered inapplicable 
on the grounds of a contract. 
There is good reason to deviate from the strict rules guaranteeing maxi-
mum proceeds in the enforcement of a security interest and to depart 
from mandatory principles of pledge law. The liberal enforcement regime 
of the Collateral Directive is justified by the argument that it guarantees 
the continued liquidity of the cash and securities markets, and as such 
limits systemic risk. In addition, a reasonable valuation of collateral is 
likely to occur in transactions between major, equally powerful market 
participants. Furthermore, the Collateral Directive allows for national 
8 On the collateral taker's general right of disposal, see also Johansson 2005, section 
3.4. 
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rules that enable a judge to check a posteriori whether the valuation of 
collateral has taken place in a commercially reasonable manner. These 
arguments are convincing in relation to major market participants and in 
this case justify the Collateral Directive's liberal enforcement regime. 
The Collateral Directive, however, is not fair to small and medium-sized 
enterprises. There is a clear imbalance of power between these players 
and major market participants. In addition, the impact of small and 
medium-sized enterprises on the overall liquidity of the cash and secu-
rities markets is limited. The liberal enforcement regime of the Collateral 
Directive fails to take into account their interests and those of their credi-
tors in a satisfactory way. Optimum proceeds are not guaranteed if valua-
tion mechanisms are determined in a contract, the terms of which may be 
dictated by the credit provider / collateral taker. Moreover, it may be 
difficult for a small or medium-sized enterprise to determine whether it 
is feasible to start legal proceedings against a collateral taker after enforce-
ment has taken place, especially if it lacks expertise and direct access to 
accurate information on fair prices for financial collateral.9 The Collateral 
Directìve should therefore not be applied to small and medium-sized 
enterprises. 
All in all, the liberal approach of the European legislator in respect of 
security interests is unfortunate. It is particularly disadvantageous to 
small and medium-sized enterprises. The right of use usually leaves them 
with a contractual claim throughout the course of a transaction. Moreover, 
the legal mechanisms that prevent abuse and guarantee optimal proceeds 
are rendered inactive when a right of pledge or a fiduciary ownership 
right is enforced. It is also therefore regrettable that those responsible for 
drafting a UNIDROIT Convention on Substantive Rules regarding Inter-
mediated Securities are currently considering a similar approach in 
respect of security interests in 'intermediated' (i.e. book-entry) securities. 
The draft UNIDROIT Convention, as a rule, even applies to natural per-
sons and envisages an automatic general right of disposal for the secured 
party, i.e. one without the consent of the security provider.10 In its current 
form, the draft UNIDROIT Convention, like the Collateral Directive, fails 
to pay sufficient attention to the position of weaker economic players who 
9 Securities are not necessarily listed with transparent prices on exchanges. They 
may, for example, be traded on alternative trading platforms or in the over-the-
counter market, where prices may diverge. 
10 See UNIDROIT 2006, Study LXXVIII - Doc. 42, March 2006, Appendix 2, Articles 
23-27. 
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may be faced with a disadvantageous enforcement regime and, in the case 
of a right of use, a mere contractual claim against the collateral taker. 
2.2.5 Concluding remark 
One of the basic arguments of the chapters on property law is the in-
compatibility between the fiduciary relationship that arises in the case of 
a security interest and a general right of disposal. This explains why an 
outright transfer of financial collateral in a genuine repo or securities 
lending transaction that envisages both a recovery and a tradeability func-
tion, is enforceable under general principles of Dutch law, for example, 
and will not be recharacterised as a security interest (chapter III). The 
incompatibility between the fiduciary nature of a security interest and a 
general right of disposal also explains why a security interest combined 
with a 'right of use' should, with regard to content, be qualified as an 
outright transfer (chapter IV). 
2.3 Insolvency law 
The Settlement Finality Directive and the Collateral Directive contain a 
number of provisions of insolvency law which have a potentially negative 
impact on the size of the estate of an insolvent entity. The changes are 
advantageous to the insolvent entity's counterparty in a system or under 
a collateral arrangement, but detrimental to his other creditors. 
2.3.2 The declaration of insolvency has no retroactive effect 
The Collateral Directive, like the Settlement Finality Directive, does not 
recognise the retroactive effect of a court's declaration of insolvency, 
which is timed from the beginning of the day that the insolvency is 
declared (the so-called 'zero hour rule'). This means that under these 
directives, insolvency takes effect from the precise moment that the insol-
vency is declared. Money and securities paid by the insolvent party on the 
day of the declaration of insolvency, but before the exact moment of that 
declaration, therefore fall outside of the insolvent estate. While this may 
be disadvantageous to the insolvent estate and the insolvent entity's other 
creditors in those Member States in which a declaration of insolvency has 
retroactive effect, it is a fair rule. The Collateral Directive accurately 
applies the principle that fixation of the insolvent estate takes place at the 
moment the insolvency is declared. 
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2.3.2 Enforceability of legal acts after the declaration of insolvency 
Under certain circumstances, the Settlement Finality Directive and the 
Collateral Directive allow the creditor under a financial collateral arrange-
ment to invoke the enforceability of legal acts that have been entered into 
by the insolvent entity without the consent of the insolvency adminis-
trator and after the moment of the declaration of insolvency. This pro-
vision is not in line with the general principle in, for example, Dutch insol-
vency law, according to which legal acts that have been conducted after 
the moment of the declaration of insolvency are not enforceable. Fixation 
at the moment of the declaration of insolvency is intended to protect the 
interests of the joint creditors of the insolvent estate against those of an in-
dividual creditor invoking protective provisions. The approach of the 
Settlement Finality Directive and the Collateral Directive means that the 
insolvent estate and the joint creditors of the insolvent entity are put in a 
disadvantageous position compared to that of a single creditor. The Euro-
pean legislator has not made it sufficiently clear that this breach of the 
fixation and pari passu principles can be justified by invoking systemic 
risk. Legal acts conducted after a declaration of insolvency can hardly be 
expected to be so numerous that they cause such risk. 
2.3.3 No freeze period 
The Settlement Finality Directive and the Collateral Directive render 
inoperable temporary freeze periods under national insolvency law 
during which (secured) creditors cannot execute their rights. Consequent-
ly, for example, a credit provider who has a right of pledge in respect of 
financial collateral, or who wants to enforce close-out netting provisions, 
does not have to wait until a freeze period (which may be applicable 
under national law), has expired. The cash and/or securities can be 
released from the insolvent estate without delay. This rule may be detri-
mental to the insolvent estate, but it does limit systemic risk, because 
recourse can be had immediately. 
2.4 Who pays the price of enhanced liquidity? 
The above points to a conflict between the objectives of the Settlement 
Finality Directive and the Collateral Directive, on the one hand, and 
reaching a fair balance between the interests of different participants in 
the financial markets on the other. The Settlement Finality Directive and 
the Collateral Directive have the honourable goals of reducing systemic 
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risk, ensuring finality of payments, improving the liquidity of the cash 
and securities markets, establishing flexible methods for the provision and 
enforcement of collateral, and achieving legal certainty. At the same time, 
in their current form the directives disturb the balance that is traditionally 
struck between the interests of collateral providers, their creditors and 
collateral takers, and, in insolvency, between the different creditors of the 
insolvent estate. 
In many respects, the Collateral Directive infringes upon core principles 
of security interests. A security interest combined with a 'right of use' and 
an enforcement regime without formal requirements are not compatible 
with those principles. In the case of a right of use, the collateral taker has 
a general right of disposal, which usually results in the degradation of the 
collateral provider's claim in respect of securities into a mere contractual 
claim against the collateral taker. The Collateral Directive also departs 
from commonly applied enforcement mechanisms, which are intended to 
prevent abuse and optimise proceeds, and in doing so balance the in-
terests of collateral providers, their creditors and collateral takers. These 
developments in the field of property law undermine the fiduciary 
relationship between the collateral provider and collateral taker." 
In the field of insolvency law, the Settlement Finality Directive and the 
Collateral Directive do not recognise the retroactive effect of the declara-
tion of insolvency, and allow a level of protection in respect of legal acts 
concluded even after the declaration of insolvency. They also render in-
active possibly applicable freeze periods. These latter developments are 
favourable to the insolvent party's counterparty in a system or under a 
financial collateral arrangement, and are detrimental to all other creditors 
of the insolvent estate. 
Particularly in the case of transactions between major credit providers 
(notably banks) and small and medium-sized enterprises that receive 
credit in exchange for collateral, the new rules in the fields of property 
and insolvency law result in a major shift in the balance of power between 
the parties which benefits collateral takers.'2 Collateral takers, to whom 
collateral has been transferred or pledged under a financial collateral 
11 It is therefore also regrettable that a comparable approach now seems to be taken 
by the drafters of the UNIDROIT Convention on Substantive Rules regarding Inter-
mediated Securities. 
12 Johansson 2005 also concludes that the directives lead to a shift in the balance of 
interests between collateral providers and takers. 
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agreement, are in a much stronger position than they were before the 
introduction of the new statutory regime. The costs of the new regime are 
borne, to a large extent, by the providers of collateral. 
The following sections investigate how the goals of limiting systemic risk 
and improving liquidity can be reconciled with the interests of the differ-
ent participants in the financial markets and how those interests, in turn, 
may be better balanced. One option is to restrictively interpret the Collat-
eral Directive in its current form, which is discussed in section 3. A second 
possibility is to amend the texts of the Settlement Finality Directive and 
the Collateral Directive. This is the topic of section 4. 
3. RESTRICTIVE OR EXTENSIVE SCOPE OF APPLICATION? 
3.1 Introduction 
Having investigated the consequences of the Collateral Directive (and the 
Dutch implementing law) in the fields of property law and insolvency 
law, it is now possible to determine whether these legislative instruments 
should be given a limited or a broad scope of application. In choosing 
between a restrictive or extensive interpretation, the interests of all the 
parties involved should be taken into account. It will come as no surprise 
that some providers of credit, such as banks, are satisfied with the Col-
lateral Directive as it stands. The analysis in section 2 above shows that 
the directive generally benefits collateral takers. Collateral takers will, 
therefore, be in favour of a broad interpretation of the Collateral Directive. 
Because of the far-reaching consequences of this interpretation, in par-
ticular for collateral providers, one may, however, wonder whether the 
scope of application of the Collateral Directive should not be more 
limited. This issue is particularly significant when collateral providers are 
small or medium-sized enterprises, because in nearly all cases there is an 
unequal balance of power between those enterprises and major financial 
institutions that provide credit. 
In respect of related changes in the Settlement Finality Directive, 
Vereecken supports a more restrictive interpretation: 
The Directìve departs from a number of fundamental principles in some 
jurisdictions, such as the equal treatment of unsecured creditors. This departure is 
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justified by the overriding need to contain systemic risk However, it means that the 
scope of the Directive must be defined and interpreted in a restrictive way 
Arguably, the same holds true for the Collateral Directive. There are two 
ways to limit the scope of the Collateral Directive (and national imple-
menting laws). First, the scope of the Collateral Directive can be limited 
to major market participants, thus ruling out minor market participants 
such as small and medium-sized enterprises. This possibility is discussed 
in section 3.2 below. A second way to limit the scope of the Collateral 
Directive, which will be treated in section 3.3 below, is to apply it only to 
financial instruments that meet a dual function requirement. In a restric-
tive interpretation, only financial collateral arrangements that serve both 
a recovery and a tradeability function are covered. In an extensive inter-
pretation, financial collateral arrangements that serve a recovery function 
only also fall within the scope of the Collateral Directive. 
3.2 Market participants 
The first way to limit the scope of the Collateral Directive is to apply it 
only to major participants in the financial markets. These major market 
participants are listed in Article l(2)(a)-(d) of the Collateral Directive. The 
clauses mention, for example, commercial and central banks, insurance 
and investment companies, and other major participants in the financial 
markets. These are indeed the entities most crucial to the continued 
liquidity of the cash and securities markets. The enterprises mentioned in 
Article l(2)(e) of the Collateral Directive, which include small and 
medium-sized enterprises, have a far more limited impact on the liquidity 
of these markets. Consequently, there is no need to include them in the 
scope of the directive. In addition, applying the Collateral Directive to 
situations in which the collateral taker is by definition more powerful than 
the collateral provider is undesirable, as in such situations, the collateral 
taker can dictate the terms of the collateral agreement (e.g. whether a right 
of use is granted, and how enforcement takes place in the event of 
default). For these reasons the Collateral Directive should not apply to 
small and medium-sized enterprises. These enterprises can be excluded 
from the directive's scope of applicability on the basis of Article 1 (3) of the 
Collateral Directive. It should be noted that in the original proposal for a 
Collateral Directive, small and medium-sized enterprises did not feature 
at all - and rightly so.14 
13 See Vereecken / Nijenhuis 2003, p. 15 
14 See Article 2(4) of the March 2001 Proposal 
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In practice, only a limited number of Member States has taken advantage 
of the opt-out offered by Article 1(3) of the Collateral Directive.15 On the 
basis of this provision, enterprises (including those that are small and 
medium-sized) can be excluded from the legislation implementing the 
Collateral Directive. One of the main arguments put forward against the 
exclusion of transactions involving enterprises in a single national market 
is that this exclusion may lead to such transactions taking place in another 
Member State that has opted for implementing legislation broader in 
scope. In the course of implementation in Germany, banks presented this 
argument in favour of a broad interpretation of the Collateral Directive.16 
The Dutch government has also suggested the possibility of concluding 
transactions under the laws of a country other than the Netherlands as an 
argument to opt for an extensive scope of application that would include 
small and medium-sized enterprises.17 
Originally, the German government proposed a limited interpretation of 
the law implementing the Collateral Directive, which excluded enter-
15 It appears that Austna, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, the Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia and Sweden (as well as Malta until March 2005) have done so in one way 
or another All other European countries have also included transactions between 
the entities mentioned in Article l(2)(a)-(d) of the CD and those mentioned in Ar­
ticle l(2)(e) Belgium, Denmark, Hungary, Latvia and the United Kingdom envisage 
an even wider scope, also covering transactions between the entities mentioned in 
Article l(2)(e) of the CD and/or transachons involving natural persons For more 
background information, see in particular Lober / Klima 2006 and the letter by the 
ISDA to the European Commission of 3 Apnl 2006 concerning the evaluation of the 
Collateral Directive See also Johansson 2005, section 3 3, Clifford Chance 2005, 
Lober 2005, the report of the debate on the implementation of the Collateral Direc­
tive m the First Chamber of the Dutch Parliament on 1 March 2005, in Eerste Kamer, 
2005/17, in particular ρ 770, the Dutch government's Explanatory Comments 
(Memorie van Toelichting) to the Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament, in Tweede 
Kamer, 2004-2005, 30 138, no 3, ρ 5 See also (although somewhat biased, as only 
those countries that have chosen a broad interpretation are listed) the Dutch 
government's Additional Explanatory Memorandum (Nadere Memorie van Ant­
woord), in Eerste Kamer, 2004-2005, 28 874, E, sechon 22. For a general overview of 
the state of the implementation of the Collateral Directive in the different Member 
States, see the International Swaps and Derivatives Association website (www isda 
org. Committees / Collateral / Collateral Law Reform Group) 
16 See, for example, the 12 February 2004 press release from the German Ministry of 
Justice concerning the 'Neuregelung fur Finanzsicherheiten 
17 See the Dutch government's Additional Explanatory Memorandum (Nadere Memorie 
van Antwoord) to the First Chamber of Parliament, in Eerste Kamer, 2004-2005, 
28 874, E, section 1 
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prises.18 Later, however, in light of the argument that this approach may 
encourage market participants to conclude transactions in other national 
markets, the government proposed a broader interpretation, which in-
cluded small and medium-sized enterprises. The German legislator was 
aware of the consequences of the Collateral Directive for property and 
insolvency law. The position of small and medium-sized enterprises, in 
particular, has been the subject of prolonged debate in the German 
Bundestag and Bundesrat. While this has not led to the exclusion of these 
enterprises from the scope of the German implementing law, it has led to 
another kind of restriction. Only certain types of financial transactions 
entered into by small and medium-sized enterprises, as indicated in § 5 
of the Kreditwesengesetz, fall within the scope of the implementing law.19 
Like the German legislator, the Dutch legislator has not made use of the 
possibility offered by Article 1(3) of the Collateral Directive of excluding 
enterprises from the scope of its implementing law. Quite the contrary, as 
originally, the Dutch legislator intended to go even further by giving the 
implementing law a much more extensive scope than that envisaged in 
the Collateral Directive. The first draft of the implementing law not only 
related to transactions between financial institutions and enterprises, but 
also to transactions between enterprises themselves. Because the First 
Chamber of Parliament did not agree with the Dutch government's 
approach, the government was forced - and rightly so - to make a new 
draft implementing law more limited in scope. This second draft law no 
longer applies to transactions between enterprises, but still covers trans-
actions between financial institutions and enterprises. 
Rather than exclude all enterprises on the basis of Article 1(3) of the Col-
lateral Directive, another, more moderate solution would be to exclude 
only the most vulnerable small and medium-sized enterprises. In this sce-
nario, only large enterprises, which are in a position of power equal to 
that of financial institutions, would fall within the scope of the Collateral 
Directive. A practical argument against this solution is that it may be diffi-
cult to formulate unequivocal criteria on a European level for enterprises 
to fulfil in order to fall within the scope of the Collateral Directive. 
18 See the Diskussionsentwurf des Bundesministeriums der Justitz, Entwurf eines Gesetzes 
zur Änderung der Insolvenzverordnung, des Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuches und anderer Ge-
setze, pp. 19 and 38. 
19 See also the explanatory comment to § 5 of the Kreditwesengesetz in the Beschluss-
empfehlung und Bericht des Rechtausschusses, Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksachel5/2485, 
11 February 2004, p. 29. 
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Nonetheless, the thresholds related to capital base and gross assets set out 
in Article 2(4)(c) of the March 2001 Proposal for a Collateral Directive20 
and European directives in the field of corporate law could serve as a 
starting point in this respect. For Dutch law, Wagemakers has suggested 
that the Collateral Directive apply only to major joint stock companies as 
described in the NCC.21 
3.3 Financial products 
3.3.1 Introduction 
A second way to limit the scope of the Collateral Directive is by applying 
it only to financial transactions that meet a dual function requirement. In 
line with this approach, financial collateral should serve both a recovery 
and a tradeability function. In the case of an outright transfer of title, both 
functions mentioned are present. If the parties opt for the provision of 
collateral on the basis of a security interest, the two functions are present 
only if the security interest is combined with a general right of disposal. 
In line with this approach, traditional security interests such as a right of 
pledge or a fiduciary transfer of title (which serve a recovery function 
only), fall outside the scope of the Collateral Directive.22 
3.3.2 Transfer of title 
The Collateral Directive in any case applies to outright transfers of finan-
cial collateral. Such outright transfers occur under repurchase, securities 
lending or derivatives transactions. Financial collateral in this case serves 
both a recovery and a tradeability function. 
In the case of a fiduciary transfer of title, however, the parties essentially 
intend to create a security interest. An extensive interpretation of the term 
20 On a number of interpretation issues in respect of these thresholds, see the 2001 
ISDA Statement of Position, section 1. 
21 See the debate in the First Chamber of Parliament on 1 March 2005, EK 17, p. 769. 
Cf. the approach taken by the Slovenian legislator, outlined in the letter of 3 April 
2006 by the ISDA to the European Commission concerning the evaluation of the 
Collateral Directive. 
22 Hughes correctly notes that, essentially, the Collateral Directive is aimed at 
facilitating the operations of the wholesale markets in repos, stock lending and 
derivatives, but is not intended to apply to secured transactions involving cash 
and/or securities generally. See Hughes 2006, in particular the introduction and the 
section on the wholesale markets. 
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'financial collateral arrangement', which includes fiduciary transfers of 
title, has a negative impact on the position of collateral providers, es-
pecially if they are small and medium-sized enterprises. Both the Collat-
eral Directive and the Dutch implementing law sideline a number of 
characteristic features of security interests that balance the interests of the 
parties involved. For example. Article 7:55 of the NCC explicitly states 
that provisions of pledge law may not be applied by way of analogy to 
title transfers. If this approach were to apply not only to outright transfers 
but also to fiduciary transfers of title, this would (as was also indicated in 
section 2.2 above) have the following consequences: (1) the fiduciary 
could appropriate the transferred assets, because the prohibition of appro-
priation of, for example. Article 3:235 of the NCC does not apply; (2) if the 
fiduciary were to opt for a sale, he could sell without being bound by any 
provisions relating to the way this sale should be executed (such as the 
mandatory provisions of pledge law relating to the public character of the 
sale, court approval or the intervention of an objective intermediary); (3) 
if the national legislator has not explicitly stated that the collateral taker 
should pay any remaining surplus value to the collateral provider after 
enforcement, as the Dutch legislator has done, the collateral taker could, 
arguably, stipulate that he is entitled to this surplus value. The result of 
an extensive interpretation of the definition of financial collateral arrange-
ments, which includes fiduciary transfers of title, would therefore be that 
all mechanisms protecting collateral providers would be disabled to the 
benefit of the fiduciary. 
Furthermore, the parties to a fiduciary transfer customarily do not intend 
to give the fiduciary an unlimited right to dispose of the objects given in 
security. He has a right of disposal only for purposes of recourse upon 
default by the collateral provider. For this reason, a fiduciary transfer of 
title lacks one of the characteristics of a financial collateral arrangement, 
i.e. tradeability. The impact of fiduciary transfers on the goal of the Collat-
eral Directive to promote the liquidity of the cash and security markets is, 
therefore, limited. 
In short, a fiduciary transfer of title contributes little to the goal of the 
Collateral Directive in respect of promoting the liquidity of the cash and 
securities markets, whereas an extensive interpretation of the definition 
of financial collateral arrangements would have a negative impact on the 
position of collateral providers, such as small and medium-sized enter-
prises. It can, therefore, be argued that fiduciary transfers of title should 
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not be financial collateral arrangements in the sense of the Collateral 
Directive and national implementing laws. 
3.3.3 Right of pledge 
With regard to a (fiduciary) transfer of title, both the text of the Collateral 
Directive and of the Dutch implementing law do, arguably, leave room for 
either an extensive or restrictive interpretation of the term 'financial collat-
eral arrangement'. In the case of a security interest combined with a right 
of use, this is different. Article 5 of the Collateral Directive and Article 7:53 
of the NCC state that a right of use can be granted. One could, for this 
reason, argue that a security interest without a right of use also falls 
within the scope of the Collateral Directive and the Dutch implementing 
law.23 
However, in the case of a traditional right of pledge, as with a fiduciary 
ownership right, the security taker does not have an unlimited right of 
disposal in respect of the collateral. As the collateral does not fulfil a 
tradeability function in this case, the Collateral Directive's goal of 
enhanced liquidity cannot be achieved. It must be kept in mind that the 
rights of collateral providers were suppressed in light of the argument 
concerning liquidity. The Collateral Directive's enforcement regime and 
the amendments to insolvency law it requires, make the protective mecha-
nisms for collateral providers illusory. If liquidity is not enhanced, these 
changes cannot be justified. For these reasons, it is submitted that the term 
'financial collateral arrangement' relates only to financial arrangements 
that actually enhance liquidity. Neither the text of the Collateral Directive 
nor the Dutch implementing law should be normative in this respect, but 
rather the directive's philosophy of liquidity should be. Whereas a secu-
rity interest combined with a right of use does influence liquidity, a secu-
rity interest without such a right of use has little or no impact on liquidity, 
and should not fall within the scope of the Collateral Directive and the 
Dutch implementing law. 
3.3.4 The dual function requirement 
The following are the main arguments in support of the dual function 
requirement. First, the structure of the internationally used market docu-
23 See, in this sense, for example, the Additional Explanatory Memorandum (Nadere 
Memorie van Antwoord), Eerste Kamer, 2004-2005, 28 874, E, section 1. 
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mentation for repos, securities lending agreements and derivatives (the 
GMRA, the GMSLA and the ISDA documentation), as well as that of 
agreements that are usually applied within a certain territory (the EMA, 
and the documentation of TBMA) show that both functions of financial 
collateral are always present. Second, market practice in, for example, the 
Netherlands, Germany, and the United Kingdom is based on the outright 
transfer method, because this is the only way, in accordance with general 
principles of civil law, to ensure that both functions are present. In the 
United States, both functions are, as a rule, also ensured but in this juris-
diction this is done either on the basis of the outright transfer method or 
by establishing a security interest combined with a general right of 
disposal. The third argument in support of the dual function requirement 
is the economic function of financial collateral and the goal of the Collat-
eral Directive, i.e. the enhancement of the liquidity of cash and securities 
markets. 
Traditional secured transactions, in which only the recovery function is 
envisaged, have little or no impact on liquidity. In this case, the non-
tradable collateral assets are non-liquid from the outset. To a limited 
extent, an extensive interpretation of the Collateral Directive, which in-
cludes traditional secured loans, may enhance liquidity. If the Collateral 
Directive and its liberal enforcement regime were to apply to such trans-
actions, this could lead to a reduction of costs for providers of credit and, 
as a result, allow them to lower their prices. This would make capital 
more readily available and have a positive impact on liquidity. It should, 
however, be noted that the potential impact on liquidity in this case is 
much smaller than in the scenario in which the collateral taker has an 
unlimited right of disposal. In the latter, both the collateral provider and 
the collateral taker are able to dispose of financial assets in the normal 
course of business. Providers of collateral would also pay a high price for 
this extensive interpretation of the Collateral Directive, as the mechanisms 
that protect their interests, such as prescribed sales and the prohibition of 
appropriation are rendered inapplicable. A limited impact on liquidity 
alone cannot justify a severe infringement on the rights of collateral pro-
viders. 
The goal of the Collateral Directive is to enhance the liquidity of the cash 
and securities markets. For this reason, the Collateral Directive should 
apply to those transactions in the capital markets that do indeed enhance 
that liquidity. A defining characteristic of financial collateral arrange-
ments (such as repurchase, securities lending and certain derivatives 
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transactions), is that both the collateral provider and the collateral taker 
are fully entitled to dispose of the cash and securities received. They are 
only under a contractual obligation to transfer equivalent assets at the end 
of a transaction. It is precisely these types of transactions that have a 
positive impact on the liquidity of the cash and securities markets. In the 
case of traditional secured transactions involving a right of pledge or a 
fiduciary transfer of title, the influence on liquidity is far more limited. 
Taking the goal of the Collateral Directive into account along with the 
negative consequences of the directive for small and medium-sized enter-
prises in particular, the directive should, in my view, be given a restrictive 
interpretation and only apply to transactions that meet the dual function 
requirement. 
The German Bundesrat seems to be in favour of a comparable approach. 
The Bundesrat attached the following statement to its decision to approve 
the German law implementing the Collateral Directive: 
[ ] In the course of the discussion in question in the German Bundestag the 
deficiencies of the Collateral Directive have become very clear Besides the 
unfounded extension of the banking privilege to general economic transactions, 
another important aspect of these deficiencies is the lack of clarity concerning the 
kinds of security that can be established with such privileged financial collateral 
For the scope of the directive this queshon is of central importance, even though the 
directive does not contain useful and reliable statements m this respect Therefore 
it should be made particularly clear that privileging financial collateral is only 
possible in the case of typical capital markets transactions, and not in the general 
credit busmess of banks This material limitation already follows from the goal of 
the directive [ ] 2 4 
In the same statement, the Bundesrat summoned the German government 
to promote a restrictive interpretation of the Collateral Directive on a 
European level. 
24 See the attachment to the Beschluss des Bundesrates of 12 March 2004 concerning the 
Collateral Directive, no 117/04 Translation TK. Original German text '[ ] Bei den 
einschlagigen Beratungen im Deutschen Bundestag sind die gravierenden Mangel 
der Finanzsicherheitennchtlmie deutlich zu Tage getreten Zu diesen zahlt neben 
der sachwidngen Ausdehnung des Bankenpn vilegs auf den allgemeinen gewerb-
lichen Rechtsverkehr vor allem die Unklarheit darüber, welche Besichemngs-
zwecke mit derart privilegierten Finanzsicherheiten verfolgt werden dürfen Diese 
Frage ist fur die Reichweite der Richtlinie von zentraler Bedeutung, ohne dass die 
Richtlinie hierzu brauchbare und verlassliche Aussagen enthielte Daher ware ins-
besondere klarzustellen, dass eine Bevorzugung von Finanzsicherheiten nur im 
Rahmen typischerFinanzmarktgeschafte - und nicht im allgemeinen Kreditgeschäft 
der Banken - in Betracht kommt Diese sachliche Grenzziehung folgt bereits aus 
dem Regelungszweck der Richtlinie [ ]' 
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3.4 Conclusion 
The Collateral Directive entails a disruption of the balance between collat-
eral providers and collateral takers in a number of respects. A security 
interest combined with a right of use weakens the (proprietary) interest 
of the original owner and will usually leave him with a mere contractual 
claim against the collateral taker. The liberal enforcement regime of the 
Collateral Directive also entails changes to pledge law that are detrimental 
to collateral providers and beneficial to collateral takers. In addition, the 
changes that the Collateral Directive requires in insolvency law (retro-
active effect is no longer given to the declaration of insolvency, legal acts 
are under certain circumstances enforceable even after the declaration of 
insolvency, and the freeze period no longer applies to financial collateral 
arrangements) are favourable to a creditor under a financial collateral 
arrangement and detrimental to the insolvent party and all his other 
creditors. These changes disturb carefully constructed balances in security 
and insolvency law, and therefore point to the conclusion that the Collat-
eral Directive and the Dutch implementing law should be interpreted 
restrictively. In my view, this should be done by limiting the scope of 
these legislative instruments to major market participants, while not 
applying them to transactions involving small and medium-sized enter-
prises that have a subordinate effect on the liquidity of the financial mar-
kets. A second way to mitigate the negative consequences of the Collateral 
Directive for weaker economic players, is to limit the scope of the direc-
tive to financial products that guarantee both recovery and tradeability, 
and which, as such, support the Collateral Directive's main goal of 
enhancing liquidity. 
4. RECOMMENDED CHANGES TO THE COLLATERAL DIREC-
TIVE AND THE SETTLEMENT FINALITY DIRECTIVE 
4.1 Introduction 
In order to limit systemic risk and to achieve the macro-economic goal of 
liquid markets for cash and securities, the European legislator has 
attempted to harmonise a number of provisions of property and insol-
vency law. The most important consequences of the Collateral Directive 
and the Settlement Finality Directive for property and insolvency law 
have been outlined in section 2 above. Generally these changes are 
favourable to credit providers / collateral takers and are unfavourable to 
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collateral providers. The European legislator's approach has particularly 
negative consequences for parties in a weaker position such as small and 
medium-sized enterprises. One wonders whether the macro-economic 
goals relating to systemic risk and liquidity could not have been attained 
by adopting another means of harmonising provisions of property and 
insolvency law. This section investigates how the negative consequences 
of the changes to property and insolvency law can be mitigated, and how 
the balance between the different participants can be restored. To this 
end, concrete proposals are made for amendments to the Collateral Direc-
tive and the Settlement Finality Directive. On the one hand, the proposed 
amendments honour the goals of a limitation of systemic risk and an 
enhancement of liquidity, which are deserving of full support, whereas 
on the other, they restore the balance between collateral providers and 
collateral takers. 
4.2 Limitation to major market participants 
One of the main deficiencies of the Collateral Directive is that it applies 
not only to major financial market participants, but also to arrangements 
between major participants and minor participants, such as small and 
medium-sized enterprises. This means that a stronger collateral taker can 
stipulate contractual terms that are advantageous to himself, for instance 
where the manner of enforcement or the establishment of a right of use is 
concerned, but which are detrimental to the weaker collateral provider 
who is in need of credit. 
For this reason, it is proposed that the Collateral Directive should be 
amended so as to apply to major participants in the financial markets 
only. This means that Article l(2)(e) and Article 1(3) of the Collateral 
Directive should be repealed. Article l(2)(d) of the directive should also 
be reconsidered, because a 'person [...] who acts in a trust or represen-
tative capacity on behalf of any one or more persons that includes any 
bondholders or holders of other forms of securitised debt' can also, in 
practice, be a minor participant. A comparable approach is in line with the 
European Commission's original proposal for a directive on financial 
collateral, which applied to major participants only. 
Another issue to be considered is that there are entities, such as pension 
funds, that are important for the liquidity of the cash and securities mar-
kets, but that are not listed in the Collateral Directive as entities to which 
the directive applies. 
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4.3 The abolition of or an amendment to the right of use 
The European legislator's introduction of a security interest combined 
with a right of use is unfortunate. This construction is not compatible with 
traditional principles of pledge law and is detrimental to collateral pro-
viders. It blurs the traditional distinction between a security interest and 
an outright transfer, and establishes an undesirable precedent. To support 
the liquidity of the markets, the European legislator should have confined 
himself to sanctioning the European market standard of the provision of 
financial collateral by way of an outright transfer. It would be best if the 
right of use were removed from the Collateral Directive. 
Alternatively, the following two amendments could be made to the Col-
lateral Directive in order to make the consequences of the right of use 
more acceptable. The first is to amend the terminology used. Instead of 
speaking of a 'right of use' it would be better to use the term 'general right 
of disposal' in the Collateral Directive. This terminology would make the 
effects of the construction clearer. 
In addition, the rule of proprietary substitution set out in Article 5(3) of 
the Collateral Directive needs to be revised. This rule should not be 
limited to equivalent assets transferred by the collateral taker at the 
moment that he deems fit. Ideally, proprietary substitution takes place 
immediately in relation to all kinds of replacement assets (e.g. sale 
proceeds). If this is impractical in light of, for example, clearing and 
netting arrangements, substitution should relate to equivalent assets as 
soon as the collateral taker becomes entitled to them. Such an amendment 
would prevent, or at least limit, the time frame in which a collateral pro-
vider is left with a mere contractual claim against the collateral taker. 
4.4 Close-out netting 
The Collateral Directive sets out a liberal regime for the enforcement of 
security interests and close-out netting. This guarantees the continued 
liquidity of the cash and securities markets in the event of the default of 
one market participant and, as such, limits systemic risk. In particular, if 
major market participants are equally powerful, this approach can be 
justified. It should nonetheless be taken into account that easy enforce-
ment by one creditor has a negative effect on the position of all other 
creditors. A cautious approach is therefore required when considering to 
what extent national limitations on enforcement should be set aside. 
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As far as close-out netting is concerned, improvements are possible. 
National law still plays a prevalent role in this respect. This is mainly 
because recital 15 of the Collateral Directive refers to national law in 
relation to a number of crucial issues, such as the reciprocity requirement 
and the issue of voidable preference. In addition, there are topics in the 
field of close-out netting that the Collateral Directive simply does not 
address, such as the moment at which the claims involved should be 
valued. In order to come to a uniform close-out netting regime in Europe, 
the issue should be readdressed. 
4.5 No enforceability of legal acts after the declaration of insolvency 
One final issue worthy of reconsideration deals with the provisions in the 
Settlement Finality Directive and the Collateral Directive, which open up 
the possibility of enforcing legal acts entered into after the declaration of 
insolvency. The European legislator has not made it sufficiently clear that 
there are grounds for setting aside the fixation and pari passu principles, 
and for putting individual counterparties of an insolvent entity in a 
system or under a financial collateral agreement in an advantageous 
position. The rule of the directives can lead to undesirable situations in 
which an insolvent entity benefits individual creditors to the detriment of 
the other creditors. 
4.6 No changes required: retroactive effect of the declaration of insol-
vency, freeze period 
There is no need to change the insolvency rules set out in the Settlement 
Finality Directive and the Collateral Directive relating to the zero hour 
rule and the freeze period. The abolition of the zero hour rule does justice 
to the principle that insolvency should take effect as of the moment it is 
declared by a judge. The non-applicability of the freeze period can be 
justified in the case of transactions between major financial market par-
ticipants, because the application of a freeze period would hamper the 
liquidity of the financial markets and increase systemic risk. 
364 
SUMMARY 
This study relates to financial collateral arrangements, under which par-
ties provide each other with cash and/or securities. These arrangements 
are primarily studied from a legal point of view. 
After a general introduction in chapter I, chapter II examines how the 
financial collateral markets currently operate. It defines financial collat-
eral, examines a number of examples of transactions involving financial 
collateral, such as repurchase, securities lending and derivatives trans-
actions, and describes which standardised agreements are commonly 
used to document such transactions. Chapter II also pays attention to the 
main players in the financial collateral markets, i.e. commercial market 
participants such as banks, insurance undertakings and investment firms. 
Central banks also enter into collateralised transactions on a large scale. 
The chapter concludes by outlining the legal framework for financial 
collateral arrangements. On a European level, such arrangements are pri-
marily regulated by the Collateral Directive, and also to a certain extent, 
by the Settlement Finality Directive. In order to guarantee liquid cash and 
securities markets in the European Union, these directives set out uniform 
legal regimes for systems in which transfers of cash and securities are 
settled, and for financial collateral arrangements. In particular, they re-
quire the harmonisation on a national level of a number of issues of 
property and insolvency law. 
Chapter III pays attention to the first method to provide collateral, i.e. the 
outright transfer method. This method is set out in internationally applied 
standard agreements for transactions involving financial collateral and is 
the market standard throughout Europe. Under Dutch law, this method 
prompts the question of whether a transfer is 'outright' or should be 
characterised as 'fiduciary', which is important in light of the prohibition 
of fiduciary transfers under the NCC. Chapter III proposes that a function-
based approach should be taken in relation to the issue of the so-called 
'recharacterisation' of an outright transfer as a security interest. This 
means that no recharacterisation risk is present if the parties intend collat-
eral to fulfil the two functions of recovery and tradeability. If, however, 
the parties only envisage a recovery function, it is submitted that they 
should establish a security interest. The Collateral Directive requires that 
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any risk of recharacterisation is eliminated and that a title transfer 
arrangement can take effect in accordance with its terms. 
Chapter FV examines a second method to provide collateral, i.e. vesting 
a security interest combined with a general right of disposal for the 
secured party. This method first flourished in the United States. Its origins 
are in the broker-dealer market's right of repledge. Under certain circum-
stances, a right of repledge can, under American law, impair the rights of 
the original owner. A collateral taker's general right of disposal, which has 
been applied in the American derivatives and securities lending markets 
for the last twenty years or so, can be seen as a radical interpretation of 
the impairing repledge. Pressure by London market participants has been 
a factor that has led to the appearance of this construction in Europe, 
where the Collateral Directive has introduced a security interest combined 
with a 'right of use', i.e. a collateral taker's general right of disposal in 
respect of encumbered assets. The construction is hardly compatible, 
though, with basic notions of American, English, Dutch and German 
property law and can, in terms of content, be equated to an outright trans-
fer. In practice, this construction usually reduces the collateral provider's 
(proprietary) claim in respect of assets to a mere contractual claim against 
the collateral taker. 
Chapter V examines the approach of the Collateral Directive in respect of 
enforcement. The Collateral Directive envisages a liberal enforcement 
regime in respect of security interests, such as a right of pledge or a fidu-
ciary ownership right. Commonly applied, mandatory formal require-
ments of pledge law guaranteeing optimum proceeds, such as a public 
sale of encumbered assets or the intervention of an objective intermediary, 
are rendered inapplicable. Moreover, the directive as a standard envisages 
the non-applicability of the prohibition of appropriation. Because the Col-
lateral Directive requires that title transfer arrangements are enforceable 
in accordance with their terms, these characteristics of pledge law, 
arguably, also cannot be applied by way of analogy to fiduciary owner-
ship rights. The Collateral Directive's approach in relation to the enforce-
ment of security interests means that a stronger provider of credit can 
determine the content of the fiduciary relationship between the parties 
and, in particular, on what terms enforcement takes place. 
Moreover, close-out netting provisions, which commonly form part of title 
transfer arrangements, are generally enforceable under the Collateral 
Directive. It should be noted, however, that a number of crucial issues 
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relating to reciprocity, similarity, voidable preference and the moment at 
which the claims involved are valued, should still be determined under 
national law. 
In the field of insolvency law, the Settlement Finality Directive and the 
Collateral Directive abolish the retroactive effect of the declaration of 
insolvency, make it possible to enforce legal acts that have been carried 
out after the declaration of insolvency, and prohibit the application of a 
freeze period. 
Chapter VI concludes that the changes required by the Settlement Finality 
Directive and the Collateral Directive in the field of property and 
insolvency law contribute to liquid markets. At the same time, it should 
be noted that they are, in all cases, favourable to credit providers/collat-
eral takers and detrimental to collateral providers and their other credi-
tors. Particularly in the case of collateral providers who do not enjoy an 
equal position of power when compared with major financial institutions, 
such as small and medium-sized enterprises, this may lead to undesirable 
results. Chapter VI investigates what can be done in order to safeguard 
liquidity on the one hand, while taking into account the interests of 
weaker economic players on the other. 
Under current law there are two ways to limit the scope of the Collateral 
Directive. First, the text of the directive allows application of its provisions 
to transactions between major market participants only. These partici-
pants in particular are important for overall liquidity. Small and medium-
sized enterprises may and should be excluded. A second way to limit the 
scope of the Collateral Directive is to interpret the term 'financial collat-
eral arrangements' as relating to transactions that serve the two functions 
of recovery and tradeability only. This interpretation limits the scope of 
the directive to transactions that truly enhance liquidity. It does not 
extend to traditional security interests that serve a recovery function only. 
In addition, a number of changes can be made to the Settlement Finality 
Directive and the Collateral Directive, which honour the goal of improved 
liquidity and which at the same time restore the balance between the 
different participants in the financial markets. First, the Collateral Direc-
tive should apply only to major participants in the financial markets. 
Second, the construction of a security interest combined with a general 
right of disposal should best be repealed, or, alternatively, the terminol-
ogy used ('general right of disposal' rather than 'right of use') and the rule 
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of proprietary substitution connected with this construction should be 
revised. A third improvement would be to readdress the Collateral Direc-
tive's rules on close-out netting, which in their current form leave many 
issues to be decided under rules of national law. A fourth issue that 
deserves reconsideration is the rule of the Settlement Finality Directive 
and the Collateral Directive, which makes it possible to enforce legal acts 
that have been entered into after the declaration of insolvency, because 
this rule thwarts the fixation and pari passu principles and may be 
misused. There is no need to revise the rules of the Settlement Finality 
Directive and the Collateral Directive, which abolish the retroactive effect 
of the declaration of insolvency and render freeze periods inoperable. 
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Dit boek heeft betrekking op financiëlezekerheidsovereenkomsten op 
grond waarvan partijen elkaar geld en/of effecten verschaffen. Deze over-
eenkomsten worden in het bijzonder beschouwd vanuit een juridisch ge-
zichtspunt. 
Na een algemene introductie in hoofdstuk I, komt in hoofdstuk II de wijze 
waarop de markt voor financiëlezekerheidsovereenkomsten is ingericht 
aan de orde. Achtereenvolgens wordt uitgelegd wat onder financiële ze-
kerheden wordt verstaan, worden voorbeelden gegeven van transacties 
met zulke zekerheden, zoals repurchase-, securities lending- en derivaten-
transacties, en worden de raamovereenkomsten beschreven op basis 
waarvan zulke transacties in de regel worden aangegaan. Hoofdstuk II be-
steedt ook aandacht aan de belangrijkste marktdeelnemers die gebruik 
maken van financiëlezekerheidsovereenkomsten. Op de commerciële 
markt zijn dit bijvoorbeeld banken, verzekeringsinstellingen en beleg-
gingsinstellingen. Daarnaast maken centrale banken op grote schaal ge-
bruik van financiële zekerheden. Het hoofdstuk wordt afgesloten met een 
overzicht van de wetgeving binnen het kader waarvan financiëlezeker-
heidsovereenkomsten moeten worden afgesloten. Op Europees niveau 
moet men hierbij met name denken aan de Richtlijn betreffende finan-
ciëlezekerheidsovereenkomsten, terwijl ook de Finaliteitsrichtlijn tot op 
zekere hoogte betrekking heeft op deze materie. Met het oog op liquide 
geld- en effectenmarkten voorzien deze richtlijnen in uniforme regels 
voor systemen waarin boekingen van geld en effecten worden afgewik-
keld en voor financiëlezekerheidsovereenkomsten. Op grond van deze 
richtlijnen zijn Lidstaten verplicht een aantal nationale bepalingen van 
goederen- en faillissementsrecht te harmoniseren. 
Hoofdstuk III besteedt aandacht aan een eerste methode om financiële ze-
kerheden te verschaffen, namelijk door overdracht. Een aantal internatio-
naal gebruikte raamovereenkomsten op grond waarvan transacties met 
financiële zekerheden worden aangegaan, voorziet in deze methode. In 
Europa is de methode van overdracht de marktstandaard. Naar Neder-
lands recht roept deze methode de vraag op of het hier gaat om een 'volle-
dige' of om een fiduciaire overdracht. Deze vraag is van belang in het licht 
van het fiducia-verbod dat is neergelegd in het Burgerlijk Wetboek. In 
hoofdstuk III wordt het standpunt verdedigd dat men een functionele 
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invalshoek moet kiezen bij het beantwoorden van de vraag of een over-
dracht niet in wezen als een zekerheidsstelling moet worden gekwalifi-
ceerd. Bezien vanuit deze invalshoek is een overdracht 'volledig', als par-
tijen de twee functies van verhaal en verhandelbaarheid voor ogen heb-
ben. Indien zij echter slechts de functie van verhaal beogen, hadden zij 
een zekerheidsrecht moeten vestigen. De Richtlijn betreffende financiële-
zekerheidsovereenkomsten schrijft voor dat een financiëlezekerheidsover-
eenkomst tot overdracht niet als een zekerheidsstelling mag worden ge-
herkwalificeerd en dat zo een overeenkomst afdwingbaar moet zijn met 
inachtneming van de daarin vervatte bepalingen. 
Hoofdstuk IV onderzoekt de tweede methode om financiële zekerheden 
te verschaffen, namelijk door het vestigen van een zekerheidsrecht met 
een daaraan gekoppelde algemene beschikkingsbevoegdheid voor de ze-
kerheidsnemer. Deze methode is opgekomen in de Verenigde Staten. 
Haar oorsprong is gelegen in de herverpanding zoals die werd toegepast 
in de broker-dealer markt. Onder omstandigheden kan zo een recht van 
herverpanding afbreuk doen aan de aanspraken van de oorspronkelijke 
eigenaar. De figuur van een zekerheidsnemer met algemene beschik-
kingsbevoegdheid, welke sinds een jaar of twintig in de Amerikaanse 
securities lending- en derivaten-markten wordt toegepast, kan worden ge-
zien als een radicale toepassing van de herverpanding die afbreuk doet 
aan de rechten van de oorspronkelijke eigenaar. Druk die werd uitge-
oefend door Londense marktdeelnemers, is een factor geweest die heeft 
bijgedragen aan de introductie van de figuur van het 'gebruiksrecht' in de 
Europese Richtlijn betreffende f inanciëlezekerheidsovereenkomsten. On-
der het recht van 'gebruik' wordt in dit verband algemene beschikkings-
bevoegdheid verstaan. De figuur van een zekerheidsnemer met algemene 
beschikkingsbevoegdheid is echter niet te rijmen met grondbeginselen 
van Amerikaans, Engels, Nederlands en Duits goederenrecht. Zij kan naar 
haar inhoud worden gelijkgesteld met een volledige overdracht. Praktisch 
gezien heeft deze figuur in de regel ten gevolge dat de (goederenrechtelij-
ke) aanspraak van de zekerheidsgever ten aanzien van een goed wordt 
gereduceerd tot een verbintenisrechtelijke aanspraak jegens de zeker-
heidsnemer. 
Hoofdstuk V gaat in op de wijze waarop uitwinning plaatsvindt conform 
de Richtlijn betreffende financiëlezekerheidsovereenkomsten. De richtlijn 
voorziet in een liberaal regime waar het gaat om de uitwinning van zeker-
heden, zoals een pandrecht of een fiduciair eigendomsrecht. Traditioneel 
toegepaste, dwingendrechtelijke voorschriften betreffende de uitwinning 
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van een pandrecht, zoals de openbare verkoop of de tussenkomst van een 
onafhankelijke tussenpersoon, zijn buiten toepassing verklaard. Daarnaast 
schaft de richtlijn in beginsel het toe-eigeningsverbod af. Omdat de richt-
lijn voorschrijft dat financiëlezekerheidsovereenkomsten tot overdracht 
afdwingbaar moeten zijn met inachtneming van de daarin vervatte bepa-
lingen, is het verdedigbaar dat de analogische toepassing van de dwin-
gende pandbepalingen op de fiduciaire overdracht eveneens is uitgeslo-
ten. De wijze waarop de richtlijn de uitwinning van zekerheidsrechten be-
nadert, betekent dat een kredietverschaffer met een sterke machtspositie 
kan bepalen hoe de fiduciaire verhouding tussen partijen wordt vormge-
geven, en in het bijzonder op welke wijze uitwinning plaatsvindt. 
Daarnaast bepaalt de Richtlijn betreffende financiëlezekerheidsovereen-
komsten in algemene termen dat contractuele afspraken betreffende close-
out netting afdwingbaar zijn. Er moet echter rekening mee worden gehou-
den dat het nationale recht nog steeds een rol speelt waar het gaat om be-
langrijke onderwerpen als wederkerigheid, gelijksoortigheid, de actio 
pauliana en het moment waarop de verbintenissen waar de verrekening 
betrekking op heeft, worden gewaardeerd. 
Op het gebied van het f aillissementsrecht hebben de Finaliteitsrichtlijn en 
de Richtlijn betreffende financiëlezekerheidsovereenkomsten de volgende 
gevolgen. Zij schaffen de terugwerkende kracht van de insolventverkla-
ring af, voorzien onder omstandigheden in de afdwingbaarheid van 
rechtshandelingen na het moment van de insolventverklaring en sluiten 
de toepasselijkheid van een afkoelingsperiode uit. 
In hoofdstuk VI wordt tot de slotsom gekomen dat de wijzigingen waar-
toe de Finaliteitsrichtlijn en de Richtlijn betreffende financiëlezekerheids-
overeenkomsten verplichten, bijdragen tot liquide geld- en effectenmark-
ten. Tegelijkertijd moet worden geconstateerd dat zij in alle gevallen in 
het voordeel zijn van kredietverschaffers/zekerheidsnemers en ten nadele 
van zekerheidsverschaffers en hun andere crediteuren. In het bijzonder 
in het geval van zekerheidsverschaffers die een minder sterke positie in-
nemen dan grote financiële instellingen, zoals kleine en middelgrote on-
dernemingen, kan dit tot onwenselijke resultaten leiden. In hoofdstuk VI 
wordt onderzocht wat er gedaan kan worden om liquiditeit te waarbor-
gen en tegelijkertijd recht te doen de belangen van zwakkere deelnemers 
aan het economisch leven. 
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Naar huidig recht zijn er twee manieren waarop de reikwijdte van de 
Richtlijn betreffende financiëlezekerheidsovereenkomsten kan worden in-
geperkt. Ten eerste is het op grond van de richtlijn toegestaan haar bepa-
lingen slechts toe te passen op transacties tussen grote marktpartijen. Het 
zijn juist deze partijen die van belang zijn voor liquide markten. Kleine en 
middelgrote ondernemingen kunnen en moeten buiten het toepassingsbe-
reik worden gehouden. Een tweede manier om het toepassingsbereik van 
de richtlijn in te perken is door het begrip 'financiëlezekerheidsovereen-
komst' eng uit te leggen en alleen toe te passen in die gevallen waarin 
financiële zekerheden de twee kenmerkende functies van verhaal en ver-
handelbaarheid vervullen. Een dergelijke interpretatie beperkt de reik-
wijdte van de richtlijn tot transacties die daadwerkelijk de liquiditeit be-
vorderen. Traditionele zekerheidsconstructies die enkel strekken tot ver-
haal vallen hiermee buiten de reikwijdte. 
Daarnaast is het mogelijk een aantal wijzigingen aan te brengen in de Fi-
naliteitsrichtlijn en de Richtlijn betreffende financiëlezekerheidsovereen-
komsten, dat enerzijds recht doet aan het oogmerk de liquiditeit te stimu-
leren en anderzijds het evenwicht tussen de belangen van de verschillen-
de betrokken marktdeelnemers herstelt. Ten eerste zou de Richtlijn betref-
fende financiëlezekerheidsovereenkomsten alleen betrekking moeten heb-
ben op grote spelers op de financiële markten. Ten tweede zou het het 
beste zijn als de figuur van een zekerheidsrecht met een daaraan gekop-
pelde algemene beschikkingsbevoegdheid voor de zekerheidsnemer werd 
afgeschaft. Het alternatief is de in dit verband gehanteerde terminologie 
te wijzigen ('algemene beschikkingsbevoegdheid' in plaats van 'gebruiks-
recht'), alsmede de met deze figuur verbonden substitutieregel. Een derde 
mogelijke verbetering betreft een heroverweging van de bepalingen van 
de Richtlijn betreffende f inanciëlezekerheidsovereenkomsten inzake close-
out netting, omdat een aantal belangrijke vragen hieromtrent nog steeds 
naar nationaal recht moeten worden bepaald. Een vierde onderwerp dat 
aandacht behoeft is de regel van de Finaliteitsrichtlijn en de Richtlijn be-
treffende financiëlezekerheidsovereenkomsten op grond waarvan onder 
omstandigheden rechtshandelingen die zijn verricht na de insolventver-
klaring afdwingbaar zijn. Deze regel is een inbreuk op het fixatie- en het 
pari passM-beginsel en kan leiden tot misstanden. Er is geen reden om de 
regels van de Finaliteitsrichtlijn en de Richtlijn betreffende financiëleze-
kerheidsovereenkomsten aan te passen, welke de terugwerkende kracht 
van de insolventverklaring en de afkoelingsperiode buiten werking stel-
len. 
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Appendix I 
DIRECTIVE 98/26/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 
of 19 May 1998 on settlement finality in payment and securities settlement systems 
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 
Havmg regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particular 
Article 100a thereof. 
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission', 
Having regard to the opmion of the European Monetary Institute2, 
Having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Social Committee1, 
Acting m accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 189b of the Treaty4, 
(1) Whereas the Lamfalussy report of 1990 to the Governors of the central banks of the 
Group of Ten Countries demonstrated the important systemic nsk inherent m 
payment systems which operate on the basis of several legal types of payment netting, 
m particular multilateral netting, whereas the reduction of legal risks assoaated with 
participation m real time gross settlement systems is of paramount importance, given 
the increasing development of these systems, 
(2) Whereas it is also of the utmost importance to reduce the nsk assoaated with 
participation in securities settlement systems, m particular where there is a close 
connection between such systems and payment systems, 
(3) Whereas this Directive aims at contributing to the efficient and cost effective operahon 
of cross-border payment and securities settlement arrangements in the Community, 
which reinforces the freedom of movement of capital in the internal market, whereas 
this Directive thereby follows up the progress made towards completion of the 
internal market, in particular towards the freedom to provide services and liberalisa­
tion of capital movements, with a view to the realisation of Economic and Monetary 
Union, 
(4) Whereas it is desirable that the laws of the Member States should aim to minimise the 
disruption to a system caused by insolvency proceedings against a participant in that 
system, 
(5) Whereas a proposal for a Directive on the reorganisation and winding-up of credit 
institutions submitted in 1985 and amended on 8 February 1988 is still pending before 
1 OJ C 207,18 7 1996, ρ 13, and OJ C 259, 26 8 1997, ρ 6 
2 Opinion delivered on 21 November 1996 
3 OJ C 56, 24 2 1997, ρ 1 
4 Opinion of the European Parliament of 9 April 1997 (OJ C 132, 28 4. 1997, ρ 74), 
Council Common Position of 13 October 1997 (OJ C 375, 10 12 1997, ρ 34) and 
Decision of the European Parliament of 29 January 1998(OJC56,23 2 1998) Coun­
cil Decision of 27 April 1998 
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the Council, whereas the Convention on Insolvency Proceedings drawn up on 23 
November 1995 by the Member States meeting within the Council exphatly excludes 
insurance undertakings, credit institutions and investment firms, 
(6) Whereas this Directive is mtended to cover payment and secunties settlement systems 
of a domestic as well as of a cross-border nature, whereas the Directive is applicable 
to Community systems and to collateral secunty constituted by their participants, be 
they Community or third country participants, m connection with participation in 
these systems, 
(7) Whereas Member States may apply the provisions of this Directive to their domestic 
institutions which participate directly in third country systems and to collateral 
secunty provided m connection with participation in such systems, 
(8) Whereas Member States should be allowed to designate as a system covered by this 
Directive a system whose mam activity is the settlement of secunties even if the 
system to a limited extent also deals with commodity derivatives, 
(9) Whereas the reduction of systemic risk requires in particular the finality of settlement 
and the enforceability of collateral secunty, whereas collateral secunty is meant to 
comprise all means provided by a participant to the other participants in the payment 
and/or securities settlement systems to secure rights and obligations in connection 
with that system, including repurchase agreements, statutory hens and fiduciary 
transfers, whereas regulation in national law of the kind of collateral secunty which 
can be used should not be affected by the definition of collateral secunty in this 
Directive, 
(10) Whereas this Directive, by covenng collateral security provided in connechon with 
operations of the central banks of the Member States functioning as central banks, 
including monetary policy operations, assists the European Monetary Institute in its 
task of promoting the efficiency of cross-border payments with a view to the 
preparation of the third stage of Economic and Monetary Union and thereby 
contributes to developing the necessary legal framework m which the future 
European central bank may develop its policy, 
(11) Whereas transfer orders and their netting should be legally enforceable under all 
Member States junsdictions and binding on third parties, 
(12) Whereas rules on finality of netting should not prevent systems testing, before the 
netting takes place, whether orders that have entered the system comply with the 
rules of that system and allow the settlement of that system to take place, 
(13) Whereas nothing m this Directive should prevent a participant or a third party from 
exercising any right or claim resulting from the underlying transaction which they 
may have in law to recovery or reshtuhon m respect of a transfer order which has 
entered a system, e g in case of fraud or technical error, as long as this leads neither 
to the unwinding of netting nor to the revocation of the transfer order m the system, 
(14) Whereas it is necessary to ensure that transfer orders cannot be revoked after a 
moment defined by the rules of the system. 
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(15) Whereas it is necessary that a Member State should immediately notify other Member 
States of the opening of insolvency proceedings against a participant in the system; 
(16) Whereas insolvency proceedings should not have a retroactive effect on the rights and 
obligations of participants in a system; 
(17) Whereas, in the event of insolvency proceedings against a participant in a system, this 
Directive furthermore aims at determining which insolvency law is applicable to the 
rights and obligations of that participant in connection with its participation in a 
system; 
(18) Whereas collateral security should be insulated from the effects of the insolvency law 
applicable to the insolvent participant; 
(19) Whereas the provisions of Article 9(2) should only apply to a register, account or 
centralized deposit system which evidences the existence of proprietary rights in or 
for the delivery or transfer of the securities concerned; 
(20) Whereas the provisions of Article 9(2) are intended to ensure that if the participant, 
the central bank of a Member State or the future European central bank has a valid 
and effective collateral security as determined under the law of the Member State 
where the relevant register, account or centralized deposit system is located, then the 
validity and enforceability of that collateral security as against that system (and the 
operator thereof) and against any other person claiming directly or indirectly through 
it, should be determined solely under the law of that Member State; 
(21) Whereas the provisions of Article 9(2) are not intended to prejudice the operation and 
effect of the law of the Member State under which the securities are constituted or of 
the law of the Member State where the securities may otherwise be located (including, 
without limitation, the law concerning the creation, ownership or transfer of such 
securities or of rights in such securities) and should not be interpreted to mean that 
any such collateral security will be directly enforceable or be capable of being recog-
nised in any such Member State otherwise than in accordance with the law of that 
Member State; 
(22) Whereas it is desirable that Member States endeavour to establish sufficient links 
between all the securities settlement systems covered by this Directive with a view 
towards promoting maximum transparency and legal certainty of transactions 
relating to securities; 
(23) Whereas the adoption of this Directive constitutes the most appropriate way of 
realising the abovementioned objectives and does not go beyond what is necessary 
to achieve them, 
HAVE ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE: 
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SECTION I 
SCOPE AND DEFINITIONS 
Article 1 
The provisions of this Directive shall apply to 
(a) any system as defined in Article 2(a), governed by the law of a Member State and 
operating in any currency, the ecu or in various currenaes which the system converts 
one against another, 
(b) any participant in such a system, 
(c) collateral security provided m connection with 
participation in a system, or 
operations of the central banks of the Member States in their functions as central 
banks 
Article 2 
For the purpose of this Directive 
(a) system shall mean a formal arrangement 
between three or more participants, without counting a possible settlement agent, 
a possible central counterparty, a possible clearing house or a possible indirect 
participant, with common rules and standardised arrangements for the execution 
of transfer orders between the participants, 
governed by the law of a Member State chosen by the participants, the 
participants may, however, only choose the law of a Member State in which at 
least one of them has its head office, and 
designated, without prejudice to other more stringent conditions of general 
applica hon laid down by national law, as a system and notified to the Commis-
sion by the Member State whose law is applicable, after that Member State is 
satisfied as to the adequacy of the rules of the system 
Subject to the conditions m the first subparagraph, a Member State may designate as 
a system such a formal arrangement whose business consists of the execution of 
transfer orders as defined in the second indent of (i) and which to a limited extent 
executes orders relating to other finanaal instruments, when that Member State 
considers that such a designation is warranted on grounds of systemic risk 
A Member State may also on a case-by-case basis designate as a system such a formal 
arrangement between two participants, without counting a possible settlement agent, 
a possible central counterparty, a possible clearing house or a possible indirect partici-
pant, when that Member State considers that such a designation is warranted on 
grounds of systemic risk, 
(b) institution shall mean 
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a credit institution as defined in the first indent of Article 1 of Directive 77/780/ 
EEC5 including the institutions set out in the list in Article 2(2) thereof, or 
an investment firm as defined in point 2 of Article 1 of Directive 93/22/EEC 
excluding the institutions set out in the list in Article 2(2)(a) to (k) thereof, or 
public authorities and publicly guaranteed undertakings, or 
any undertaking whose head office is outside the Community and whose func-
tions correspond to those of the Community credit institutions or investment 
firms as defined in the first and second indent, 
which participates in a system and which is responsible for discharging the financial 
obligations arising from transfer orders within that system. 
If a system is supervised in accordance with national legislation and only executes 
transfer orders as defined in the second indent of (i), as well as payments resulting 
from such orders, a Member State may decide that undertakings which participate in 
such a system and which have responsibility for discharging the financial obligations 
arising from transfer orders within this system, can be considered institutions, 
provided that at least three participants of this system are covered by the categories 
referred to in the first subparagraph and that such a decision is warranted on grounds 
of systemic risk; 
(c) 'central counterparty' shall mean an entity which is interposed between the institu-
tions in a system and which acts as the exclusive counterparty of these institutions 
with regard to their transfer orders; 
(d) 'settlement agent' shall mean an entity providing to institutions and/or a central 
counterparty participating in systems, settlement accounts through which transfer 
orders within such systems are settled and, as the case may be, extending credit to 
those institutions and/or central counterparties for settlement purposes; 
(e) 'clearing house' shall mean an entity responsible for the calculation of the net posi-
tions of institutions, a possible central counterparty and/or a possible settlement 
agent; 
(f) 'participant' shall mean an institution, a central counterparty, a settlement agent or a 
clearing house. 
According to the rules of the system, the same participant may act as a central 
counterparty, a settlement agent or a clearing house or carry out part or all of these 
tasks. 
A Member State may decide that for the purposes of this Directive an indirect 
participant may be considered a participant if it is warranted on the grounds of 
systemic risk and on condition that the indirect participant is known to the system; 
5 First Council Directive 77/780/EEC of 12 December 1977 on the coordination of the 
laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the taking up and 
pursuit of the business of credit institutions (OJ L 322,17.12.1977, p. 30). Directive 
as last amended by Directive 96/13/EC (OJ L 66,16. 3.1996, p. 15). 
6 Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on investment services in the securities 
field (OJ L 141, 11. 6. 1993, p. 27). Directive as last amended by Directive 97/9/EC 
(OJ L 84, 26. 3.1997, p. 22). 
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(g) 'indirect participant' shall mean a credit institution as defined m the first indent of (b) 
with a contractual relationship with an institution participating in a system executing 
transfer orders as defined in the first mdent of (i) which enables the abovemenhoned 
credit institution to pass transfer orders through the system, 
(h) 'secunhes' shall mean all instruments referred to in section Β of the Annex to Directive 
93/22/EEC, 
(i) 'transfer order' shall mean 
any instruction by a participant to place at the disposal of a recipient an amount 
of money by means of a book entry on the accounts of a credit institution, a 
central bank or a settlement agent, or any instruction which results in the assump­
tion or discharge of a payment obligation as defined by the rules of the system, 
or 
an instruction by a participant to transfer the title to, or interest in, a security or 
secunhes by means of a book entry on a register, or otherwise, 
(j) 'insolvency proceedings' shall mean any collective measure provided for in the law 
of a Member State, or a third country, either to wind up the parhapant or to reorgan­
ise it, where such measure involves the suspending of, or imposing limitations on, 
transfers or payments, 
(k) 'netting' shall mean the conversion into one net claim or one net obligation of claims 
and obligations resulting from transfer orders which a participant or participants 
either issue to, or receive from, one or more other participants with the result that only 
a net claim can be demanded or a net obligation be owed, 
(1) 'settlement account' shall mean an account at a central bank, a settlement agent or a 
central counterparty used to hold funds and secunhes and to settle transactions 
between participants in a system, 
(m) 'collateral secunty' shall mean all realisable assets provided under a pledge (including 
money provided under a pledge), a repurchase or similar agreement, or otherwise, 
for the purpose of secunng rights and obligations potentially arising m connection 
with a system, or provided to central banks of the Member States or to the future 
European central bank 
SECTION II 
NETTING AND TRANSFER ORDERS 
Articles 
1 Transfer orders and nethng shall be legally enforceable and, even m the event of 
insolvency proceedings against a parhapant, shall be binding on third parhes, pro­
vided that transfer orders were entered into a system before the moment of opening 
of such insolvency proceedings as defined in Article 6(1) 
Where, exceptionally, transfer orders are entered into a system after the moment of 
opening of insolvency proceedings and are earned out on the day of opening of such 
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proceedings, they shall be legally enforceable and binding on third parties only if, 
after the time of settlement, the settlement agent, the central counterparty or the 
clearing house can prove that they were not aware, nor should have been aware, of 
the opening of such proceedings 
2 No law, regulation, rule or practice on the setting aside of contracts and transactions 
concluded before the moment of opening of insolvency proceedings, as defined in 
Article 6(1) shall lead to the unwinding of a netting 
3 The moment of entry of a transfer order mto a system shall be defined by the rules of 
that system If there are conditions laid down in the national law governing the 
system as to the moment of entry, the rules of that system must be m accordance with 
such conditions 
Artide 4 
Member States may provide that the opening of insolvency proceedings against a 
participant shall not prevent funds or securities available on the settlement account of that 
participant from being used to fulfil that participant's obligations in the system on the day 
of the opening of the insolvency proceedings Furthermore, Member States may also 
provide that such a participant's credit facility connected to the system be used against 
available, existing collateral secunty to fulfil that participant's obligations in the system 
Articles 
A transfer order may not be revoked by a participant in a system, nor by a third party, 
from the moment defined by the rules of that system 
SECTION III 
PROVISIONS CONCERNING INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS 
Article 6 
1 For the purpose of this Directive, the moment of opening of insolvency proceedings 
shall be the moment when the relevant judicial or administrative authority handed 
down its deasion 
2 When a deasion has been taken m accordance with paragraph 1, the relevant judicial 
or administrative authority shall immediately notify that deasion to the appropnate 
authority chosen by its Member State 
3 The Member State referred to m paragraph 2 shall immediately notify other Member 
States 
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Article? 
Insolvency proceedings shall not have retroactive effects on the rights and obligations of 
a parhapant arising from, or in connection with, its participation in a system earlier than 
the moment of openmg of such proceedings as defined in Article 6(1) 
Article 8 
In the event of insolvency proceedings being opened against a participant in a system, the 
rights and obligations arising from, or in connection with, the participation of that partici-
pant shall be determined by the law governing that system 
SECTION IV 
INSULATION OF THE RIGHTS OF HOLDERS OF COLLATERAL SECURITY FROM 
THE EFFECTS OF THE INSOLVENCY OF THE PROVIDER 
Article 9 
1 The rights of 
a parhapant to collateral secunty provided to it in connection with a system, and 
central banks of the Member States or the future European central bank to collat-
eral secunty provided to them, 
shall not be affected by insolvency proceedings against the participant or counterparty 
to central banks of the Member States or the future European central bank which 
provided the collateral security Such collateral secunty may be realised for the 
satisfaction of these rights 
2 Where secunties (including rights in secunties) are provided as collateral security to 
partiapants and/or central banks of the Member States or the future European central 
bank as described m paragraph 1, and their right (or that of any nominee, agent or 
third party acting on their behalf) with respect to the securities is legally recorded on 
a register, account or centralised deposit system located in a Member State, the deter-
mination of the rights of such entities as holders of collateral secunty m relation to 
those secunhes shall be governed by the law of that Member State 
SECTION V 
FINAL PROVISIONS 
Article 10 
Member States shall speafy the systems which are to be mcluded in the scope of this 
Directive and shall notify them to the Commission and inform the Commission of the 
authorities they have chosen in accordance with Article 6(2) 
The system shall indicate to the Member State whose law is applicable the partiapants m 
the system, including any possible indirect partiapants, as well as any change in them 
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In addition to the indication provided form the second subparagraph. Member States may 
impose supervision or authonsabon requirements on systems which fall under their 
jurisdiction 
Anyone with a legitimate interest may require an institution to inform him of the systems 
in which it partiapates and to provide information about the main rules governing the 
functioning of those systems 
Article 11 
1 Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative provi-
sions necessary to comply with this Directive before 11 December 1999 They shall 
forthwith inform the Commission thereof 
When Member States adopt these measures, they shall contain a reference to this 
Directive or shall be accompanied by such reference on the occasion of their official 
publication The methods of making such a reference shall be laid down by the 
Member States 
2 Member States shall communicate to the Commission the text of the provisions of 
domestic law which they adopt in the field governed by this Directive In this 
Communication, Member States shall provide a table of correspondence showing the 
national provisions which exist or are introduced m respect of each Article of this 
Directive 
Article 12 
No later than three years after the date mentioned m Article 11(1), the Commission shall 
present a report to the European Parliament and the Council on the application of this 
Directive, accompanied where appropriate by proposals for its revision 
Article 13 
This Directive shall enter into force on the day of its publication m the Official Journal of 
the European Communities 
Article 14 
This Directive is addressed to the Member States 
Done at Brussels, 19 May 1998 
For the European Parliament 
The President 
J M GIL-ROBLES 
For the Council 
The President 
G BROWN 
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Appendix Π 
DIRECTIVE 2002/47/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 
of 6 June 2002 on financial collateral arrangements 
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particular 
Article 95 thereof, 
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission', 
Having regard to the opinion of the European Central Bank2, 
Having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Social Committee1, 
Acting in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 251 of the Treaty4, 
Whereas: 
(1) Directive 98/26/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 1998 on 
settlement finality in payment and securities settlement systems5 constituted a 
milestone in establishing a sound legal framework for payment and securities 
settlement systems. Implementation of that Directive has demonstrated the 
importance of limiting systemic risk inherent in such systems stemming from the 
different influence of several jurisdictions, and the benefits of common rules in 
relation to collateral constituted to such systems. 
(2) In its communication of 11 May 1999 to the European Parliament and to the Council 
on financial services: implementing the framework for financial markets: action plan, 
the Commission undertook, after consultation with market experts and national 
authorities, to work on further proposals for legislative action on collateral urging 
further progress in the field of collateral, beyond Directive 98/26/EC. 
(3) A Community regime should be created for the provision of securities and cash as 
collateral under both security interest and title transfer structures including repur­
chase agreements (repos). This will contribute to the integration and cost-efficiency 
of the financial market as well as to the stability of the financial system in the 
Community, thereby supporting the freedom to provide services and the free 
movement of capital in the single market in financial services. This Directive focuses 
on bilateral financial collateral arrangements. 
1 OJ C 180 E, 26.6.2001, p. 312. 
2 OJ C 196, 12.7.2001, p. 10. 
3 OJC48, 21.2.2002, p. 1. 
4 Opinion of the European Parliament of 13 December 2001 (not yet published in the 
Official Journal), Council Common Position of 5 March 2002 (not yet published in 
the Official Journal) and Decision of the European Parliament of 15 May 2002. 
5 OJL166,11.6.1998, p. 45. 
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(4) This Directive is adopted in a European legal context which consists in particular of 
the said Directive 98/26/EC as well as Directive 2001/24/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 4 April 2001 on the reorganisation and winding up 
of credit institutions6. Directive 2001/17/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 19 March 2001 on the reorganisation and winding-up of insurance under-
takings7 and Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency 
proceedings*. This Directive is in line with the general pattern of these previous legal 
acts and is not opposed to it. Indeed, this Directive complements these existing legal 
acts by dealing with further issues and going beyond them in connection with 
particular matters already dealt with by these legal acts. 
(5) In order to improve the legal certainty of financial collateral arrangements. Member 
States should ensure that certain provisions of insolvency law do not apply to such 
arrangements, in particular, those that would inhibit the effective realisation of 
financial collateral or cast doubt on the validity of current techniques such as bilateral 
close-out netting, the provision of additional collateral in the form of top-up collateral 
and substitution of collateral. 
(6) This Directive does not address rights which any person may have in respect of assets 
provided as financial collateral, and which arise otherwise than under the terms of the 
financial collateral arrangement and otherwise than on the basis of any legal provi-
sion or rule of law arising by reason of the commencement or continuation of 
winding-up proceedings or reorganisation measures, such as restitution arising from 
mistake, error or lack of capacity. 
(7) The principle in Directive 98/26/EC, whereby the law applicable to book entry 
securities provided as collateral is the law of the jurisdiction where the relevant 
register, account or centralised deposit system is located, should be extended in order 
to create legal certainty regarding the use of such securities held in a cross-border 
context and used as financial collateral under the scope of this Directive. 
(8) The lex rei sitae rule, according to which the applicable law for determining whether 
a financial collateral arrangement is properly perfected and therefore good against 
third parties is the law of the country where the financial collateral is located, is 
currently recognised by all Member States. Without affecting the application of this 
Directive to directly-held securities, the location of book entry securities provided as 
financial collateral and held through one or more intermediaries should be deter-
mined. If the collateral taker has a valid and effective collateral arrangement accord-
ing to the governing law of the country in which the relevant account is maintained, 
then the validity against any competing title or interest and the enforceability of the 
collateral should be governed solely by the law of that country, thus preventing legal 
uncertainty as a result of other unforeseen legislation. 
(9) In order to limit the administrative burdens for parties using financial collateral under 
the scope of this Directive, the only perfection requirement which national law may 
impose in respect of financial collateral should be that the financial collateral is 
6 OJ L 125, 5.5.2001, p. 15. 
7 OJL 110, 20.4.2001, p. 28. 
8 OJ L 160, 30.6.2000, p. 1. 
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delivered, transferred, held, registered or otherwise designated so as to be in the 
possession or under the control of the collateral taker or of a person acting on the 
collateral taker s behalf while not excluding collateral techniques where the collateral 
provider is allowed to substitute collateral or to withdraw excess collateral 
(10) For the same reasons, the creation, validity, perfection, enforceability or admissibility 
in evidence of a financial collateral arrangement, or the provision of financial collater­
al under a financial collateral arrangement, should not be made dependent on the 
performance of any formal act such as the execuhon of any document in a specific 
form or in a particular manner, the making of any filing with an official or public 
body or registration in a public register, advertisement in a newspaper or journal, in 
an official register or publication or in any other matter, notification to a public officer 
or the provision of evidence in a particular form as to the date of execution of a 
document or instrument, the amount of the relevant financial obligations or any other 
matter This Directive must however provide a balance between market efficiency and 
the safety of the parties to the arrangement and third parties, thereby avoiding inter 
aha the risk of fraud This balance should be achieved through the scope of this 
Directive covering only those financial collateral arrangements which provide for 
some form of dispossession, ι e the provision of the financial collateral, and where the 
provision of the financial collateral can be evidenced m writing or in a durable 
medium, ensuring thereby the traceabihty of that collateral For the purpose of this 
Directive, acts required under the law of a Member State as condibons for transferring 
or creating a secunty interest on financial instruments, other than book entry 
securities, such as endorsement in the case of instruments to order, or recording on 
the issuer s register in the case of registered instruments, should not be considered as 
formal acts 
(11) Moreover, this Directive should protect only financial collateral arrangements which 
can be evidenced Such evidence can be given in writing or in any other legally 
enforceable manner provided by the law which is applicable to the financial colla teral 
arrangement 
(12) The simplification of the use of financial collateral through the limitation of adminis­
trative burdens promotes the efficiency of the cross-border operations of the European 
Central Bank and the national central banks of Member States participating in the 
economic and monetary union, necessary for the implementation of the common 
monetary policy Furthermore, the provision of limited protection of financial collater­
al arrangements from some rules of insolvency law in addition supports the wider 
aspect of the common monetary policy, where the participants in the money market 
balance the overall amount of liquidity in the market among themselves, by cross-
border transachons backed by collateral 
(13) This Directive seeks to protect the validity of financial collateral arrangements which 
are based upon the transfer of the full ownership of the financial collateral, such as by 
eliminating the so-called re-charactensationof such financial collateral arrangements 
(including repurchase agreements) as secunty interests 
(14) The enforceability of bilateral close-out netting should be protected, not only as an 
enforcement mechanism for title transfer financial collateral arrangements including 
repurchase agreements but more widely, where close-out netting forms part of a 
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financial collateral arrangement. Sound risk management practices commonly used 
in the financial market should be protected by enabling participants to manage and 
reduce their credit exposures arising from all kinds of financial transactions on a net 
basis, where the credit exposure is calculated by combining the estimated current 
exposures under all outstanding transactions with a counterparty, setting off recipro-
cal items to produce a single aggregated amount that is compared with the current 
value of the collateral. 
(15) This Directive should be without prejudice to any restrictions or requirements under 
national law on bringing into account claims, on obligations to set-off, or on netting, 
for example relating to their reciprocity or the fact that they have been concluded 
prior to when the collateral taker knew or ought to ha ve known of the commencement 
(or of any mandatory legal act leading to the commencement) of winding-up proceed-
ings or reorganisation measures in respect of the collateral provider. 
(16) The sound market practice favoured by regulators whereby participants in the 
financial market use top-up financial collateral arrangements to manage and limit 
their credit risk to each other by mark-to-market calculations of the current market 
value of the credit exposure and the value of the financial collateral and accordingly 
ask for top-up financial collateral or return the surplus of financial collateral should 
be protected against certain automatic avoidance rules. The same applies to the 
possibility of substituting for assets provided as financial collateral other assets of the 
same value. The intention is merely that the provision of top-up or substitution 
financial collateral cannot be questioned on the sole basis that the relevant financial 
obligations existed before that financial collateral was provided, or that the financial 
collateral was provided during a prescribed period. However, this does not prejudice 
the possibility of questioning under national law the financial collateral arrangement 
and the provision of financial collateral as part of the initial provision, top-up or 
substitution of financial collateral, for example where this has been intentionally done 
to the detriment of the other creditors (this covers inter alia actions based on fraud or 
similar avoidance rules which may apply in a prescribed period). 
(17) This Directive provides for rapid and non-formalistic enforcement procedures in 
order to safeguard financial stability and limit contagion effects in case of a default 
of a party to a financial collateral arrangement. However, this Directive balances the 
latter objectives with the protection of the collateral provider and third parties by 
explicitly confirming the possibility for Member States to keep or introduce in their 
national legislation an a posteriori control which the Courts can exercise in relation 
to the realisation or valuation of financial collateral and the calculation of the relevant 
financial obligations. Such control should allow for the judicial authorities to verify 
that the realisation or valuation has been conducted in a commercially reasonable 
manner. 
(18) It should be possible to provide cash as collateral under both title transfer and secured 
structures respectively protected by the recognition of netting or by the pledge of cash 
collateral. Cash refers only to money which is represented by a credit to an account, 
or similar claims on repayment of money (such as money market deposits), thus 
explicitly excluding banknotes. 
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(19) This Directive provides for a right of use in case of security financial collateral 
arrangements, which increases liquidity in the financial market stemming from such 
reuse of 'pledged' securities. This reuse however should be without prejudice to 
national legislation about separation of assets and unfair treatment of creditors. 
(20) This Directive does not prejudice the operation and effect of the contractual terms of 
financial instruments provided as financial collateral, such as rights and obligations 
and other conditions contained in the terms of issue and any other rights and obliga-
tions and other conditions which apply between the issuers and holders of such 
instruments. 
(21) This Act complies with the fundamental rights and follows the principles laid down 
in particular in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 
(22) Since the objective of the proposed action, namely to create a minimum regime 
relating to the use of financial collateral, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the 
Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale and effects of the action, be 
better achieved at Community level, the Community may adopt measures, in accord-
ance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty. In accord-
ance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Directive does 
not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve that objective, 
HAVE ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE: 
Article 1 
Subject matter and scope 
1. This Directive lays down a Community regime applicable to financial collateral 
arrangements which satisfy the requirements set out in paragraphs 2 and 5 and to 
financial collateral in accordance with the conditions set out in paragraphs 4 and 5. 
2. The collateral taker and the collateral provider must each belong to one of the follow-
ing categories: 
(a) a public authority (excluding publicly guaranteed undertakings unless they fall 
under points (b) to (e)) including: 
(i) public sector bodies of Member States charged with or intervening in the 
management of public debt, and 
(ii) public sector bodies of Member States authorised to hold accounts for 
customers; 
(b) a central bank, the European Central Bank, the Bank for International Settlements, 
a multilateral development bank as defined in Article 1(19) of Directive 2000/12/ 
EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 March 2000 relating to 
the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions'', the International 
Monetary Fund and the European Investment Bank; 
9 OJ L 126, 26.5.2000, p. 1. Directive as amended by Directive 2000/28/EC (OJ L 275, 
27.10.2000, p. 37). 
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(c) a finanaal institution subject to prudential supervision including 
(i) a credit institution as defined in Article 1(1) of Directive 2000/12/EC, includ­
ing the institutions listed in Article 2(3) of that Directive, 
(n) an investment firm as defmed in Article 1 (2) of Council Directive 93/22/EEC 
of 10 May 1993 on investment services in the securities field10, 
(m) a financial institution as defined in Article 1(5) of Directive 2000/12/EC, 
(iv) an insurance undertaking as defined in Article 1(a) of Council Directive 92/ 
49/EEC of 18 June 1992 on the coordination of laws, regulations and adminis­
trative provisions relating to direct insurance other than life assurance' ' and 
a life assurance undertaking as defined in Article 1(a) of Council Directive 
92/96/EEC of 10 November 1992 on the coordination of laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions relating to direct life assurance12, 
(v) an undertaking for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) 
as defined m Article 1(2) of Council Directive 85/611/EEC of 20 December 
1985 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions 
relating to undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities 
(UCITS)' \ 
(vi) a management company as defined in Article la(2) of Directive 85/611/EEC, 
(d) a central counterparty, settlement agent or clearing house, as defined respectively 
in Article 2(c), (d) and (e) of Directive 98/26/EC, including similar institutions 
regulated under national law acting in the futures, options and derivatives 
markets to the extent not covered by that Directive, and a person, other than a 
natural person, who acts in a trust or representative capacity on behalf of any one 
or more persons that includes any bondholders or holders of other forms of 
secuntised debt or any institution as defined in points (a) to (d), 
(e) a person other than a natural person, including unmcorporated firms and 
partnerships, provided that the other party is an institution as defined in points 
(a)to(d) 
3 Member States may exclude from the scope of this Directive finanaal collateral 
arrangements where one of the parties is a person mentioned in paragraph 2(e) 
If they make use of this option Member States shall inform the Commission which 
shall inform the other Member States thereof 
4 (a) The financial collateral to be provided must consist of cash or financial 
instruments 
(b) Member States may exclude from the scope of this Directive finanaal collateral 
consisting of the collateral provider's own shares, shares m affiliated under­
takings within the meaning of seventh Counal Directive 83/349/EEC of 13 June 
1983 on consolidated accounts'4, and shares in undertakings whose exclusive 
10 OJ L141,11 6 1993, ρ 27 Directive as last amended by Directive 2000/64/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Counal (OJ L 290,1711 2000, ρ 27) 
11 OJ L 228,11 8 1992, ρ 1 Directive as last amended by Directive 2000/64/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council 
12 OJ L 360, 912 1992, ρ 1 Directive as last amended by Directive 2000/64/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council 
13 OJ L 375,31 12 1985, ρ 3 Directive as last amended by Directive 2001/108/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 41,13 2 2002, ρ 35) 
14 OJ L 193,18 7 1983, ρ 1 Directive as last amended by Directive 2001/65/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 283, 27 10 2001, ρ 28) 
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purpose is to own means of production that are essential for the collateral pro-
vider s business or to own real property 
5 This Directive applies to hnanaal collateral once it has been provided and if that 
provision can be evidenced in writing 
The evidencing of the provision of hnanaal collateral must allow for the identification 
of the hnanaal collateral to which it applies For this purpose, it is sufhaent to prove 
that the book entry securities collateral has been credited to, or forms a credit in, the 
relevant account and that the cash collateral has been credited to, or forms a credit in, 
a designated account 
This Directive applies to hnanaal collateral arrangements if that arrangement can be 
evidenced in writing or in a legally equivalent manner 
Article 2 
Definitions 
1 For the purpose of this Directive 
(a) 'fmanaal collateral arrangement' means a title transfer financial collateral 
arrangement or a security hnanaal collateral arrangement whether or not these 
are covered by a master agreement or general terms and conditions, 
(b) 'htle transfer hnanaal collateral arrangement' means an arrangement, including 
repurchase agreements, under which a collateral provider transfers full owner-
ship of hnanaal collateral to a collateral taker for the purpose of securing or 
otherwise covering the performance of relevant fmanaal obligations, 
(c) 'secunty hnanaal collateral arrangement' means an arrangement under which a 
collateral provider provides fmanaal collateral by way of secunty in favour of, 
or to, a collateral taker, and where the full ownership of the hnanaal collateral 
remains with the collateral provider when the secunty nght is established, 
(d) cash' means money credited to an account in any currency, or similar claims for 
the repayment of money, such as money market deposits, 
(e) 'fmanaal instruments' means shares in companies and other securities equivalent 
to shares in companies and bonds and other forms of debt instruments if these are 
negotiable on the capital market, and any other securities which are normally 
dealt m and which give the nght to acquire any such shares, bonds or other 
securities by subscription, purchase or exchange or which give rise to a cash 
settlement (excluding instruments of payment), including units m collective 
investment undertakings, money market instruments and claims relating to or 
nghts in or in respect of any of the foregoing, 
(f) 'relevant fmanaal obligations' means the obligations which are secured by a 
fmanaal collateral arrangement and which give a right to cash settlement and/or 
debvery of fmanaal instruments 
Relevant fmanaal obligations may consist of or include 
(i) present or future, actual or contingent or prospective obligations (including 
such obligations arising under a master agreement or similar arrangement), 
(u) obligations owed to the collateral taker by a person other than the collateral 
provider, or 
(in) obligations of a speafied class or kind ansing from time to time, 
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(g) 'book entry securities collateral' means financial collateral provided under a 
financial collateral arrangement which consists of financial instruments, title to 
which is evidenced by entries in a register or account maintained by or on behalf 
of an intermediary, 
(h) 'relevant account' means m relation to book entry securities collateral which is 
subject to a financial collateral arrangement, the register or account - which may 
be maintained by the collateral taker - m which the entries are made by which 
that book entry securities collateral is provided to the collateral taker, 
(i) 'equivalent collateral' 
(i) m relation to cash, means a payment of the same amount and m the same 
currency, 
(n) m relation to financial instruments, means hnanaal instruments of the same 
issuer or debtor, forming part of the same issue or class and of the same 
nominal amount, currency and description or, where a fmancial collateral 
arrangement provides for the transfer of other assets following the occur-
rence of any event relating to or affecting any hnanaal instruments provided 
as hnanaal collateral, those other assets, 
(j) winding-up proceedings' means collective proceedings involving realisation of 
the assets and distribution of the proceeds among the creditors, shareholders or 
members as appropriate, which involve any intervention by administrative or 
judiaal authorities, including where the collective proceedings are terminated by 
a composition or other analogous measure, whether or not they are founded on 
insolvency or are voluntary or compulsory, 
(k) reorganisation measures' means measures which involve any intervention by 
administrative or judiaal authorities which are intended to preserve or restore the 
financial situation and which affect pre-existing rights of third parties, including 
but not limited to measures involving a suspension of payments, suspension of 
enforcement measures or reduction of claims, 
(1) 'enforcement event' means an event of default or any similar event as agreed 
between the parties on the occurrence of which, under the terms of a financial 
collateral arrangement or by operahon of law, the collateral taker is entitled to 
realise or appropriate fmanaal collateral or a close-out netting provision comes 
into effect, 
(m) nght of use' means the nght of the collateral taker to use and dispose of hnanaal 
collateral provided under a secunty hnanaal collateral arrangement as the owner 
of it in accordance with the terms of the secunty hnanaal collateral anangement, 
(n) close-out netting provision means a provision of a financial collateral arrange-
ment, or of an arrangement of which a financial collateral arrangement forms 
part, or, m the absence of any such provision, any statutory rule by which, on the 
occurrence of an enforcement event, whether through the operation of netting or 
set-off or otherwise 
(i) the obligations of the parhes are accelerated so as to be immediately due and 
expressed as an obligation to pay an amount representing their estimated 
current value, or are terminated and replaced by an obligation to pay such 
an amount, and/or 
(n) an account is taken of what is due from each party to the other m respect of 
such obligations, and a net sum equal to the balance of the account is payable 
by the party from whom the larger amount is due to the other party 
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2 References in this Directive to finanaal collateral being provided', or to the 'provision 
of financial collateral, are to the finanaal collateral being delivered, transferred, held, 
registered or otherwise designated so as to be in the possession or under the control 
of the collateral taker or of a person acting on the collateral taker's behalf Any right 
of substitution or to withdraw excess finanaal collateral in favour of the collateral 
provider shall not prejudice the financial collateral having been provided to the 
collateral taker as mentioned in this Directive 
3 References m this Directive to writing' include recording by electronic means and any 
other durable medium 
Article 3 
Formal requirements 
1 Member States shall not require that the creation, validity, perfection, enforceability 
or admissibility in evidence of a finanaal collateral arrangement or the provision of 
finanaal collateral under a finanaal collateral arrangement be dépendent on the 
performance of any formal act 
2 Paragraph 1 is without prejudice to the application of this Directive to finanaal 
collateral only once it has been provided and if that provision can be evidenced in 
writing and where the finanaal collateral arrangement can be evidenced in writing 
or m a legally equivalent manner 
Article 4 
Enforcement of financial collateral arrangements 
1 Member States shall ensure that on the occurrence of an enforcement event, the 
collateral taker shall be able to realise in the following manners, any finanaal collater-
al provided under, and subject to the terms agreed in, a security finanaal collateral 
arrangement 
(a) financial instruments by sale or appropriation and by setting off their value 
against, or applying their value in discharge of, the relevant finanaal obligations, 
(b) cash by setting off the amount against or applying it m discharge of the relevant 
financial obligations 
2 Appropnahon is possible only if 
(a) this has been agreed by the parhes in the security finanaal collateral arrange-
ment, and 
(b) the parties have agreed in the security finanaal collateral arrangement on the 
valuation of the finanaal instruments 
3 Member States which do not allow appropriation on 27 June 2002 are not obliged to 
recognise it 
If they make use of this option, Member States shall inform the Commission which in 
turn shall inform the other Member States thereof 
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4 The manners of realising the financial collateral referred to in paragraph 1 shall, 
subject to the terms agreed in the secunty financial collateral arrangement, be without 
any requirement to the effect that 
(a) prior notice of the intention to realise must have been given, 
(b) the terms of the realisation be approved by any court, public officer or other 
person, 
(c) the realisation be conducted by public auction or in any other prescribed manner, 
or 
(d) any additional time period must have elapsed 
5 Member States shall ensure that a financial collateral arrangement can take effect in 
accordance with its terms notwithstanding the commencement or continuation of 
winding-up proceedings or reorganisation measures in respect of the collateral 
provider or collateral taker 
6 This Article and Articles 5, 6 and 7 shall be without prejudice to any requirements 
under national law to the effect that the realisation or valuation of hnanaal collateral 
and the calculation of the relevant financial obligations must be conducted in a 
commercially reasonable manner 
Articles 
Right of use of financial collateral under security financial collateral arrangements 
1 If and to the extent that the terms of a secunty financial collateral arrangement so 
provide. Member States shall ensure that the collateral taker is entitled to exerase a 
right of use m relation to financial collateral provided under the security hnanaal 
collateral arrangement 
2 Where a collateral taker exercises a nght of use, he thereby incurs an obligation to 
transfer equivalent collateral to replace the onginal hnanaal collateral at the latest on 
the due date for the performance of the relevant financial obligations covered by the 
secunty hnanaal collateral arrangement 
Alternatively, the collateral taker shall, on the due date for the performance of the 
relevant fmanaal obligations, either transfer equivalent collateral, or, if and to the 
extent that the terms of a secunty fmanaal collateral arrangement so provide, set off 
the value of the equivalent collateral against or apply it in discharge of the relevant 
fmanaal obligations 
3 The equivalent collateral transferred in discharge of an obligation as descnbed in 
paragraph 2, first subparagraph, shall be subject to the same secunty hnanaal 
collateral agreement to which the onginal fmanaal collateral was subject and shall be 
treated as having been provided under the secunty hnanaal collateral arrangement 
at the same time as the onginal hnanaal collateral was first provided 
4 Member States shall ensure that the use of fmanaal collateral by the collateral taker 
according to this Article does not render invalid or unenforceable the nghts of the 
collateral taker under the secunty financial collateral arrangement m relation to the 
fmanaal collateral transferred by the collateral taker in discharge of an obligation as 
descnbed in paragraph 2, first subparagraph 
393 
Appendix II 
5. If an enforcement event occurs while an obligation as described in paragraph 2 first 
subparagraph remains outstanding, the obligation may be the subject of a close-out 
netting provision. 
Article 6 
Recognition of title transfer financial collateral arrangements 
1. Member States shall ensure that a title transfer financial collateral arrangement can 
take effect in accordance with its terms. 
2. If an enforcement event occurs while any obligation of the collateral taker to transfer 
equivalent collateral under a title transfer financial collateral arrangement remains 
outstanding, the obligation may be the subject of a close-out netting provision. 
Article? 
Recognition of close-out netting provisions 
1. Member States shall ensure that a close-out netting provision can take effect in 
accordance with its terms: 
(a) notwithstanding the commencement or continuation of winding-up proceedings 
or reorganisation measures in respect of the collateral provider and/or the col-
lateral taker; and/or 
(b) notwithstanding any purported assignment, judicial or other attachment or other 
disposition of or in respect of such rights. 
2. Member States shall ensure that the operation of a close-out netting provision may not 
be subject to any of the requirements that are mentioned in Article 4(4), unless 
otherwise agreed by the parties. 
Article 8 
Certain insolvency provisions disapplied 
1. Member States shall ensure that a financial collateral arrangement, as well as the 
provision of financial collateral under such arrangement, may not be declared invalid 
or void or be reversed on the sole basis that the financial collateral arrangement has 
come into existence, or the financial collateral has been provided: 
(a) on the day of the commencement of winding-up proceedings or reorganisation 
measures, but prior to the order or decree making that commencement; or 
(b) in a prescribed period prior to, and defined by reference to, the commencement 
of such proceedings or measures or by reference to the making of any order or 
decree or the taking of any other action or occurrence of any other event in the 
course of such proceedings or measures. 
2. Member States shall ensure tha t where a financial collateral arrangement or a relevant 
financial obligation has come into existence, or financial collateral has been provided 
on the day of, but after the moment of the commencement of, winding-up proceedings 
or reorganisation measures, it shall be legally enforceable and binding on third parties 
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if the collateral taker can prove that he was not aware, nor should have been aware, 
of the commencement of such proceedings or measures 
3 Where a hnanaal collateral arrangement contams 
(a) an obligation to provide financial collateral or additional financial collateral in 
order to take account of changes in the value of the financial collateral or in the 
amount of the relevant financial obligations, or 
(b) a right to withdraw financial collateral on providing, by way of substitution or 
exchange, hnanaal collateral of substantially the same value. 
Member States shall ensure that the provision of hnanaal collateral, additional 
hnanaal collateral or substitute or replacement hnanaal collateral under such an 
obligation or right shall not be treated as invalid or reversed or declared void on the 
sole basis that 
(i) such provision was made on the day of the commencement of winding-up 
proceedings or reorganisation measures, but prior to the order or decree making 
that commencement or m a prescribed period prior to, and defined by reference 
to, the commencement of winding-up proceedings or reorganisation measures or 
by reference to the making of any order or decree or the taking of any other achon 
or occurrence of any other event in the course of such proceedings or measures, 
and/or 
(n) the relevant hnanaal obligations were incurred prior to the date of the provision 
of the hnanaal collateral, additional hnanaal collateral or substitute or replace-
ment hnanaal collateral 
4 Without prejudice to paragraphs 1, 2 and 3, this Directive leaves unaffected the 
general rules of national insolvency law in relation to the voidance of transachons 
entered into during the prescribed period referred to in paragraph 1(b) and in 
paragraph 3(i) 
Article 9 
Conflict of laws 
1 Any queshon with respect to any of the matters speahed in paragraph 2 arising in 
relation to book entry securities collateral shall be governed by the law of the country 
in which the relevant account is maintained The reference to the law of a country is 
a reference to its domestic law, disregarding any rule under which, m deciding the 
relevant queshon, reference should be made to the law of another country 
2 The matters referred to in paragraph 1 are 
(a) the legal nature and proprietary effects of book entry secunhes collateral, 
(b) the requirements for p>erfecting a hnanaal collateral arrangement relating to book 
entry secunhes collateral and the provision of book entry secunhes collateral 
under such an arrangement, and more generally the completion of the steps 
necessary to render such an arrangement and provision effective against third 
parhes, 
(c) whether a person's title to or interest in such book entry secunhes collateral is 
overridden by or subordinated to a competing title or interest, or a good faith 
acquisition has occurred. 
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(d) the steps required for the realisation of book entry securities collateral following 
the occurrence of an enforcement event. 
Article 10 
Report by the Commission 
Not later than 27 December 2006, the Commission shall present a report to the European 
Parliament and the Council on the application of this Directive, in particular on the 
application of Article 1(3), Article 4(3) and Article 5, accompanied where appropriate by 
proposals for its revision. 
Article 11 
Implementation 
Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions 
necessary to comply with this Directive by 27 December 2003 at the latest. They shall 
forthwith inform the Commission thereof. 
When Member States adopt those provisions, they shall contain a reference to this Directive 
or be accompanied by such reference on the occasion of their official publication. Member 
States shall determine how such reference is to be made. 
Article 12 
Entry into force 
This Directive shall enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of 
the European Communities. 
Article 13 
Addressees 
This Directive is addressed to the Member States. 
Done at Brussels, 6 June 2002. 
For the European Parliament 
The President 
P. COX 
For the Council 
The President 
A. M. BIRULÉS Y BERTRÀN 
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11(3.3) 
11(5.1), 11(5.4), 11(5.5) 
See Master Equity & Fixed Interest Stock Lend­
ing Agreement 
See Master Gilt Edged Stock Lending Agreement 
11(7.2.1.b) 
IV(3.4.1), IV(3.4.2), IV(3.4.6), IV(3.7), IV(5.2.3.a), 
IV(5.2.7) 
See Reciprocity 
Ν 
Netherlands Annex See Global Master Repurchase Agreement 
Open market operations 
Operations 
fine-tuning -
open market -
refinancing -
structural -
Opt-out clause 
OSLA 
OTC 
Overseas Securities Lender's 
Agreement 
Over-the-counter 
See Operations 
II(7.2.2.a), II(7.2.2.c), n(7.2.2.d) 
11(7.2.1.a), 11(7.2.1.b), II(7.2.1.c), II(7.2.2.a) 
II(7.2.2.a), II(7.2.2.b) 
II(7.2.2.a), II(7.2.2.d) 
11(8.2.2), 11(8.2.4), 11(8.7.2), VI(3.2) 
See Overseas Securities Lender's Agreement 
See Over-the-counter 
11(3.3), IV(3.3) 
11(3.4), IV(1.3.2), IV(5.2.4), V(2.2.1.c), V(2.2.3), 
VI(2.2.4.b, n.9) 
Ρ 
Pari passu 
Paritas creditorum 
Perishable goods 
IV(1.3.3), IV(4.1.2), IV(4.9), IV(5.2.3.b), V(3.1.1), 
V(4.3.2), V(4.3.3.c), V(4.3.3.d), V(6.2.2), VI(2.3.2), 
VI(4.5) 
See Pari passu 
IV(4.4), IV(4.7.4, n.192), IV(4.9), IV(5.2.3.b) 
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Subject Index 
Pledge 
irregular right of -
subsidiary right of -
Price differential 
Pricing rate 
Prime broker 
Prohibition of appropriation 
Proprietary substitution 
See Irregular right of pledge 
IV(2.1), IV(2.2), IV(2.3)/ IV(2.4.1.)/ ^(2.4.2), 
IV(2.4.3), IV(2.6)/ IV^.l, n.66), IV(4.3), IV(4.5.1.a), 
IV(4.5.5.b)/ ^(4.9), ^(5.2.2), IV(5.2.3.b) 
111(3.5), ΠΙ(3.6.7), ΙΠ(5.2) 
11(4.2.1), 11(4.6.1) 
See also Repo rate 
See Repo rate 
IV(3.1), IV(3.2.1), IV(3.2.2), IV(3.7) 
See Appropriation 
See Substitution 
R 
Raamovereenkomst Financiële 
Derivaten 
Rahmenvertrag 
Reciprocity 
Redemption 
equity / right of -
11(3.4) 
11(3.2), 11(3.3), 11(3.4) 
11(8.7.3), V(3.1.3), V(3.1.4), V(3.2), V(3.6), VI(4.4) 
111(1.3), IV(2.2), IV(2.4.2), IV(2.4.4), IV(2.5), 
IV(2.6), IV(3.2.2), IV(3.4.1), IV(3.4.2), IV(3.4.4), 
IV(3.4.5), ^(3.4.6), IV(3.5), IV(3.7), IV(4.5.5.b)/ 
IV(4.6.4.d), IV(4.6.4.f), IV(4.9), IV(5.2.1), IV(5.2.2), 
IV(5.2.3), IV(5.2.4), IV(5.2.7), IV(5.5), VI(2.2.2), 
VI(2.2.4.a) 
Refinancing operations 
Replaceability 
Repledge 
Repo rate 
Repricing 
Reservation of title 
Retroactive force 
Reverse transactions 
S 
Sale on commission 
Similarity 
Standing facilities 
Structural operations 
Subsidiary right of pledge 
Substitution 
- of collateral 
See Operations 
111(2.4.2), 111(2.6.1), 111(2.6.2), 111(2.8), 111(3.6.3), 
111(3.6.4), IV(4.6.2), IV(4.6.3.e), IV(4.6.4.b), 
IV(4.6.4.c), IV(4.6.4.f), IV(4.9), IV(5.2.3.b), 
VI(2.2.4.a) 
See Pledge 
11(4.2.1), 11(4.6.3), II(7.2.2.b) 
See also Price differential 
II(4.3.2.b), 11(4.3.3, n.40), 111(2.6.2) 
III(3.4.2.b), IV(4.5.1), IV(4.5.3), IV(4.5.5), 
IV(4.6.5), IV(4.9), IV(5.2.3.b), V(5.4) 
11(8.5), 11(8.6), Π(8.8.1), 11(8.8.2), 11(8.9), 11(9.4.3), 
V(4.1), V(4.2), V(6.2), V(6.2.1), VI(2.3.1), VI(2.4), 
VI(3.4), VI(4.6) 
11(2.2.1), Π(7.1), 11(7.2) 
IV(4.5.1), lV(<i.S.2), IV(4.5.3), IV(4.5.5.b), IV(4.9), 
IV(5.2.3.b) 
V(3.1.4), V(3.2.2), V(3.3) 
II(7.2.1.d), 11(7.2.2) 
See Operations 
See Pledge 
11(4.4), 11(8.6), 111(2.7) 
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Subject Index 
proprietary -
Surplus value 
Swap 
Systemic risk 
Τ 
Tax 
TBMA 
The Bond Market Association 
- Master Repurchase Loan 
Agreement 
- Master Securities Agreement 
Trust 
U 
UNIDROIT 
- Draft Convention on Convention 
on Substantive Rules regarding 
Intermediated Securities 
- Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts 
Unjustified enrichment 
IV(1.3.1), IV(2.4.5), IV(3.4.5), IV(4.4), IV(4.6.3.d), 
IV(4.7), IV(4.8), IV(4.9), IV(5.2.3.b), VI(2.2.4.a), 
VI(4.3) 
111(1.3), III(3.2.2.c), III(3.2.3.d), III(3.3.2.c), 
III(3.3.3.b), 111(3.4.1), III(3.4.1.a), III(3.4.1.d), 
IU(3.4.2), III(3.4.3.a), 111(3.4.5), ΙΠ(3.7.1),ΙΠ(3.7.2), 
ΙΠ(5.2), V(1.2), VI(2.2.2), VI(2.2.3.a), VI(3.3.2) 
11(2.2.3), II(7.2.1.c), V(3.5.5) 
See also Derivatives, International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association 
11(8.7.2), V(2.2.2), V(4.2), V(4.3.3.a), V(4.3.3.d), 
V(5.3), V(6.2.3), VI(l.l), VI(1.4), VI(2.2.4.b), 
VI(2.3.2), VI(2.3.3), VI(2.4), VI(4.1), VI(4.4), 
VI(4.6) 
1(3), IV(1.4.3), IV(2.6), IV(3.5), IV(5.4), IV(5.5), 
V(5.2), V(5.4), VI(2.2.4.a) 
See The Bond Market Association 
11(3.2) 
11(3.2), 11(7.3), ΠΙ(3.5), IV(2.1), VI(3.3.4) 
11(3.3), IV(2.3), IV(2.4.1), IV(2.5), VI(3.3.4) 
111(1.2), IV(1.3.2), IV(1.3.3), IV(2.4.5), IV(3.2.3), 
IV(3.4.5) 
IV(l.l), IV(5.2.6), V(2.2.2), V(2.3, n.37), V(6.1.1), 
VI(2.2.4.b),VI(2.4,n.ll) 
V(3.2.5), V(3.2.6, n.58), V(3.3.4) 
III(3.4.2.b) 
Voidable preference 
Voting rights 
11(8.7.3), 11(9.4.3), III(3.4.2.b), V(3.1.3), V(3.3.6), 
V(3.4), V(3.5.7), V(3.6), V(6.1.2), VI(2.2.3.b), 
VI(4.4) 
III(3.3.3.b, n.87), III(3.4.3.b), 111(4.4), 111(4.6), 
IV(1.4.1), IV(5.4) 
Zero hour rule See Retroactive force 
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